THE BATTLE OF YPRES--FINAL PHASE
In its final phase the great battle lasted for another eleven days.
Holding now the main ridge of hills from Zandvoorde to near Wytscheate
on the Ypres-Lille road, a distance of five miles, and in possession
of the village of Hollebeke, or rather of its site, the Germans appear
to have decided that the effective direction for their attack was
through Wytscheate and the sector of the Allied front following the
Lille road from near Wytscheate through the village of Messines to
Armentières. And this decision on their part was without question
strategically sound. Could they have carried it out, they would not
only have compelled the British forces to fall back from the west of
Lille, but to evacuate Ypres. They would have won the battle. Moreover
the victory must have been decisive, for on the north it would have
cut off an important part of the British and French forces, together
with the Belgians, from the remainder of the Allied line, and on the
south it would have turned the flank of that line. The mistake, a
fatal mistake, lay in not having made this the real objective from the
first, and in wasting force and incurring defeat, with its inevitable
demoralisation, in attempts to break through into Ypres across the
belt of woods on the east and the south-east.
There the only lines along which attacks in great strength could be
thrown were roads running into Ypres like spokes into the hub of a
wheel, but the farther in any one of these attacking columns moved,
the more were its flanks exposed. The precaution against flank attack,
advance in echelon, was made by the character of this woodland belt
out of the question. We have seen that, appreciating these
capabilities of defence, the British Commander-in-Chief had crushed a
gigantic onset. It is manifest now that the Germans had believed that
by weight of numbers they could prevail over the difficulties, and the
chances those difficulties gave of holding this sector with a
comparatively small force, but that had merely involved them in
enormous losses, a risk inseparable from their tactics.
Having now realised their mistake, they attempted to throw an immense
wedge of troops against the two miles of British line between
Wytscheate and Messines. Here again, however, they found themselves
anticipated. The front was no longer held merely by a single rank of
cavalry. The bemudded, dirty, unshaven ragged, and almost
unrecognisable yet victorious survivors of that band of heroes had
been relieved. Part of the 16th French Army Corps, General Conneau's
cavalry, a division of the Indian Army Corps, and a part of the
British 2nd Army Corps were on or behind it. Sir John French was
taking no unnecessary risks. To these troops, some 50,000 in all,
therefore, he added as a reserve units of the Territorials recently
arrived from England. It was certain that they would have to meet
German forces four if not five times as numerous, and it was certain
that those German troops would fight to the last gasp.
The Germans lost no time. Their attack against Wytscheate and Messines
was made concurrently before daybreak. They had taken advantage of the
darkness to carry out mass movements which could not be sighted from
aeroplanes. The onset was both heavy and sudden, and it formed
probably the greatest night operation on record. Darkness, it was now
held, afforded the best protection against British rifle power. As
this was an attack which had to succeed at all costs, the enemy took
the heavy punishment inflicted by a furious resistance. A proportion
of these German troops were lads of 17 and even younger. They had been
used to fill up the gaps left by casualties, and mingled with the
older men drove forward on the order of their officers and faced death
at the muzzles of British rifles and the massed guns of the British
Horse Artillery by hundreds. Both Wytscheate and Messines fell into
the enemy's hands. At the same time with the evident object of
arresting the movement of reserves assaults were made along the
British line to the south of Messines past Armentières and along the
valley of the Lys. This part of the attack was, of course, no more
than strategical. For the purpose it was useless. Round both
Wytscheate and Messines the enemy found himself confronted by quite
unexpected forces. He could make no further advance from either. So
costly indeed had been his attack upon Wytscheate, that the French
infantry, launched upon a counter-attack with the aid of a British
cavalry force, cleared him out of the place at the point of the
bayonet.
It was during the fighting on this day, a Sunday, that there occurred
the episode which earned for the London Scottish Territorials the
special acknowledgment of the Commander-in-chief. Transported in motor
omnibuses from the base at Boulogne to Ypres, where, on arrival, they
were quartered for the night in the Hôtel de Ville, they had been sent
forward in the first instance to Neuve Eglise, and then to Messines to
support the front line. This was during the crisis of the German
attack on October 31. The battalion fought its way forward from
Messines to a position east of the Ypres-Lille main road. There, under
heavy fire, it dug itself in, and for five hours repulsed a series of
determined assaults. Resolved at any price to be rid of these fellows
in kilts who had thrown themselves right athwart the line of advance
upon Messines, the Germans, at two o'clock in the morning of November
1, renewed the onset with a crushing superiority of numbers. While the
battalion was resisting the attack in front, another force of the
enemy developed an attack in flank. Others, getting between the first
and second British lines of trenches opened an assault from the rear.
