OLD BATTLEGROUNDS
It was in accordance with the fitness of things that the British Army
should fight and conquer on the very spots consecrated by the memories
of the most famous battles of old. From Gaza onwards we made our
progress by the most ancient road on earth, for this way moved
commerce between the Euphrates and the Nile many centuries before the
East knew West. We fought on fields which had been the battlegrounds
of Egyptian and Assyrian armies, where Hittites, Ethiopians, Persians,
Parthians, and Mongols poured out their blood in times when kingdoms
were strong by the sword alone. The Ptolemies invaded Syria by this
way, and here the Greeks put their colonising hands on the country.
Alexander the Great made this his route to Egypt. Pompey marched over
the Maritime Plain and inaugurated that Roman rule which lasted for
centuries; till Islam made its wide irresistible sweep in the seventh
century. Then the Crusaders fought and won and lost, and Napoleon's
ambitions in the East were wrecked just beyond the plains.
Up the Maritime Plain we battled at Gaza, every yard of which had
been contested by the armies of mighty kings in the past thirty-five
centuries, at Akir, Gezer, Lydda, and around Joppa. All down the ages
armies have moved in victory or flight over this plain, and General
Allenby in his advance was but repeating history. And when the
Turks had been driven beyond the Plain of Philistia, and the
Commander-in-Chief had to decide how to take Jerusalem, we saw the
British force move along precisely the same route that has been taken
by armies since the time when Joshua overcame the Amorites and the day
was lengthened by the sun and moon standing still till the battle
was won. Geography had its influence on the strategy of to-day as
completely as it did when armies were not cumbered with guns and
mechanical transport. Of the few passes from the Maritime Plain over
the Shephelah into the Judean range only that emerging from the green
Vale of Ajalon was possible, if we were to take Jerusalem, as the
great captains of old took it, from the north. The Syrians sometimes
chose this road in preference to advancing through Samaria, the Romans
suffered retreat on it, Richard Coeur de Lion made it the path for his
approach towards the Holy City, and, precisely as in Joshua's day and
as when in the first century the Romans fell victims to a tremendous
Jewish onslaught, the fighting was hardest about the Beth-horons, but
with a different result--the invaders were victorious. The corps which
actually took Jerusalem advanced up the new road from Latron through
Kuryet el Enab, identified by some as Kirjath-jearim where the
Philistines returned the Ark, but that road would have been denied to
us if we had not made good the ancient path from the Vale of Ajalon to
Gibeon. Jerusalem was won by the fighting at the Beth-horons as
surely as it was on the line of hills above the wadi Surar which
the Londoners carried. There was fighting at Gibeon, at Michmas, at
Beeroth, at Ai, and numerous other places made familiar to us by the
Old Testament, and assuredly no army went forth to battle on more
hallowed soil.
Of all the armies which earned a place in history in Palestine,
General Allenby's was the greatest--the greatest in size, in
equipment, in quality, in fighting power, and not even the invading
armies in the romantic days of the Crusades could equal it in
chivalry. It fought the strong fight with clean hands throughout, and
finished without a blemish on its conduct. It was the best of all the
conquering armies seen in the Holy Land as well as the greatest.
Will not the influence of this Army endure? I think so. There is an
awakening in Palestine, not merely of Christians and Jews, but of
Moslems, too, in a less degree. During the last thirty years there
have grown more signs of the deep faiths of peoples and of their
veneration of this land of sacred history. If their institutions and
missions could develop and shed light over Palestine even while the
slothful and corrupt Turk ruled the land, how much faster and more in
keeping with the sanctity of the country will the improvement be under
British protection? The graves of our soldiers dotted over desert
wastes and cornfields, on barren hills and in fertile valleys, ay, and
on the Mount of Olives where the Saviour trod, will mark an era more
truly grand and inspiring, and offer a far greater lesson to future
generations than the Crusades or any other invasion down the track of
time. The Army of General Allenby responded to the happy thought of
the Commander-in-Chief and contributed one day's pay for the erection
of a memorial near Jerusalem in honour of its heroic dead. Apart from
the holy sites, no other memorial will be revered so much, and future
pilgrims, to whatever faith they belong, will look upon it as a
monument to men who went to battle to bring lasting peace to a land
from which the Word of Peace and Goodwill went forth to mankind.
