CHAPTER XI

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REORGANIZATION (1815-1824).

118. REFERENCES.

BIBLIOGRAPHIES.--W. E. Foster, _References to Presidential

Administrations_, 15-19; Justin Winsor, Narrative and Critical History_,

VII. 344, 345, 437-439; J.F. Jameson, _Bibliography of Monroe_ (Appendix

to Oilman's _Monroe_); Channing and Hart, _Guide_, §§ 174-178.

HISTORICAL MAPS.--Nos. 1 and 5, this volume, and No. 1, Wilson, _Division

and Reunion_ (_Epoch Maps_ Nos. 7, 8, and 10); Labberton, _Atlas_, lxvii.;

T. MacCoun, _Historical Geography, Scribner, Statistical Atlas_, Plate 14.

GENERAL ACCOUNTS.--H. Von Holst, _Constitutional History_, I. 273-408; R.

Hildreth, _United States_. VI. 575-713 (to 1821); James Schouler, _United

States_, II. 444-463, III. 1-335; Bryant and Gay, _Popular History_. IV.

244-281; J. B. McMaster, _People of the United States_, IV. (to 1820);

Geo. Tucker, _United States_, III. 146-408; J. T. Morse, _John Quincy

Adams_, 102-164; Ormsby, _Whig Party_, 129-172.

SPECIAL HISTORIES.--Henry Adams, _History of the United States_, IX.;

Carl Schurz, _Henry Clay_, I. 137-202; N. P. Gilman, _James Monroe_, 125-

174; F. W. Taussig, _Tariff History_, J. L. Bishop, _American

Manufactures_, II. 146-298; G. F. Tucker, _Monroe Doctrine_, Payne,

_European Colonies_, E. Stanwood, _Presidential Elections_, H. L. Carson,

_Supreme Court_, I. chs. xii.-xiv.; A C. McLaughlin, _Cass_, chs. ii., iv.

CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS.--J. Q. Adams, _Memoirs_, IV.-VI.; Josiah Quincy,

_Figures of the Past_, _Niles Register_, T. H. Benton, _Thirty Years'

View_, I. 1-44; Nathan Sargent, _Public Men, and Events_, I. 17-56; R.

Rush, _Residence at the Court of London_, J. Flint, _Recollections of the

last Ten Years_ (1826); R. Walsh, _Appeal from the Judgment of Great

Britain_ (1819); D. Warden, _Statistical, Political, and Historical

Account of the United States_ (1819); S. G. Goodrich, Recollections, II.

393-436; _The National Intelligencer_; Featon, _Sketches of America_,

_Fifth Report_; works of Clay, Calhoun, Webster, Madison, Woodbury.--

Reprints in F. W. Taussig, _State Papers and Speeches on the Tariff_,

_American History told by Contemporaries_, III.

119. CONDITIONS OF NATIONAL GROWTH (1815).

[Sidenote: Prosperity.]

The population of the United States at the end of the war was about eight

million five hundred thousand, and it was increasing relatively faster in

the South and West than near the seaboard. The return of peace seemed also

a return of prosperity. Short crops abroad revived the demand for American

cereals, so that the surplus accumulated during the war could be sold at

fair prices, and the exports in 1816 ran up to $64,000,000. In 1815,

American shipping recovered almost to the point which it had reached in

1810. The revenue derived from taxation in 1814 was but $11,000,000; in

1816 it was $47,000,000. More than twenty thousand immigrants arrived in

1817. Wealth seemed increasing both in the North and the South.

[Sidenote: National literature.]

[Sidenote: The Clergy.]

Another evidence of the quickening of national life was the beginning of a

new national literature. In 1815 was founded the "North American Review,"

and in an early number appeared Bryant's "Thanatopsis." Already in 1809

had appeared the first work of an American which was comparable with that

of the British essayists,--Washington Irving's "Knickerbocker" History of

New York. His quaint humor was not less appreciated from his good-natured

allusions to the Jeffersonian principle of government "by proclamation."

The hold of the clergy had been much weakened in New England; there had

been a division of the Congregational Church, with the subsequent founding

of the Unitarian branch; and the Jeffersonian principle of popular

government was gaining ground. The people were keen and alert.

[Sidenote: Means of transportation.]

[Sidenote: Steamboats.]

