THE BATTLE OF YPRES--SECOND PHASE
It is true that no line of demarcation divides the operations which
resulted in the advance of the British army from St. Omer to Lille,
and the operations which followed. Technically they are all one, for
the fighting was continuous. At the same time it is advisable for the
sake of clearness to consider those operations rather in the nature of
a prelude, and the main Battle of Ypres as extending from October 17
to November 15, when the defeat of the Germans was complete.
On October 17 the Allied forces were: the Belgians, who occupied the
line of the Yser from Nieuport to Dixmude; two divisions of French
territorials, the 87th and the 89th, who had also arrived on October
16 and were at Vlamertynghe and Poperinghe; the French cavalry, who
held the ten miles of country between Dixmude and Ypres; the British
troops under the command of General Rawlinson, who held a line to the
east of Ypres extending from Poelcappel through Gheluvelt to
Zandvoorde; the British cavalry under the command of General Allenby,
who had pushed down to the valley of the Lys towards Werwick, three
miles above Menin; and finally, the main body of the British force,
the 3rd and the 2nd Army Corps, holding a line to the west of Lille
from Le Ghier to Herlies, and from there south-west, through the
village of Violaines, just outside La Bassee, to Givenchy.
We may anticipate here by saying that on October 19 the detrainment of
the 1st British Army Corps, under the command of General Sir Douglas
Haig was completed at St. Omer; that on the same date the 10th French
Army, under the command of General Maudhuy, reached the line between
Ypres and Dixmude; and that on October 20 the first of the Indian
troops, the Lahore Division, also arrived at the front.
There were now three armies, the Belgians, the French, and the
British, the latter consisting, with the Indians, of four Corps. The
10th French army included a division of Marines from Brest, and a
Corps of Moroccans and Senegalese. This was the force, equivalent,
with the two bodies of British and French cavalry, to some 320,000
men, on which fell during the ensuing four weeks, the weight of an
attack by eighteen German army corps mustering in the aggregate nearly
1,080,000 of all arms.
These German forces included:
The troops of General von Deimling liberated by the evacuation of
Antwerp, among them a division of Marines;
The army of the Duke of Wurtemberg, comprising the 22nd, the 23rd,
part of the 24th, the 26th, and the 27th Reserve (Landwehr) Corps;
The army of General von Fabeck, consisting of four Corps and one
division;
The army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria, comprising the Prussian
Guards, the 4th, 7th, 13th, 14th and 19th Corps; the 18th Reserve
Corps; and the 1st Bavarian Reserve Corps.[7]
[7] Some of these German army corps were not complete. A
French Army Bulletin issued in November last stated that
north of the Lys, on October 30, the Germans had fourteen
army corps and four corps of cavalry.
The gathering together of this vast mass of combatants does not appear
to have been completed until October 23 or 24. Such delay as occurred,
though in fact the massing was carried out at remarkable speed, sprang
not from the embodiment of fresh formations, nor from any difficulty
in sending them westward from Germany. In order to make up this force
which was intended to be another spear head, the Germans had creamed
the whole of their fighting front in the West. Having before them the
example of the transfer of the British army from the Aisne, they had
taken a leaf out of the book of the Allies. All save the best of their
Reserve Corps had been distributed along their front. These new levies
released the more reliable and seasoned men alike of the Active army
and of the Landwehr, and the importance of the Battle of Ypres is,
apart from other consequences, that it broke or destroyed the best of
the remaining troops of Germany.
To begin with, the weight of the German counter-offensive was thrown,
not against Ypres, but against the British positions to the west of
Lille. Their objective was to secure La Bassee, the little mining town
on the northern edge of the coalfield, some eight miles to the
south-west of Lille. This point it is now clear they intended to make
the immediate pivot on which to swing round their northern front. As
the British positions at this time stood, communication between Lille
and La Bassee by the main road was cut. There is another point it is
insistent to notice. La Bassee lies at the end of one of the
promontories of the inland "coastline." It was already held by the
Germans and the spur had been strongly entrenched.
Yet another reason dictated the plan. One of the evident objects of
the British operations was to push down the Lys and seize the crossing
and railway junction at Menin. That would not only have gravely
embarrassed the German occupation of Lille, but would equally have
embarrassed a development of their attack between the Lys and the
coast.
