CHAPTER I

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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES

AND PREPARATIONS FOR A CATASTROPHIC

CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE:

FINDINGS AND ACTIONS TAKEN

PREPARED BY

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

FROM ANALYSES CARRIED OUT BY THE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ad hoc COMMITTEE ON ASSESSMENT OF

CONSEQUENCES AND PREPARATIONS FOR

A MAJOR CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE

[Illustration: fema symbol

federal emergency

management agency]

Washington, D.C. 20472

November 1980

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER:

I. Executive Summary of Findings, Issues, and Actions 1

II. Geologic Earthquake Scenarios 15

III. Assessment of Losses for Selected Potential

California Earthquakes 21

IV. An Assessment of the Current State of Readiness

Capability of Federal, State, and Local

Governments for Earthquake Response 27

V. An Assessment of the Social Impacts 35

ANNEX:

1. Copies of Correspondence Between President

Carter and Governor Brown 37

2. Current California and Federal Earthquake

Response Planning 43

3. California Assembly Bill No. 2202 53

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 57

CHAPTER I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, ISSUES, AND ACTIONS

A. BACKGROUND

After viewing the destruction wrought by the eruption of Mt. St.

Helens in Washington State in May 1980, President Carter became

concerned about the impacts of a similar event of low probability but

high damage potential, namely a catastrophic earthquake in California,

and the state of readiness to cope with the impacts of such an event.

As a result of the President's concern, an _ad hoc_ committee of the

National Security Council was formed to conduct a government review of

the consequences of, and preparation for such an event. In addition to

the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Committee included

representatives from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the

United States Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior, the

Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation, and the

National Communications System, at the Federal level; State of

California agencies and California local governments at the State and

local levels; and consultants from the private sector. During the

summer of 1980, the participants in this review prepared working papers

on relevant issues and problem areas for the consideration of the _ad

hoc_ committee. Pertinent facts, conclusions and recommendations were

reviewed with the Governor of the State of California. The President

reviewed the _ad hoc_ committee's findings and approved the

recommendations for Federal action. This report summarizes the results

of the assessment and notes these actions.

A number of Federal legislative and administrative actions have been

taken to bring about, in the near future, an increased capability to

respond to such an event. The Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977

(P.L. 95-124) authorizes a coordinated and structured program to

identify earthquake risks and prepare to lessen or mitigate their

impacts by a variety of means. The coordination of this program, the

National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP), is the

responsibility of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),

which is charged with focusing Federal efforts to respond to

emergencies of all types and lessen their impacts before they occur.

The NEHRP has six high-priority thrusts:

» Overall coordination of Federal departments and agencies'

programs

» Maintenance of a comprehensive program of research and

development for earthquake prediction and hazards

mitigation

» Leadership and support of the Federal Interagency

Committee on Seismic Safety in Construction as it develops

seismic design and construction standards for use in

Federal projects

» Development of response plans and assistance to State and

local governments in the preparation of their plans

» Analysis of the ability of financial institutions to

perform their functions after a creditable prediction of

an earthquake as well as after an event, together with an

exploration of the feasibility of using these institutions

to foster hazard reduction

» An examination of the appropriate role of insurance in

mitigating the impacts of earthquakes.

More recently, a cooperative Federal, State, local, and private-sector

effort was initiated to prepare for responding to a credible

large-magnitude earthquake, or its prediction, in Southern California.

B. SUMMARY

The review provided the overall assessment that the Nation is

essentially unprepared for the catastrophic earthquake (with a

probability greater than 50 percent) that must be expected in

California in the next three decades. While current response plans and

preparedness measures may be adequate for moderate earthquakes,

Federal, State, and local officials agree that preparations are

woefully inadequate to cope with the damage and casualties from a

catastrophic earthquake, and with the disruptions in communications,

social fabric, and governmental structure that may follow. Because of

the large concentration of population and industry, the impacts of

such an earthquake would surpass those of any natural disaster thus

far experienced by the Nation. Indeed, the United States has not

suffered any disaster of this magnitude on its own territory since the

Civil War.