In two respects the war had taught the Americans their own weakness: they

had had poor facilities for transportation, and they had lacked

manufactures of military material. There was a widespread feeling that the

means of intercommunication ought to be improved. The troops on the

northern frontier had been badly provisioned and slowly reinforced because

they could not readily be reached over the poor roads. A system had been

invented which was suitable for the rapid-running rivers of the interior

and for lake navigation: in 1807 Fulton made the first voyage by steam on

the Hudson River. Nine years later a system of passenger service had been

developed in various directions from New York, and a steamer was running

on the Mississippi.

[Sidenote: Rise of manufactures.]

[Sidenote: Foreign competition.]

Manufactures had sprung up suddenly and unexpectedly in the United States.

The restrictive legislation from 1806 to 1812, though it had not cut off

foreign imports, had checked them; and shrewd ship-owners had in some

cases diverted their accumulated capital to the building of factories. In

1812 commerce with England was totally cut off, and importations from

other countries were loaded down with double duties. This indirect

protection was enough to cause the rise of many manufactures, particularly

of cotton and woollen goods. In 1815, the capital invested in these two

branches of industry was probably $50,000,000. On the conclusion of peace

in England and America an accumulated stock of English goods poured forth,

and the imports of the United States instantly rose from $12,000.000 in

1814, to $106,000,000 in 1815. These importations were out of proportion

to the exports and to the needs of the country, and they caused the

stoppage of a large number of American factories. Meanwhile, American

ships had begun to feel the competition of foreign vessels in foreign

trade. Without intending it, the country had drifted into a new set of

economic conditions.

120. THE SECOND UNITED STATES BANK (1816).

[Sidenote: Banks and currency.]

The first evidence of this change of feeling was a demand for the renewal

of the bank which had been allowed to expire in 1811 (§ 110). The country

had been thrown entirely upon banks chartered by the States; the pressure

of the war had caused their suspension, and the currency and banking

capital of the United States had thus been thrown into complete confusion.

For example, the Farmers Exchange Bank of Gloucester, R. I., was started,

with a capital of $3,000; accumulated deposits so that one of the

directors was able to steal $760,000; and then it failed, with specie

assets of $86.46. In 1811 there were eighty-eight State banks; in 1816

there were two hundred and forty-six.

[Sidenote: Bank bill of 1814.]

[Sidenote: The Bank Act.]

Since the re-charter bill of 1811 had failed by only one vote, Dallas,

Secretary of the Treasury in 1814, again proposed a national bank.

Congress accepted the principle, but an amendment proposed by John C.

Calhoun so altered the scheme that upon Dallas's advice Madison cast his

first important veto against it on Jan. 30, 1815. What Dallas desired was

a bank which would lend money to the government; what Congress planned was

a bank which would furnish a currency based on specie. In the next session

of Congress Madison himself urged the creation of a bank, and this time

Calhoun supported him. The Federalists, headed by Daniel Webster,--

remnants of the party which had established the first national bank,--

voted against it on the general principle of factious opposition. A small

minority of the Republicans joined them, but it was passed without much

difficulty, and became a law on April, 10, 1816.

[Sidenote: Bank charter.]

The bank was modelled on its predecessor (§ 78), but the capital was

increased from $10,000,000 to $35,000,000, of which the United States

government held $7,000,000. It was especially provided that "the deposits

of the money of the United States shall be made in said bank or branches

thereof." In return for its special privileges the bank agreed to pay to

the government $1,500,000. The capital was larger than could safely be

employed; it was probably intended to absorb bank capital from the State

banks. The prosperity of the country, aided by the operations of the bank,

secured the renewal of specie payments by all the sound banks in the

country on Feb. 20, 1817.

[Sidenote: Loose construction accepted.]

The striking feature in the bank was not that it should be established,

but that it should be accepted by old Republicans like Madison, who had

found the charter of a bank in 1791 a gross perversion of the

Constitution. Even Henry Clay, who in 1811 had powerfully contributed to

the defeat of the bank, now came forward as its champion.

121. INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS (1806-1817).

[Sidenote: Local improvements.]

[Sidenote: Cumberland road.]

[Sidenote: Gallatin's scheme.]

