CHAPTER XI.

THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS INTERPRETATION.

The Constitution is not what it ought to be, not what we wish it to

be; not what is consistent with sound morals, but simply what its

words meant in 1789,--nothing more, nothing less.

The Constitution of the United States was drawn up by a Convention, of

which Washington was president. The people, assembled in their State

Conventions, adopted the draft, because it aptly expressed the kind of

union they wished to have, because it fully and exactly expressed their

meaning. In order, therefore, to ascertain the character of our

political union with the Slave States, we have only to ascertain the

true meaning of the words of the Constitution, or their plain, obvious,

and common meaning, at the time the Constitution was adopted. Every

writer who wishes to be understood uses his words in their usual

signification. Every one supposes that we mean just what our words

commonly mean now. When we read Chaucer, or Shakspeare, or Dr. Johnson,

we understand him to mean just what his words commonly meant at the time

he wrote, unless such meaning is repelled or qualified by the context,

in which case we adopt this new or qualified meaning. In like manner,

the people of the United States are to be understood to mean, by the

words of the Constitution, just what those words commonly meant when the

Constitution was adopted, unless such meaning is repelled or qualified

by the context; in which case, a regard for truth obliges us to adopt

this new or qualified meaning.

This simple, true, and universally practised rule is thus laid down by

Judge Story (Comm. on Const. Abr. Sec. 210):--

"Every word employed in the Constitution is to be expounded in its

plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some

ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it. Constitutions are not

designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of

expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning,

or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or juridical

research. They are instruments of a practical nature, founded on the

common business of human life, adapted to common wants, designed for

common use, and fitted for common understandings. The people make

them; the people adopt them; the people must be supposed to read

them, with the help of common sense; and cannot be presumed to admit

in them any recondite meaning, or any extraordinary gloss."--Sec.

212: "Where technical words are used, the technical meaning is to be

applied to them, unless it is repelled by the context. But the same

word often possesses a technical and a common sense. In such a case,

the latter is to be preferred, unless some attendant circumstance

points clearly to the former."

The Constitution was also framed and adopted with reference to the

actual political, social, and local condition of the people. It grew out

of their wants and wishes. The steps which finally led to its adoption

grew out of one of the many defects in the articles of confederation.

Consequently, to arrive at the true meaning of the Constitution, we must

bear in mind the political, social, and local condition of the people at

the time of its adoption, and, among many other similar facts, the very

general existence of domestic slavery.[V]

Keeping in view these, the very simplest rules of interpretation, we

will show what the Constitution is according to the common meaning of

its terms; what its framers intended to make it; what, in point of fact,

it has been considered to be in the practice of the government; and,

finally, what it has been adjudged to mean by that body which it has

itself pointed out as the final arbiter of its meaning. And, if all

these unite in giving the Constitution but one character, we, as

reasonable men, seeking the truth, cannot deny that such is its true

character.

Slavery and the Constitution · 第 11 / 16 章