Menin, of course, could only be seized and held before the main mass
of the German forces came up. Accordingly, Sir John French on October
17 directed Sir Henry Rawlinson to move from his position east of
Ypres and attack the place. The distance from the British line then at
Gheluvelt to Menin was not more than five miles. No doubt the move
would have left the country to the east of Ypres for the time being
open. The importance, however, of occupying Menin appeared fully to
justify the taking of such a risk. Sir Henry Rawlinson moved forward
to the attack, but it was not pressed. Concerning this matter Sir John
French says in his dispatch:
Instructions for a vigorous attempt to establish the British
Forces east of the Lys were given on the night of the 17th to the
Second, Third, and Cavalry Corps.
I considered, however, that the possession of Menin constituted a
very important point of passage, and would much facilitate the
advance of the rest of the Army. So I directed the General Officer
Commanding the Fourth Corps to advance the 7th Division upon
Menin, and endeavour to seize that crossing on the morning of the
18th.
The left of the 7th Division was to be supported by the 3rd
Cavalry Brigade, and further north by the French Cavalry in the
neighbourhood of Roulers.
Sir Henry Rawlinson represented to me that large hostile forces
were advancing upon him from the east and north-east, and that his
left flank was severely threatened.
I was aware of the threats from that direction, but hoped that at
this particular time there was no greater force coming from the
north-east than could be held off by the combined efforts of the
French and British cavalry and the Territorial troops supporting
them until the passage at Menin could be seized and the First
Corps brought up in support.
Sir Henry Rawlinson probably exercised a wise judgment in not
committing his troops to this attack in their somewhat weakened
condition; but the result was that the enemy's continued
possession of the passage at Menin certainly facilitated his rapid
reinforcement of his troops and thus rendered any further advance
impracticable.
On the morning of October 20 the 7th Division and 3rd Cavalry
Division had retired to their old position extending from
Zandvoorde through Kruiseik and Gheluvelt to Zonnebeke.
Proving abortive, this effort must have served to some extent at all
events to disclose to the enemy the British general's intentions, and
must in consequence have been of material assistance in deciding upon
his dispositions. In justice to Sir Henry Rawlinson it is necessary to
point out that his position was by no means an easy one to maintain.
As Sir John French states:
A very difficult task was allotted to Sir Henry Rawlinson and his
command. Owing to the importance of keeping possession of all the
ground towards the north which we already held, it was necessary
for him to operate on a very wide front, and, until the arrival of
the First Corps in the northern theatre--which I expected about
the 20th--I had no troops available with which to support or
reinforce him.
Although on this extended front he had eventually to encounter
very superior forces, his troops, both Cavalry and Infantry,
fought with the utmost gallantry, and rendered very signal service.
The army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria was at this time opposed to
the British between the line of the Lys and Lille, and it was along
the ten miles between La Bassee and Frelinghein, amid a mass of almost
continuous industrial villages, that the clash of the great battle
began. Outnumbered by nearly three to one, the British troops were
subjected to an incessant series of desperate assaults. It was clear
that the rapid success of the British operations during the preceding
week, as well as the collapse of the German projects, had stung the
enemy to fury. The attacks began against Herlies and Aubers, villages
north of the La Bassee spur, and themselves built along the tops or
straggling down the slopes of two minor promontories. Beaten off with
heavy loss to the enemy, these attacks were, regardless of the
punishment received, renewed both by day and by night. The villages
were reduced by the German artillery to ruins. Amid these ruins,
however, and in the trenches cut for the defence, the British troops
held out. In repulsing one of these attacks the Royal Irish, with
magnificent dash, and burning to give the enemy a real taste of their
quality, fought across the spur to Le Pilly, driving the Germans
before them like as though their advance was that of a column of
irresistible demons. In Le Pilly they entrenched themselves. They had
gone so far forward, however, in the impetus of the pursuit that they
were cut off from communication with the rest of the British force.
They fought until their last cartridge was used up. For more than
thirty hours they held out, surrounded by masses of Germans on all
sides. Sheer famine at the finish compelled them, and their gallant
commander, Major Daniell, to surrender.
Instead of diminishing, the German attacks increased in violence.