Side by side with the bank bill went a proposition for an entirely new

application of the government funds. Up to this time internal

improvements--roads, canals and river and harbor improvements--had been

made by the States, so far as they were made at all. Virginia and Maryland

had spent considerable sums in an attempt to make the Potomac navigable,

and a few canals had been constructed by private capital, sometimes aided

by State credit. In 1806 the United States began the Cumberland Road, its

first work of the kind; but it was intended to open up the public lands in

Ohio and the country west, and was nominally paid for out of the proceeds

of those public lands. Just as the embargo policy was taking effect,

Gallatin, encouraged by the accumulation of a surplus in the Treasury,

brought in a report, April 4, 1808, suggesting the construction of a great

system of internal improvements: it was to include coastwise canals across

the isthmuses of Cape Cod, New Jersey, upper Delaware and eastern North

Carolina; roads were to be constructed from Maine to Georgia, and thence

to New Orleans, and from Washington westward to Detroit and St. Louis. He

estimated the cost at twenty millions, to be provided in ten annual

instalments. Jefferson himself was so carried away with this prospect of

public improvement that he recommended a constitutional amendment to

authorize such expenditures. The whole scheme disappeared when the surplus

vanished; but from year to year small appropriations were made for the

Cumberland road, so that up to 1812 more than $200,000 had been expended

upon it.

[Sidenote: Calhoun's Bonus Bill.]

[Sidenote: Madison's veto.]

The passage of the bank bill in 1816 was to give the United States a

million and a half of dollars (Section 120). Calhoun, therefore, came

forward, Dec. 23, 1816 with a bill proposing that this sum be employed as

a fund "for constructing roads and canals and improving the navigation of

watercourses." "We are" said he, "a rapidly--I was about to say a

fearfully--growing country.... This is our pride and danger, our weakness

and our strength." The constitutional question he settled with a phrase:

"If we are restricted in the use of our money to the enumerated powers, on

what principle can the purchase of Louisiana be justified?" The bill

passed the House by eighty-six to eighty-four; it was strongly supported

by New York members, because it was expected that the general government

would begin the construction of a canal from Albany to the Lakes; it had

also large support in the South, especially in South Carolina. In the last

hours of his administration Madison vetoed it. His message shows that he

had selected this occasion to leave to the people a political testament;

he was at last alarmed by the progress of his own party, and, like

Jefferson, he insisted that internal improvements were desirable, but

needed a constitutional amendment. The immediate effect of the veto was

that New York, seeing no prospect of federal aid, at once herself began

the construction of the Erie Canal, which was opened eight years later.

[Sidenote: State improvements.] Other States attempted like enterprises;

but the passes behind the Susquehanna and Potomac rivers were too high,

and no permanent water way was ever finished over them.

122. THE FIRST PROTECTIVE TARIFF (1816).

[Sidenote: Increase of duties.]

[Sidenote: Jefferson's attitude.]

The protection controversy had hardly appeared in Congress since the

memorable debate of 1789 (Section 76). From time to time the duties had

been slightly increased, and in 1799 a general administrative tariff act

had been passed. The wars with the Barbary powers had necessitated a

slight increase of the duties, known as the Mediterranean Fund, and this

had been allowed to stand. Up to the doubling of the duties in 1812 the

average rate on staple imports was only from ten to fifteen per cent, and

the maximum was about thirty per cent. The whole theory of the Republican

administration had been that finance consisted in deciding upon the

necessary expenses of government, and then in providing the taxes

necessary to meet them. This theory had been disturbed by the existence of

a debt which Jefferson was eager to extinguish; and he therefore permitted

the duties to remain at a point where they produced much more than the

ordinary expenditure of the government.

[Sidenote: The manufacturers.]

[Sidenote: The West.]

A change had now come over the country. The incidental protection afforded

by the increase of duties, and then by the war, had built up manufactures,

not only in New England, but in New York and Pennsylvania. In these

strongholds of capital and trade there was a cry for higher duties, and it

was much enforced by the attitude of the Western members. There were a few

staple crops, particularly hemp and flax, which could not be produced in

the face of foreign competition, and for which Western States were

supposed to be adapted. Hence a double influence was at work in behalf of

a protective tariff: the established industries pleaded for a continuance

of the high duties which had given them an opportunity to rise; and the

friends of young industries asked for new duties, in order that their

enterprises might be established.

[Sidenote: Dallas's tariff bill.]

[Sidenote: Opponents.]

[Sidenote: Advocates.]

