“Our topic last Sunday was Goodness. Good is a much-abused word. We

often speak disdainfully of a person, as being a goody-goody, but

usually this person, though not necessarily bad, is not good according

to the standard of to-day. In the last generation, and even in some

places to-day, the good child is the one which does its work

conscientiously, and spends all its spare time at sewing or doing odd

jobs around the house. The ‘good man’ does his work faithfully, never

swears or lies under any circumstances, and follows his religion, as it

is set down for him by others, absolutely to the letter.

“In speaking of bad, one kind we mentioned was that which was once good,

but which we have left behind us in our progress. This is true of that

old standard. We have said that what we want is complete sympathy. That

which is beautiful is the symbol of completeness, and the good is

beautiful; and therefore the man with a warm, sympathetic heart is the

good man. A splendid type of this sort of man is Abraham Lincoln, a man

who suffered with the sufferer, and rejoiced with the happy; a man with

charity for all and enmity toward none.

“We condemn the selfish man, but the man who does so much for others

that he does nothing for himself, is to be criticized just as much.

Hillel says: ‘If I am not for myself, who will be for me?’

“There is really no such thing as self-sacrifice, for if you voluntarily

give up one thing for another, it is because you like it better.”

I said that this paper proved to me, what I had already suspected, that

in the last meeting I had dwelt too much on one side of our subject, and

not enough on the other.

“Perhaps,” said Henry, “I spent too much time describing the man who

isn’t truly good?”

“No,” I answered, “I don’t mind that. But you say ‘the man with a warm

and sympathetic heart is the good man.’ To be the truly good and great

man, one must have more than a warm and sympathetic heart, more, even,

than a feeling of kindliness and sympathy for one’s fellows.

“You speak of Lincoln as a man ‘with charity for all and enmity toward

none.’ But Lincoln was much more than that. This alone would not have

made him great and splendid. What did?”

Henry said: “He was a man of determination,” and, before I could answer,

Alfred went on: “He was a man of large sympathies.”

“Yes,” I said, “it is the combination of the two; it is more than both.

I mean that the great and good man is the man whose final far-off aim is

the unity and completeness of man, who shapes his life and his work

toward that aim, who works for it, lives for it, sacrifices himself and

all things to it; and such a man was Lincoln. He made mistakes—he used

them for his cause. His morality, his law, was the union—that symbol of

the larger union—and for this immense self-fulfilment he worked with

his might, and died for it.”

“Yes,” said Henry, “and the great man must make mistakes, and go beyond

them. Roosevelt, for instance, is always making mistakes, and then

acknowledging them, and going forward once more.”

“Surely. And so Lincoln worked for the union, in sympathy with all men.”

“In one speech,” said Henry, “he asked Davis, his opponent in the House,

to ‘help him save the union.’”

“Now, Henry,” I said, “there is another thing in your paper—if you

don’t mind my saying it?”

“Not at all.”

“I mean that when you quoted Hillel you should have finished the

quotation: ‘If I am not for myself, who will be for me?’ and ‘but if I

am for myself alone, what am I then?’ You did not bring out the idea of

the large and small self, of sacrificing the small self to the large,

because you love the large self above all else, not because you like it

better. This morning I heard a lecture by Professor Royce, of Harvard,

and it is curious that he used exactly the same words we used in

speaking of self-sacrifice. He said we sacrifice the small to the large

self.”

At this point Ruth came in, and brought Marian’s paper. I read it at

once:

“Our meeting of the Seekers of February 14th was very interesting. We

talked about goodness. First we tried to define _good_, and finally

reached the conclusion that _goodness_ means being in a harmonious

relation with all our fellow-beings. We should try to make our life like

some beautiful picture or other work of art, making it a complete and

harmonious whole. All our friends and acquaintances, everything we see,

hear, do or know, help to make this picture; and if we try, we can

consciously make it what we want. We are masters of our lives, and if we

remember this, it will influence all our thoughts and deeds. We also

spoke of happiness, and decided that each one has a different kind of

happiness, depending on what he wants most. We also spoke of

self-sacrifice. There is really no such thing as self-sacrifice, because

when we give up one thing it is always because we think another finer,

and because we want the other more. We cannot have every detail in our

picture as clear as the main idea, and we must give up something to

bring out this idea.”

