long trod the stage with dignity and elevation.
_Paradoxa_.—This tract contains a defence of six peculiar opinions or
paradoxes of the Stoics, somewhat of the description of those which Cato
was wont to promulgate in the Senate. These are, that what is morally
fitting (_honestum_) is alone good,—that the virtuous can want nothing for
complete happiness—that there are no degrees in crimes or good
actions—that every fool is mad—that the wise alone are wealthy—that the
wise man alone is free, and that every fool is a slave. These absurd and
quibbling positions the author supports, in a manner certainly more
ingenious than philosophical. The _Paradoxa_, indeed, seem to have been
written as a sort of exercise of rhetorical wit, rather than as a serious
disquisition in philosophy; and each paradox is personally applied or
directed against an individual. There is no precision whatever in the
definitions; the author plays on the ambiguity of the words, _bonum_ and
_dives_, and his arguments frequently degenerate into particular examples,
which are by no means adequate to support his general proposition.
_De Naturâ Deorum_.—Of the various philosophical works of Cicero, the most
curious perhaps, and important, is that on the Nature of the Gods. It is
addressed to Brutus, and is written in dialogue. This form of composition,
besides the advantages already pointed out, is peculiarly fitted for
subjects of delicacy and danger, where the author dreads to expose himself
to reproach or persecution. On this account chiefly it seems to have been
adopted by the disciples of Socrates. That philosopher had fallen a victim
to popular fury,—to those imputations of impiety which have so often and
so successfully been repeated against philosophers. In the schools of his
disciples, a double doctrine seems to have been adopted for the purpose of
escaping persecution, and Plato probably considered the form of dialogue
as best calculated to secure him from the imputations of his enemies. It
was thus, in later times, that Galileo endeavoured to shield himself from
the attacks of error and injustice, and imagined, that by presenting his
conclusions in the Platonic manner, he would shun the malignant vigilance
of the Court of Inquisition(433).
In the dialogue _De Naturâ Deorum_, the author presents the doctrines of
three of the most distinguished sects among the ancients—the Epicureans,
the Stoics, and the Academics—on the important subject of the Nature of
the Divine Essence, and of Providence. He introduces three illustrious
persons of his country, each elucidating the tenets of the sect that he
preferred, and contending for them, doubtless, with the chief arguments
which the learning or talents of the author himself could supply. Cicero
represents himself as having gone to the house of C. Cotta the Pontifex
Maximus, whom he found sitting in his study with C. Velleius, a Senator,
who professed the principles of Epicurus, and Q. Lucilius Balbus, a
supporter of the doctrines of the Stoics.—“As soon as Cotta saw me, ‘You
are come,’ says he, ‘very seasonably, for I have a dispute with Velleius
upon an important subject, in which, considering the nature of your
studies, it is not improper for you to join.’—‘Indeed,’ said I, ‘I am come
very seasonably, as you say, for here are three chiefs of the three
principal sects met together.’ ” Cotta himself is a new Academic, and he
proceeds to inform Cicero that they were discoursing on the nature of the
gods, a topic which had always appeared to him very obscure, and that
therefore he had prevailed on Velleius to state the sentiments of Epicurus
upon the subject. Velleius is requested to go on with his arguments; and
after recapitulating what he had already said, “with the confidence
peculiar to his sect, dreading nothing so much as to seem to doubt about
anything, he began, as if he had just then descended from the council of
the gods(434).”
The discourse of Velleius consists, in a considerable degree, of raillery
and declamations directed against the doctrines of different sects, of
which he enumerates a great variety, and which supposes in Cicero
extensive philosophical erudition, or rather, perhaps, from the slight
manner in which they are passed over, that he had taken his account of
them from some ancient Diogenes Laertius, or Stanley(435).—“I have
hitherto,” says Velleius, “rather exposed the dreams of dotards than the
opinions of philosophers; and whoever considers how rashly and
inconsiderately their tenets are advanced, must entertain a veneration for
Epicurus, and rank him in the number of those beings who are the subject
of this dispute, for he alone first founded the existence of the gods, on
the impression which nature herself hath made on the minds of men.”