Accordingly, in February, 1816, Secretary Dallas made an elaborate report

in favor of protective duties. John Randolph, who still posed as the

defender of the original Republican doctrine, protested. "The

agriculturist," said he, "has his property, his lands, his all, his

household gods to defend;" and he pointed out what was afterward to become

the most effective argument against the tariff: "Upon whom bears the duty

on coarse woollens and linens and blankets, upon salt and all the

necessaries of life? Upon poor men and upon slaveholders." Webster,

representing the commercial interest of New England, decidedly opposed the

tariff, especially the minimum principle, and succeeded in obtaining a

slight reduction. One of the strongest defenders of the tariff was

Calhoun. Manufactures, he declared, produced an interest strictly

American, and calculated to bind the widespread republic more closely

together. The chief supporter of the system was Henry Clay of Kentucky,

the Speaker of the House. His argument was that the country ought to be

able to defend itself in time of war, It was not expected at this time

that a protective tariff would become permanent. In a few years, said a

committee of the House, the country would be in a condition to bid

defiance to foreign competition.

[Sidenote: Protective policy.]

[Sidenote: The minimum.]

The act as passed April 27, 1816, had favorable votes in every State in

the Union except Delaware and North Carolina. The opposition was strong in

the South and in New England. Madison signed the bill and accepted the

policy, and even Jefferson declared that "We must now place the

manufacturer by the side of the agriculturist." The act imposed duties of

twenty-five per cent upon cotton and woollen goods, and the highest ad

valorem duty was about thirty per cent. In addition, no duty was to be

less than six and a quarter cents a yard on cottons and woollens: hence as

improvements in machinery caused a rapid lowering of the cost of

production abroad, the duty grew heavier on coarse goods, in proportion to

their value, till it was almost prohibitory. The act was accepted without

any popular demonstrations against it, and remained in force, with some

unimportant modifications, until 1824. One purpose undoubtedly was to show

to foreign governments that the United States could discriminate against

their trade if they discriminated against ours.

123. MONROE'S ADMINISTRATION (1817-1825).

[Sidenote: Monroe's election.]

[Sidenote: The cabinet.]

The election of 1816 proved that the Federalists could no longer keep up a

national organization. They were successful only in Massachusetts,

Connecticut, and Delaware. On March 4, 1817, therefore, James Monroe took

his seat as the President of a well-united people. Although he had been

the friend and candidate of Randolph, he represented substantially the

same principles as Jefferson and Madison. His cabinet was the ablest since

Washington's; he gathered about him four of the most distinguished public

men in the country. His Secretary of State was John Quincy Adams, one of

the negotiators of the treaty of Ghent. His Secretary of the Treasury was

William H. Crawford of Georgia, who had shown financial ability in

Congress and in Madison's cabinet. For Secretary of War he chose John C.

Calhoun, who had in the six years of his national public service become

renowned as an active and almost a passionate advocate of the use of large

national powers. His Attorney-General was William Wirt of Virginia.

[Sidenote: Party strength.]

These young men represented an eager policy, and in their national

principles had advanced far beyond the old Federalists; but the people had

been somewhat startled by the boldness of the preceding Congress, and many

of the members who would have agreed with the President had lost their

seats. Throughout the whole administration Jefferson at Monticello, and

Madison at Montpelier, remained in dignified retirement; from time to time

Monroe asked their advice on great public questions.

[Sidenote: Commercial treaties.]

One of the first tasks of the administration was to restore the commercial

relations which had been so disturbed by the Napoleonic wars. Algiers had

taken advantage of the War of 1812 to capture American vessels. In 1815

the Dey was compelled on the quarter-deck of Decatur's ship to sign a

treaty of peace and amity. All our commercial treaties had disappeared in

the war, and had to be painfully renewed. In 1815 a commercial convention

was made with Great Britain, and in 1818 the fishery privileges of the

United States were reaffirmed. The West India trade was still denied, but

a retaliatory act brought Great Britain to terms, and it was opened in

1822.

124. TERRITORIAL EXTENSION (1805-1819).

[Sidenote: Northern boundary.]

[Sidenote: Oregon.]

[Sidenote: Boundary treaty.]

The administration inherited two serious boundary controversies, one with

England, and another with Spain. Some progress had been made toward

running the northeast boundary, till in 1818 the commissioners disagreed.