In selecting General Sir Edmund Allenby as the Palestine Army's chief
the War Cabinet made a happy choice. General Sir Archibald Murray
was recalled to take up an important command at home after the two
unsuccessful attempts to drive the Turks from the Gaza defences. The
troops at General Murray's disposal were not strong enough to take
the offensive again, and it was clear there must be a long period of
preparation for an attack on a large scale. General Allenby brought to
the East a lengthy experience of fighting on the Western Front, where
his deliberate methods of attack, notably at Arras, had given the
Allies victories over the cleverest and bravest of our enemies.
Palestine was likely to be a cavalry, as well as an infantry,
campaign, or at any rate the theatre of war in which the mounted arm
could be employed with the most fruitful of results. General Allenby's
achievements as a cavalry leader in the early days of the war marked
him as the one officer of high rank suited for the Palestine command,
and his proved capacity as a General both in open and in trench
warfare gave the Army that high degree of confidence in its
Commander-in-Chief which it is so necessary that a big fighting force
should possess. A tremendously hard worker himself, General Allenby
expected all under him to concentrate the whole of their energies
on their work. He had the faculty for getting the best out of his
officers, and on his Staff were some of the most enthusiastic soldiers
in the service. There was no room for an inefficient leader in any
branch of the force, and the knowledge that the Commander-in-Chief
valued the lives and the health of his men so highly that he would not
risk a failure, kept all the staffs tuned up to concert pitch. We
saw many changes, and the best men came to the top. His own vigour
infected the whole command, and within a short while of arriving at
the front the efficiency of the Army was considerably increased.
The Palestine G.H.Q. was probably nearer the battle front than any
G.H.Q. in other theatres of operations, and when the Army had broken
through and chased the enemy beyond the Jaffa-Jerusalem line, G.H.Q.
was opened at Bir Salem, near Ramleh, and for several months was
actually within reach of the long-range guns which the Turks
possessed. The rank and file were not slow to appreciate this. They
knew their Commander-in-Chief was on the spot, keeping his eye and
hand on everything, organising with his organisers, planning with
his operation staff, familiar with every detail of the complicated
transport system, watching his supply services with the keenness of a
quartermaster-general, and taking that lively interest in the medical
branch which betrayed an anxious desire for the welfare and health of
the men. The rank and file knew something more than this. They saw the
Commander-in-Chief at the front every day. General Allenby did not
rely solely on reports from his corps. He went to each section of the
line himself, and before practically every major operation he saw the
ground and examined the scheme for attack. There was not a part of the
line he did not know, and no one will contradict me when I say that
the military roads in Palestine were known by no one better than the
driver of the Commander-in-Chief's car. A man of few words, General
Allenby always said what he meant with soldierly directness, which
made the thanks he gave a rich reward. A good piece of work brought a
written or oral message of thanks, and the men were satisfied they
had done well to deserve congratulations. They were proud to have the
confidence of such a Chief and to deserve it, and they in their turn
had such unbounded faith in the military judgment of the General and
in the care he took to prevent unnecessary risk of life, that there
was nothing which he sanctioned that they would not attempt. Such
mutual confidence breeds strength, and it was the Commander-in-Chief's
example, his tact, energy, and military genius which made his Army a
potent power for Britain and a strong pillar of the Allies' cause.