These set on fire an adjacent house. The flare from this building lit
up the combat and the bayonet charges in which the companies of the
reserve dashed into and defeated the Germans who had got round the
position. By their gallantry the reserve prevented the battalion from
being surrounded.
Unable to carry the position by assault, the Germans now tried to wipe
out the battalion by an enfilade fire from machine guns. This had now
at length made retirement imperative. The corps had to cut its way out
with the bayonet. Inevitably the losses were heavy. The striking fact,
however, is that the first unit of the Territorial Force which had
taken part in battle had saved itself in a situation and in a manner
which would have done honour to the most famous and veteran regiment
in the Service. Indeed there are few episodes in British military
annals more dramatic or more brilliant. Naturally this episode, apart
from its immediate military effect, attracted great attention because
it afforded a proof of the quality of the Territorial Force, a proof
which that Force has since amply upheld.
The effect of the delay opposed to the German advance by this unlooked
for and obstinate resistance was serious. Without question it upset
their plans and prevented the attacks upon Wytscheate and Messines
from being, as they had been designed to be, simultaneous. The result
was both that the attack upon Wytscheate failed to stay, and that the
attack upon Messines effected nothing more than the occupation of the
ruins of that village. That trifling outcome needless to say was not
the German aim.
The upshot of the German operations for this day proved for all
practical purposes negative. On November 2 the effort to break through
was renewed. Wytscheate was once more attacked and carried. This time
the place was set on fire, and as night fell at the end of the short
dim November day the burning ruins cast round a mighty glare, lighting
up the fierce and repeated bayonet charges with which time and again
the French infantry threw back the efforts of the enemy to make
headway.
Meanwhile, finding that strong forces of the Allies had been ranged
against them, the Germans to the south of Messines tried to open up a
road for their columns with an artillery fire of great intensity. On
the other side the British and French ranged a powerful force of guns
in a wide arc, and concentrating the fire of these towards one
comparatively limited fire-zone on the German front, moved that
fire-swept area up and down the hostile line. The effect may be
compared to playing the point of a ray of sunlight focussed through a
burning glass. In face of such a fire no advance could be along this
section attempted. The Germans had to retire their troops out of range
to save them from annihilation.
And this in effect was the defeat of their scheme. Next day (November
3) the attack was towards Hollebeke, in combination with another
attempt to debouch from Wytscheate. The diversion was tantamount to a
confession of failure.
In face of it Sir John French knew that he had definitely won the
battle. His first step was to issue an Army Order thanking the troops.
Every word of this historic document is justified. It ran:
I have made many calls upon you, and the answers you have made to
them have covered you, your regiments, and the Army to which you
belong with honour and glory.
Your fighting qualities, courage, and endurance have been
subjected to the most trying and severe tests, and you have proved
yourselves worthy descendants of the British soldiers of the past
who have built up the magnificent traditions of the regiments to
which you belong.
You have not only maintained those traditions but you have
materially added to their lustre.
It is impossible for me to find words in which to express my
appreciation of the splendid services you have performed.[10]
[10] To the 2nd British Army Corps Sir John French issued on
the same date a special Army Order in these terms: "The
Field Officer Commanding-in-Chief has watched with the
deepest admiration and solicitude the splendid stand made by
the soldiers of the King in their successful effort to
maintain the forward position which they have won by their
gallantry and steadfastness.
"He believes that no other army in the world would show such
tenacity, especially under the tremendous artillery fire
directed against it.
"Its courage and endurance are beyond all praise. It is an
honour to belong to such an Army."
But though in truth decided, the battle was not yet over. The Germans
refused to accept defeat. They now adopted different tactics. These
were a tremendous bombardment of the British lines alternating with
repeated attacks. The latter were not as before directed against one
or two decisive points of the front, but distributed all round and
included the part of the front to the north of Ypres. There four
hostile army corps were employed. The attacks were not only made with
smaller masses and more numerous, but they were delivered both by day
and by night and almost without cessation. It was, in fact, a tactic
of wearing down. This went on for six days and nights without
cessation. The struggle was marked by many remarkable episodes due to
the fact that the Germans, conscious of defeat, now fought with
redoubled bitterness and with much of the spirit of bravado and
revenge.