The basis for this overall assessment is summarized below and

discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapters of this report.

C. LIKELIHOOD OF FUTURE EARTHQUAKES

Earth scientists unanimously agree on the inevitability of major

earthquakes in California. The gradual movement of the Pacific Plate

relative to the North American Plate leads to the inexorable

concentration of strain along the San Andreas and related fault

systems. While some of this strain is released by moderate and smaller

earthquakes and by slippage without earthquakes, geologic studies

indicate that the vast bulk of the strain is released through the

occurrence of major earthquakes--that is, earthquakes with Richter

magnitudes of 7.0 and larger and capable of widespread damage in a

developed region. Along the Southern San Andreas fault, some 30 miles

from Los Angeles, for example, geologists can demonstrate that at

least eight major earthquakes have occurred in the past 1,200 years

with an average spacing in time of 140 years, plus or minus 30 years.

The last such event occurred in 1857. Based on these statistics and

other geophysical observations, geologists estimate that the

probability for the recurrence of a similar earthquake is currently as

large as 2 to 5 percent per year and greater than 50 percent in the

next 30 years. Geologic evidence also indicates other faults capable

of generating major earthquakes in other locations near urban centers

in California, including San Francisco-Oakland, the immediate Los

Angeles region, and San Diego. Seven potential events have been

postulated for purposes of this review and are discussed in chapter

II. The current estimated probability for a major earthquake in these

other locations is smaller, but significant. The aggregate probability

for a catastrophic earthquake in the whole of California in the next

three decades is well in excess of 50 percent.

D. CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE

Casualties and property damage estimates for four of the most likely

catastrophic earthquakes in California were prepared to form a basis

for emergency preparedness and response. Chapter III gives details on

these estimates. Deaths and injuries would occur principally because

of the failure of man-made structures, particularly older, multistory,

and unreinforced brick masonry buildings built before the adoption of

earthquake-resistant building codes. Experience has shown that some

modern multistory buildings--constructed as recently as the late

1960's but not adequately designed or erected to meet the current

understanding of requirements for seismic resistance--are also subject

to failure. Strong ground shaking, which is the primary cause of

damage during earthquakes, often extends over vast areas. For example,

in an earthquake similar to that which occurred in 1857, strong ground

shaking (above the threshold for causing damage) would extend in a

broad strip along the Southern San Andreas fault, about 250 miles long

and 100 miles wide, and include almost all of the Los Angeles-San

Bernardino metropolitan area, and all of Ventura, Santa Barbara, San

Luis Obispo, and Kern counties.

For the most probable catastrophic earthquake--a Richter magnitude 8+

earthquake similar to that of 1857, which occurred along the Southern

San Andreas fault--estimates of fatalities range from about 3,000, if

the earthquake were to occur at 2:30 a.m. when the population is

relatively safe at home, to more than 13,000, if the earthquake were to

occur at 4:30 p.m. on a weekday, when much of the population is either

in office buildings or on the streets. Injuries serious enough to

require hospitalization under normal circumstances are estimated to be

about four times as great as fatalities. For the less likely prospect

of a Richter magnitude 7.5 earthquake on the Newport-Inglewood fault in

the immediate Los Angeles area, fatalities are estimated to be about

4,000 to 23,000, at the same respective times. Such an earthquake,

despite its smaller magnitude, would be more destructive because of its

relative proximity to the most heavily developed regions; however, the

probability of this event is estimated to be only about 0.1 percent per

year. Smaller magnitude--and consequently less damaging--earthquakes

are anticipated with greater frequency on a number of fault systems in

California.