Every successive repulse seemed only to add to the rage of their
commanders. For four days and nights these onsets followed one upon
another. To describe these but a little while before peaceful suburbs
of Lille, now cut and blown into wreckage and swept by the fire and
hurricane of war, as a hell is to put it mildly. The days and nights
were days and nights of dismal darkness and rain. Foiled in the effort
by a frontal attack to drive the British once more across the Lys, the
Germans, now supported by the arrival of additional masses, developed
their assault to the east and north of Ypres. On October 20 they
captured Le Gheir, but were on the same day driven out of the place
again with heavy loss. This important crossing of the Lys is the most
direct route from Lille to Ypres.
In view of the heavy attack which by this time had been launched
towards the flank position of the 3rd Army Corps at Le Gheir, the
British cavalry were dismounted and put into the fighting line to fill
the gap of some four miles still existing between Le Gheir and
Zandvoorde to the south of Ypres. Throwing aside the sabre for the
rifle and bayonet and the spade, the cavalry promptly dug themselves
in, and proved as valiant in the trenches as they had time and again
shown themselves in the saddle. They were a thin line of less than one
man to the yard. Thin as it was, however, it turned out to be a line
of steel.
On October 20 the 1st British Army Corps reached Ypres from St. Omer.
They had covered the intervening twenty-five miles in one long day's
tramp. It had been intended to send them in co-operation with the
French cavalry forward to Thourout, and possibly on to Bruges. This
scheme had to be abandoned.
On October 22 the battle became general from La Bassee to Dixmude.
Following upon a terrific bombardment, a powerful column of the enemy,
debouching from La Bassee, attempted in mass formation to rush the
trenches held by the Wiltshires and the Manchester Regiment at
Violaines. The attack never got home. The mass of the enemy, something
like 6,000 strong, thrown into confusion by the deadly fire from the
trenches, broke and fled. They were rallied and reformed from
supports. A second time the assault was launched. It met with no
better fortune.
In the meantime an attack in enormous force had been hurled against
the positions held by the 3rd British Army Corps. This attack, one of
the bloodiest episodes of the battle, also failed. The Germans,
nevertheless, had got across the Lys at Warneton and at Comines, two
miles farther down stream, and, forming behind the railway, which here
runs on an embankment along the valley to the north of the river,
advanced in overwhelming force upon Messines and Houthem. Though
offering a desperate resistance, the British cavalry were forced to
retire as far as Hollebeke and Wytscheate. Part of the Indian troops,
the 7th Division, sent to their support, delivered a brilliant flank
attack on the Germans from Wulverghem. The Germans held the ground
they had gained, but their onset was paralysed.
The British front had now been dented in. In consequence it became
necessary to reform it. The line was withdrawn. From Givenchy the
positions extended to the high road running from Violaines through
Neuve Chapelle to Armentières, and then through Armentières across the
Lys to Wytscheate. This is, in fact, the main road from La Bassee to
Ypres.
Disposed along a line from Bixschoote through Langemarck on the north
of Ypres, the troops of the British 1st Army Corps were attacked by
the whole strength of the army of General von Fabeck. The resistance
opposed to these enormous odds was heroic. Time and again the attacks
made in mass formation were beaten back. Upon the Prussian commanders
the frightful losses suffered by their troops, who fell not man by
man, but by ranks and companies, appeared to make no impression. A
combined infantry and artillery attack drove the French cavalry across
the Ypres and Nieuport canal. The British line had then to be retired.
Under heavy fire the Cameron Highlanders dug themselves in at Pilkem
on the canal two miles to the north of Ypres. At the end of a day of
awful carnage the Germans at this point made a last desperate effort.
They got at length up to the line of the trenches, hastily made to
meet the exigencies of the moment. It came to the bayonet, with this
comparative handful of British heroes against a mass of foes maddened
by their losses. The Highlanders fought like lions. At the cold steel
the Germans were no match for them. Nothing but their dauntless
courage and their military superiority saved them from being totally
wiped out. Out of that terrible fray the remnant of them retired,
bloodstained and with bloodstained arms, but fierce and unconquerable,
opposing a sullen front still to the enemy who, having at a fearful
price won the position, had been too punished to follow up the
advantage.
These trenches at Pilkem, it is interesting to note, were the nearest
point at which during any part of the battle the Germans approached to
Ypres. The enemy, however, did not enjoy his dearly-bought advantage
long. At daybreak an attack upon the Germans was made by the Queens,
the Northamptons, and the King's Own Rifles. The enemy had occupied
the night clearing the trenches of the dead, mostly their own dead,
with which they were choked. For so prompt a counter-attack they were
evidently not prepared. In the cold grey of this October dawn they
suddenly saw these lines of khaki detach themselves from the mist. It
was like a bad dream, but it turned in a flash into a fiery reality.
