THE YANKEE MINING SQUADRON
[Illustration: THE NORTH SEA MINE BARRAGE.
Showing also Foul Ground East of Dogger Bank due to Irregular Minefields.
The 1st to 13th Minefields were American.]
THE YANKEE MINING
SQUADRON
OR
LAYING THE NORTH SEA
MINE BARRAGE
BY
CAPTAIN REGINALD R. BELKNAP, U.S.N.
_The Squadron Commander_
[Illustration]
ANNAPOLIS, MD.
THE UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE
1920
COPYRIGHT, 1919
COPYRIGHT, 1920
BY
J. W. CONROY
Trustee for U.S. Naval Institute
PREFACE
In writing of the “biggest ‘mine planting stunt’ in the world’s
history”—to quote a Christmas greeting from Rear Admiral Clinton-Baker,
head of the British minelaying force—I have endeavored to make an account
that would be readable enough for general interest, largely for the
reason that, compared to other operations, our undertaking received scant
mention at the time. Its very nature required preparation in quiet and
precluded discussion of its progress. Unnecessary technical detail has
therefore been suppressed, although much could be written that would be
welcomed by those versed in it.
The whole account is based on data obtained at first hand. The
description of assembling the squadron for a mining excursion fits the
third excursion rather than the first, but the difference is a minor one,
affecting only the numbers present—six ships on the first excursion, ten
on the third. All the rest is correct, in substance and details.
Besides influencing an early armistice, this great minelaying operation
marks an epoch in the use of submarine mines in warfare. It was an event
in military history, as well as a prominent operation, and the credit for
it belongs not alone to the officers and men who were actually present
but also to those of the old mine force, to whose services in developing,
in our navy, the art of handling and laying mines in large numbers, the
success of the great operation was so largely due.
Details of the mechanical development of the new mine itself have not
been gone into, for obvious reasons. Justice to that part could be
done only by those who were directly concerned in it, but I am glad of
the opportunity to express appreciation of the valuable service which
was rendered to our cause in the war by Commander S. P. Fullinwider,
U.S.N., in seizing upon and developing the long-sought means for such an
undertaking, and by Lieut. Commander T. S. Wilkinson, U.S.N., and the
officers and designing engineers in the Bureau of Ordnance and at the
Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, R.I., by their skill and ingenuity in
designing mechanical features, when normal experimenting was impossible.
As for the ships—the personal study which Captain J. D. Beuret (C.C.),
U.S.N., made of the mine elevator problem was the foundation of its
brilliant success, and the fact that, in the whole period of service,
few alterations or improvements in the minelayers were found desirable,
although suggestions were called for, is the best tribute to those who
planned and carried out their conversion.
Only very inadequate expression can be given here to my appreciation of
the services of my staff, in particular Captain H. V. Butler, U.S.N.,
whose excellent conduct of the flagship, supported by the indefatigable
care of his navigator, Lieut. Commander J. C. Cunningham, U.S.N., made
it possible to approach and navigate close to unmarked minefields in the
open sea. And I was fortunate to have one so thoroughly loyal and capable
as Commander B. L. Canaga, without whose unremitting attentiveness,
and tactful management of countless details under difficulties, our
performance would have been far less creditable.
Inseparable from our recollections will always be the excellent and
friendly official and personal relations with the destroyer escort,
especially when H.M.S. _Vampire_ led. Captain H. R. Godfrey, C.B.,
D.S.O., writes, “It was the determination of every officer and man in the
14th Flotilla, who had the honor of being entrusted with the screening of
the U.S. Minelaying Force, that no preventable attack by enemy submarine
or surface vessel should inflict damage on any ship of the Force.” It is
but speaking for all of us to say, that is what we felt, from the first
moment of that grey morning’s meeting on the day of arrival.
