MAKING JERUSALEM SECURE
General Allenby within two days of capturing Jerusalem had secured a
line of high ground which formed an excellent defensive system, but
his XXth Corps Staff was busy with plans to extend the defences to
give the Holy City safety from attack. Nothing could have had so
damaging an influence on our prestige in the East, which was growing
stronger every day as the direct result of the immense success of the
operations in Palestine, as the recapture of Jerusalem by the Turks.
We thought the wire-pulling of the German High Command would have its
effect in the war councils of Turkey, and seeing that the regaining of
the prize would have such far-reaching effect on public opinion no one
was surprised that the Germans prevailed upon their ally to make the
attempt. It was a hopeless failure. The attack came at a moment when
we were ready to launch a scheme to secure a second and a third line
of defences for Jerusalem, and gallantly as the Turks fought--they
delivered thirteen powerful attacks against our line on the morning
of December 27--the venture had a disastrous ending, and instead of
reaching Jerusalem the enemy had to yield to British arms seven miles
of most valuable country and gave us, in place of one line, four
strong lines for the defence of the Holy City. By supreme judgment,
when the Turks had committed themselves to the attack on Tel el Ful,
without which they could not move a yard on the Nablus road, General
Chetwode started his operations on the left of his line with the 10th
and 74th Divisions, using his plan as it had been prepared for some
days to seize successive lines of hills, and compelled the enemy,
in order to meet this attack, to divert the fresh division held in
waiting at Bireh to throw forward into Jerusalem the moment the
storming troops should pierce our line. With the precision of
clockwork the Irish and dismounted yeomanry divisions secured their
objectives, and on the second day of the fighting we regained the
initiative and compelled the Turks to conform to our dispositions.
On the fourth day we were on the Ramallah-Bireh line and secured for
Jerusalem an impregnable defence. Prisoners told us that they had been
promised, as a reward for their hoped-for success, a day in Jerusalem
to do as they liked. We can imagine what the situation in the Holy
City would have been had our line been less true. The Londoners who
had won the City saved it. Probably only a few of the inhabitants had
any knowledge of the danger the City was in on December 27. Their
confidence in the British troops had grown and could scarcely be
stronger, but some of them were alarmed, and throughout the early
morning and day they knelt on housetops earnestly praying that our
soldiers would have strength to withstand the Turkish onslaughts. From
that day onward the sound of the guns was less violent, and as our
artillery advanced northwards the people's misgivings vanished and
they reproached themselves for their fears.
It will be remembered how the troops of the XXth Corps were disposed.
The 53rd Division held the line south-east and east of Jerusalem from
Bir Asad through Abu Dis, Bethany, to north of the Mount of Olives,
whence the 60th Division took it up from Meshari, east of Shafat to
Tel el Ful and to Beit Hannina across the Jerusalem-Nablus road. The
74th Division carried on to Nebi Samwil, Beit Izza to Beit Dukku, with
the 10th Division on their left through Foka, Tahta to Suffa, the gap
between the XXth Corps to the right of the XXIst Corps being held
by the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade of the Australian Mounted
Division. Against us were the 27th Turkish Division and the 7th and
27th cavalry regiments south of the Jericho road, with the 26th, 53rd,
19th, and 24th Divisions on the north of that road and to the west of
the Jerusalem-Nablus road, one division being in reserve at Bireh, the
latter a new division fresh from the Caucasus. The 6th and 8th Turkish
cavalry regiments were facing our extreme left, the estimated strength
of the enemy in the line being 14,700 rifles and 2300 sabres. Just as
it was getting dark on December 11 a party of the enemy attacked the
179th Brigade at Tel el Ful but were repulsed. There was not much
activity the following day, but the 53rd Division began a series of
minor operations by which they secured some features of tactical
importance. On the 13th the 181st Brigade made a dashing attack on Ras
el Kharrabeh and secured it, taking 43 prisoners and two machine guns,
with 31 casualties to themselves.
It was about this time the Corps Commander framed plans for the
advance of our front north of Jerusalem. There had been a few days of
fine weather, and a great deal had been done to improve the condition
of the roads and communications. An army of Egyptian labourers had
set to work on the Enab-Jerusalem road and from the villages had come
strong reinforcements of natives, women as well as men (and the women
did quite as much work as the men), attracted by the unusual wage
payable in cash. In Jerusalem, too, the natives were sent to labour on
the roads and to clean up some of the filth that the Turks had allowed
to accumulate for years, if not for generations, inside the Holy City.