The British infantry were into them with the bayonet. Led by General
Bulfin, who had proved on the Aisne that he was the man for a tight
corner, the British brigade were out to retake those trenches. Of
British bayonet work these German troops had already seen enough.
There was a scene, as they endeavoured to rally, of mad rage and
confusion; the shouts and curses of their officers mingling with the
roar of conflict, and the clash of steel on steel in the savage work
of thrust and parry. German reinforcements were hurried up. The line
of fighting men, their own troops in retreat, the British pressing on
the rear, met the reinforcements as they advanced. With this fresh
mass to deal with, the British troops in turn were forced backwards.
They fought with a bulldog tenacity, and once more the Germans gave
way. By the end of the day, despite repeated attacks upon them, the
British were masters of the position.
Even now the weight of such a battle as this was severe, and yet it
was to go on for another twenty-six days. On October 22 General Joffre
visited the British Head-quarters. The result was the arrival on this,
the 23rd of October, of the 9th French Army Corps. This reinforcement
was sorely needed. On the east of Ypres the line was drawn perilously
thin. From Zandvoorde round to Peolcappel it was held only by the 7th
Division of infantry under Major-General Capper, and by the 3rd
Cavalry Division, commanded by Major-General Byng. The cavalry, like
the rest of the British mounted force, had gone into the trenches, or,
rather, into hastily-made lines of fire-cover. Somewhat remarkably,
the Germans had not been quick to discover the relative weakness of
this part of the front. So far they had thrown the weight and fury of
their attack against the north and south. Their mistake undoubtedly
arose from the bold tactics adopted by the British Commander-in-Chief.
On the east of Ypres he had kept up a show of counter-attack. The 7th
Division had, on the 21st, made a bound forward to Passchendeale, on
the way to Roulers. This, following upon the movement towards Menin,
had evidently led the enemy to suppose that here was the strongest
part of the British line. In plain language, the enemy had been most
successfully "bluffed." As a consequence, the Germans opposite the 7th
Division remained on the defensive, and there was gained a respite, if
a bitter and incessant bombardment can so be called, of nearly two
days. The interval was beyond estimate valuable. It enabled the 9th
French Army Corps to take up part of the vastly too extended position
held by these British forces, who had been spaced out over some six
miles of country at the rate of considerably less than one man to the
yard--a single line without reserves of any kind.
Following upon their arduous march from Ghent, during which, covering
the retreat of the Belgian army, they had fought a rearguard action
for the greater part of the way, the 7th Division had, since October
17, been almost incessantly engaged. Even the toughest of British
troops--and these were among the toughest toughs in the army--would
feel the worse for wear after such an experience. It had indeed
approached "the limit"--as the limit was understood before the Battle
of Ypres.
Picture the situation. These British and French troops in their
hastily made trenches had not only masses of the enemy in front of
them--masses thrown forward in dense columns of attack, which at all
hazards they had to break--but the roar of battle in their rear, and
from minute to minute they could not tell how the fortune of battle in
their rear was going. They could only hope that their comrades, too,
were "sticking it." Overhead was the almost incessant flight and
ear-splitting explosions of shells, an indescribable din. To right and
left flared the burning ruins of houses and villages. An acrid smoke
rolled over the awful scene, darkening the grey sky with its lowering
pall. In this pallid light and amid the contending thunders of the
cannon, a monstrous chorus from hundreds of iron throats, the
grey-green ranks of the enemy would suddenly swarm out of their
trenches, and their savage yells mingling with their volleys, would
try to dash across the intervening space, 200, sometimes not more than
100 yards. To reach the British trenches was a matter not of minutes;
it was a matter of seconds. How were such rushes to be stopped? The
only way was for these British infantrymen to sit tight and give them
fifteen rounds "rapid"--fifteen rounds in less than as many seconds,
rounds in which every bullet found its billet. The hostile mass came
on trampling over its dying and its dead, but it was ragged and it
grew more ragged with every one of those successive blasts of death.