NEWPORT, 15 June, 1919.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
1. The Mine Force Ready 11
2. The Need and the Means 17
3. The Bases in Scotland 22
4. The Supply of Mines 25
5. General Supplies and Transportation 30
6. A Sample of Quality 33
7. Mine Assembling and Embarking 35
8. The First Minelaying Excursion 39
Squadron Organization and Ships’ Data 46
9. Athletics 49
10. The Squadron Complete 53
11. Tactics 57
12. Some Incidents 61
13. Signals 67
14. The Barrier Across 69
15. Finishing the Barrier 72
16. The Thirteenth Excursion 77
17. Results 82
18. General Living Conditions 86
19. Farewell to the Highlands 89
20. Scapa Flow 92
21. Home 94
22. The Mine Sweepers 96
23. The Mine Force, Old and New 98
24. After the War 108
Summary of Mines Laid 110
ILLUSTRATIONS
PAGE
The North Sea Mine Barrage Frontispiece
Mine Assembly and Storage Sheds 22
A Mine in Mid-Air, Being Hoisted in 25
Launching a Mine Through the Stern Port 26
The Sequence of Operations After a Mine is Launched 27
A Mine Carrier Steamer 30
Mines and Mine Anchors Awaiting Assembly 35
Loading Mines into Lighters 36
Squadron Flagship _San Francisco_ 37
The Mine Squadron at Sea 40
Arrangement of Mine Tracks, Elevators, and Turntables,
in _Roanoke_ Class of Minelayers 51
The Squadron in Minelaying Formation 59
Approaching and Laying the Fourth Mine Field 63
The Boston-New York Passenger Liner _Massachusetts_ 101
The 20-Knot Minelayer _Shawmut_ 102
Organization of the Mine Force 105
THE YANKEE MINING SQUADRON
CHAPTER ONE
THE MINE FORCE READY
The national anthem at morning colors woke me, and I arose and looked
out. What a glorious sight! Green slopes in all freshness, radiant with
broom and yellow gorse, the rocky shore mirrored in the Firth, which
stretched, smooth and cool, wide away to the east and south, and in
the distance snow-capped Ben Wyvis. Lying off the entrance to Munlochy
Bay, we had a view along its sloping shores into the interior of Black
Isle, of noted fertility. Farther out were Avoch, a whitewashed fishing
village, and the ancient town of Fortrose, with its ruined 12th century
cathedral. Across the Firth lay Culloden House, where Bonnie Prince
Charlie slept before the battle. Substantial, but softened in outline
by the morning haze, the Royal Burgh of Inverness covered the banks
and heights along the Ness River, gleaming in the bright sunshine. And
how peaceful everywhere! _Canandaigua_ and _Sonoma_ lay near by, the
_Canonicus_ farther out—but no movement, no signal, no beat of the
engines, no throbbing pumps. All seemed resting from those last four
days of our passage overseas, which had all but done away with sleep.
My responsibility for the safe conduct of the squadron had ended at 1
a.m., when it dispersed at the buoy, whence the routes to our bases at
Inverness and Invergordon diverged. The captains taking the ships to
their berths singly, Captain Butler was up until 5 o’clock, needing
daylight to take the _San Francisco_ all the way in. Turned in at last,
his servant and orderly at 8 o’clock were 45 minutes waking him.
The Senior British Naval officer, Captain H. F. J. Rowley, R.N., came
on board early, to give us welcome, and then we went to our own chief,
Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, U.S.N., commander of the Mine Force, whose
headquarters were here at Inverness, U.S. Naval Base 18. After taking a
look over the base itself, Captain Murfin’s work and province, we stayed
to lunch at Kingsmills, a handsome place amid beautiful surroundings,
bordering on the golf links, with gardens, tennis court, croquet lawn,
and fishing brook, which Admiral Strauss, Captain Murfin, and some of the
headquarters staff had rented. It was a satisfaction to everyone to see
our chief so befittingly established, and this came out very effectively
later, at a picturesque and enjoyable garden party given there on the 4th
of July, an occasion which was being celebrated locally with unaffected
cordiality. Altogether, we could feel ourselves fortunate in the beauty
and attractiveness of our surroundings and also, as we soon found, in the
hospitality and kindliness of the people.
The American Mine Force had come to Scotland, arriving May 26, 1918, to
coöperate with the British in laying a great barrier of mines, from the
Orkney Islands across the North Sea to Norway. To provide for doing our
share, the small minelaying force which our navy possessed on entering
the war, consisting principally of the old cruisers _San Francisco_ and
_Baltimore_, had been augmented by eight converted merchantmen. Only six
weeks before, five of them had joined the _San Francisco_, the squadron
flagship, at Hampton Roads, Virginia, fresh from the shipyards.
The program for the newly organized squadron contemplated the ships being
in Scotland, ready for a minelaying operation, in 45 days from the time
they left the shipyards. The work of conversion having been extensive and
hardly finished, the new ships were very raw, having had but a few days
to shake down. Troubles with engines and steering gear, lost anchors,
fogs, and missing stores repeatedly interfered with training. Up to May
5, 1918, not a day had passed without a mishap or some forced alteration
of plan. Instead of progressing to the rehearsal of a minelaying
operation by the squadron, we had been unable even to keep all together
for a single whole day. Yet we were preparing for an operation in which,
with the ships steaming close together, all must go like clock-work, for
hours without interruption.
Another week of training before going across would, therefore, have been
amply justified, but the sense of urgency was too strong. Besides, our
mine bases in Scotland needed the 500 men we were to bring them. So,
after four hustling days and nights of final preparation, we had stolen
away from Newport, Rhode Island, just after midnight of Saturday, May 11,
1918.
Started at last! And, thanks to coöperation far and near, better prepared
than expected. There were a few quiet hours that Sunday morning—then fog
shut in thick until next day. This was trying, so early on the voyage,
but as we kept together all through it, the experience only gave more
confidence. Next, one ship’s steering gear broke down, and she just
escaped a fatal collision. The third morning, the same vessel broke down
altogether. Through lucky foresight, a powerful tug, _Sonoma_, was with
us, which towed the disabled ship 150 miles until next morning, when the
break was repaired.
The submarines that soon afterwards appeared on our coast were known to
be crossing the Atlantic now, so we had target practice next afternoon,
to be ready for them. Then I felt we could give a good account of any
surface attack. Torpedoes, fire, and collision were what we had to fear.
All the ships had mines on board and, since we steamed only 500 yards
apart, an explosion in one ship would have involved the others.