In either of these earthquakes, casualties could surpass the previous

single greatest loss of life in the United States due to a natural

disaster, which was about 6,000 persons killed when a hurricane and

storm surge struck the Galveston area of the Texas coast in 1900. The

highest loss of life due to earthquakes in the United States occurred

in San Francisco in 1906, when 700 people were killed. By way of

comparison (in spite of the vast differences in building design and

practices and socioeconomic systems) the devastating 1976 Tangshan

earthquake in China caused fatalities ranging from the official

Chinese Government figure of 242,000 to unofficial estimates as high

as 700,000. Fortunately, building practices in the United States

preclude such a massive loss of life.

Property losses are expected to be higher than in any past earthquake

in the United States. For example, San Francisco in 1906, and

Anchorage in 1964, were both much less developed than today when they

were hit by earthquakes. And the San Fernando earthquake in 1971, was

only a moderate shock that struck on the fringe of a large urban area.

Each of these three earthquakes caused damage estimated at about $0.5

billion in the then current dollars. Estimates of property damage for

the most probable catastrophic earthquake on the Southern San Andreas

(Richter magnitude 8+) and for the less probable but more damaging one

(Richter magnitude 7.5) on the Newport-Inglewood fault, are about $15

billion and $70 billion respectively. By comparison, tropical storm

Agnes caused the largest economic loss due to a natural disaster in

the United States to date but it amounted to only $3.5 billion (in

1972 dollars).

It should be noted, however, that substantial uncertainty exists in

casualty and property damage estimates because they are based on

experience with only moderate earthquakes in the United States (such

as the 1971 San Fernando earthquake) and experience in other countries

where buildings are generally less resistant to damage. The

uncertainty is so large that the estimated impacts could be off by a

factor of two or three, either too high or too low. Even if these

lowest estimates prevail, however, the assessment about preparedness

and the capability to respond to the disasters discussed in this

report would be substantially unchanged.

Assuming a catastrophic earthquake, a variety of secondary problems

could also be expected. Search and rescue operations--requiring heavy

equipment to move debris--would be needed to free people trapped in

collapsed buildings. It is likely that injuries, particularly those

immediately after the event, could overwhelm medical capabilities,

necessitating a system of allocating medical resources to those who

could be helped the most. Numerous local fires must be expected;

nevertheless, a conflagration such as that which followed the Tokyo

earthquake of 1923, or the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, is

improbable, unless a "Santa Ana type" wind pattern is in effect. Since

the near failure of a dam in the San Fernando, California, earthquake

of 1971 (which was a moderate event), substantial progress has been

made in California to reduce the hazard from dams, in some cases

through reconstruction. For planning purposes, however, experts

believe that the failure of at least one dam should be anticipated

during a catastrophic earthquake in either the Los Angeles or San

Francisco regions.

Experience in past earthquakes, particularly the 1971 San Fernando

earthquake, has demonstrated the potential vulnerability of commercial

telephone service to earthquakes, including the possibility of damage

to switching facilities from ground shaking and rupture of underground

cables that cross faults. This is especially serious because

immediately following earthquakes, public demand for telephone

services increases drastically. This increased demand overloads the

capability of the system, even if it had not been damaged, and

therefore management action to reduce the availability of service to

non-priority users and to accommodate emergency calls is mandatory.

Radio-based communication systems, particularly those not requiring

commercial power, are relatively safe from damage, although some must

be anticipated. The redundancy of existing communication systems,

including those designed for emergency use, means that some capability

for communicating with the affected region from the outside would

almost surely exist. Restoration of service by the commercial carriers

should begin within 24 to 72 hours as a result of maintenance and

management actions; however, total restoration of service would take

significantly longer.

While numerous agencies have the capability for emergency

communication within themselves, non-telephonic communication among

entities and agencies in the affected area is minimal. This is true

for Federal, State, and local agencies. This weakness has been pointed

out repeatedly by earthquake response exercises, and the problem is

raised by almost every emergency preparedness official at every level

of government. Consequently, a major problem for resolution is the

operational integration of communications systems and networks among

the relevant Federal, State, and local agencies.