Then it became a mere torn remnant, then it wavered. Its fury was
gone; its courage was gone; the driving power of its ruthless officers
was gone; the fear of disciplinary punishment was gone; all were
swallowed up in the instinctive love of life. A lightning rush back to
cover to avoid that devastating hail of lead swept every protester off
his feet. From first to last such an episode would be measured in time
by minutes. Into those minutes, however, seemed crowded an eternity of
experience. In circumstances like these the sole thought of the
soldier is his individual duty. He feels with an absorbing intensity
that the issue depends upon him doing it even to the death. In that
feeling lies the glorious "joy of battle."
All round Ypres was ringed with these contending fires. The heaviest
pressure of the German attack, however, was still on the sector of the
front between Armentières and La Bassee. It was plainly hoped that if
success attended this onset, the retirement of the whole of the
British, French and Belgian forces to the north of it must follow, and
strategically that must have been the result, for if the 2nd British
Army Corps had given way, neither Ypres nor the line of the Yser could
have been held. In the accounts which have been given hitherto of the
battle, attention has mostly been directed to its later stages when
the attack developed against Ypres from the east, but the vital combat
which went far to secure the eventual victory was the death grapple
between the 2nd Army Corps and the masses of Prince Ruprecht's Army
thrown against them west of Lille. These troops of the 2nd British
Army Corps had been fighting almost day and night since October 11,
that is up to this time for twelve days, and it had been impossible to
afford them any relief.
Along this sector of the front the 2nd and 3rd Corps of the British
Army were opposed to eight corps of Germans. That immense superiority
in numbers enabled the enemy to keep up an unbroken succession of
assaults by a system of reliefs. Costly in life to the enemy though
such tactics were, he was evidently convinced that under this strain
the British must inevitably break. The fighting raged through this now
desolated area of ruined houses and wrecked roads. Roofless, with
great gaps torn in their walls by shells, the smashed remains of
furniture mixed up with fallen and broken beams, splintered doors, and
battered stairways, often the scenes of bitter hand-to-hand duels, the
houses bordering the streets littered and obstructed by
window-shutters shot-riddled and blown off their hinges, piles and
fragments of bricks, slates and glass, the shapeless remains of
chimneys and other flotsam of ruin. In face of the hostile pressure
the British line had had to be drawn back on to the lower ground of
the valley. This withdrawal, however, had tightened up and
strengthened it, and the whole position was without question saved
through General Smith-Dorrien making that necessary and prudent move
in the right time.[8]
[8] The German attack against the Lincolns in the village of
Herlies and the retirement of that corps is described in a
letter from Corporal E. Clark to Major Haggard, Chairman of
the Veterans' Club. Corporal Clark says: "... We found
ourselves surrounded in the shape of a horseshoe, the enemy
firing at us from all angles. We just got the order to
retire when a shell struck the trench in front, a piece
catching me on the nose and burying me, but I managed to
crawl out nearly blind, and started to retire under a
murderous rifle fire. No one could realise what it was like
unless actually there. Men were crawling about like ants
trying to reach safety, but it was only luck for those that
did. I managed to get to a wood, where I found a number of
wounded, and waited until the firing cooled down, when we
chanced it over the river, getting there as best we could,
the Germans shelling the bridge the whole time, also a
railway cutting, in which we got for shelter."
How the Devons at a decisive point of the line covered this retirement
and beat off a furious German attack is told by one of the officers of
the corps. He says:
On the night of October 22, we advanced a bit and dug ourselves
more or less in by dawn, and soon after light we saw great masses
of German infantry emerge from woods and hedges some 1,000 yards
to our front, and advance to attack us. We opened fire on them,
and killed dozens. This was answered by the Germans with a
tremendous shell fire from their heavy guns. The Devons were
perfectly wonderful; not a man left his trench. All day long the
battle raged, and you never saw such an inferno. By night the
place was a mass of fire, smoke, dead, and dying. All night they
attacked us. Sometimes they got right up to our trenches, only to
be hurled back by the Devons' bayonets. Dawn broke on the 24th
with the same struggle still going on, and it continued all day
and night, and all through the 25th. We never slept a wink, and by
night we were absolutely done. No humans could have done more.
The men were perfectly splendid, and repulsed every attack, with
great loss to the enemy. We were relieved at 1 a.m. on October 26,
and as we marched back a mile into billets all the troops cheered
us frantically. General Smith-Dorrien sent a wire congratulating
us on our splendid fight. We heard officially from Divisional
Head-quarters that there were 1,000 dead Germans in front of our
trenches. The whole place was littered with their dead.