The Army not merely provided work for idle hands but enabled starving
bodies to be vitalised. Food was brought into Jerusalem, and with the
cash wages old and young labourers could get more than a sufficiency.
The native in the hills proved to be a good road repairer, and the
boys and women showed an eagerness to earn their daily rates of pay;
the men generally looked on and gave directions. It was some time
before steam rollers crushed in the surface, but even rammed-in stones
were better than mud, and the lorry drivers' tasks became lighter.
General Chetwode's plan was to secure a line from Obeid, 9000 yards
east of Bethlehem, the hill of Zamby covering the Jericho road three
miles from Jerusalem, Anata, Hismeh, Jeba, Burkah, Beitun, El Balua,
Kh. el Burj, Deir Ibzia to Shilta. The scheme was to strike with the
53rd and 60th Divisions astride the Jerusalem-Nablus road, and at the
same time to push the 10th Division and a part of the 74th Division
eastwards from the neighbourhood of Tahta and Foka. The weather again
became bad on December 14 and the troops suffered great discomfort
from heavy rains and violent, cold winds, so that only light
operations were undertaken. On the 17th the West Kent and Sussex
battalions of the 160th Brigade stalked the high ground east of Abu
Dis at dawn, and at the cost of only 26 casualties took the ridge with
5 officers and 121 other ranks prisoners, and buried 46 enemy dead.
One battalion went up the hill on one side, while the Sussex crept up
the opposite side, the Turks being caught between two fires. The 53rd
Division also improved their position on the 21st December. As one
leaves Bethany and proceeds down the Jericho road one passes along a
steep zigzag with several hairpin bends until one reaches a guardhouse
near a well about a mile east of Bethany. The road still falls
smartly, following a straighter line close to a wadi bed, but hills
rise very steeply from the highway, and for its whole length until
it reaches the Jordan valley the road is always covered by high bare
mountains. Soon after leaving the zigzag there is a series of three
hills to the north of the road. It was important to obtain possession
of two of these hills, the first called Zamby and the second named by
the Welsh troops 'Whitehill,' from the bright limestone outcrop at the
crest. The 159th Brigade attacked and gained Zamby and then turned
nearer the Jericho road to capture Whitehill. The Turks resisted very
stoutly, and there was heavy fighting about the trenches just below
the top of the hill. By noon the brigade had driven the enemy off, but
three determined counter-attacks were delivered that day and the
next and the brigade lost 180 killed and wounded. The Turks suffered
heavily in the counter-attacks and left over 50 dead behind them; also
a few prisoners. At a later date there was further strong fighting
around this hill, and at one period it became impossible for either
side to hold it.
By the 21st there was a readjustment of the line on the assumption
that the XXth Corps would attack the Turks on Christmas Day, the 53rd
Division taking over the line as far north as the wadi Anata, the 60th
Division extending its left to include Nebi Samwil, and the 74th going
as far west as Tahta. As a preliminary to the big movement the 180th
Brigade was directed to move on Kh. Adaseh, a hill between Tel el Ful
and Tawil, in the early hours of December 23, and the 181st Brigade
was to seize a height about half a mile north of Beit Hannina. The
latter attack succeeded, but despite the most gallant and repeated
efforts the 180th Brigade was unable to gain the summit of Adaseh,
though they got well up the hill. The weather became bad once more,
and meteorological reports indicated no improvement in the conditions
for at least twenty-four hours, and as the moving forward of artillery
and supplies was impossible in the rain, General Chetwode with the
concurrence of G.H.Q. decided that the attack should not be made on
Christmas Day. The 60th Division thereupon did not further prosecute
their attack on Adaseh. On the 24th December, while General Chetwode
was conferring with his divisional commanders, information was brought
in that the Turks were making preparations to recapture Jerusalem by
an attack on the 60th Division, and the Corps Commander decided that
the moment the enemy was found to be fully committed to this attack
the 10th Division and one brigade of the 74th Division would fall on
the enemy's right and advance over the Zeitun, Kereina, and Ibzia
ridges. How well this plan worked out was shown before the beginning
of the New Year, by which time we had secured a great depth of ground
at a cost infinitely smaller than could have been expected if the
Turks had remained on the defensive, while the Turkish losses, at a
moment when they required to preserve every fighting man, were much
greater than we could have hoped to inflict if they had not come into
the open. There was never a fear that the enemy would break through.
