III. Of the Reason for conceiving an End which is also a Duty

An end is an object of the free elective will, the idea of which

determines this will to an action by which the object is produced.

Accordingly every action has its end, and as no one can have an end

without himself making the object of his elective will his end,

hence to have some end of actions is an act of the freedom of the

agent, not an affect of physical nature. Now, since this act which

determines an end is a practical principle which commands not the

means (therefore not conditionally) but the end itself (therefore

unconditionally), hence it is a categorical imperative of pure

practical reason and one, therefore, which combines a concept of

duty with that of an end in general.

Now there must be such an end and a categorical imperative

corresponding to it. For since there are free actions, there must also

be ends to which as an object those actions are directed. Amongst

these ends there must also be some which are at the same time (that

is, by their very notion) duties. For if there were none such, then

since no actions can be without an end, all ends which practical

reason might have would be valid only as means to other ends, and a

categorical imperative would be impossible; a supposition which

destroys all moral philosophy.

Here, therefore, we treat not of ends which man actually makes to

himself in accordance with the sensible impulses of his nature, but of

objects of the free elective will under its own laws- objects which he

ought to make his end. We may call the former technical

(subjective), properly pragmatical, including the rules of prudence in

the choice of its ends; but the latter we must call the moral

(objective) doctrine of ends. This distinction is, however,

superfluous here, since moral philosophy already by its very notion is

clearly separated from the doctrine of physical nature (in the present

instance, anthropology). The latter resting on empirical principles,

whereas the moral doctrine of ends which treats of duties rests on

principles given a priori in pure practical reason.

{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 35}

The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics · 第 8 / 52 题