CHAPTER IV_The Crisis of the Naval War

THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM

The question of the introduction of convoys for the protection of

merchant ships was under consideration at various times during the war.

The system had been employed during the old wars and had proved its

value in the case of attack by vessels on the surface, and it was

natural that thoughts should be directed towards its reintroduction when

the submarine campaign developed. There is one inherent disadvantage in

this system which cannot be overcome, although it can be mitigated by

careful organization, viz. the delay involved. Delay means, of course, a

loss of carrying-power, and when tonnage is already short any proposal

which must reduce its efficiency has to be very carefully examined. The

delay of the convoy system is due to two causes, (a) because the speed

of the convoy must necessarily be fixed by the speed of the slowest

ship, and (b) the fact that the arrival of a large number of ships at

one time may cause congestion and consequent delay at the port of

unloading. However, if additional safety is given there is compensation

for this delay when the risk is great. One danger of a convoy system

under modern conditions should be mentioned, viz. the increased risk

from attack by mines. If ships are sailing singly a minefield will in

all probability sink only one vessel--the first ship entering it. The

fate of that ship reveals the presence of the field, and with adequate

organization it is improbable that other vessels will be sunk in the

same field. In the case of a convoy encountering a minefield, as in the

case of a fleet, several ships may be sunk practically simultaneously.

During the year 1916, whilst I was still in command of the Grand Fleet,

suggestions as to convoys had been forwarded to the Admiralty for the

better protection of the ocean trade against attack by surface vessels;

but it was pointed out to me that the number of cruisers available for

escort work was entirely insufficient, and that, consequently, the

suggestions could not be adopted. This objection was one that could only

be overcome by removing some of the faster merchant ships from the trade

routes and arming them. To this course there was the objection that we

were already--that is before the intensive campaign began--very short of

shipping.

Shortly after my taking up the post of First Sea Lord at the Admiralty,

at the end of 1916, the question was discussed once more. At that time

the danger of attack by enemy raiders on shipping in the North Atlantic

was small; the protection needed was against attack by submarines, and

the dangerous area commenced some 300-400 miles from the British

Islands. It was known that unrestricted submarine warfare was about to

commence, and that this would mean that shipping would usually be

subjected to torpedo attack from submarines when in a submerged

condition. Against this form of attack the gun armament of cruisers or

armed merchant ships was practically useless, and, however powerfully

armed, ships of this type were themselves in peril of being torpedoed.

Small vessels of shallow draught, possessing high speed, offered the

only practicable form of protection. Shallow draught was necessary in

order that the protecting vessels should themselves be comparatively

immune from successful torpedo fire, and speed was essential for

offensive operations against the submarines.

Convoy sailing was, as has been stated, the recognized method of trade

protection in the old wars, and this was a strong argument in favour of

its adoption in the late war. It should, however, be clearly understood

that the conditions had entirely changed. Convoy sailing for the

protection of merchant ships against torpedo attack by submarines was

quite a different matter from such a system as a preventive against

attack by surface vessels and involved far greater difficulties. In the

days of sailing ships especially, accurate station keeping was not very

necessary, and the ships comprising the convoy sailed in loose order and

covered a considerable area of water. On a strange vessel, also a

sailing vessel, being sighted, the protecting frigate or frigates would

proceed to investigate her character, whilst the ships composing the

convoy closed in towards one another or steered a course that would take

them out of danger.

In the circumstances with which we were dealing in 1917 the requirements

were quite otherwise. It was essential for the protection of the convoy

that the ships should keep close and accurate station and should be able

to manoeuvre by signal. Close station was enjoined by the necessity of

reducing the area covered by the convoy; accurate station was required

to ensure safety from collision and freedom of manoeuvre. It will be

realized that a convoy comprising twenty to thirty vessels occupies

considerable space, even when steaming in the usual formation of four,

five or six columns. Since the number of destroyers or sloops that could

be provided for screening the convoy from torpedo attack by submarines

was bound to be very limited under any conditions, it was essential that

the columns of ships should be as short as possible; in other words,

that the ships should follow one another at close intervals, so that the

destroyers on each side of the convoy should be able as far as possible

to guard it from attack by submarines working from the flank, and that

they should be able with great rapidity to counter-attack a submarine

with depth charges should a periscope be sighted for a brief moment

above the surface, or the track of a torpedo be seen. In fact, it was

necessary, if the protection of a convoy was to be real protection, that

the ships composing the convoy should be handled in a manner that

approached the handling of battleships in a squadron. The diagram on p.