We all thought this paper excellent. I told Ruth briefly what we had

said before she came; and then we spoke at length of the importance of

living our belief, of working for the cause, of giving ourselves to the

large self.

I said: “Every great man has always done just that, whether he was

writer, philosopher, artist, statesman or scientist; he has always

devoted himself to a work which aimed toward the great union.”

Florence said: “You mean not like the philosophers, simply to dream of

the good, but like the artist, to work it out? Didn’t you say that, when

we spoke of choosing the artistic life?”

“No,” I answered, “not quite. The philosopher and dreamer also work for

the supreme good, by showing what it is like, and pointing the way which

men afterward go.”

“That is what I always thought,” said Florence.

“Yes,” I answered, “the philosopher is the teacher of teachers. But I

chose the artistic way of viewing life, because it combines the

philosophic and the scientific way, the vision and the work.”

Virginia now said: “But sometimes men who work for completeness, and

whose motives are all good, do harm, anyway.”

“What do you mean?”

“Jesus, for instance,” she said. “He has done so much harm throughout

the ages, which he never meant to do.”

“It was not he who did the harm,” I answered; “it was the people who

misunderstood him and misused his words. No great man ever does all that

he sets out to do. He cannot, since his aim is no less than perfection.”

“I hate perfect people,” said Virginia, “or to think of any great man as

perfect, because it is so inhuman. I read a book for children, lately,

about Jesus, which made him out a perfect child. It was full of

contradictions, for it said first that he was a wonder, who walked,

talked and thought earlier than other children, and then it said that he

was human, and understood all human weaknesses. I think that to know men

a man must have human weaknesses and imperfections.”

“Yes,” I said; “and I never thought of Jesus as unhumanly perfect. He,

too, had his temptation and weakness to fight and overcome. Indeed, only

the petty man could be perfect.”

“But he would not be perfect,” said Henry.

“No,” I answered; “but according to his standard, he might think himself

so. The great man, the Jesus, the Lincoln, could never be perfect, for

his perfection could only come with the completeness and beauty and

goodness of the whole world. You said of Jesus that he did harm, because

the doctrine made from his words did harm. But you must see that until

all men are great men, every man must suffer so. Take Lincoln, for

instance. If he had lived, and kept control of the Government, surely

the evils of the reconstruction period would have been avoided. You

might say, then, that Lincoln did harm, because his work led to all that

wrong and unhappiness.”

“But it has all come right now,” said Henry.

“Hardly,” I answered; “it is not nearly right, even to-day.”

“And I suppose,” Virginia said, “that finally the work of Jesus and of

every great man will come right.”

“And Lincoln’s work,” said Florence, “will come right sooner, because it

is not so large as the work of Jesus.”

Now I said I wanted to go on to a subject which seemed to me especially

interesting, the question of the making of laws and regulations. Was it

not a curious thing that men’s minds, outrunning their other powers,

should see clearly the great good for which they strove, and should make

regulations for themselves, which they were even unable to keep?

Henry and Ruth did not think it at all curious that people should make

regulations for themselves, but it did seem strange that they were

unable to keep them.

“To me,” I said, “it seems a wonderful thing that the sense of beauty

and fitness should be so strong in the mind of man, should so far outrun

his impulses and his body, that he creates for himself laws and

regulations which he then tries to follow, as one sets up a ladder which

he afterward tries to climb. Of course, we no longer believe in

revelation, in the old Biblical sense, but to us it means revelation

from within. We do not believe that God dictated his laws to Moses, but

that Moses created his laws from his own sense of love and beauty. Man

made his own laws. And his laws outrun him.”

“Some people,” said Ruth, “make laws for the other people, who are not

up to them.”

“No,” Henry said; “isn’t it really all the people making laws for

themselves?”

“Yes,” I answered, “for finally it is the few making laws for all, for

themselves, too. It is humanity making laws for humanity. Every time a

man does wrong and knows he is doing wrong, he is breaking one of his

self-made or self-chosen laws. His mind outruns his powers. When

Coleridge wanted to break himself of the opium-eating habit, he used to

hire men to stand in front of the drug-stores and prevent his going in.

He tried to overcome himself with himself.”