Velleius having concluded his discourse, (the remainder of which can now
have little interest as relating to the form of the gods and their
apathy,) Cotta, after some compliments to him, enters on a confutation of
what he had advanced; and, while admitting that there are gods, he
pronounces the reasons given by Velleius for their existence to be
altogether insufficient. He then proceeds to attack the other positions of
Velleius, with regard to the form of the gods, and their exemption from
the labours of creation and providence. His arguments against
Anthropomorphism are excellent; and in reply to the hypothesis of Epicurus
concerning the indolence of the gods, he inquires, “What reason is there
that men should worship the gods, when the gods, as you say, not only do
not regard men, but are entirely careless of everything, and absolutely do
nothing? But they are, you say, of so glorious a nature, that a wise man
is induced by their excellence to adore them. Can there be any glory in
that nature, which only contemplates its own happiness, and neither will
do, nor does, nor ever did anything? Besides, what piety is due to a being
from whom you receive nothing, or how are you indebted to him who bestows
no benefits?”
When Cotta has concluded his refutation of Velleius, with which the first
book closes, Balbus is next requested to give the sentiments of the
Stoics, on the subject of the gods, to which, making a slight excuse, he
consents. His first argument for their existence, after shortly alluding
to the magnificence of the world, and the prevalence of the doctrine, is
“the frequent appearance of the gods themselves. In the war with the
Latins,” he continues, “when A. Posthumius, the Dictator, attacked
Octavius Mamilius, the Tusculan, at Regillus, Castor and Pollux were seen
fighting in our army on horseback, and since that time the same offspring
of Tyndarus gave notice of the defeat of Perseus; for P. Vatienus,
grandfather of the present youth of that name, coming in the night to
Rome, from his government of Reate, two young men on white horses appeared
to him, and told him King Perseus was that day taken prisoner. This news
he carried to the Senate, who immediately threw him into prison, for
speaking inconsiderately on a state affair; but when it was confirmed by
letters from Paullus, he was recompensed by the Senate with land and
exemption. The voices of the Fauns have been often heard, and deities have
appeared in forms so visible, that he who doubts must be hardened in
stupidity or impiety.”
Balbus, after farther arguing for the existence of the gods, from events
consequent on auguries and auspices, proceeds to what is more peculiarly
the doctrine of the Stoics. He remarks,—“that Cleanthes, one of the most
distinguished philosophers of that sect, imputes the idea of the gods
implanted in the minds of men, to four causes—The first is, what I just
now mentioned, a pre-knowledge of future things: The second is, the great
advantages we enjoy from the temperature of the air, the fertility of the
earth, and the abundance of various kinds of benefits: The third is, the
terror with which the mind is affected by thunder, tempests, snow, hail,
devastation, pestilence, earthquakes, often attended with hideous noises,
showers of stones, and rain like drops of blood. His fourth cause,”
continues Balbus, “and that the strongest, is drawn from the regularity of
the motion, and revolution of the heavens, the variety, and beauty, and
order of the sun, moon, and stars; the appearance only of which is
sufficient to convince us they are not the effects of chance; as when we
enter into a house, a school, or court, and observe the exact order,
discipline, and method therein, we cannot suppose they are so regulated
without a cause, but must conclude there is some one who commands, and to
whom obedience is paid; so we have much greater reason to think that such
wonderful motions, revolutions, and order of those many and great bodies,
no part of which is impaired by the vast infinity of age, are governed by
some intelligent being.”
This argument is very well stated, but Balbus, in a considerable degree,
weakens its effect, by proceeding to contend, that the world, or universe
itself, (the stoical deity,) and its most distinguished parts, the sun,
moon, and stars, are possessed of reason and wisdom. This he founds partly
on a metaphysical argument, and partly on the regularity, beauty, and
order of their motions.
Balbus, after various other remarks, enters on the topic of the creation
of the world, and its government by the providence of the gods. He justly
observes, that nothing can be more absurd than to suppose that a world, so
beautifully adorned, could be formed by chance, or by a fortuitous
concourse of atoms(436). “He who believes this possible,” says he, “may as
well believe, that if a great number of the one-and-twenty letters,
composed either of gold, or any other metal, were thrown on the ground,
they would fall into such order as legibly to form the Annals of Ennius. I
doubt whether fortune could make a single verse of them.” He quotes a very
beautiful passage from a now lost work of Aristotle, in which that
philosopher urges the argument that may be deduced from providential
design, with more soundness and imagination than are usual with him.