On October 24 the Indian troops under the command of General Watkis
were sent to Lacon, three miles in the rear of the front, as a
reserve. In the evening of that day, a day like those preceding it of
dismal rain, the Germans made an exceptional effort. With the
advantage of the bad and failing light, which it was probably hoped
would confuse the British rifle fire, a thing they had now learned to
dread, they delivered a massed assault in enormous force. The attack
was made simultaneously by three columns directed one against the
trenches held by the Wiltshires above Givenchy; the second against the
trenches held by the Royal West Kents; and the third against the
position of the Gordons at the farther end of the line near
Fauquissart. The first two attacks failed completely. The third had a
temporary success. The Gordons, with odds which no skill with the
rifle could overcome, were driven from their trenches. This was
undoubtedly the chief point of the German onset. While the struggle
was going on the Middlesex regiment had been ordered up to support.
They arrived nearly as soon as the Germans had seized the position.
Darkness had now come on. Shaken by their heavy losses, the Germans
were not prepared for this practically instantaneous counter-attack.
They did not know what was behind it. The Middlesex regiment appeared
to spring at them out of the ground. Though elated at their victory
they were exhausted. For aught they could tell other forces were at
the back of these. The fight was fierce but brief. The end of it saw
the enemy flying back into the night to escape the deadly bayonets
wielded with what seemed almost superhuman energy. The attack added
another blank to Prince Ruprecht's record.
In the meantime persistent attacks had been kept up on the position of
the 3rd Corps along the railway from Laventie to Armentières, as well
as on the line held by the Cavalry Corps along the hills from
Wytscheate to Zandvoorde. It was the evident intention of the Germans
to seize this ridge as dominating the British position in Ypres. Along
this sector they were massed in great strength. Shortened, however, as
it now was the front held. The struggle round the village of Hollebeke
was to the last degree desperate. The line, however, of the Indian
troops along the high road from Armentières to Wytscheate still
menaced this German attack in flank, and materially helped the Cavalry
Corps to hold its ground.
In view of this failure of the onslaught from the south, the enemy on
October 25 renewed his attack in strength against the line of the 1st
British Army Corps to the north of Ypres, and combined it with yet
another onset south of Ypres against the trenches held by the Cavalry
Corps. It was deemed prudent to reinforce part of the line here from
the Reserve of French Territorials. Those of the cavalry whom they
replaced were withdrawn and concentrated at Zillebeke to the north of
the Zandvoorde ridge.
Apparently the losses and the confusion arising from the defeat of the
great assault of the evening before (October 24) made it impossible
for the Germans to renew their efforts on this day (October 25)
against the front from Armentières to La Bassee. Their only success in
the fighting of the 25th was the capture of the trenches held by the
Leicestershire Regiment whom they had managed to overwhelm.
We now come to a lull in the battle. It had gone on along the southern
sector of the front since October 17, and along the whole front since
October 22. During the last three days more especially the Germans had
exerted their total strength. They had incurred a terrible sacrifice
of life, and so far the only result, a miserable result for such a
price, had been the slight retirement of the British line to the west
of Lille, and a foothold across the Lys to the south of Ypres.
It is not surprising therefore that for the time being they ceased
their attacks while they moved up additional forces. These were not
merely to repair losses but to add to the mass and momentum of the
onset. None of the objects sought by this battle had been gained, nor
did any one of them appear to any nearer of attainment.
The position from the German side is reflected in the army order which
on October 26 Prince Ruprecht issued to his troops. Copies of it were
afterwards found on dead German officers of his army. "You have been
fighting," he told them, "under very difficult conditions. It is our
business now not to let the struggle with our most detested enemy drag
on longer. The decisive blow has still to be struck."
The Kaiser at this time came to Courtrai and Thielt to supervise the
massing of his legions, and went round their billets and cantonments
making a succession of speeches. Everything was done to fortify their
determination, and heighten their ardour. A general army order was
issued reminding them that "the thrust against Ypres" was of decisive
importance. On October 29 the mighty mass of a front extending from
Lille to the coast was judged to have been refitted and in every
respect ready for the final and irresistible blow.
On his side Sir John French had made use of the interval to reform and
tighten his line. The comparatively weak spot to the east of Ypres was
stiffened, and if this lull was necessary to the enemy it proved of
equal advantage to the Allies, and opposed to the enemy's intended
final blow a new set of difficulties.