Crossing in our company was the big collier _Jason_, loaded with an
aviation station outfit for Killingholme, England, which afterwards
did good work. On the tenth day, heavy weather came on, and _Jason_
disappeared in a black squall, rolling heavily and steering far off the
course. She being a sister of the ill-fated _Cyclops_, and no trace of
her showing in four days, added considerably to the anxiety felt as we
entered the active submarine zone. Radio calls brought no response.
We had all but given her up, when, at early daylight, just before the
appointed rendezvous with the destroyers, she came lumbering up astern.
And so, notwithstanding the many vicissitudes in 3000 miles steaming, we
met the escort with our number complete and right on the dot, in time and
place.
Our arrival off Inverness the following midnight, May 25-26, 1918,
made the Mine Force complete as to constituent parts necessary for the
operation in hand. The _Baltimore_ and _Roanoke_ had preceded the others,
making us seven. Three more were still in shipyard hands, but there was
no need to wait for them before beginning the minelaying.
Between operations the squadron was divided for loading, half at
Inverness (Base 18), and half at Invergordon (Base 17), 30 miles away.
Being intended for the storage and assembly of mines—all that we used
came from America—these bases had scant means at first for assisting the
ships. Their needs could be supplied from the Royal Naval Dockyard and
two depots, under Rear Admiral E. R. Pears, R.N., and Captain Tancred at
Invergordon, and Captain Rowley at Inverness, who were always cordially
responsive to our requests.
The motto for all American naval forces abroad, however, was to be
self-supporting, and thanks to our provident first supply and to regular
replenishment by the mine carriers, we had to draw on the British stocks
for very little. After a month, the repair ship _Black Hawk_ arrived. She
took no part in minelaying, being always moored off Inverness, separate
from the Mine Squadron and flying Rear Admiral Strauss’ flag, but her
equipment of machine tools and repair material made the Mine Force
normally independent in regard to upkeep. Except for docking, we asked
very little of the British in the way of repairs.
Upon one occasion, the soluble salt washers for the principal safety
device of the mines nearly ran out, the local atmospheric conditions
having caused many more to be used than estimated. No washers of the
right size and kind were obtainable anywhere inside three weeks,
and thus a shortage of these atoms—the size of a peppermint “Life
Saver”—threatened to hold up the laying of 5000 mines. The _Black Hawk_
had a steam press, however, and could make a die—and by the time they
were needed, washers in plenty were ready—incidentally of better quality
than before.
While the ships were unloading the mines they had brought, for overhaul
on shore, and were coaling and otherwise preparing for minelaying, the
larger preliminaries were taken up at a conference of Rear Admiral
Strauss and myself with Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commander-in-Chief of
H.B.M. Grand Fleet. Vice Admiral Brock, his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral
Clinton-Baker, the British Rear Admiral of Mines, Captain Lockhart-Leith,
the head of his Staff, and Captain R. A. Pound, of the Admiralty,
attended this conference, which was held on board the flagship _Queen
Elizabeth_, at Rosyth, Thursday, 30 May, 1918.
First came the subject of tactics, and I explained my plan, to lay
the mines with the squadron steaming in line abreast, ships 500 yards
apart, making a trace on the chart like a music score. Three vessels
(later five) would be laying mines simultaneously. When a ship had
emptied herself of mines, her neighbor, ready and waiting while steaming
alongside, would begin. At the end of the minefield, some temporary
small buoys would be planted, by which to pick the field up later, to
continue it. This plan was accepted without comment.
The area to be mined having been publicly notified two months before,
the enemy might have placed some mines there, on the random chance of
damaging our force. The only arrangement practicable to meet such a
contingency was for some of the destroyer escort to explore for mines
ahead of the minelaying formation as it proceeded. Only those ships would
be fully protected that might be following directly in the wake of the
searching destroyers, the main purpose being to discover the existence of
an enemy minefield in time for the squadron to maneuver aside.
A clear understanding was reached at the conference of the relation
of the mine squadron and its escort to the supporting force. The mine
squadron being lightly armed and of moderate speed, it would have been
at great disadvantage against even a numerically weaker force of light
cruisers, with their superior batteries and speed. Hence the need of
the support, which would consist of a battleship or battle cruiser
squadron, or both, and of light cruisers, according to the estimated
risk of attack at the time. If attack threatened, the mine squadron and
its destroyer escort would seek safety in the direction ordered by the
Support Commander; otherwise they would proceed on their mission and
return to base afterwards, according to the program for that occasion.
The destroyer escort would be of strength sufficient to ward off any
probable attack by submarines or by surface vessels that might elude the
supporting force and the regular patrols.
The location of the first minefield was decided upon; then further
details were settled with Vice Admiral Brock and Rear Admiral
Clinton-Baker, for the first mining excursion, which was to be done by
the American and British squadrons at the same time. Preparatory notice
was to be given by the Commander Mine Force to the Admiral of the Grand
Fleet at least four days before the time the mine squadron was expected
to be loaded and ready for an excursion. Upon a second, definite notice,
not less than 48 hours in advance, when it was certain that the squadron
would be ready, a combined operation order would be issued by the
Admiral, naming all the forces concerned and containing the instructions
and intelligence necessary for all.