We had commanding positions everywhere, and the more one studied our
line on the chain of far-flung hills the more clearly one realised the
prevision and military skill of General Chetwode and the staff of the
XXth Corps in preparing the plans for its capture before the advance
on Jerusalem was started. The 'fourth objective' of December 8-9 well
and truly laid the foundations for Jerusalem's security, and relieved
the inhabitants from the accumulated burdens of more than three years
of war. We had nibbled at pieces of ground to flatten out the line
here and there, but in the main the line the Turks assaulted was that
fourth objective. The Turks put all their hopes on their last card. It
was trumped; and when we had won the trick there was not a soldier in
General Allenby's Army nor a civilian in the Holy City who had not a
profound belief in the coming downfall of the Turkish Empire.
Troops in the line and in bivouac spent the most cheerless Christmas
Day within their memories. Not only in the storm-swept hills but on
the Plain the day was bitterly cold, and the gale carried with it
heavy rain clouds which passed over the tops of mountains and rolled
up the valleys in ceaseless succession, discharging hail and rain in
copious quantities. The wadis became roaring, tearing torrents fed by
hundreds of tributaries, and men who had sought shelter on the lee
side of rocks often found water pouring over them in cascades. The
whole country became a sea of mud, and the trials of many months of
desert sand were grateful and comforting memories. Transport columns
had an unhappy time: the Hebron road was showing many signs of
wear, and it was a long journey for lorries from Beersheba when the
retaining walls were giving way and a foot-deep layer of mud invited a
skid every yard. The Latron-Jerusalem road was better going, but the
soft metal laid down seemed to melt under the unceasing traffic in the
wet, and in peace time this highway would have been voted unfit
for traffic. The worst piece of road, however, was also the most
important. The Nablus road where it leaves Jerusalem was wanted to
supply a vital point on our front. It could not be used during the day
because it was under observation, and anything moving along it was
liberally dosed with shells. Nor could its deplorable condition be
improved by working parties. The ground was so soft on either side of
it that no gun, ammunition, or supply limber could leave the track,
and whatever was required for man, or beast, or artillery had to be
carried across the road in the pitch-black hours of night. Supplies
were only got up to the troops after infinite labour, yet no one went
hungry. Boxing Day was brighter, and there were hopes of a period of
better weather. During the morning there were indications that an
enemy offensive was not far off, and these were confirmed about noon
by information that the front north of Jerusalem would be attacked in
the night. General Chetwode thereupon ordered General Longley to start
his offensive on the left of the XXth Corps line at dawn next morning.
Shortly before midnight the Turks began their operations against the
line held by the 60th Division across the Nablus road precisely where
it had been expected. They attacked in considerable strength at Ras et
Tawil and about the quarries held by our outposts north of that hill,
and the outposts were driven in. About the same time the 24th Welsh
Regiment--dismounted yeomanry--made the enemy realise that we were on
the alert, for they assaulted and captured a hill quite close to Et
Tireh, just forestalling an attack by a Turkish storming battalion,
and beat off several determined counter-attacks, as a result of which
the enemy left seventy killed with the bayonet and also some machine
guns on the hill slopes.
The night was dark and misty, and by half-past one the Turks had
developed a big attack against the whole of the 60th Division's front,
the strongest effort being delivered on the line in front of Tel el
Ful, though there was also very violent fighting on the west of the
wadi Ed Dunn, north of Beit Hannina. The Turks fought with desperate
bravery. They had had no food for two days, and the commander of one
regiment told his men: 'There are no English in front of you. I have
been watching the enemy lines for a long time; they are held by
Egyptians, and I tell you there are no English there. You have only to
capture two hills and you can go straight into Jerusalem and get food.
It is our last chance of getting Jerusalem, and if we fail we shall
have to go back.' This officer gave emphatic orders that British
wounded were not to be mutilated. Between half-past one and eight A.M.
the Turks attacked in front of Tel el Ful eight times, each attack
being stronger than the last. Tel el Ful is a conical hill covered
with huge boulders, and on the top is a mass of rough stones and
ruined masonry. The Turks had registered well and severely shelled our
position before making an assault, and they covered the advance
with machine guns. In one attack made just after daybreak the enemy
succeeded in getting into a short length of line, but men of the
2/15th Londons promptly organised a counter-attack and, advancing
with fine gallantry, though their ranks were thinned by a tremendous
enfilade fire from artillery and machine guns, they regained the
sangars. For several hours after eight o'clock this portion of the
line was quieter, but the Turk was reorganising for a last effort. A
very brilliant defence had been made during the night of Beit Hannina
by the 2/24th Londons, which battalion was commanded by a captain, the
colonel and the majors being on the sick list. The two companies
in the line were attacked four times by superior numbers, the last
assault being delivered by more than five hundred men, but the
defenders stood like rocks, and though they had fifty per cent,
of their number killed or wounded, and the Turks got close to the
trenches, the enemy were crushingly defeated.