The northwest boundary had now come to be more important. A few months

before the annexation of Louisiana, Jefferson had sent an expedition to

explore the country drained by the Columbia River, which had been

discovered by a Boston ship in 1791. This expedition, under Lewis and

Clark, in 1805 reached tributaries of the Columbia and descended it to its

mouth, anticipating a similar English expedition. Nevertheless, the

Hudson's Bay Company established trading-posts in the region. Monroe

settled the difficulty for the time being by a treaty with Great Britain

in 1818, providing that the disputed region lying between the Rocky

Mountains and the Pacific Ocean and extending indefinitely northward

should be jointly occupied by both countries. At the same time the

northern boundary was defined from the Lake of the Woods to the Rocky

Mountains.

[Sidenote: West Florida.]

[Sidenote: Spanish treaty.]

A year later another treaty with Spain gave to the United States a region

which Jefferson had longed for in vain. Ever since 1803 the United States

had asserted that West Florida had come to it as a part of Louisiana (§

99). Spain steadfastly refused to admit this construction or to sell the

province. In 1810 Madison by proclamation took possession of the disputed

region, and a part of it was soon after added to Louisiana. East Florida

could not possibly be included within Louisiana, but as a detached

peninsula it was of little value to Spain. John Quincy Adams now undertook

a negotiation for the settlement of all outstanding difficulties with

Spain, and on Feb. 22, 1819, a treaty was signed: East Florida was ceded

for a payment of about $6,500,000, and at the same time the western

boundary of Louisiana was settled. An irregular line was described from

the Gulf to the forty-second parallel; it was not far distant from the

watershed south and west of the tributaries of the Mississippi. Then came

the triumph of the whole negotiation: Adams obtained from Spain a

renunciation of all claims north of the forty-second parallel, as far west

as the Pacific. Our hold upon Oregon was thus much strengthened.

125. JUDICIAL DECISIONS (1812-1824).

[Sidenote: New judges.]

[Sidenote: Authority asserted.]

Two departments of the federal government had now shown their belief that

the United States was a nation which ought to exercise national powers How

did it stand with the judiciary department? Of the judges of the Supreme

Court appointed by Washington and Adams but two remained in office in

1817; but the new justices, as they were appointed, quietly accepted the

constitutional principles laid down by Marshall, their Chief Justice and

leader. Among them was Joseph Story of Massachusetts, whose mastery of

legal reasoning and power of statement gave him unusual influence. After

the Marbury case in 1803 (§ 96) the Court refrained for some years from

delivering decisions which involved important political questions. In

1809, however, it sustained Judge Peters of the Pennsylvania District

Court in a struggle for authority against the governor and legislature of

that State (§ 110). The courts were victorious, and the commander of the

militia, who had opposed them with armed force, was punished.

[Sidenote: Appeals taken.]

[Implied powers affirmed.]

The legislation of 1815 and 1816 showed to the Court that its view of the

Constitution was accepted by the people; and it now began a series of

great constitutional decisions, which put on record as legal precedents

the doctrines of implied powers and of national sovereignty. In the great

cases of Martin _vs._ Hunter's Lessee, and Cohens _vs._ Virginia, in 1816

and 1821, it asserted the right of the Supreme Court to take cases on

appeal from the State courts, and thus to make itself the final tribunal

in constitutional questions. At about the same time, in two famous cases,

McCullough _vs._ Maryland in 1819, and Osborn et al. _vs._ Bank of the

United States in 1824, the doctrine of implied powers was stated in the

most definite manner. Both cases arose out of the attempt of States to tax

the United States Bank, and the final issue was the power of Congress to

charter such a bank. The doctrine laid down by Hamilton in 1791 (§ 78) was

reaffirmed in most positive terms. "A national bank," said Marshall, "is

an appropriate means to carry out some of the implied powers, a usual and

convenient agent.... Let the end be within the scope of the Constitution,

and all means which are ... plainly adapted to that end, which are not

prohibited,... but consistent with the letter and spirit of the

Constitution, are constitutional." Although the tariff act was not tested

by a specific case, the spirit of the decision reached it also.

[Sidenote: State powers limited.]

[Sidenote: Impairment of contracts.]