After lunching on board with Admiral Beatty, Rear Admiral Strauss and
I took our leave. We had a look at Holyrood Palace and a walk through
Canongate Street that afternoon, returning to Inverness next day. Not
enough material had yet been accumulated to assemble mines to fill
all seven minelayers present, but 3400 would be ready in a few days,
sufficient to lay a field 47 miles long, consisting of one row of mines
at each of the three levels prescribed. A mine embarking schedule was
made out accordingly, to include _San Francisco_, _Baltimore_, _Roanoke_,
_Canandaigua_, _Canonicus_, and _Housatonic_, for a start on June 7.
CHAPTER TWO
THE NEED AND THE MEANS
A barrier of high explosive across the North Sea—10,000 tons of TNT, 150
shiploads of it, spread over an area 230 miles long by 25 miles wide and
reaching from near the surface to 240 feet below—70,000 anchored mines
each containing 300 pounds of explosive, sensitive to a touch, barring
the passage of German submarines between the Orkneys and Norway—this was
the final five months’ contribution of the American and British mining
forces towards bringing the war to a close.
To stop the enemy submarines near their bases, before they could scatter
on the trade routes, would obviously defeat their campaign more surely
than merely hunting them at large. That was the purpose of the Northern
Mine Barrage, which, with the barrage at Dover, made it not impossible
but extremely hazardous to enter or leave the North Sea. That many a
submarine came to grief in attempting these barriers is now a certainty,
and the establishment of the Northern Barrage, which many had thought
impossible, insured the early finish of the submarine campaign.
The resumption of ruthless submarine warfare became a serious threat
to the cause of the Allies, and at the time of our entry into the war
their situation was critical—how much more critical than the world was
allowed to know at the time, Admiral Sims has disclosed in his “The
Victory at Sea.” The relief brought about through the convoy system, in
which our destroyers, the navy’s first participants, had a large share,
was immediate and important. But the submarine menace was far from ended
and—according to the best information—would soon be greatly augmented,
while the increasing number of transports would offer the enemy more
opportunities, with the added horror of troopship sinkings in prospect.
Of further measures, the most effective would be such a blockade as would
keep the submarines in or from their bases. The British had already mined
a large area north and west from Heligoland, but this obstruction was
not insurmountable, for the Germans from nearby could always clear a
passage through when wanted. In any case, until the Skagerrack passage
were closed, the submarines might use that route without hindrance. Two
weighty reasons kept the Skagerrack open—unwillingness to violate neutral
waters, and the ease with which German forces could raid any barrier
near their bases. It may be recalled with what sudden damage a small
German cruiser detachment raided a convoy just outside the Skagerrack, in
October, 1917.
To be effective, therefore, any barrier must be beyond easy reach of
a raiding force and cover the Skagerrack, and must also be far enough
to the northward of the British bases not to hamper the battle fleet’s
engaging with the enemy. Hence, the anti-submarine barriers should be,
one near Dover Strait, the other across the North Sea, from Scotland to
Norway.
The closing of Dover Strait, undertaken by the British Navy alone, needs
no further mention here. Although the strong tidal currents there,
frequent rough seas, and hard, smooth bottom were unfavorable for
minefields, other means—such as a line of guard vessels moored not far
apart and equipped with powerful searchlights, together with numerous
active patrollers—were employed with a considerable degree of success.
The Northern Barrage would be too long a front, and much of it too far
from base, for effective patrol without a great number of vessels. A
wide, thickly sown minefield, however, would watch night and day in all
weathers without relief, and would be even more effective against passage
submerged than against passage on the surface, because of the less wear
and disturbance of the mines by wave action, deep down under water.
Currents were not strong in the northern location, but the bottom lay
as deep as 900 feet, whereas 300 feet had heretofore been the deepest
water ever mined. Merely to provide the mines meant a large undertaking,
besides involving an enormous quantity of the same high explosive which
was likewise in heavy demand for shells and bombs. Supposing the mines
ready, the planting of so many would be a long and dangerous operation,
employing all the Allies’ existing minelayers indefinitely. And neither
the British nor ourselves yet had a mine that was quite satisfactory for
the prospective requirements.
Our Naval Bureau of Ordnance, however, was intent on finding the
means for such a barrier, so that when, in May, 1917, among the many
contrivances offered for winning the war, Mr. Ralph E. Browne, an
electrical engineer of Salem, Massachusetts, presented his submarine
gun for consideration, Commander S. P. Fullinwider, U.S.N., in charge
of the Bureau’s mining affairs, saw that, although the invention was
not suitable for naval purposes in the form offered, a new electrical
device which it contained, if applied to the firing mechanism of a
submarine mine, would result in just what we were looking for—a mine at
once sensitive and far reaching. Mr. Browne collaborated with the Bureau
of Ordnance in developing the new mine-firing device. By July, 1917,
all doubt as to its practicability had been dispelled and the Bureau of
Ordnance was able to give assurance that, in urging the closing of the
German bases, our navy might offer the means.
Extravagant claims were common in the field of mining inventions, and
three years of war lessons in the perversity of mines made the British
naturally skeptical of this American find. An experienced officer in
mining was sent over to see, Lieutenant R. H. DeSalis, R.N., who had
received the D.S.O. for some minelaying on the Belgian coast. As the new
device was put through its paces before him, the chill thawed out and in
two hours he had become almost an enthusiast. Upon his report the British
Admiralty took up the plan with active interest.