The morning lull was welcome. Our troops got some rest though their
vigilance was unrelaxed, and few imagined that the Turks had yet given
up the attempt to reach Jerusalem. We were ready to meet a fresh
effort, but the strength with which it was delivered surprised
everybody. The Turk, it seemed, was prepared to stake everything on
his last throw. He knew quite early on that morning that his Caucasus
Division could not carry out the role assigned to it. General Chetwode
had countered him by smashing in with his left with a beautiful
weighty stroke precisely at the moment when the Turk had compromised
himself elsewhere, and instead of being able to put in his reserves to
support his main attack the enemy had to divert them to stave off an
advance which, if unhindered, would threaten the vital communications
of the attackers north of Jerusalem.
It was a remarkable situation, but all the finesse in the art of war
was on one side. Every message the Turkish Commander received from his
right must have reported progress against him. Each signal from the
Jerusalem front must have been equally bitter, summing up want of
progress and heavy losses. With us, Time was a secondary factor; with
the Turk, Time was the whole essence of the business, so he pledged
his all on one tremendous final effort. It was almost one o'clock when
it started, and it was made against the whole front of our XXth Corps.
It was certainly made in unexpected strength and with a courage
beyond praise. The Turk threw himself forward to the assault with the
violence of despair, and his impetuous onrush enabled him to get into
some small elements of our front line; but counter-attacks immediately
organised drove him out. Over the greater portion of the front the
advance was stopped dead, but in some places the enemy tried a
whirlwind rush and used bomb against bomb. He had met his match.
The 60th Division which bore the brunt of the onslaught, as it was
bound to do from its position astride the main road, was absolutely
unbreakable, and at Tel el Ful there lay a dead Turk for every yard
of its front. The enemy drew off, but to save the remnants of his
storming troops kept our positions from near Ras et Tawil, Tel el Ful
to the wadi Beit Hannina under heavy gunfire for the rest of the day.
The Turk was hopelessly beaten, his defeat irretrievable. He had
delivered thirteen costly attacks, and his sole gains were the exposed
outpost positions at the Tawil and the quarries. All his reserves had
been vigorously engaged, while at two o'clock in the afternoon General
Chetwode had in reserve nineteen battalions less one company still
unused, and the care exercised in keeping this large body of troops
fresh for following up the Turkish defeat undoubtedly contributed
to the great success of the advances on the next three days.
Simultaneously with their attack on the 60th Division positions the
Turks put in a weighty effort to oust the 53rd Division from the
positions they held north and south of the Jericho road. Whether in
their wildest dreams they imagined they could enter Jerusalem by this
route is doubtful, but if they had succeeded in driving in our line on
the north they would have put the 53rd Division in a perilous position
on the east with only one avenue of escape. The Turks concentrated
their efforts on Whitehill and Zamby. A great fight raged round the
former height and we were driven off it, but the divisional artillery
so sprinkled the crest with shell that the Turk could not occupy it,
and it became No Man's Land until the early evening when the 7th Royal
Welsh Fusiliers recaptured and held it. The contest for Zamby lasted
all day, and for a long time it was a battle of bombs and machine
guns, so closely together were the fighting men, but the Turks never
got up to our sangars and were finally driven off with heavy loss,
over 100 dead being left on the hill. The Turkish ambulances were seen
hard at work on the Jericho road throughout the day. There was a stout
defence of a detached post at Ibn Obeid. A company of the 2/10th
Middlesex Regiment had been sent on to Obeid, about five miles east
of Bethlehem, to watch for the enemy moving about the rough tracks
in that bare and broken country which falls away in jagged hills and
sinuous valleys to the Dead Sea. The little garrison, whose sole
shelter was a ruined monastic building on the hill, were attacked at
dawn by 700 Turkish cavalry supported by mountain guns. The garrison
stood fast all day though practically surrounded, and every attack was
beaten off. The Turks tried again and again to secure the hill, which
commands a track to Bethlehem, but, although they fired 400 shells
at the position, they could not enter it, and a battalion sent up to
relieve the Middlesex men next morning found that the company had
driven the enemy off, its casualties having amounted to only 2 killed
and 17 wounded. Thus did the 'Die Hards' live up to the traditions of
the regiment.