107 shows an ideal convoy with six destroyers protecting it, disposed in

the manner ordered at the start of the convoy system.

[Illustration on page 107, with caption "Diagram illustrating a convoy

of 25 Merchant Ships, with an escort of 6 Destroyers zigzagging at high

speed for protection. The convoy shown in close order and on its normal

course."]

[Illustration on page 108 shows, according to its caption, "Typical

convoy and escort of 10 Trawlers in the early days of convoy."]

How far this ideal was attainable was a matter of doubt. Prior to 1917

our experience of merchant ships sailing in company had been confined to

troop transports. These vessels were well officered and well manned,

carried experienced engine-room staffs, were capable of attaining

moderate speeds, and were generally not comparable to ordinary cargo

vessels, many of which were of very slow speed, and possessed a large

proportion of officers and men of limited sea experience, owing to the

very considerable personnel of the Mercantile Marine which had joined

the Royal Naval Reserve and was serving in the Fleet or in patrol craft.

Moreover, even the troop transports had not crossed the submarine zone

in company, but had been escorted independently; and many naval officers

who had been in charge of convoys, when questioned, were not convinced

that sailing in convoy under the conditions mentioned above was a

feasible proposition, nor, moreover, were the masters of the transports.

In February, 1917, in order to investigate this aspect of the question,

a conference took place between the Naval Staff and the masters of cargo

steamers which were lying in the London docks. The masters were asked

their opinion as to how far their ships could be depended on to keep

station in a convoy of 12 to 20 vessels. They expressed a unanimous

opinion that it was not practicable to keep station under the conditions

mentioned, the difficulty being due to two causes: (1) the inexperience

of their deck officers owing to so many of them having been taken for

the Royal Naval Reserve, and (2) the inexperience of their engineers,

combined with the impossibility of obtaining delicate adjustments of

speed by reason of the absence of suitable engine-room telegraphs and

the poor quality of much of the coal used. When pressed as to the

greatest number of ships that could be expected to manoeuvre together in

safety, the masters of these cargo steamers, all experienced seamen,

gave it as their opinion that two or possibly three was the maximum

number. The opinions thus expressed were confirmed later by other

masters of merchant ships who were consulted on the subject. It is to

the eternal credit of the British Merchant Marine, which rendered

service of absolutely inestimable value to the Empire throughout the

war, that when put to the test by the adoption of the convoy system,

officers and men proved that they could achieve far more than they

themselves had considered possible. At the same time it should be

recognized how severe a strain was imposed on officers, particularly the

masters, of vessels sailing in convoy.

The matter was kept constantly under review. In February, 1917, the

Germans commenced unrestricted submarine warfare against merchant ships

of all nationalities, and as a consequence our shipping losses, as well

as those of Allied and neutral countries, began to mount steadily each

succeeding month. The effect of this new phase of submarine warfare is

best illustrated by a few figures.

During the last four months of 1916 the gross tonnage lost by _submarine

attack_ alone gave the following monthly average: British, 121,500;

Allies, 59,500; neutrals, 87,500; total, 268,500.

In the first four months of 1917 the figures became, in round numbers:

British. Allies. Neutrals. Total.

January 104,000 62,000 116,000 282,000

February 256,000 77,000 131,000 464,000

March 283,000 74,000 149,000 506,000

April 513,000 133,000 185,000 831,000

(The United States entered the war on April 6, 1917.)

NOTE.--In neither case is the loss of fishing craft included.

It will be realized that, since the losses towards the end of 1916 were

such as to give just cause for considerable anxiety, the later figures

made it clear that some method of counteracting the submarines must be

found and found quickly if the Allied cause was to be saved from

disaster.