Upon returning from London in mid-October, 1917, Admiral Mayo, of our
Atlantic Fleet, brought back the outline of a proposed minelaying
operation. The paper was quite informal—unsigned, undated, bearing in
pencil across the top, “Admiralty would be glad to learn whether Navy
Department concur in the plans as shewn.”
The field was to be 230 miles long—the distance from Washington to New
York—divided into three parts, the middle section, of 135 miles, called
Area A, allotted to us, because the reach of the new American mines was
greater than ordinary—three of them covering the same extent as eight
mines of other types. Thus numbers and effort were saved.
There would be three “systems,” each consisting of one or more rows of
mines just below the surface, dangerous to any craft, and other rows
at intermediate and extreme depths, so that, whether running on the
surface or at ordinary submergence or as deep as 240 feet, a submarine
had the odds against her. In the absence of patrol vessels to drive them
down, submarines would naturally run on the surface, and so the rows of
upper level mines were made more numerous than those at deeper levels.
The stroke of a mine is sudden and powerful, and while a vessel on the
surface may survive it, to a submerged submarine it is usually fatal.
All classes of vessels shy at a minefield, and that the Germans shared
this aversion was shown by captured papers, which made it clear that the
submarines dreaded nothing so much as mines.
The scheme was unprecedented, and that its great magnitude would involve
a mass of detail requiring very careful adjustment was evident on the
most cursory examination. Some who heard of it regarded it as impossible,
and foolish to attempt. As to the new mines, the very basis of the whole
project—since a complete unit would not exist for several months, the
statement of Rear Admiral Ralph Earle, Chief of the Naval Bureau of
Ordnance, that the mines would be forthcoming in season, had to be based
upon tests of the mine only by parts, with the assumption that all would
function properly when assembled. Action upon that assurance would at
once involve upward of forty million dollars, which made his stand a
bold one, inviting unmeasured odium, should the mine after all fail. To
await the mine’s final proving, however, would have been fatal to any
possibility of beginning the barrage before 1919.
The task of laying the barrier would be hazardous in itself, with
constant danger of interruption by the enemy. A single minefield in the
open sea, or widely separated ones, presented no extreme difficulties,
but to lay a series of them so close together as to leave no considerable
gaps between, made a problem for which no really practical solution was
yet visible.
For four days the project was under consideration by the Naval General
Board at Washington. Time pressed, the need was great, the new mine very
promising. The attitude of our officers was favorable. My own expressed
view, based on three years’ experience in mining, was that, though
much greater difficulties and magnitude would develop even than yet
foreseen, the scheme was nevertheless feasible, was within our minelaying
experience in principle, and, though it could hardly be more than half or
a quarter effective, it was well worth doing. The British Admiralty’s
approval and belief in the practicability of the scheme was implied in
the original paper, but an explicit confirmation was asked and obtained
by cable, on the basis of their three years’ war experience and knowledge
of North Sea conditions. And so the plan went to the Secretary of the
Navy bearing the General Board’s approval, as promising a sufficient
degree of success to warrant undertaking it.
CHAPTER THREE
THE BASES IN SCOTLAND
The British Minelaying Squadron was to operate from Grangemouth, near
Rosyth, on the Firth of Forth. As a mine assembling and operating
base for the American Squadron, the British naval authorities decided
on Inverness and Invergordon, in the Scottish Highlands, situated on
Inverness Firth and Cromarty Firth, respectively, which empty into Moray
Firth about eight miles apart. One base would have been enough and in
some respects more convenient, but the limited transportation means
across Scotland necessitated two. To require the slow mine carriers
to navigate the difficult passages around the north of Scotland would
prolong their exposure to submarines and cause more escort duty for
destroyers, so it was decided to discharge their cargoes on the west
side, at points which gave a short haul across Scotland—Fort William,
at the western terminus of the Caledonian Canal, and Kyle of Loch Alsh,
where one crosses to the Isle of Skye. The cargoes were transported by
canal motor-barge and by the Highland Railway.
[Illustration: MINE ASSEMBLY AND STORAGE SHEDS.
U.S. Naval Base 18, Inverness.]
In order to issue mines to the ships ready in all respects for planting,
the bases needed a large number of men for shop work, besides others
for transportation, police, clerical work, messmen, and sanitation. The
entire establishment on shore was under Captain O. G. Murfin, U.S.N.,
who had 20 American naval officers and 1000 enlisted men at each base,
3 officers and 60 men at each of the unloading points, Fort William
(actually at Corpach village) and Kyle. Headquarters was at Inverness,
because of its superior communications and more central location. Captain
Murfin had sailed November 13, for England, to supervise the preparation
of the bases. With him had gone Commander T. L. Johnson, then commanding
the small minelayer _Dubuque_, who was to inform himself fully on the
situation and return to Washington as soon as practicable with answers to
a long list of questions—everything we could then think of as useful to
know for intelligent coöperation in the preparations.