Because of their network-like character, most systems for

transportation and water and power generation and distribution, as a

whole, are resistant to failure, despite potentially severe local

damage. These systems would suffer serious local outages, particularly

in the first several days after the event, but would resume service

over a few weeks to months. The principal difficulty would be the

greatly increased need for these systems in the first few days after

the event, when lifesaving activities would be paramount.

Portions of the San Francisco Bay Area and of the Los Angeles Area

contain substantial concentrations of manufacturing capacity for

guided missiles and space vehicles, semiconductors, aircraft parts,

electronic computing equipment, and airframes. Their specific

vulnerability to the postulated earthquakes was not analyzed. In the

event of major damage, however, the long-term impacts may be mitigated

somewhat by such measures as the use of underutilized capacity located

elsewhere, substitution of capacity from other industries, imports,

use of other products, and drawing-down of inventories.

Since we have not recently experienced a catastrophic earthquake in

the United States, there are many unknowns which must be estimated

with best judgment. This is true particularly for the response of

individuals as well as governmental and other institutions. Popular

assumptions of post-disaster behavior include antisocial behavior and

the need for martial law, the breakdown of government institutions,

and the requirement for the quick assertion of outside leadership and

control. Practical experience and field studies of disasters, however,

indicate that these assumptions are not necessarily correct. On the

contrary, the impacts of the disaster commonly produce a sense of

solidarity and cooperativeness among the survivors. Nonetheless, the

perception remains among emergency response officials that there will

be an increased need for law enforcement following the event.

Another major unknown involves whether a medium or short-term warning

of the event would be possible and how such a warning could be

utilized most effectively. The technology for earthquake prediction is

in an early stage of development and, therefore it is problematical

that researchers will succeed in issuing a short-term warning before a

catastrophic earthquake, should the event occur in the next few

years. Yet as research progresses, scientifically-based,

intermediate-term warnings are possible, but subject to a high degree

of uncertainty. Consequently, response preparations must be made for

both an earthquake without warning, and one with a short-or

intermediate-term warning, possibly with a significant level of

uncertainty.

E. CAPABILITY FOR RESPONSE

Planning for response to a large-scale disaster is a complicated

process encompassing many variables such as population densities and

distribution characteristics; land-use patterns and construction

techniques; geographical configurations; vulnerability of

transportation; communications and other lifeline systems; complex

response operations; long-term physical, social, and economic recovery

policies. These factors, together with the realization that an

earthquake has the potential for being the greatest single-event

catastrophe in California, make it incumbent upon the State to

maintain as high a level of emergency readiness as is practicable, and

to provide guidance and assistance to local jurisdictions desiring to

plan and prepare for such events. Annex 2 reviews the general nature

of preparedness planning and the basic characteristics of California

and Federal Government plans.

Federal, State, and local emergency response capabilities are judged

to be adequate for moderate earthquakes--those that are most likely to

occur frequently in California and cause property damage in the range

of $1 billion. Such an event, however, would severely tax existing

resources and provide a major test of management relationships among

different governmental levels. Federal, State, and local officials,

however, are quick to point out serious shortcomings in their ability

to respond to a catastrophic earthquake. An analysis of the

preparedness posture of 60 local governments, 34 California State

organizations, and 17 Federal agencies, carried out by the California

Office of Emergency Services (OES) and FEMA, indicates that response

to such an earthquake would become disorganized and largely

ineffective. Many governmental units have generalized earthquake

response plans, some have tailored earthquake plans, and several plans

are regularly exercised. The coordination of these plans among

jurisdictions, agencies, and levels of government, however, is

inadequate. In addition, the potential for prediction is not

incorporated; long-term recovery issues are not considered; and

communications problems are significant, as discussed above. Overall,

Federal preparedness is deficient at this time. Early reaction to a

catastrophic event would likely be characterized by delays,

ineffective response, and ineffectively coordinated delivery of

support.