Balbus then proceeds to display the marks of deliberate plan in the
universe, beginning with astronomy. In treating of the constellations, he
makes great use of Cicero’s poetical version of Aratus, much of which he
is supposed, perhaps with little probability, or modesty in the author, to
have by heart; and, accordingly, we are favoured with a considerable
number of these verses. He also adduces manifold proofs of design and
sovereign wisdom, from a consideration of plants, land animals, fishes,
and the structure of the human body; a subject on which Cicero discovers
more anatomical knowledge than one should have expected. Balbus also
contends that the gods not only provide for mankind universally, but for
individuals. “The frequent appearances of the gods,” he observes,
“demonstrate their regard for cities and particular men. This, indeed, is
also apparent from the foreknowledge of events, which we receive either
sleeping or waking.”
Cicero makes Balbus, in the conclusion of his discourse, express but
little confidence in his own arguments.—“This is almost the whole,” says
he, “that has occurred to my mind, on the nature of the gods, and that I
thought proper to advance. Do you, Cotta, if I may advise, defend the same
cause. Remember that in Rome you keep the first rank—remember you are
Pontifex. It is a pernicious and impious custom, either seriously or
seemingly to argue against the gods.”
In the third book of this very remarkable work, Cicero exhibits Cotta as
refuting the doctrines of Balbus. “But before I enter on the subject,”
says Cotta, “I have a word to say concerning myself; for I am greatly
influenced by your authority, and your exhortation at the conclusion of
your discourse, to remember I was Cotta, and Pontifex; by which, I
presume, you intimated that I should defend the religion and ceremonies
which we received from our ancestors: Truly, I always have, and always
will defend them, nor shall the arguments, either of the learned or
unlearned, ever remove the opinions I have imbibed concerning the worship
of the immortal gods. In matters of religion, I submit to the rules of the
High Priests, T. Coruncanius, P. Scipio, and P. Scævola. These, Balbus,”
continues he, “are my sentiments, both as a priest and Cotta. But you must
bring me to your opinion by the force of your reason; for a philosopher
should prove to me the religion he would have me embrace; but I must
believe without proof the religion of our ancestors.”
The Pontifex thus professing to believe the existence of the gods merely
on the authority of his ancestors, proceeds to ridicule this very
authority. He represents the appearances of Castor and Pollux, and those
others adduced by Balbus, as idle tales. “Do you take these for fabulous
stories?” says Balbus. “Is not the temple built by Posthumius, in honour
of Castor and Pollux, to be seen in the Forum? Is not the decree of the
Senate concerning Vatienus still subsisting? Ought not such authorities to
move you?”—“You oppose me,” replies Cotta, “with stories; but I ask
reasons of you.”
A chasm here follows in the original, in which Cotta probably stated the
reasons of his scepticism, in spite of the acts of the Senate, and so many
public memorials of supernatural facts. “You believe,” continues Cotta,
“that the Decii, in devoting themselves to death, appeased the gods. How
great, then, was the iniquity of the gods, that they could not be
appeased, but at the price of such noble blood!—As to the voice of the
Fauns, I never heard it; if you assure me you have, I shall believe you;
though I am absolutely ignorant what a Faun is. Truly, Balbus, you have
not yet proved the existence of the gods. I believe it, indeed, but not
from any arguments of the Stoics. Cleanthes, you said, attributes the idea
that men have of the gods to four causes. The first is a foreknowledge of
future events; the second,—tempests and other shocks of nature; the
third,—the utility and plenty of things we enjoy; the fourth,—the
invariable order of the stars and heavens. Foreknowledge I have already
answered. With regard to tempests in the air, the sea, and the earth, I
own, that many people are affrighted by them, and imagine that the
immortal gods are the authors of them. But the question is not, whether
there be people who believe there are gods, but whether there are gods or
not. As to the two other causes of Cleanthes, one of which is derived from
the plenty we enjoy, the other from the invariable order of the seasons
and heavens, I shall treat on them when I answer your discourse concerning
the providence of the gods.”