Having thus asserted the authority of the nation on one side, the Court

proceeded to draw the boundary of the powers of the States on the other

side. In a question arising out of grants of land by the Georgia

legislature in the Yazoo district, it had been claimed that any such grant

could be withdrawn by a subsequent legislature. The Court held in Fletcher

_vs._ Peck, in 1810, that such a withdrawal was in contravention of

the constitutional clause which forbade the States to impair the

obligation of contracts. In 1819, in the celebrated case of Dartmouth

College _vs._ Woodward, this principle was pushed to an unexpected

conclusion. The legislature of New Hampshire had passed an act modifying a

charter granted in colonial times to Dartmouth College. Webster, as

counsel for the Board of Trustees which had thus been dispossessed,

pleaded that a charter granted to a corporation was a contract which could

not be altered without its consent. Much indirect argument was brought to

bear upon Marshall, and eventually the Court held that private charters

were contracts. The effect of this decision was to diminish the power and

prestige of the State governments; but the general sentiment of the

country sustained it. So united did all factions now seem in one theory of

national existence that in the election of 1820 Monroe received every vote

but one.

126. THE SLAVERY QUESTION REVIVED (1815-1820).

[Sidenote: Silent growth of slavery.]

Out of this peace and concord suddenly sprang up, as Jefferson said, "like

a fire-bell in the night," a question which had silently divided the Union,

and threatened to dissolve it. It was the question of slavery. During the

whole course of the Napoleonic wars the country had been occupied in the

defence of its neutral trade; since 1815 it had been busy in reorganizing

its commercial and political system. During this time, however, four new

States had been admitted into the Union: of these, two--Ohio and Indiana--

came in with constitutions prohibiting slavery; two--Louisiana and

Mississippi--had slaves. This balance was not accidental; it was arranged

so as to preserve a like balance in the Senate.

[Sidenote: Slavery profitable.]

[Sidenote: Slave-trade forbidden.]

The movement against slavery had by no means spent itself: there were

still emancipation societies both North and South. In 1794 Jay appeared to

suppose that cotton was not an American export (§ 85); but since the

invention of the cotton-gin in 1793 the cultivation of cotton by slave

labor had grown more and more profitable, and in 1820 that export was

valued at nearly twenty millions. The planters of the northern belt of

slaveholding States did not share in this culture, but they found an

increasing sale for their surplus blacks to their Southern neighbors; they

had, therefore, joined with members from the Northern States in the act of

March 2, 1807, to prohibit the importation of slaves. The act was

insufficient, inasmuch as the punishment provided was slight, and slaves

captured while in course of illegal importation were sold for the benefit

of the States into which they were brought, In 1820 the slave-trade was

made piracy, so that the nominal penalty was death.

[Sidenote: Schemes of colonization.]

One evidence of the uneasiness of the country on the slavery question was

the formation of the American Colonization Society in 1816. Its purpose

was to encourage emancipation, and thus to reduce the evils of slavery, by

drawing off the free blacks and colonizing them in Africa. It had a large

membership throughout the country; James Madison and Henry Clay were among

its presidents. Some States made grants of money in its aid, and after

1819 the United States assisted it by sending to the African colony slaves

captured while in course of illegal importation. The whole scheme was but

a palliative, and in fact rather tended to strengthen slavery, by taking

away the disquieting presence of free blacks among the slaves. The

Society, however, never had the means to draw away enough negroes sensibly

to affect the problem; the number which they exported was replaced many

times over by illegal importations from Africa.

[Sidenote: Fugitive slaves.]

[Sidenote: District of Columbia.]

In two other directions the nation had power over slavery, but declined to

exercise it The Fugitive Slave Act (Section 79) was found to be

ineffective. From 1818 to 1822 three bills to strengthen it were

introduced and strongly pressed, but nothing could be accomplished. In the

District of Columbia, where the United States had complete legislative

power, slavery existed under a very harsh code. Washington was a centre

for the interstate slave-trade, and John Randolph, himself a slaveholder,

could not restrain his indignation that "we should have here in the very

streets of our metropolis a depot for this nefarious traffic;" but

Congress took no action.

[Sidenote: Status of Louisiana.]

A question had now arisen which must be decided. The whole of the

Louisiana cession was slaveholding territory, and settlers had gone up the

Mississippi River and its western tributaries with their slaves. In 1819

it was found necessary to provide a territorial government for Arkansas;

and the people living about the Missouri River applied to be admitted as a

State with a slaveholding constitution.

127. THE MISSOURI COMPROMISES (1818-1821),

[Sidenote: Arkansas debate.]

The first step in the great slavery contest was a bill introduced into the

House in December, 1818, providing a territorial government for Arkansas.