Let it not be imagined that General Allenby in his victorious campaign
shone only as a great soldier. He was also a great administrator. In
England little was known about this part of the General's work, and
owing to the difficulties of the task and to the consideration which
had, and still has, to be shown to the susceptibilities of a number of
friendly nations and peoples, it may be long before the full story of
the administration of the occupied territory in Palestine is unfolded
for general appreciation. It is a good story, worthy of Britain's
record as a protector of peoples, and though from the nature of his
conquest over the Turks in the Bible country the name of General
Allenby will adorn the pages of history principally as a victor, it
will also stand before the governments of states as setting a model
for a wise, prudent, considerate, even benevolent, administration of
occupied enemy territory. In days when Powers driven mad by military
ambition tear up treaties as scraps of paper, General Allenby observed
the spirit as well as the letter of the Hague Convention, and found
it possible to apply to occupied territory the principles of
administration as laid down in the Manual of Military Law.
The natives marvelled at the change. In place of insecurity,
extortion, bribery and corruption, levies on labour and property and
all the evils of Turkish government, General Allenby gave the country
behind the front line peace, justice, fair treatment of every race and
creed, and a firm and equitable administration of the law. Every man's
house became his castle. Taxes were readily paid, the tax gatherers
were honest servants, and, none of the revenue going to keep fat
pashas in luxury in Constantinople, there came a prospect of
expenditure and revenue balancing after much money had been usefully
spent on local government. Until the signing of peace international
law provided that Turkish laws should apply. These, properly
administered, as they never were by the Turks, gave a basis of good
government, and, with the old abuses connected with the collection
of revenue removed, and certain increased taxation and customs dues
imposed by the Turks during the war discontinued, the people resumed
the arts of peace and enjoyed a degree of prosperity none of them had
ever anticipated. What the future government of Palestine may be is
uncertain at the time of writing. There is talk of international
control--we seem ever ready to lose at the conference table what a
valiant sword has gained for us--but the careful and perfectly correct
administration of General Allenby will save us from the criticism of
many jealous foreigners. Certainly it will bear examination by any
impartial investigator, but the best of all tributes that could be
paid to it is that it satisfied religious communities which did not
live in perfect harmony with one another and the inhabitants of a
country which shelters the people of many different races.
The Yilderim undertaking, as the Bagdad scheme was described, did not
meet with the full acceptance of the Turks. The 'mighty Jemal', as the
Germans sneeringly called the Commander of the Syrian Army, opposed it
as weakening his prospects, and even Enver, the ambitious creature and
tool of Germany, postponed his approval. It would seem the taking over
of the command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force by General Allenby
set the Turks thinking, and made the German Military Mission in
Constantinople reconsider their plans, not with a view to a complete
abandonment of the proposal to advance on Bagdad, as would have been
wise, but in order to see how few of the Yilderim troops they could
allot to Jemal's army to make safe the Sinai front. There was an
all-important meeting of Turkish Generals in the latter half of
August, and Jemal stood to his guns. Von Falkenhayn could not get
him to abate one item of his demands, and there can be no doubt that
Falkenhayn, obsessed though he was with the importance of getting
Bagdad, could see that Jemal was right. He admitted that the Yilderim
operation was only practicable if it had freedom for retirement
through the removal of the danger on the Palestine front. With that
end in view he advocated that the British should be attacked, and
suggested that two divisions and the 'Asia Corps' should be sent from
Aleppo to move round our right. Jemal was in favour of defensive
action; Enver procrastinated and proposed sending one division to
strengthen the IVth Army on the Gaza front and to proceed with the
Bagdad preparations. The wait-and-see policy prevailed, but long
before we exerted our full strength Bagdad was out of the danger zone.
General Allenby's force was so disposed that any suggestion of
the Yilderim operation being put into execution was ruled out of
consideration.
Several documents captured at Yilderim headquarters at Nazareth in
September 1918, when General Allenby made his big drive through Syria,
show very clearly how our Palestine operations changed the whole of
the German plans, and reading between the lines one can realise how
the impatience of the Germans was increasing Turkish stubbornness
and creating friction and ill-feeling. The German military character
brooks no opposition; the Turks like to postpone till to-morrow what
should be done to-day. The latter were cocksure after their two
successes at Gaza they could hold us up; the Germans believed that
with an offensive against us they would hold us in check till the wet
season arrived.[1]
[Footnote 1: See Appendices I., II., and III.]