In the meantime, Cotta goes on to refute the Stoical notions with regard
to the reason and understanding attributed to the sun, moon, and stars. He
then proceeds to controvert, and occasionally to ridicule, the opinions
entertained of numerous heathen gods; the three Jupiters, and other
deities, and sons of deities.—“You call Jupiter and Neptune gods,” says
he; “their brother Pluto, then, is one; Charon, also, and Cerberus, are
gods, but that cannot be allowed. Nor can Pluto be placed among the
deities; how then can his brothers?” Cotta next ridicules the Stoics for
the delight they take in the explication of fables, and in the etymology
of names; after which he says, “Let us proceed to the two other parts of
our dispute. 1st, Whether there is a Divine Providence that governs the
world? and, lastly, Whether that Providence particularly regards mankind?
For these are the remaining propositions of your discourse.”
There follows a considerable _hiatus_ in the original, so that we are
deprived of all the arguments of Cotta on the proposition maintained by
Balbus, that there is a Divine Providence which governs the world. At the
end of this chasm, we find him quoting long passages from tragedies, and
arguing against the advantages of reason, from the ill use which has been
made of it. He then adduces a number of instances, drawn from history and
observation, of fortunate vice, and of wrecked and ruined virtue, in order
to overturn the doctrine of _particular providence_; contending, that as
no family or state can be supposed to be formed with any judgment or
discipline, if there are no rewards for good actions, or punishment for
bad, so we cannot believe that a Divine Providence regulates the world,
when there is no distinction between the honest and the wicked.
“This,” concludes Cotta, “is the purport of what I had to say concerning
the nature of the gods, not with a design to destroy their existence, but
merely to show what an obscure point it is, and with what difficulties an
explanation of it is attended.” Balbus observing that Cotta had finished
his discourse, “You have been very severe,” says he, “against the being of
a Divine Providence, a doctrine established by the Stoics, with piety and
wisdom; but, as it grows too late, I shall defer my answer to another
day.”—“There is nothing,” replied Cotta, “I desire more than to be
confuted.”—“The conversation ended here, and we parted. Velleius judged
that the arguments of Cotta were the truest, but those of Balbus seemed to
me to have the greater probability.”
It seems likely that this profession or pretext, that the discourse is
left unfinished, may (like the occasional apologies of Cotta) be
introduced to save appearances(437). It is evident, however, that Cicero
intended to add, at least, new prefaces to the two latter books of this
work, probably from suspecting, as he went on, that the discourses are too
long to have taken place in one day, as they are now represented. Balbus
says, in the second book, “Velut a te ipso, hesterno die dictum est(438).”
Fulvius Ursinus had remarked that this was an inadvertence, either in
Cicero or a transcriber, as the discourse is continued throughout the same
day. That it was not owing to a transcriber, or to any inadvertence in
Cicero, but to a design of altering the introductions to the second and
third books, appears from a passage in book third, where Cotta says to
Balbus, “Omniaque, quæ a te _nudiustertius_ dicta sunt(439).” Now, it is
extremely unlikely that there should have been two such instances of
inadvertency in the author, or carelessness in the copyist.