One instance of this was the extraordinary attempt to carry a French
trench by a charge of cavalry. This, of course, was no better than
suicide. "Every horse," says "Eye Witness," in recording the affair,
"was killed, but those riders who were not hit continued the charge on
foot. The last survivors were slain on the very parapet of the
trench."
At another point, where the bodies of a company of Germans enfiladed
by machine-gun fire lay as they had fallen in a regular row, a second
body of the enemy advanced at nightfall, and along the line of corpses
dug themselves in.
By dint of these attacks, and while the British troops were
strengthening their line, turning their hasty pre-cover into trenches
of systematic make, with zigzag communication ways, and supports
trenches and "dugouts" in the rear, the Germans in many places
advanced their positions so close that the occupants of the trench on
one side were within earshot of those on the other. It became the
enemy's practice to bring up heavy artillery in the night, to shell a
British position, and while the troops were sitting tight under the
bombardment to "dig in" close by.
This closeness of the opposing entrenched positions in many places led
to repeated night raids; a form of activity in which more especially
the Indian troops proved adepts. An Indian night raid, which recovered
a line of trenches the enemy had taken, is thus described by those who
witnessed it:
In the afternoon it began to rain heavily, and the rain continued
to fall as the night darkened. British troops in the trenches,
knowing of the massing of the enemy, were keenly on the alert
amidst the most depressing circumstances, and none were allowed
the comfort of a sleep.
But, all unknown to them, behind a thin line of trees some short
distance to the rear, there silently gathered together many
hundreds of figures, which, by reason of their lithe, gliding
movements and their practical invisibility might have passed for a
mysterious aggregation of spirits from some other sphere. Not a
word was uttered, and such orders as were issued seemed to pass
down the long lines as the wind whispers through the grass.
Shortly afterwards a score of these grey figures detached
themselves from the larger body and stealthily, like Red Indians
on the trail in an enemy's country, moved up to and beyond the
advanced line of the British trenches. Down these, under the
breath, was passed the word, "The Indians are going out," and the
already alert Tommies craned their heads forward into the misty
night to watch events.
The score of ghostly figures suddenly disappeared from their view,
and, python-like, crawled noiselessly to the first German trench.
Here were the German look-out men.
What happened there exactly is not known. There was no shout or
sudden cry, but in a few minutes the British soldiers saw one of
the score reappear like an apparition and go back to his comrades
in the rear. Then the hundreds waiting there filed past the
trenches just as silently as had the advanced party before them,
and also disappeared in the direction of the German lines.
For five minutes there was perfect quiet. Then came a few shots,
followed by a wild splutter of musketry, intermingled with cries
and groans.
Three or four light-balls were thrown in the air, and by their
means the British troops could see, some 600 yards to their front,
a mass of wild and struggling men, the gleam of steel, and the
whirling rush of the rifle-butt. It was the Pathans at their
deadly work. For ten minutes they hacked and slew amongst the
half-awake and wholly-bewildered Germans, who had laid down in
serried ranks to await the order for the night assault on the
British trenches.
The score of Pathans who had gone out in advance had silently
slain the German pickets, and the main body had thus been enabled
to get right amidst the sleeping foe unchallenged. The slaughter
was terrible, and only ended when the Germans, thoroughly aroused
to their peril, bolted and ran. Then their swarthy assailants,
glutted with their night's work, came back briskly, but just as
silently, to their original post.
The threatened German attack had been turned into a bloody defeat.
For hours afterwards the furious Germans poured a hail of shrapnel
and shell into our trenches, in the hope of obtaining some revenge
for their terrible punishment.[11]
[11] Account sent by Mr. Hodson, Correspondent of the
Central News, and published in the _Daily Telegraph_. The
trenches taken were filled in.
Besides this a variety of ruses were resorted to. Men dressed in
French or British uniforms stole singly through the British lines to
cut field telephone wires. Others employed themselves as
eavesdroppers. Germans dressed in imitation uniforms of the British
staff more than once appeared and tried to give false orders.[12]
[12] "Eye Witness," writing under date November 13, 1914,
says: "One remarkable and absolutely authentic case
occurred. A man dressed in a uniform which resembled that of
a British Staff officer suddenly appeared near our trenches
and walked along the line, asking if many casualties had
been suffered, and stating that the situation was serious
and that a general retirement had been ordered. A similar
visit was reported by several men in different trenches, and
orders were issued that this strange officer was to be
detained if again seen. Unluckily he did not make another
appearance."
On the main ridge to the south-east of Ypres, the Germans massed a
number of batteries with which they tried to rake the British lines.