FEMA Region IX (San Francisco) has drafted an Earthquake Response Plan

for the San Francisco Bay area. Annex 2 gives an overview of this

draft plan. This is a site-specific plan for response to potential

catastrophic earthquake occurrences. The emergency response portion

relies upon a decentralized approach which provides for Federal

disaster support activities to be assigned to selected Federal

agencies by mission assignment letters. No specific plans have been

prepared in this detail for other seismic risk areas, although it is

expected that the Bay Area plan could be easily adapted to other

areas. The Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation

are developing detailed earthquake plans that would ensure a

well-organized and adequate response to mission assignments for a

major earthquake. The plans of other agencies need further

development.

Very significant capabilities to assist in emergency response exist

within the California National Guard, California Highway Patrol, the

Departments of Health Services and Transportation, and the U.S.

Department of Defense. Capabilities exist for such lifesaving

activities as _aerial reconnaissance, search and rescue, emergency

medical services, emergency construction and repair, communications,

and emergency housing and food_. Current estimates by both Federal and

State officials, however, indicate that at least 6 to 8 hours would be

required before personnel and equipment can be mobilized and begin

initial deployment to the affected area. During the period before the

arrival of significant outside assistance critical to the saving of

lives (especially of those trapped in collapsed buildings), the public

would be forced to rely largely upon its own resources for search and

rescue, first aid, and general lifesaving actions. The current level

of public preparation for this critical phase of response can be

described as only minimal. Much of the current state of preparedness

arises from past programs aimed at a wide spectrum of emergencies,

particularly civil defense against nuclear attack. New or strengthened

programs are needed to enhance public preparedness.

FEMA has recently entered into a cooperative effort with California

State and local governments to prepare an integrated prototype

preparedness plan to respond to a catastrophic earthquake in Southern

California or to a prediction of such an event. The plan's completion,

in late 1981, promises to improve substantially the state of readiness

to respond to the prediction and the occurrence of an earthquake in

that area and to provide a model which could be applied to other

earthquake-prone regions of California and the rest of the country.

F. FINDINGS, ISSUES, AND ACTIONS

The _ad hoc_ committee responsible for this review developed several

significant findings related to the implications of major earthquakes

in California and our capabilities to respond to them. It then

identified major relevant issues raised by these findings and caused a

number of actions to be taken. A brief discussion of the results of

its review follows.

1. Leadership

=Finding=: _Effective leadership at all governmental levels is the

single most important factor needed to improve this Nation's

preparedness for a catastrophic earthquake in California._ The problem

of emergency preparedness is severely complicated because

responsibilities for preparation and response cut across normal lines

of authority. Further complication arises from the large areal extent

of the impacts expected from a major earthquake, affecting literally

dozens of government entities. The emergency services coordinator at

any level of government is effective only to the extent he or she is

backed by the political leadership at that level. This is especially

true when preparedness activities must be done, for the most part,

within existing resources. City and county officials must increasingly

accept their share of the responsibility for preparedness, but

commitment by State or Federal leaders is also essential. The general

tendency among elected officials and the public is to ignore the

existing hazard problem. Experience, however, teaches that effective

response mechanisms must be in place before the disaster; they cannot

be developed in the time of crisis. Overcoming this apathy and

developing the organizational arrangements among Federal, State, and

local government and volunteer agencies--together with the private

sector and the general public will require, above all, leadership.

=Issue=: The leadership role of the Federal Government in

preparing for a catastrophic earthquake in California and

how this leadership role is to be exerted require

clarification.

=Action=: The President has communicated with the

Governor of California to indicate the results of this

review, to express concern about the need for cooperative

leadership to prepare for the event, and to offer to

increase the Federal effort with the State of California

and local governments in the cooperative undertaking to

prepare for a catastrophic earthquake. He stressed that

the Federal role is to supplement the effort and

resources of the State, and that commitment of

significant Federal resources would be contingent upon

the application of significant State resources. In his

response to the President's communications, the Governor

of California underscored the State's readiness to

participate in this cooperative effort and announced his

signing into law a measure that would provide substantial

State resources (see annex 1). A summary of the new law

(A.B. 2202) is contained in annex 3.