The large, substantial, stone buildings of two idle distilleries,
Dalmore, three miles out from Invergordon, and Glen Albyn, at Muirtown,
where the Caledonian Canal locks out to Inverness Firth—clean, dry, and
well ventilated—gave excellent living accommodations for the men. The
smaller buildings made suitable offices, but considerable additions were
made for messing, cooking, and washing arrangements. A Y.M.C.A. hut was
established in each base, and at Inverness the little Muirtown Hotel
was transformed into a small hospital. This, and similar provision at
Dalmore, all under Captain E. J. Grow (M.C.), were for mild or emergency
cases. The main dependence for hospital care was Strathpeffer—a “hydro”
cure in peace time—20 miles from either base. There a U.S. Naval Base
Hospital of 1000 beds had been established, under Captain E. S. Bogert,
Medical Corps, with the Leland Stanford unit.
The buildings for mine assembly and storage were erected on adjacent
vacant land, spur tracks being brought in from the main railway line,
thus making good communication between the two bases, as well as with
their receiving sources and shipping out points. Most of the machine
tools and other shop and office equipment, as well as furnishings for the
men’s use, came from the United States.
Some dredging was done in Inverness Firth to admit our minelayers into
Beauly Basin, near the canal entrance. The navigation marks for entering
the Firth were improved, because ordinarily vessels of our size seldom
came in there, and then only by day. In addition, the whole length of the
Caledonian Canal was lighted, for night navigation by the mine carrying
lighters.
Labor was scarce in the Highlands and the weather that winter was severe.
The work went slowly, delayed considerably beyond expectation. Captain
Murfin had many discouragements, and disappointments in deliveries from
the United States. In spite of the kindness of all about him, he must
often have felt very far away from home; but afterwards, the frank
admiration repeatedly expressed by all visitors to the bases must have
repaid his six long months of effort. In the end, the bases were ready in
time, and their capacity, and the rate of transportation as well, were
twice the original estimate, the two bases together being capable of
assembling 1000 mines a day ready for planting.
Sending over the base personnel began with small drafts in December, but
as accommodations for the full number were not ready soon enough, and
the demand to use all transportation for troops became pressing during
the Germans’ great drive in March, 1918, the base complements were not
more than about two-thirds full when the mine squadron sailed from the
United States coast in May. The greater part, 750, of the number then
lacking had therefore to be brought over by the squadron. Though this
retarded the proper organizing of the base personnel, it did not delay
the minelaying.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE SUPPLY OF MINES
In the same past six months other preparations, too, had been pushing
ahead, both at home and abroad. Providing the mines—the task of our
Naval Bureau of Ordnance—would alone make a story of great interest.
Considering how long it had taken to develop previous types of mines, to
have made a success of an invention that was new since our entering the
war was indeed remarkable, the more so from inability to test a single
mine complete before ordering 100,000.
[Illustration: A MINE IN MID-AIR, BEING HOISTED IN.
The Plummet is at the Lower Left Corner.]
Mines for the open sea in great numbers, moored “flying”—that is, by
ships steaming at considerable speed—need anchors with automatic depth
regulation. Such mechanism had undergone important changes during the
war, and the new American mines needed all the improvements, to make them
sure to plant at the intended level. They were to be much deeper than
ever attempted before, and also in deeper water.
[Illustration: LAUNCHING A MINE THROUGH THE STERN PORT.
There is a Nine-Foot Drop, from Rails to Water.]
Three British officers of considerable mine experience assisted here,
Lieut. Commander H. O. Mock, R.N.R., Lieutenant R. H. DeSalis, R.N.,
and Lieut. Commander Harold Isherwood, R.N.V.R. The last was an expert
designer, and had an important part in planning our new mine anchor,
which was similar to a late model British mine anchor.
A submarine mine of to-day consists of a mine case, shaped like a ball or
egg, about one yard in diameter, mounted on an anchor in the form of an
iron box about 30 inches square, connected by a wire rope mooring cable,
about ⅜ inch in diameter. The mine case contains the charge of high
explosive—300 pounds of TNT in our mines—and the firing mechanism. The
combination stands about 5 feet high and weighs 1400 pounds. Four small
car wheels on the anchor run on steel tracks, allowing the mines to be
easily moved along the decks to the launching point.
[Illustration: THE SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS AFTER A MINE IS LAUNCHED.]
When the mine dives overboard, the mine and anchor come to the surface
and float for a time, still held together, part of the mine case above
water. Outside the anchor is a 90-pound plummet, containing a reel of
⅛-inch diameter steel wire “plummet cord,” made the same length that the
mine is to be below the surface. Thus, if the mine is to be 160 feet
beneath the surface, the cord is made 160 feet long. The plummet drops
off when the mine goes overboard, unreels its cord, coming to the end
with a jerk that trips the slip hook which holds the mine and anchor
together. The pull on the cord also lifts the latch on the reel inside
the anchor, allowing the mooring wire to unwind. The nearly solid plummet
tends to sink faster than the more bulky anchor, thus keeping the cord
taut until the plummet strikes bottom. The cord then at once slackens,
releasing the latch, locking the reel, and preventing any more mooring
wire unwinding. The anchor, continuing to sink, pulls the mine under
until the anchor strikes bottom. The mine is thus finally moored always
at the desired depth beneath the surface, no matter how irregular the
ocean bed may be. The mine cases are buoyant enough to pull straight up
from their anchors ordinarily, but in a current they are swayed away from
the vertical, which dips them down somewhat deeper than intended. For
this reason, any locality where the currents are strong is unfavorable
for a minefield—one of the difficulties the British Navy had to contend
with in closing the Dover Strait.
