NAVAL WORK
The main effort of the Navy during the year 1917 was directed towards
the defeat of the enemy's submarines, since the Central Powers confined
their naval effort almost entirely to this form of warfare, but many
other problems occupied our attention at the Admiralty, and some of
these may be mentioned.
Considerable discussion took place in the early part of the year on the
subject of the policy to be pursued in the Eastern theatre of war, and
naval opinion on the possibility of effecting a landing in force at
different points was invited and given. It need only be said here that
the matter was brought forward more than once, and that the situation
from the naval point of view was always clear. The feasible landing
places so far as we were concerned were unsuited to the military
strategy at that period; the time required to collect or build the great
number of lighters, horse boats, etc., for the strong force required was
not available, and it was a sheer impossibility to provide in a short
period all the small craft needed for an operation of magnitude, whilst
the provision of the necessary anti-submarine defences would have taxed
our resources to the utmost and have prevented essential work of this
nature in other theatres.
The work of the Navy, therefore, _off the coast of Palestine_ was
confined to protecting the left flank of the advancing army and
assisting its operations, and to establishing, as the troops advanced,
bases on the coast at which stores, etc., could be landed. This task was
effectively carried out.
The anchorages on this coast are all entirely open to the sea, and
become untenable at very short notice, so that the work of the Navy was
always carried out under considerable difficulty. Nor could the ships
working on the flank be adequately guarded against submarine attack, and
some losses were experienced, the most important being the sinking of
Monitor M15 and the destroyer _Staunch_ by a submarine attack off Deir
el Belah (nine miles south of Gaza) in November.
The Navy continued its co-operation with the Army in the _Salonika
theatre of war_, assisted by the Royal Naval Air Service, and
bombardments were continually carried out on military objectives.
Similarly _in the Adriatic_ our monitors and machines of the R.N.A.S.
assisted the military forces of the Allies; particularly was this the
case at the time of the Austrian advance to the Piave, where our
monitors did much useful work in checking enemy attempts to cross that
river.
_Off the Gallipoli Peninsula_ the Naval watch on the mouth of the
Dardanelles was continued; extensive new minefields were laid during the
year, and were effective in sinking the _Breslau_ and severely damaging
the _Goeben_ when those vessels attempted a sortie on January 20, 1918.
The R.N.A.S. during the year carried out many long distance
reconnaissance and bombing operations over Constantinople and the
vicinity.
_In the Red Sea_ Naval operations were carried out in conjunction with
friendly Arabs, and the Arabian coast cleared of Turkish forces.
_In the White Sea_ during the latter part of 1917 the whole of the Naval
work fell upon British Naval forces when the Russian ships, which had
co-operated hitherto, had come under the influence of the political
situation. Our force in these waters consisted largely of trawlers
engaged in minesweeping and escort work. The latter duty imposed a very
heavy strain on officers and men, involving as it did the safe conduct
during the year of no fewer than one thousand ships carrying stores and
munitions for the Russian military forces.
_In the Baltic_ the situation became very difficult owing first to the
Russian revolution and, finally, to the Russian debacle. Our force in
these waters consisted of seven submarines. It became evident at the
beginning of October, 1917, that the Germans were intending to carry out
some operations in the Baltic against Russia, and the question of
affording assistance was at once considered by the Naval Staff. It was
surmised that but little dependence could be placed on the Russian
Baltic Fleet (events showed this surmise to be accurate), and in order
to keep our control over the North Sea and ensure the safety of our
communications with France it was obvious that for any action we might
decide to take we should be obliged to divide the Grand Fleet, sending
such portion of that Command into the Baltic as could successfully
engage the High Sea Fleet if encountered, as well as to secure the
return passage via the Great Belt, and retaining a sufficient force to
deal with such German vessels as might attempt operations in the North
Sea or Channel during our raid into the Baltic.
There were many ways in which the Germans might seriously hamper, if not
entirely prevent, the return of our fleet from the Baltic unless we
secured the exits. The Great Belt could easily be closed by block-ships
at its narrowest points, and extensive minefields could be laid. It was
obvious, therefore, that to secure the exit a strong force would be
required, and that it would necessarily occupy a position where it would
be open to serious attack.
The initial operation of gaining access to the Baltic via the Great
Belt, though not impossible, was difficult, involving as it did sweeping
passages through very extensive minefields, and even when our ships were
in the Baltic fairly constant sweeping would be necessary.
Finally, the whole operation would be complicated by the question of
fuel supply, especially to the destroyers and other small craft with a
limited radius of action, since we could not depend upon Russian sources
of supply. These were amongst the considerations which made it clear
that the operation was not one that I could recommend. The Russian naval
view is given in the following statement which appeared in the Russian
Press in October:
The Naval General Staff categorically denies the rumours circulated in
Petrograd on the 8th and 9th instant, to the effect that the British or
French Fleet had broken through to the Baltic Sea.
At the same time it is pointed out that it would be a physical
impossibility for the Allies' Fleet to come in from the western
entrance, because it would be necessary to pass through the Sound or
through one of the two Belts.
Entry to the Sound through Danish or Swedish waters could not also be
affected owing to the fact that these waters in part are only 18 feet
deep, while large-sized vessels would require at least 30 feet of water.
As regards the entry to the Belts, this would be an extremely hazardous
undertaking as parts of the routes are under control of the Germans who
have constructed their own defences consisting of mines and batteries.
In these circumstances, according to the opinion of our naval experts,
an entrance into the Baltic by the Allies' Fleets could only be
undertaken after gaining possession of these waters and the adjacent
coast; and then only with the co-operation of land forces.
The Germans had an easy task in the Baltic, as the Russian resistance
was not of a serious nature; our submarines attacked on every possible
occasion, and scored some successes against German vessels. Towards the
end of the year it became necessary to consider the action to be taken
in regard to our submarines, as the German control of the Baltic became
effective, and the demobilization of the Russian fleet became more and
more pronounced. Many schemes for securing their escape from these
waters were discussed, but the chances of success were so small, and the
submarines themselves possessed so little fighting value owing to their
age, that eventually instructions were sent to the senior officer to
destroy the submarines before they could fall into German hands.