2. Management of Preparedness and Response Activities

=Finding=: _Preparedness must be developed as a partnership between

Federal, State, and local governments with improvements needed at all

levels_, as none have the resources or authorities to solve the

problem alone.

=Issue=: Since the Nation faces a very probable earthquake

in California sometime during the next 30 years, FEMA

should provide the necessary leadership, management, and

coordination required to strengthen planning and

preparedness within the Federal Government, as delegated

under the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program of

1977 and the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. In this effort,

FEMA requires the support and assistance of numerous other

Federal agencies.

=Actions=: FEMA is taking steps to:

» Strengthen significantly its management, research,

application, and coordination functions, as delegated

under the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program

and Disaster Relief Act.

» Lead other agencies in the development of a

comprehensive preparedness strategy detailing specific

objectives and assignments, and periodically monitor

accomplishments in meeting assigned responsibilities.

Departments and agencies with appropriate capabilities

will provide needed support to FEMA in strengthening

Federal preparedness and hazard mitigation programs.

=Issue=: A major deficiency that has been identified is the

potential for delay following a catastrophic earthquake in

processing a request for a Presidential declaration of a

major disaster, and the subsequent initiation of full-scale

Federal support for lifesaving actions. The first few hours

are critical in saving the lives of people trapped in

collapsed buildings; consequently, this is when Federal

support is needed most. Decisions on post-event recovery

aspects of Federal assistance can be deferred until

lifesaving operations are underway and sufficient

information about damage is in hand.

=Action=: FEMA will develop and negotiate, before the

event, an agreement with the State of California which

will enable the President to declare a major disaster and

initiate full-scale Federal support for lifesaving and

humanitarian action within minutes of a catastrophic

earthquake. The agreement will defer resolution of issues

relating to longer-term restoration and recovery and

similar questions with large budgetary implications until

adequate damage estimates are available. The Executive

Branch will thus be able to arrive at an informed

decision.

=Issue=: Significant improvements in the Federal, State,

and local capability for coordination of operational

response to a catastrophic earthquake are needed.

=Actions=: FEMA and other appropriate Federal agencies will

increase their efforts, in a partnership with appropriate

State and local agencies and volunteer and private-sector

organizations, to:

» Complete development and agreement on fully integrated

earthquake response plans for both the San Francisco

and Los Angeles regions, including provision for

predicted as well as unpredicted earthquakes, building

upon the existing draft plan for San Francisco.

» Establish a small FEMA staff in California dedicated to

the coordination of earthquake preparedness planning and

implementation.

» Develop improved mechanisms for the coordination of

medical and mortuary activities following a catastrophic

earthquake.

» Identify and document the critical requirements for

emergency communications--particularly non-telephonic

communications--among Federal, State, and local

agencies. Shortfalls between critical requirements and

current capabilities, as well as remedial actions or

recommended solutions for each will be identified in

accordance with the "National Plan for Communications

Support in Emergencies and Major Disasters." This

review will include consideration of using existing

satellite communications or a dedicated system, should

it be found necessary.

» Cooperatively conduct practice response exercises with

State and local officials that will prepare officials

and the public for conditions that might be encountered

in a catastrophic earthquake and that would reveal

deficiencies in planning.

=Issue=: Improving the current inadequate preparedness of

the public for a catastrophic earthquake requires a

substantial increase in public information and public

awareness. Although public information is primarily a

State, local, and private-sector responsibility, the

Federal Government has a role as well. Because citizens

will have no choice but to rely largely upon their own

resources in the first several hours immediately following

a catastrophic earthquake, it is important that certain

basic knowledge about lifesaving measures be very widely

disseminated.

