Emotions and passions are essentially distinct; the former belong to
feeling in so far as this coming before reflection makes it more
difficult or even impossible. Hence emotion is called hasty (animus
praeceps). And reason declares through the notion of virtue that a man
should collect himself; but this weakness in the life of one's
understanding, joined with the strength of a mental excitement, is
only a lack of virtue (Untugend), and as it were a weak and childish
thing, which may very well consist with the best will, and has further
this one good thing in it, that this storm soon subsides. A propensity
to emotion (e.g., resentment) is therefore not so closely related to
vice as passion is. Passion, on the other hand, is the sensible
appetite grown into a permanent inclination (e. g., hatred in contrast
to resentment). The calmness with which one indulges it leaves room
for reflection and allows the mind to frame principles thereon for
itself; and thus when the inclination falls upon what contradicts
the law, to brood on it, to allow it to root itself deeply, and
thereby to take up evil (as of set purpose) into one's maxim; and this
is then specifically evil, that is, it is a true vice.
Virtue, therefore, in so far as it is based on internal freedom,
contains a positive command for man, namely, that he should bring
all his powers and inclinations under his rule (that of reason); and
this is a positive precept of command over himself which is additional
to the prohibition, namely, that he should not allow himself to be
governed by his feelings and inclinations (the duty of apathy); since,
unless reason takes the reins of government into its own hands, the
feelings and inclinations play the master over the man.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 195}