None of the anti-submarine measures that had been under consideration or

trial since the formation of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval

Staff in December, 1916, could _by any possibility_ mature for some

months, since time was necessary for the production of vessels and more

or less complicated matériel, and in these circumstances the only step

that could be taken was that of giving a trial to the convoy system for

the ocean trade, although the time was by no means yet ripe for

effective use of the system, by reason of the shortage of destroyers,

sloops and cruisers, which was still most acute, although the situation

was improving slowly month by month as new vessels were completed.

Prior to this date we had already had some experience of convoys as a

protection against submarine attack. The coal trade of France had been

brought under convoy in March, 1917. The trade between Scandinavia and

North Sea ports was also organized in convoys in April of the same year,

this trade having since December, 1916, been carried out on a system of

"protected sailings." It is true that these convoys were always very

much scattered, particularly the Scandinavian convoy, which was composed

largely of neutral vessels and therefore presented exceptional

difficulties in the matter of organization and handling. The number of

destroyers which could be spared for screening the convoys was also very

small. The protection afforded was therefore more apparent than real,

but even so the results had been very good in reducing the losses by

submarine attack. The protection of the vessels employed in the French

coal trade was entrusted very largely to trawlers, as the ships

composing the convoy were mostly slow, so that in this case more

screening vessels were available, although they were not so efficient,

being themselves of slow speed.

For the introduction of a system of convoy which would protect merchant

ships as far as their port of discharge in the United Kingdom, there

were two requirements: (a) A sufficient number of convoying cruisers or

armed merchant ships, whose role would be that of bringing the ships

comprising the convoy to some selected rendezvous outside the zone of

submarine activity, where it would be met by the flotilla of small

vessels which would protect the convoy through the submarine area. It

was essential that the ships of the convoy should arrive at this

rendezvous as an organized unit, well practised in station-keeping by

day, and at night, with the ships darkened, and that the vessels should

be capable also of zigzagging together and of carrying out such

necessary movements as alterations of course, etc.; otherwise the convoy

could not be safely escorted through the danger area. (b) The other

essential was the presence of the escorting flotilla in sufficient

strength.

It has been mentioned that there was an insufficient number of vessels

available for use as convoying cruisers. It was estimated that about

fifty cruisers or armed merchant ships would be required for this

service if the homeward-bound trade to the British Isles alone was

considered. An additional twelve vessels would be necessary to deal with

the outward-bound trade. At the time only eighteen vessels were

available, and these could only be obtained by denuding the North

Atlantic entirely of cruisers.

The situation in regard to destroyers or other fast vessels presented

equal difficulties. Early in February, 1917, we had available for

general convoy or patrol work only fourteen destroyers stationed at

Devonport and twelve sloops at Queenstown, and owing to repairs and the

necessity of resting officers and men periodically, only a proportion of

these were available at any one time. A number of these vessels were

required to escort troop transports through the submarine danger zone.

During the month of February six sloops were diverted from their proper

work of minesweeping in the North Sea and added to the patrol force at

Queenstown, and eight destroyers were taken from the Grand Fleet and

sent to southern waters for patrol and escort duty. There were obvious

objections to this weakening of the North Sea forces, but it was

necessary in the circumstances to ignore them.

This total of forty destroyers and sloops represented the whole

available force at the end of February. Simultaneously a careful

investigation showed that for the institution of a system of convoy and

escort for homeward-bound Atlantic trade alone to the United Kingdom,

our requirements would be eighty-one destroyers or sloops and

forty-eight trawlers (the latter vessels being only suitable for

escorting the slow 6-7-knot ships of the trade from Gibraltar to the

United Kingdom). For the outward Atlantic trade from the United Kingdom

our estimated requirements were forty-four additional destroyers or

sloops.

The deficiency in suitable vessels of this class is best shown by the

following table, which reveals the destroyer position at different

periods during the year 1917:

--------------------------------------------------------------------

Mediterranean.