“I like Coleridge,” said Virginia. “I like people with weaknesses, who

try to overcome them.”

I said I liked them, too, that there was no sight so stimulating as that

of fights and conquests, as seeing the very thing we longed for, the

opposition beaten, the difficulties overcome.

“But even the weak people who fail to win,” said Virginia; “I like them,

too.”

“So do I,” I answered; “the fight itself, even the failure, the human

longing, is worth while.

“But I want you to see clearly one thing about all laws and regulations,

and that is that they are substitutes. They are substitutes for

understanding love, or, rather, they are the forerunners of

understanding love, the path of beauty and fitness which the mind makes

for itself before all our desires are strong and harmonious enough to

fulfil the supreme desire. Laws are the framework on which the house of

love shall be built. But when the house is finished, the framework shall

no more be seen; nor is it of value in itself, but only as that which

upholds the house. I would like to talk with you of certain special laws

of this kind. And the first is justice.”

“I was just going to say that,” said Ruth; “it was on my lips.”

“I was thinking of it, too,” said Henry.

“I am sorry,” I answered, “that I did not give you the chance.”

We talked of this subject, and agreed that although justice, the sense

of equity, was a great and necessary virtue and a serviceable tool, it

was but the tool of love, and less than love, and that if our

understanding, our sympathy and possession of life were complete, we

would no longer think of justice, nor praise it; that the rigid laws of

justice, which must oftentimes change, were forever at the service of

love, which made changes and overcame laws.

“Some people are not so far advanced as others,” said Virginia, “and the

others lift them up with laws. Some people are undeveloped, like

animals.”

We could not help laughing at Virginia, with her eternal animals.

“You remember,” I said, “I spoke to you of past virtues that were good

in their time, because the time was ripe only for them, and that in

their own setting interest and delight us, and remain forever beautiful,

like old pictures, but which would now be ugly, bad and out-of-place.

Revenge is an example. How the old stories of revenge stir and even

uplift us, and yet how hateful is the idea of revenge in modern life!

You remember being thrilled and stirred by the heroism of some old duel,

whereas you could find no beauty or heroism in any duel at the present

time.”

“I think,” said Ruth, “it is often the language in which the thing is

put that stirs us.”

“It is the spirit of the time and place,” I said. “No language could

make a duel in New York, among educated people, inspiring or heroic.

With war it is the same. Old wars and wars among savages may inspire us,

because of the heroism and comradeship of the fighters. But among modern

nations even the justified war must be somewhat disgusting, because now

far more heroism is required in other works, and comradeship can mean no

less than all mankind.

“Now,” said I, “can any of you think of another virtue, like justice,

which is a substitute for understanding love?”

“Yes,” said Florence; “I think that pity is.”

“Pity?” I said. “Yes—perhaps. Still, that is somewhat different. Pity

was good once, because it was feeling, and feeling is the root of all

understanding and sympathy. But self-torturing pity seems to me a

weakness. Sympathy is quite a different, a stronger, a braver thing. Who

agrees with me?”

First, they said, would I explain exactly what I meant?

“Sympathy seems to me understanding and love, such as you have for

yourself. You are willing to suffer, since it is a part of life and a

part of the way. You want to suffer for the cause, if necessary; not

otherwise. But you don’t pity yourself. You would be ashamed to make so

much of your pain. So you do not pity others. You love them, you feel

with them, you help them bravely. You can bear their pain without making

a fuss over them, as you would bear your own. You consider them as

strong and brave as yourself.”

They all agreed with me, save Virginia. She said: “If I step by accident

on the foot of a little dog, and he cries out, then that hurts me. And I

think it is good, because then I know how I would feel if I were a

little dog, and I try not to do it again. Isn’t that pity?”

“Perhaps,” I said; “we are apt to pity lower creatures. But there is no

good in the mere feeling of physical pain that goes with such things, of

the pain and thrill up and down your spine when you hurt any creature

accidentally, and hear it cry out.”

“Don’t you think,” asked Alfred, “it is only because they cry out that

we feel it?”

“Maybe,” I said, “for the cry makes us know of the pain. At one time,

however, a virtue was made of the mere suffering _with_ others; and I

suppose in its good time this was necessary, because it developed the

feeling which makes sympathy possible.”