Having dealt with the failure of the Turkish attacks against the 60th
and 53rd Divisions in front of Jerusalem, let us change our view point
and focus attention on the left sector of XXth Corps, where the enemy
was feeling the full power of the Corps at a time when he most wished
to avoid it. General Longley had organised his attacking columns in
three groups. On the right the 229th Brigade of the 74th Division was
set the task of moving from the wadi Imeish to secure the high ground
of Bir esh Shafa overlooking Beitunia; the 31st Brigade, starting from
near Tahta, attacked north of the wadi Sunt, to drive the enemy from a
line from Jeriut through Hafy to the west of the olive orchards
near Ain Arik; while the left group, composed of the 29th and 30th
Brigades, aimed at getting Shabuny across the wadi Sad, and Sheikh
Abdallah where they would have the Australian Mounted Division on
their left. The advance started from the left of the line. The
29th Brigade leading, with the 30th Brigade in support, left their
positions of deployment at six o'clock, by which time the Turk had had
more than he had bargained for north and east of Jerusalem. The 1st
Leinsters and 5th Connaught Rangers found the enemy in a stubborn mood
west of Deir Ibzia, but they broke down the opposition in the proper
Irish style and rapidly reached their objectives. The centre group
started one hour after the left and got their line without much
difficulty. The right group was hotly opposed. Beginning their advance
at eight o'clock the 229th Brigade had reached the western edge of the
famous Zeitun ridge in an hour, but from this time onwards they were
exposed to incessant artillery and machine-gun fire, and the forward
movement became very slow. In five hours small parties had worked
along the ridge for about half its length, fighting every yard, and it
was not until the approach of dusk that we once more got control of
the whole ridge. It was appropriate that dismounted yeomen should gain
this important tactical point which several weeks previously had been
won and lost by their comrades of the Yeomanry Mounted Division.
Descending from the ridge the brigade gave the Turk little chance to
stand, and with a bayonet charge they reached the day's objective
in the dark. At two o'clock, when the Turks' final effort against
Jerusalem had just failed, the 60th and 74th Divisions both sent
in the good news that the Turkish commander was moving his reserve
division from Bireh westwards to meet the attack from our left. Airmen
confirmed this immediately, and it was now obvious that General
Chetwode's tactics had compelled the enemy to conform to his movements
and that we had regained the initiative. At about ten o'clock the 24th
Royal Welsh Fusiliers of the 231st Brigade captured Kh. ed Dreihemeh
on the old Roman road a mile east of Tireh, and at eleven o'clock
advanced to the assault of hill 2450, a little farther eastward. They
gained the crest, but the enemy had a big force in the neighbourhood
and counter-attacked, forcing the Welshmen to withdraw some distance
down the western slope. They held this ground till 4.30 when our guns
heavily bombarded the summit, under cover of which fire the infantry
made another attack. This was also unsuccessful owing to the intense
volume of fire from machine guns. The hill was won, however, next
morning.
The night of December 27-28 was without incident. The Turk had staked
and lost, and he spent the night in making new dispositions to meet
what he must have realised was being prepared for him on the following
day.
It is doubtful whether there was a more successful day for our Army in
the Palestine campaign than December 27. The portion of our line which
was on the defensive had stood an absolutely unmovable wall, against
which the enemy had battered himself to pieces. Our left, or attacking
sector, had gained all their objectives against strong opposition in
a most difficult country, and had drawn against them the very troops
held in reserve for the main attack on Jerusalem. The physical powers
of some of our attacking troops were tried highly. One position
captured by the 229th Brigade was a particularly bad hill. The
slope up which the infantry had to advance was a series of almost
perpendicular terraces, and the riflemen could only make the ascent by
climbing up each others' backs. When dismounted yeomen secured another
hill some men carrying up supplies took two hours to walk from the
base of the hill to the summit. The trials of the infantry were shared
by the artillery. What surprises every one who has been over the route
taken by the 10th and 74th Divisions is that any guns except those
with the mountain batteries were able to get into action. The road
work of engineers and the 5th Royal Irish Regiment (Pioneers) was
magnificent, and they made a way where none seemed possible; but
though these roadmakers put their backs into their tasks, it was only
by the untiring energies of the gunners and drivers that artillery was
got up to support the infantry. The guns were brought into action well
ahead of the roads, and were man-hauled for considerable distances.