The new mine having, by October, been carried past the experimental stage
as to its principal features, by the Naval Torpedo Station at Newport,
R.I., some important mechanical details of the mine yet remaining were
now worked out by the _Baltimore_, Captain A. W. Marshall, working
directly under the Bureau of Ordnance. By the time complete units were
ready, the _Baltimore_ had been sent abroad, so the proof testing
devolved upon the _San Francisco_, Captain H. V. Butler. This came in
March and April.
No throw of the dice was ever watched more intently than those first
proof tests. Upwards of forty million dollars had been staked on them and
were already half spent. Results on the first day made us feel easy, but
it was two days more—from various delays—before we succeeded in exploding
a full loaded mine. This had been planted in Chesapeake Bay, well marked
and guarded, in the very same deep hole where a whirlpool effect troubled
the German submarine _Deutschland_ on her first return trip. It was not
possible to place the mine far from the fairway, however, since the water
elsewhere was not deep enough for our purpose. Early the second morning,
the battleship _Arizona_ came along, heading too near it. The signal “You
are standing into a minefield!” sent her rudder hard over and engines
full speed astern. We could see the mud stirred up, from two miles away.
Since we could not get the mine up, what a relief it was when it was set
off at last by sweeping!
The final proving of the mine as a whole, which was completed in April,
off Cape Ann, did not take place until after several cargoes of mine
parts had been shipped abroad, but the mine’s success, from its first
trials, showed how careful and observant had been all those who were
concerned in its designing and testing.
The prospect in October was that the shipment of mines would begin in
January, but through delay in completing the detailed plans and from the
abnormal industrial conditions prevailing, these shipments did not attain
a regular flow until May, so that the ships and the mines were ready
together.
Secrecy, as well as timely delivery, caused the manufacturing to be
partitioned among 500 contractors and sub-contractors, some of them as
far west as the Mississippi. Certain mine parts from different makers
were put together by still others, and all parts flowed toward Norfolk,
Virginia, the trans-Atlantic shipping point. Planning this dividing up,
placing the contracts, and arranging for the inspection of all—taking
into account the transportation involved and the many different kinds of
firms—wire rope makers, automobile concerns, foundries, machine shops,
electricians, die-presses, and even candymakers—it was indeed a complex
web. What tireless industry and what endless patience under pressure went
into this work, only Commander Fullinwider and his assistants can fully
appreciate.
A large plant to charge the mines with explosive was built alongside
the Naval Magazine at St. Julien’s Creek, near the Norfolk Navy Yard.
This plant was of capacity larger than any other of the kind, ample for
handling 1000 mines a day. The high explosive was melted in steam kettles
to about the consistency of hasty pudding, and drawn off, 300 pounds of
TNT at a time, into the mine spheres. An automatic device shut the flow
off at the right weight, and a mechanical conveyer carried the mines
along slowly, to the pier end, by which time they would be cool enough to
load into the waiting ship. Hot work around those steam kettles through
the long summer! A quiet but important corner, handling 25,000,000
pounds of TNT, with constant risk from fire. Several of the sailors were
overcome by the kettles’ poisonous fumes, and one died. The duty was
monotonous and inconspicuous but was done with praiseworthy faithfulness.
CHAPTER FIVE
GENERAL SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORTATION
Under the extraordinary demand prevailing abroad for food and all kinds
of military material, it was only fitting that ordinary supplies for our
part of the Northern Barrage operation should come from America, British
sources to be used only for fuel and fresh provisions. Details are
needless here, except to mention their completeness—largely due to the
efforts of Captain G. C. Schafer of the Pay Corps. After starting things
fair at home, he sailed about mid-December for England, where the needs
of the bases could be best determined. With him went Assistant Paymaster
R. N. Smither, U.S.N.R.F., who later became his successor, and Lieutenant
Thomas Newhall, U.S.N.R.F., who had been enrolled for duty principally in
connection with transporting the mine carriers’ cargoes across Scotland.
His experience in railroading and his tactful energy made a valuable
asset. After their departure, purchases and deliveries were followed up
indefatigably by Assistant Paymaster A. B. Peacock, U.S.N.R.F., who was
quite successful in bringing pressure to bear effectively. One morning,
after a certain freight car had been missing for two weeks, he reported
that eight railroad presidents were now interested personally in the
search—and the car was then found.
[Illustration: A MINE CARRIER STEAMER.
Twenty-Four of These were Constantly Employed to Transport the Mine Parts
Over to Scotland for Assembly and Laying.]