“I think it is good,” said Virginia, “for when my sister was ill, I did

not know how she felt, or understood her, and so I couldn’t sympathize

with her; but later I understood, and then I wished I had felt with her

as she did. It would have been better.”

“Perhaps,” I said, “for it would have taught you to feel. To know how

others feel is the best thing in the world. But to let that feeling

overcome and crush you, to pity them, is weakness. I think it is a

weakness we have all felt, and longed to overcome, when we suffered so

much with others that we were unable to act.”

“Yes, indeed,” said Ruth.

“To be strong to help and strong to do, not overcome with world-sorrow,”

I said, “to face suffering in ourselves and others as something to be

overcome and used!”

Virginia spoke of a curious calmness in herself that made her not act

excitedly when anything happened, but always wait first to see the

outcome. “If a child falls in the street,” she said, “I don’t go rushing

toward it as some people do, but wait to see if it will pick itself up.”

“But if it fell out of a window,” said Ruth, “I suppose you would rush

forward.”

“No,” she answered, “not unless it were necessary. I would wait to see

what happened. When my hat blows off, I never go rushing after it till I

see where it is going to stop.”

The juxtaposition of a falling child and a falling hat was

disconcerting.

“I know how Virginia feels,” I said; “it is the artist in her always

looking on at all that happens. It is a good way, too. Now what other

virtues are there, like justice, that are really substitutes for right

feeling?”

They could not think of the others. So I mentioned honesty, which is

much like justice—even a form of it; steered clear of a reef of

arguments on truth-telling, showed them how honesty would not even be

mentioned where there was perfect love, and went on to the next and most

important, namely, duty. They had not thought of it in this way before.

They all disliked the word duty.

I spoke again of the girl who stays home from the theatre with some one

she does not love, because she feels it to be her duty. Why does she do

it?

“Because she chooses,” said Alfred; “she wants to do it most.”

“But why?” I asked.

“She may think,” said Ruth, “that the other person would do the same for

her.”

“But she may not think so,” I said, “and still she would stay.”

“Because,” said Virginia, “she would feel good afterward.”

“Yes,” I said, “in a sense it is that. It would give her satisfaction.”

“I would do it,” said Ruth, “but I don’t think I would feel any

particular satisfaction afterward.”

“But,” I said, “if you didn’t do it, you would feel dissatisfied with

yourself. And therein lies the explanation of duty. Duty is a substitute

for love. It is the substitute the mind imposes on us when our feelings

will not fulfil the scheme of beauty and order which is our strongest

desire. To do your duty is to fulfil your strongest desire—lacking the

great love. Love shall overcome duty. Duty means only debt. It is

limited, small. It is the ugly framework that love must make before it

can build its beautiful dwelling-place. The strong man always does his

duty, because he flinches at nothing that is on the path, but more and

more he loses duty in love.”

Virginia said: “I think it is fun sometimes to hate things, such as

hating to go to school.”

“Why?”

“Because to do a thing you hate to do makes you feel good sometimes. I

like it.”

“We have come to love the hard thing,” I said, “because it is the

growing thing. We get to fancy that when we do something hard we must be

getting ahead, because generally it is true.”

Virginia said: “I like the poem by Rebecca of Sunnybrook Farm:

‘When joy and duty clash,

Let duty go to smash.’”

“I wish joy and duty were the same,” I said, “and that is just what they

are when love conquers. You have to do your duty when love fails, and so

it often seems an unpleasant job.”

I spoke now of promises, and of how unnecessary they would be were it

not for our failures in love. Then we went on to speak of obedience. We

said that where love was perfect one would not think of obedience or

disobedience. Obedience is a substitute for understanding. He who

understands does not obey. He acts. We spoke of necessary obedience, the

substitute, and then of the family where parents and children were so

much at one that obedience was never mentioned.

“A person out of such a home,” said Virginia, “would not have enough to

struggle against. I don’t like people who are just perfect, and have

nothing to overcome.”

“We will never reach perfection,” they said; and they all, save Henry,

agreed with me that the greatest joy in life was working for, rather

than achieving our desires.

“But when we reach perfection,” he said, “we won’t wish for it any

more.”

I refused to argue that problematic point.

I said: “Be sure the strong and good man will always find something

still to fight and overcome.”