The work on the Nature of the Gods, though in many respects a most
valuable production, and a convincing proof of the extensive learning of
its author, gives a melancholy picture of the state of his mind. Unfitted
to bear adversity, and borne down by the calamities of his country, and
the death of his beloved daughter, (misfortunes of which he often
complains,) Cicero seems to have become a sceptic, and occasionally to
have doubted even of a superintending Providence. Warburton appears to be
right in supposing, that Cicero was advanced in years before he seriously
adopted the sceptical opinions of the new Academy. “This farther appears,”
says he, after some remarks on this head, “from a place in his Nature of
the Gods, where he says, that his espousing the new Academy of a sudden,
was a thing altogether unlooked for(440). The change, then, was late, and
after the ruin of the republic, when Cicero retired from business, and had
leisure in his recess to plan and execute this noble undertaking. So that
a learned critic appears to have been mistaken, when he supposed the
choice of the new Academy was made in his youth. ‘This sect,’ says he,
‘did best agree with the vast genius, and ambitious spirit, of _young
Cicero_(441).’ ”
It appears not, however, to have been, as Warburton supposes, altogether
from a systematic plan, of explaining to his countrymen the philosophy of
the Greeks, that Cicero became a sceptic; but partly from gloomy views of
nature and providence. It seems difficult otherwise to account for the
circumstance, that Cotta, an ancient and venerable Consul, the _Pontifex_
of the metropolis of the world, should be introduced as contending, even
against an Epicurean, for the non-existence of the gods. Lord Bolingbroke
has justly remarked, “that Cotta disputes so vehemently, and his arguments
extend so far, that Tully makes his own brother accuse him directly, and
himself by consequence indirectly, of atheism.—‘Studio contra Stoicos
disserendi deos mihi videtur funditus tollere.’ Now, what says Tully in
his own name? He tells his brother that Cotta disputes in that manner,
rather to confute the Stoics than to destroy the religion of
mankind.—‘Magis quam ut hominum deleat religionem.’ But Quintus answers,
that is, Tully makes him answer, he was not the bubble of an artifice,
employed to save the appearance of departing from the public religious
institutions. ‘Ne communi jure migrare videatur(442).’ ” Cotta, indeed,
goes so far in his attack on Providence, that Lord Bolingbroke, who is not
himself a model of orthodoxy, takes up the other side of the question
against the Roman Pontiff, and pleads the cause of Providence with no
little reason and eloquence.(443)
In the foregoing analysis, or abridgment of the work on the Nature of the
Gods, it will have been remarked, that two chasms occur in the argument of
Cotta. Olivet enters into some discussion with regard to the latter and
larger chasm. “I cannot,” says he, “see any justice in the accusation
against the primitive Christians, of having torn this passage out of all
the MSS. What appearance is there, that through a pious motive they should
have erased this any more than many others in the same book, which they
must undoubtedly have looked upon as no less pernicious?” Olivet seems
inclined to suspect the Pagans; but, in my opinion, the chasms in the
discourse of Cotta, if not accidental, are to be attributed rather to
Christian than pagan zeal. Arnobius, indeed, speaking of this work, says,
That many were of opinion that it ought to have been destroyed by the
Roman Senate, as the Christian faith might be approved by it, and the
authority of antiquity subverted(444). There is no evidence, however, that
any such destruction or mutilation was attempted by the Pagans; and we
find that the satire directed against the heathen deities has been
permitted to remain, while the chasms intervene in portions of the work,
which might have been supposed by a pious zealot, to bear, in some
measure, against the Christian, as well as the Pagan faith. In the first
of them, the Pontifex begins, and is proceeding to contend, that in spite
of Acts of the Senate, temples, statues, and other commemorations of
miraculous circumstances, all such prodigies were nothing but mere fables,
however solemnly attested, or generally believed. Now, the transcriber
might fear, lest a similar inference should be drawn by the sceptic, to
that which has in fact been deduced by the English translator of this
work, in the following passage of a note:—“Hence we see what little credit
ought to be paid to facts, said to be done out of the ordinary course of
nature. These miracles are well attested: They were recorded in the annals
of a great people—believed by many learned and otherwise sagacious
persons, and received as religious truths by the populace; but the
testimonies of ancient records, the credulity of some learned men, and the
implicit faith of the vulgar, can never prove that to have been, which is
impossible in the nature of things ever to be.” At the beginning of the
other and larger chasm, Cotta was proceeding to argue against the
proposition of the Stoics, that there is a Divine Providence which governs
the world. Now, there is a considerable analogy between the system of the
ancient Stoics, and the Christian scheme of Providence, both in the
theoretical doctrine, and in the practical inference, of the propriety of
a cheerful and unqualified submission to the chain of events—to the
dispensations of nature in the Stoical, and of God in the purer doctrine.
To Christian zeal, therefore, rather than to pagan prudence, we must
attribute the two chasms which now intervene in the discourse of Cotta.