Taylor of New York proposed that slavery be prohibited in the Territory;

McLane of Delaware suggested the "fixing of a line on the west of the

Mississippi, north of which slavery should not be tolerated." The test

vote on the exclusion of slavery was a tie, and Clay, as Speaker, cast his

vote against it. The new Territory lay west of the Mississippi, and

adjacent to Louisiana. The Northern members were, therefore, not disposed

to make the issue at that point, and on March 2, 1819, an Act was passed

organizing Arkansas, with no mention of slavery. Meanwhile, Illinois had

been admitted, making eleven free States.

[Sidenote: Proposed restriction on Missouri.]

Side by side with this debate had proceeded a discussion on the admission

of Missouri as a State. On Feb. 13, 1819, Talmadge of New York proposed as

an amendment "that the further introduction of slavery or involuntary

servitude be prohibited, ... and that all children of slaves born within

the said State after the admission thereof into the Union shall be free."

Missouri lay west of Illinois, which had just been admitted into the Union

as a Free State; the Northern members, therefore, rallied, and passed the

Talmadge amendment by a vote of eighty-seven to seventy-six. The Senate,

by a vote of twenty-two to sixteen, refused to accept the amendment; there

was no time for an adjustment, and Congress adjourned without action.

[Sidenote: Missouri bill.]

[Sidenote: Maine bill.]

[Sidenote: Compromise line.]

During 1819 the question was discussed throughout the Union. Several

legislatures, by unanimous votes, protested against admitting a new Slave

State, and when the new Congress assembled in 1819 it became the principal

issue of the session. Alabama was at once admitted, restoring the balance

of Slave and Free States. The people of Maine were now about to separate

from Massachusetts, and also petitioned for entrance into the Union. A

bill for this purpose passed the House on December 30, and a month later a

bill for the admission of Missouri, with the Talmadge amendment, was also

introduced into the House. The Senate, on Feb. 16, 1820, voted to admit

Maine, provided Missouri was at the same time admitted as a Slave State.

The House still refused to comply. Thomas of Illinois now proposed as a

compromise the principle suggested by McLane a year earlier,--that an east

and west line be drawn across the Louisiana cession, north of which

slavery should be prohibited. Fourteen Northern members united with the

seventy-six Southern members to form a bare majority against prohibiting

slavery in Missouri; the principle was thus abandoned, and the only

question was where the line should be drawn: the parallel of 36° 30' was

selected, but it was expressly provided that Missouri should be

slaveholding. On March 3 the compromise became a law.

[Sidenote: Missouri constitution.]

A year later a third difficulty arose. The people of Missouri had formed a

constitution which provided that free colored men should not be allowed to

enter the State under any pretext. Nearly the whole Northern vote in the

House was cast against admitting the State with this provision. Clay

brought about a compromise by which the Missourians were to agree not to

deprive of his rights any citizen of another State. Upon this

understanding Missouri was finally admitted.

[Sidenote: Friends of disunion.]

[Sidenote: Advantage to the South.]

[Sidenote: Advantage to the North.]

In form the compromises were a settlement of difficulties between the two

Houses; in fact they were an agreement between the two sections, by which

the future of slavery in every part of the Louisiana purchase was to be

settled once for all. Threats were freely made that if slavery were

prohibited in Missouri, the South would withdraw. Calhoun told Adams that

if the trouble produced a dissolution of the Union, "the South would be

from necessity compelled to form an alliance, offensive and defensive,

with Great Britain." Adams retorted by asking whether, in such a case, if

"the population of the North should be cut off from its natural outlet

upon the ocean, it would fall back upon its rocks bound hand and foot to

starve, or whether it would not retain its powers of locomotion to move

southward by land?" The compromise was, as Benton says, "conceived and

passed as a Southern measure," although Randolph called it a "dirty

bargain;" nevertheless, on the final test vote thirty-five Southern

members refused to admit the principle that Congress could prohibit

slavery in the Territories. The South gained Missouri, and a few years

later Arkansas came in as a slave State; but in the long run the advantage

was to the North. The South got the small end of the triangle; the North

the whole region now occupied by the States of Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, the

Dakotas, and Montana, and parts of Colorado, Wyoming, and Minnesota; and

the final struggle over slavery was postponed for thirty years.

128. RELATIONS WITH THE LATIN-AMERICAN STATES (1815-1823).

[Sidenote: The Spanish colonies.]