We spoke now of how disobedience might be a virtue, of the rebels in

wars for freedom, and the child who would refuse to obey his parents, if

they ordered him to do what he thought bad; the thief’s child, for

example.

I said: “The framework is for the house—not for itself—and if it

doesn’t suit the house, it must be pulled down.”

Now we had an amusing talk on conventions, in which Henry objected to

full-dress suits, bouillon cups and polite lies. But I showed them how

good and necessary were conventions properly used, since they saved us

weighty discussions on trivial matters. I said it was a good thing we

didn’t have to waste time and energy deciding what we would eat for

breakfast each day.

“But,” said Henry, “if some day I don’t care to eat oatmeal for

breakfast, I don’t want to feel obliged.”

“No,” I said; “don’t be a slave to convention.”

I went on: “If all things were right, then conformity would be

good—though uninteresting—but in this growing world we need reformers

who smash and reform things, whenever conformity becomes deformity.”

You notice that Alfred spoke more at this meeting. I had told him that

if he did not help us along, and show what he meant and thought, he was

not living up to our idea of completeness and work in unison.

FOURTEENTH MEETING

I read Henry’s paper:

“A good man will bring those with whom he comes in contact into

harmonious relations with himself. It is not enough to have a good

heart. Many people are always meaning to do good, but never do it. It is

the actions that count; for we said: ‘Art (good) is self-expression and

self-fulfilment.’

“Many things which we call virtues are only substitutes for love and

sympathy, which we are outgrowing. The principal ones are justice,

honesty, conformity, obedience and pity.

“Men have not perfect sympathy, but often do things at the expense of

others. Therefore man, realizing his weakness, has made for himself a

set of laws.”

I objected to his use of the word “pity” along with the other

substitutes. We had another short talk on the subject.

Virginia said: “I would rather commit suicide than be pitied.”

“Then,” I answered, “since we do not wish to be pitied, we could not,

with perfect sympathy, do so unto others.”

Virginia went on: “When a person who has some trouble or loss makes a

great fuss over it, I must say I don’t think very well of him.”

“We expect people to bear life bravely,” I said, “and to help them do

it, to do it altogether. A man who is prevented from helping by his own

pity is like a man who, when he saw another blind, put out his own eyes

in sorrow, instead of leading the blind.”

I said I wanted to speak of a subject that seemed especially to interest

Virginia. I meant patriotism, but patriotism in a large and unusual

sense. What were their ideas on this subject? Virginia implied that

patriotism was not good, “because whenever you are patriotic for your

own country, you have to be patriotic against other countries. You seem

to be praising and helping your own at the expense of others.”

“That,” I said, “is just the trouble with the false view of patriotism,

and that view has grown out of wars and conquests. For, naturally,

whenever people fought for their country, they had to fight against

another. But I see patriotism—and any loyalty or faithfulness—in a

larger relation. Think for a moment what the word patriotism really

means, in its verbal root, and you will see how it grows, how it begins

at home, and ends by including the world. What does it mean?”

Henry remembered that it came from a word meaning “Father.”

“Yes,” I said, “it meant, originally, loyalty to our fathers, to our

family; and so you must see what it would finally mean.”

“Because,” asked Ruth, “we are related to the whole world?”

“Yes,” I answered, “we are related to the whole world, we are children

of all the nations; but most of all, of course, children of our fathers;

so that, beginning at the centre, we shall spread to all sides, yet not

lose the centre. The definite thing, the love for this land, this home,

will come first, and include all the others. We will be patriotic for

our Father, the world.”

“Do you suppose,” asked Marian, “that an Englishman could be patriotic

for the United States?”

“Yes,” I said, “and I am glad you asked that, for it gives me a chance

to tell you what forms patriotism is beginning to take. An Englishman,

or American, may be patriotic for Anglo-Saxonism all the world over; for

the English language and literature everywhere; he may dream of it as

the world-language; and then, surely, he is patriotic for these States,

as well as for England. I am not going to preach patriotism to you. I

know you are all patriotic for this country, for Americanism, for the

idea of democracy which America upholds. Surely the schools, from first

to last, dwell so much upon it that an American child can hardly help

being patriotic.”

I was surprised at the burst of answers.

The Seekers · 第 11 / 15 段