The ridge, however, was an exposed position, and both the French and
British guns were concentrated upon it with marked effect. Describing
this "Eye Witness" states:
The south two villages (Kortewilde and Kostzelhoe) which the enemy
had captured and their line on the ridge close by were heavily
bombarded by the British and French artillery. From the high
ground to the west the effect of this cannonade could be seen to
some extent, though the villages under fire were partially
obscured from view by the smoke of the bursting shells, and
resembled the craters of volcanoes belching fire and fumes. At one
place the gaunt wreck of the old church tower and the blackened
remains of a few houses round it would emerge for a moment only to
be again blotted out in the pall of smoke. The long straggling
villages, when they became temporarily visible, seemed to melt
away and assume odd and fantastic shapes as the houses crumbled
and the blocks of masonry were thrown hither and thither by the
blasting effect of lyddite and melinite.
There can be no doubt the change in tactics was due in part to the
fact that owing to the shock of defeat a continuance of the mass
attacks had become for the time impracticable. Of the feeling, at any
rate, on the part of some of the enemy the following extract from a
German soldier's diary picked up on the battlefield throws a certain
light:
2ND NOVEMBER.--Before noon sent out in a regular storm of
bullets by order of the major. These gentlemen, the officers, send
their men forward in the most ridiculous way. They themselves
remain far behind safely under cover. Our leadership is really
scandalous. Enormous losses on our side, partly from the fire of
our own people, for our leaders neither know where the enemy lies
nor where our own troops are, so that we are often fired on by our
own men. It is a marvel to me that we have got on as far as we
have done. Our captain fell, also all our section leaders and a
large number of our men.
Moreover, no purpose was served by this advance, for we remained
the rest of the day under cover and could go neither forward nor
back, nor even shoot.
It is simply ridiculous, this leadership. If only I had known it
before! My opinion of the German officers has changed. An adjutant
shouted to us from a trench far to the rear to cut down a hedge
which was in front of us. Bullets were whistling round from in
front and from behind. The gentleman himself, of course, remained
behind.
Still in the trenches. Shells and shrapnel burst without ceasing.
In the evening a cup of rice and one-third of an apple per man.
Let us hope peace will soon come. Such a war is really too awful.
The English shoot like mad. If no reinforcements come up,
especially heavy artillery, we shall have a poor look-out.
The first day I went quietly into the fight with an indifference
which astonished me. To-day, for the first time in advancing, when
my comrades right and left fell, felt rather nervous, but lost
that feeling again soon. One becomes horribly indifferent. Picked
up a piece of bread by chance. Thank God! at least something to
eat.
There are about 70,000 English who must be attacked from all four
sides and destroyed. They defend themselves, however,
obstinately.[13]
[13] Given in the British official narrative.
As the effect of this week of day and night wearing down work, it was
apparently on November 10, judged that the British were ripe for the
enemy's last effort--the attack of the Prussian Guard. This, preceded
by the most intensive artillery fire the Germans had yet achieved,
began on November 11 soon after daybreak. They had clearly, in regard
to the massing of their guns, taken a leaf out of the book of the
French and British artillerists, and they tried against the entrenched
positions north and south of the Menin-road, the effect which had been
successfully used against them at Messines. The way having thus been,
as it was supposed, opened up, 1st and 4th Brigades of the Prussian
Guard rolled forward.
The line of attack lay diagonally across part of the British front,
and on it was turned the united fury of field guns, machine guns and
rifles. It has been affirmed by all who saw the onset that the Guard
stood against this terrible hail like rock. The grey-green mass, at
the outset some 20,000 strong, moved forward in close formation, and
almost as though on parade. As one man fell another stepped into his
place. Their losses were enormous, but the mass kept its formation and
its momentum. At three places despite the desperate resistance of the
British they broke the line, and penetrated into the woods. There,
however, the British reserves, brought up for the counter-attack, fell
upon them. In a bayonet fight with a brigade of Irishmen, the Guards
met not only their equals, but their superiors. Those who held
together were driven back, enfiladed by the fire of machine guns. The
rest broke into scattered bodies; these when rounded up fought to the
last where they stood. Only a miserable remnant of this mass of brave
men reached the lines of the enemy.
That was the supreme effort and the end. On the farther side of
Belgium beyond the sight of the beaten army flared the monstrous pyres
of paraffin-soaked timber in which, tied together, four by four, and
standing upright, the bodies of the unfortunate German slain were
burned by tens of thousands. Such was the aftermath of this mighty
tragedy.