{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 95}
That external constraint, so far as it withstands that which hinders
the external freedom that agrees with general laws (as an obstacle
of the obstacle thereto), can be consistent with ends generally, is
clear on the principle of contradiction, and I need not go beyond
the notion of freedom in order to see it, let the end which each may
be what he will. Accordingly, the supreme principle of jurisprudence
is an analytical principle. On the contrary the principle of ethics
goes beyond the notion of external freedom and, by general laws,
connects further with it an end which it makes a duty. This principle,
therefore, is synthetic. The possibility of it is contained in the
Deduction (Sec. ix.).
This enlargement of the notion of duty beyond that of external
freedom and of its limitation by the merely formal condition of its
constant harmony; this, I say, in which, instead of constraint from
without, there is set up freedom within, the power of self-constraint,
and that not by the help of other inclinations, but by pure
practical reason (which scorns all such help), consists in this
fact, which raises it above juridical duty; that by it ends are
proposed from which jurisprudence altogether abstracts. In the case of
the moral imperative, and the supposition of freedom which it
necessarily involves, the law, the power (to fulfil it) and the
rational will that determines the maxim, constitute all the elements
that form the notion of juridical duty. But in the imperative, which
commands the duty of virtue, there is added, besides the notion of
self-constraint, that of an end; not one that we have, but that we
ought to have, which, therefore, pure practical reason has in
itself, whose highest, unconditional end (which, however, continues to
be duty) consists in this: that virtue is its own end and, by
deserving well of men, is also its own reward. Herein it shines so
brightly as an ideal to human perceptions, it seems to cast in the
shade even holiness itself, which is never tempted to
transgression. * This, however, is an illusion arising from the fact
that as we have no measure for the degree of strength, except the
greatness of the obstacles which might have been overcome (which in
our case are the inclinations), we are led to mistake the subjective
conditions of estimation of a magnitude for the objective conditions
of the magnitude itself. But when compared with human ends, all of
which have their obstacles to be overcome, it is true that the worth
of virtue itself, which is its own end, far outweighs the worth of all
the utility and all the empirical ends and advantages which it may
have as consequences.
* So that one might vary two well-known lines of Haller thus:
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 100}