Two howitzers and one field gun were kept up with the infantry on the
first day of the advance where no horses could get a foothold, and the
manner in which the gunners hauled the guns through deep ravines
and up seemingly unclimbable hills constituted a wonderful physical
achievement. The artillery were called upon to continue their arduous
work on the 28th and 29th under conditions of ground which were even
more appalling than those met with on the 27th. The whole country was
devoid of any road better than a goat track, and the ravines became
deeper and the hills more precipitous. In some places, particularly
on the 10th Division front, the infantry went forward at a remarkable
pace; but guns moved up with them, and by keeping down the fire of
machine guns dotted about on every hill, performed services which
earned the riflemen's warm praise. The 9th and 10th Mountain Batteries
were attached to the 10th Division, but field and howitzer batteries
were also well up. On the 28th the 53rd Division bit farther into the
enemy's line in order to cover the right of the 60th Division, which
was to continue its advance up the Nablus road towards Bireh. The
158th Brigade captured Anata, and after fighting all day the 1/7th
Royal Welsh Fusiliers secured Ras Urkub es Suffa, a forbidding-looking
height towering above the storm-rent sides of the wadi Ruabeh. The
1/1st Herefords after dark took Kh. Almit.
In front of the 60th Division the Turks were still holding some strong
positions from which they should have been able seriously to delay
the Londoners' advance had it not been for the threat to their
communications by the pressure by the 10th and 74th Divisions. The
Londoners had previously tested the strength of Adaseh, and had found
it an extremely troublesome hill. They went for it again--the 179th
Brigade this time--and after a several hours' struggle took it at
dusk. Meanwhile the 181st Brigade had taken the lofty villages of Bir
Nebala and El Jib, and after Adaseh became ours the Division went
ahead in the dark and got to the line across the Nablus road from Er
Ram to Rafat, capturing some prisoners. The 74th Division also made
splendid progress. In the early hours the Division, with the 24th
Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the 24th Welsh Regiment attached, secured
Jufeir and resumed their main advance in the afternoon, the 230th and
231st Brigades cooperating with the 229th Brigade which was under the
orders of the 10th Division. Before dark they had advanced their line
from the left of the 60th Division in Rafat past the east of Beitunia
to the hill east of Abu el Ainein, and this strong line of hills
once secured, everybody was satisfied that the Turks' possession of
Ramallah and Bireh was only a question of hours. Part of this line had
been won by the 10th Division, which began its advance before noon in
the same battle formation as on the 27th. Soon after the three groups
started the heavy artillery put down a fierce fire on the final
objectives, and before three o'clock the Turks were seen to be
evacuating Kefr Skyan, Ainein, and Rubin. The enemy put up a stout
fight at Beitunia and on a hill several hundred yards north-west of
the village, but the 229th Brigade had good artillery and machine-gun
assistance, and got both places before four o'clock, capturing seventy
prisoners, including the commander of the garrison, and a number of
machine guns. The left group was hotly opposed from a hill a mile west
of Rubin and from a high position south-west of Ainein. The nature of
the ground was entirely favourable to defence and for a time the Turk
took full advantage of it, but our artillery soon made him lose his
stomach for fighting, and doubtless the sound of many shell-bursts
beyond Ramallah made him think that his rock sangars and the deep
ravines in front of him were not protection against a foe who fought
Nature with as much determination as he fought the Turkish soldier.