For transportation beyond the seaboard, cargoes of mines must go in
special ships, which could carry also the general supplies for the
operation. The mine carriers should be small rather than large, to
minimize the effect on the progress of the operation in the event of
losing one. About 60,000 tons in constant employment being needed, 24 of
the so-called “Lake” steamers were selected, built on the Great Lakes
for coastwise service, of 2500 tons average capacity. They were armed
against submarines, manned by naval crews, and would sail in convoy,
two or three every eight days, beginning in February. Their fitting out
and management came under the Naval Overseas Transport Service, which
furnished them according to schedule. Slow speed, due to their small size
and cheap build, made them good prey for submarines, which sank one of
these carriers in April, the _Lake Moor_, with 41 of her crew—almost our
only loss of life in the whole operation. This was another part of the
whole operation that was obscure, though all-important, which would yet
have been very conspicuous had it not been so well done.
The great amount and the dangerous nature of these cargoes needed special
arrangements for embarking them, for which Southern Railway Pier No. 4.
at Pinner’s Point, opposite Norfolk, Virginia, was taken exclusively.
This pier being large enough to assemble several cargoes at once, the
entire cargoes could be loaded there, and that was the plan, until the
great disaster at Halifax aroused strong local opposition concerning the
place of loading the mines on board. It was too late then to relocate
the plant for charging the mines with TNT, and as the ground of local
opposition was undeniably well taken, a real problem was presented. To
take the loaded mines in lighters from the magazine 17 miles to the
Explosives Anchorage, as first proposed, would have been very slow—almost
impossible in bad weather—even had ample towage, lighterage, and labor
been available, besides involving an extra handling for every mine,
with attendant damage and risk. Thanks to the timely exertions of
Captain W. J. Maxwell, U.S.N., who was in general charge of the loading
and despatch of mines, a channel was dredged up to the magazine pier,
where the steamers could embark the mines directly, after loading the
unobjectionable part of their cargoes at Pier 4. Thus local interests
were quieted with the greatest measure of safety.
Several ingenious arrangements were devised for handling the mine
material quickly. Two mine anchors fastened together, 1600 pounds, could
be trundled about by one man, making a considerable labor saving on
loading 2000 in one cargo. The pier became also the sub-assembly point
for some mine parts, requiring a shop, as well as shipping organization.
All was done by naval enlisted men, under the supervision of Lieutenant
A. J. Love and Lieut. Commander R. E. Corcoran (P.C.). It was not long
before these steamers began to take supplies also for our Battle Squadron
with the Grand Fleet, 500 tons at a time.
CHAPTER SIX
A SAMPLE OF QUALITY
While details were shaping for proving the mine early in March, an urgent
request came from the British Admiralty for one or more minelayers to
help lay a field in the North Irish Channel. This passage was used by
slow convoys to the west coast, making port first at Lamlash in the
island of Arran, and submarine activity here needed to be checked. The
sinking of the _Tuscania_ had taken place in this vicinity.
At that time, only the _San Francisco_ and _Baltimore_ could be
considered for this duty, and as the former was flagship, the _Baltimore_
was sent. To “How soon can you go?” over long distance wire, Captain
Marshall answered “Right away,” guessing at the destination, and on March
4 he sailed from New York to join H.M.S. _Leviathan_ as escort for a fast
convoy out of Halifax.
By popular standards, the _Baltimore_ was a musty back number—years
older than many of her officers and crew—but she had been at Manila
Bay with Dewey and had otherwise distinguished herself in a long and
varied career. Though classed as a poor steamer, the ease with which,
time after time, she produced extra speed at a pinch was a standing
joke. Thanks to a good overhaul early in the war and to the ability and
contagious enthusiasm of her engineer, Lieutenant R. P. Molten, U.S.N.,
she now topped a 9-day transatlantic run at 13 knots, for the most part
in rough weather, with a three-hour spurt at 18.6 knots—2 knots faster
than was supposed to be safe for her engines—just to keep pace with the
_Leviathan_.
She arrived at Greenock, Scotland, March 17, ready for work, but was so
much earlier than expected that her first mines were not delivered until
April 13. Without any preparatory trials, though the mines were British,
of a type new to the _Baltimore_, she went out at once, beginning the
deep minefield between the island of Islay and the Irish coast, which was
to prevent submerged but not surface passage.
More mines in excess of her reported capacity having been sent to her,
10 had to be carried on the upper deck, and the last one of these mines,
in going down the elevator, was jambed, due to the roll of the ship,
and held suspended in the elevator shaft. William J. Powers, gunner’s
mate, 1st class, promptly of his own initiative, at imminent risk of the
1800-pound weight falling or one of the mine’s firing horns breaking,
removed the detonator and with it the great menace to the ship. Before
the _Baltimore’s_ next trip, her own mechanics extended the launching
deck tracks, to accommodate 180 instead of 170 mines, since the British
naval authorities wished her to plant the larger number each time. Four
times more she planted 180 mines, April 18, 21, 28 and May 2, planting
always at night, in an area infested with submarines.
Extra careful navigation was required, both to lay the mines just where
intended, as their anchor cables had been cut to fit (anchors not
automatic), and to approach close to the minefields previously laid,
yet avoid them. In one such operation, the gyro-compass went wrong at
a critical moment. The navigator, Lieut. Commander George W. Hewlett,
U.S.N., kept his head and held his peace, applying the corrections to the
magnetic compass with coolness and accuracy, as if maneuvering to avoid a
sand bank, instead of to clear a minefield by only 500 yards.