=Action=: FEMA will stimulate and work with the State of

California and other appropriate groups to develop and

publicize earthquake awareness, hazard mitigation

techniques, specific post-earthquake actions to be taken,

including first aid, and other pertinent information.

=Issue=: The possibility of a credible,

scientifically-based prediction of a catastrophic

earthquake poses serious challenges to government and our

society. The current level of scientific understanding of

earthquake prediction and the available resources are such

that present instrumentation efforts are directed toward

research rather than maintaining extensive monitoring

networks for real-time prediction. The transition from

research to fully operational capability will require

additional scientific understanding as well as resources.

Earthquake predictions are possible, perhaps likely,

however, from the current research effort. Even with a

significant level of uncertainty, any scientifically

credible prediction that indicates a catastrophic

earthquake is expected within about 1 year or less, will

require very difficult and consequential decisions on the

part of elected officials at all levels of government.

Decisions may include such possibilities as the

mobilization of National Guard and U.S. Department of

Defense resources prior to the event, the imposition of

special procedures or drills at potentially hazardous

facilities, such as nuclear reactors or dams, the

condemnation or evacuation of particularly unsafe buildings

with the subsequent need for temporary housing, and the

provisions of special protection of fragile inventories. If

the prediction is correct and appropriate actions are

taken, thousands of lives can be saved and significant

economic losses can be avoided. The costs of responding to

a prediction may be substantial, however, and the

commitment of resources undoubtedly will have to be made in

the face of considerable uncertainty and even reluctance.

Indeed, the possibility of an inaccurate prediction must be

faced squarely.

=Actions=: FEMA, in conjunction with other appropriate

Federal agencies, State and local governments, and

volunteer and private-sector organizations, will increase

its actions to develop procedures for responding to a

credible, scientific earthquake prediction, including:

» Identification of constructive and prudent actions to

be taken

» Analysis of the costs and benefits of various

alternative actions

» Identification of roles and responsibilities in deciding

which actions should be implemented and by whom

» Criteria for evaluating circumstances when the provision

of Federal assistance would be appropriate

The U.S. Geological Survey of the Department of the

Interior will:

» Maintain a sound and well-balanced program of research

in earthquake prediction and hazard assessment based

upon a carefully considered strategic plan

» Work with State and local officials and FEMA to develop

improved mechanisms for the transmission of earthquake

predictions and related information, and to plan for the

utilization of the capability for earthquake prediction

3. Resources

=Finding=: While leadership and management are essential ingredients to

achieve an adequate earthquake preparedness posture, _the availability

of adequate staffing and resources at all levels of government

determines the efficacy of agency programs and initiatives_. In many

agencies, earthquake preparedness has been accorded a low priority in

their programs. This is a manifestation of a more general problem of

minimal agency resource allocation to emergency preparedness. The

results of the actions that have been indicated will be limited unless

additional resources are made available.

=Issue=: Additional resources should be provided as

necessary to accelerate the earthquake hazard mitigation

and preparedness activities under the National Earthquake

Hazards Reduction Program.

=Action=: FEMA has reassessed its priorities and is

allocating resources to increase the staffing, funding,

and management attention and direction for earthquake

hazards mitigation, including preparations for a

catastrophic earthquake in California. This includes an

increase of staff resources in FEMA Region IX for

Federal, State, and local coordination of planning,

preparedness, and mitigation. Resource needs that cannot

be fully met by the reassessment and reallocation for

Fiscal Year 1981 should be identified and justified along

with needs for Fiscal Year 1982 in the course of the

budget submissions for Fiscal Year 1982. To facilitate an

adequate and balanced response by other Federal agencies,

FEMA will provide timely guidance to other agencies on

specific priorities for this effort in relation to other

major preparedness goals. The Office of Management and

Budget and the Office of Science and Technology Policy

will work together to develop a cross-agency ranking of

budgetary resources for earthquake preparedness for

Fiscal Year 1982.

An Assessment of the Consequences and Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findings and Actions Taken · 第 1 / 6 章