Down to the south the Turks had to bring their divisions. Their line
of communications was very bad. There was a railway from Aleppo
through Rayak to Damascus, and onwards through Deraa (on the Hedjaz
line) to Afule, Messudieh, Tul Keram, Ramleh, Junction Station to Beit
Hanun, on the Gaza sector, and through Et Tineh to Beersheba. Rolling
stock was short and fuel was scarce, and the enemy had short rations.
When we advanced through Syria in the autumn of 1918 our transport was
nobly served by motor-lorry columns which performed marvels in getting
up supplies over the worst of roads. But as we went ahead we, having
command of the sea, landed stores all the way up the coast, and unless
the Navy had lent its helping hand we should never have got to Aleppo
before the Turk cried 'Enough.' Every ounce of the Turks' supplies had
to be hauled over land. They managed to put ten infantry divisions and
one cavalry division against us in the first three weeks, but they
were not comparable in strength to our seven infantry divisions and
three cavalry divisions. In rifle strength we outnumbered them by two
to one, but if the enemy had been well led and properly rationed he,
being on the defensive and having strong prepared positions, should
have had the power to resist us more strongly. The Turkish divisions
we attacked were: 3rd, 7th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 24th, 26th, 27th, 53rd,
and 54th, and the 3rd Cavalry Division. The latter avoided battle, but
all the infantry divisions had heavy casualties. That the moral of the
Turkish Army was not high may be gathered from a very illuminating
letter written by General Kress von Kressenstein, the G.O.C. of the
Sinai front, to Yilderim headquarters on September 29, 1917.[1]
[Footnote 1: See Appendix IV.]
The troops who won Palestine and made it happier than it had been for
four centuries were exclusively soldiers of the British Empire.
There was a French detachment and an Italian detachment with General
Allenby's Army. The Italians for a short period held a small portion
of the line in the Gaza sector, but did not advance with our force;
the French detachment were solely employed as garrison troops. The
French battleship _Requin_ and two French destroyers cooperated with
the ships of the Royal Navy in the bombardment of the coast. Our Army
was truly representative of the Empire, and the units composing it
gave an abiding example that in unity rested our strength. From over
the Seven Seas the Empire's sons came to illustrate the unanimity
of all the King's subjects in the prosecution of the war. English,
Scottish, Irish, and Welsh divisions of good men and true fought side
by side with soldiers of varying Indian races and castes. Australia's
valiant sons constituted many brigades of horse and, with New Zealand
mounted regiments, became the most hardened campaigners in the
Egyptian and Palestine theatre of operations. Their powerful support
in the day of anxiety and trial, as well as in the time of triumph,
will be remembered with gratitude. South Africa contributed good
gunners; our dark-skinned brethren in the West Indies furnished
infantry who, when the fierce summer heat made the air in the Jordan
Valley like a draught from a furnace, had a bayonet charge which
aroused an Anzac brigade to enthusiasm (and Colonial free men can
estimate bravery at its true value). From far-away Hong Kong and
Singapore came mountain gunners equal to any in the world, Kroomen
sent from their homes in West Africa surf boatmen to land stores,
Raratongas from the Southern Pacific vied with them in boat craft and
beat them in physique, while Egypt contributed a labour corps and
transport corps running a long way into six figures. The communion of
the representatives of the Mother and Daughter nations on the stern
field of war brought together people with the same ideals, and if
there are any minor jealousies between them the brotherhood of arms
will make the soldiers returning to their homes in all quarters of the
globe the best of missionaries to spread the Imperial idea. Instead of
wrecking the British Empire the German-made war should rebuild it
on the soundest of foundations, affection, mutual trust, and common
interest.