Six-inch howitzers of the 378th Siege Battery had been brought up to
Foka in the early hours, and all the afternoon and evening they
were plastering the road from Ramallah along which the enemy were
retreating. The left group defied the nests of machine guns hidden
among the rocks and broke down the defence. The centre group had been
delayed by the opposition encountered by the left, but they took Skyan
at six o'clock and all of the objectives for one day were in our hands
by the early evening. An advance along the whole front was ordered to
begin at six o'clock on December 29. On his right flank the enemy was
willing to concede ground, and the 159th Brigade occupied Hismeh,
Jeba, and the ridges to the north-west to protect the flank of the
60th Division. The 53rd Division buried 271 enemy dead on their front
as the result of three days' fighting. The 181st Brigade made a rapid
advance up the Nablus road until they were close to Bireh and Tahunah,
a high rocky hill just to the north-west of the village. The Turks had
many machine guns and a strong force of riflemen in these places, and
it was impossible for infantry to advance against them over exposed
ground without artillery support. The 303rd Field Artillery Brigade
was supporting the brigade, and they were to move up a track from
Kullundia while the foot-sloggers used the high road, but the track
was found impassable for wheels and the guns had to be brought to the
road. The attack was postponed till the guns were in position. The
gunners came into action at half-past two, and infantry moved to the
left to get on to the Ramallah-Bireh metalled road which runs at right
angles to the trunk road between Nablus and Jerusalem. The 2/22nd
and the 2/23rd Londons, working across the road, reached the Tahunah
ridge, and after a heavy bombardment dashed into the Turkish
positions, which were defended most stubbornly to the end, and thus
won the last remaining hill which commanded our advance up the Nablus
road as far as Bireh. On the eastern side of the main highway the
180th Brigade had once more done sterling service. There is a bold
eminence called Shab Saleh, a mile due south of Bireh. It rises almost
sheer from a piece of comparatively flat ground, and the enemy held it
in strength. The 2/19th and the 2/20th Londons attacked this feature,
and displaying great gallantry in face of much machine-gun fire seized
it at half-past three. Once again the gunners supported the infantry
admirably. The 2/17th and 2/18th Londons pushed past Saleh in a
north-easterly direction and, leaving Bireh on their left, got into
extremely bad country and took the Turks by surprise on a wooded ridge
at Sheikh Sheiban. The two brigades rested and refreshed for a couple
of hours and then advanced once more, and by midnight they had routed
the Turks out of another series of hills and were in firm possession
of the line from Beitin, across the Nablus road north of the Balua
Lake, to the ridge of El Burj, having carried through everything which
had been planned for the Division.
Ramallah had been taken at nine o'clock in the morning without
opposition by the 230th and 229th Brigades, and at night the 74th
Division held a strong line north of the picturesque village as far as
Et Tireh. The 10th Division also occupied the Tireh ridge quite
early in the day, and one of their field batteries and both mountain
batteries got within long range of the Nablus road, and not only
assisted in shelling the enemy in Bireh but harassed with a hot fire
any bodies of men or transport seen retreating northwards. The Flying
Corps, too, caused the Turks many losses on the road. The airmen
bombed the enemy from a low altitude and also machine-gunned them, and
moreover by their timely information gave great assistance during
the operations. By the 30th December all organised resistance to our
advance had ceased and the XXth Corps consolidated its line, the 60th
Division going forward slightly to improve its position and the other
divisions rearranging their own. The consolidation of the line was not
an easy matter. It had to be very thoroughly and rapidly done. The
supply difficulty compelled the holding of the line with as few troops
as possible, and when it had been won it was necessary to put it in a
proper order in a minimum of time, and to bring back a considerable
number of the troops who had been engaged in the fighting to hold
the grand defensive chain which made Jerusalem absolutely safe. The
standard gauge railway was still a long way from Ramleh, and the
railway construction parties had to fight against bad weather and
washouts. The Turkish line from Ramleh to Jerusalem was in bad order;
a number of bridges were down, so that it was not likely the railway
could be working for several weeks. Lorries could supply the troops in
the neighbourhood of the Nablus road, though the highway was
getting into bad condition, but in the right centre of the line the
difficulties of terrain were appalling. The enemy had had a painful
experience of it and was not likely to wish to fight in that country
again; consequently it was decided to hold this part of the line with
light forces.
In this description of the operations I have made little mention of
the work of the Australian Mounted Division which covered the gap
between XXth and XXIst Corps. These Australian horsemen and yeomanry
guarded an extended front in inaccessible country, and every man in
the Division will long remember the troubles of supply in the hills.
They had some stiff fighting against a wily enemy, and not for a
minute could they relax their vigilance. When, with the Turks' fatal
effort to retake Jerusalem, the 10th Division changed their front
and attacked in a north-easterly direction, the Australian Mounted
Division moved with it, and they found the country as they progressed
become more rugged and bleak and extremely difficult for mounted
troops. The Division was in the fighting line for the whole month of
December, and when they handed over the new positions they had reached
to the infantry on the last day of the year, their horses fully needed
the lengthened period of rest allotted to them.