[Sidenote: Revolutions.]

While the attention of the country was absorbed by the Missouri struggle,

a new question of diplomacy had arisen. In 1789 almost every part of the

two American continents south of the United States, except Brazil, was

subject to Spain. The American Revolution had given a shock to the

principle of colonial government by European powers; the Spanish colonies

refused to acknowledge the authority of the French usurpers in Spain, and

in 1808 a series of revolts occurred. At the restoration of the Spanish

Bourbons in 1814, the colonies returned to nominal allegiance. The new

king attempted to introduce the old regime: the colonies had too long

enjoyed the sweets of direct trade with other countries, and they resented

the ungentle attempts to restore them to complete dependence; between 1816

and 1820 the provinces on the Rio de la Plata, Chile, and Venezuela again

revolted; and by 1822 there was a revolutionary government in every

continental Spanish province, including Mexico.

[Sidenote: The Holy Alliance.]

[Sidenote: Intervention proposed.]

When Europe was reorganized, after the fall of Napoleon, almost all the

powers entered into a kind of a treaty, known as the Holy Alliance, framed

Sept. 26, 1815. They announced the future principle of international

relations to be that of "doing each other reciprocal service, and of

testifying by unalterable good will the mutual affection with which they

ought to be animated," and that they considered themselves "all as members

of one and the same Christian nation." Within this pious verbiage was

concealed a plan of mutual assistance in case of the outbreak of

revolutions. When Spain revolted against her sovereign in 1820, a European

Congress was held, and by its direction the French in 1823 a second time

restored the Spanish Bourbons. The grateful king insisted that the

revolution of the Spanish colonies ought to be put down by a common effort

of the European powers, as a danger to the principle of hereditary

government.

[Sidenote: American interests.]

[Sidenote: Russian colonization.]

[Sidenote: English proposals.]

Here the interests of the United States became involved: they were trading

freely with the Spanish Americans; they sympathized with the new

governments, which were nominally founded on the model of the North

American republic; they felt what now seems an unreasonable fear that

European powers would invade the United States. At the same time the

Russians, who had obtained a foothold on the northwest coast fifty years

earlier, were attempting to establish a permanent colony, and on Sept. 24,

1821, issued a ukase forbidding all foreigners to trade on the Pacific

coast north of the fifty-first parallel, or to approach within one hundred

Italian miles of the shore. John Quincy Adams, who had a quick eye for

national rights, protested vigorously. Now came most gratifying evidence

that the United States was the leading power in America: in September,

1823, the British government proposed to our minister in England that the

two countries should unite in a declaration against European intervention

in the colonies. The invitation was declined, but the good will of Great

Britain was assured.

129. THE MONROE DOCTRINE (1823).

[Sidenote: Monroe's message.]

[Sidenote: Colonization clause.]

[Sidenote: Intervention Clause.]

John Quincy Adams had succeeded in bringing the President to the point

where he was willing, in behalf of the nation, to make a protest against

both these forms of interference in American affairs. When Congress met,

in December, 1823, Monroe sent in a message embodying what is popularly

called the Monroe Doctrine. He had taken the advice of Jefferson, who

declared that one of the maxims of American policy was "never to suffer

Europe to meddle with cis-Atlantic affairs." Madison, with characteristic

caution, suggested an agreement with Great Britain to unite in "armed

disapprobation." In the cabinet meeting, Adams pointed out that

intervention would result, not in restoring the colonies to Spain, but in

dividing them among European nations, in which case Russia might take

California. His views prevailed, and the message contained, in the first

place, a clause directed against Russia: "The American continents, by the

free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are

henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any

European powers." Against intervention there was even a stronger protest:

"With the governments who have declared their independence and maintained

it,... we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing

them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European

power, in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly

disposition toward the United States."

[Sidenote: Effect.]

In every way this dignified protest was effectual: the news caused an

immediate rise in the funds of the revolted States in European markets;

projects of European intervention were at once abandoned; and Great

Britain followed the United States in recognizing the independence of the

new countries. In 1824 Russia made a treaty agreeing to claim no territory

south of 54° 40', and not to disturb or restrain citizens of the United

States in any part of the Pacific Ocean.

When Monroe retired from the Presidency on March 4, 1825, the internal

authority of the national government had for ten years steadily increased,

and the dignity and influence of the nation abroad showed that it had

become one of the world's great powers.

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