----------------------------------------------------------------+

Pembroke. |

-------------------------------------------------------------+ |

Queenstown. | |

---------------------------------------------------------+ | |

Bunerana. | | |

------------------------------------------------------+ | | |

North Channel. | | | |

---------------------------------------------------+ | | | |

------------------------------------------------+ | | | | |

---------------------------------------------+ | | | | | |

------------------------------------------+ | | | | | | |

---------------------------------------+ | | | | | | | |

------------------------------------+ | | | | | | | | |

---------------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | |

------------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | | |

---------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | | | |

------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | | | | |

--------------------+---+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+---+--+---

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Flotilla Leaders | 10| 2| 3| | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Modern destroyers | 97|45|18|14|13| | | | | | | | | |29

|[A]| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

construction | | |11| 6|16| 9| | 9|11|15| 4| | | | 8

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

P boats | | 2| 5| | 4|10| 4| 1| | | | | | |

--------------------+---+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+---+--+---

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Flotilla Leaders | 10| 3| 4| | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Modern destroyers | 95|23|29|38|15| | | 5| | | | 4| 32| |29

|[A]| | | | | | | | | | | |[B]| |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

construction | | |10| 5|16| 7| |29| 1|11| 4| | | | 8

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

P boats | | 2| 6| | 8| 9| 4| 1| | | | | | 5|

--------------------+---+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+---+--+---

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Flotilla Leaders | 11| 4| 6| | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Modern destroyers |101|24|26|37| 9| | | 4| | | |29| 35| |32

|[A]| | | | | | | | | | | |[B]| |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

construction | | |10| 4| 8|12| 2|30| |11| 4| | | | 8

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

P boats | | 2| 6| |31| | | 1| | | | | |10|

--------------------+---+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+---+--+---

[Footnote A: Includes destroyers detached for protection work in other

commands.]

[Footnote B: Includes United States destroyers.]

There was the possible alternative of bringing only a small portion of

the trade under convoy by taking all the available fast small craft from

patrol duty and utilizing them to escort this portion of the trade, but

it was felt that as this would leave the _whole_ of the remaining trade

entirely without protection, and no fast patrol craft would be on the

trade routes to pick up the crews of any merchant ships that might be

sunk by submarines, the step was not justified.

The next point for consideration was the possibility of obtaining

destroyers or sloops from other sources with which to increase the

forces for trade protection. The only commands on which it was possible

to draw further were the Grand Fleet, the Harwich and Dover forces, the

destroyers of old types working on the East Coast, or the destroyers and

"P" boats protecting our cross-Channel communications west of the Dover

Command.

It was out of the question to reduce the Harwich or Dover flotillas

materially, as we were already running the gravest risks from the

inadequacy of these forces to deal with enemy destroyers and submarines

operating in southern waters from Zeebrugge or from German ports, and in

addition the Harwich Force furnished the sole protection for the weekly

convoy running between the Thames and Dutch ports, besides being much

required for reconnaissance and offensive operations in the Heligoland

Bight so far as it could be spared for this purpose. However, the

emergency was such that destroyers were taken from Harwich, as the force

obtained new vessels of a faster and more powerful type. The destroyers

on the East Coast and in the Portsmouth Command were already inadequate

to afford proper protection to the trade and the cross-Channel

communications, as evidenced by our losses. Here again, however, in

order to meet the very serious situation, some destroyers were

eventually transferred to Devonport from Portsmouth, but at the expense

of still less protection and fewer opportunities for offensive action

against submarines. There remained only the Grand Fleet destroyers on

which we could draw yet further. It had always been held that the Grand

Fleet required a total force of one hundred destroyers and ten flotilla

leaders for the double purpose of screening the ships from submarine

attack when at sea and of countering the enemy's destroyers and

attacking his heavy ships with torpedo fire in a fleet action. We had

gradually built the destroyer force of the Grand Fleet up to this figure

by the early spring of 1917, although, of course, it fell far short of

requirements in earlier months. It was well known to us that the High

Sea Fleet would be accompanied by at least eight flotillas, or

eighty-eight destroyers, when proceeding to sea at its _selected_

moment, and it was quite probable that the number might be much higher,

as many more vessels were available. At our _average_ moment, even with

a nominal force of one hundred destroyers and ten flotilla leaders, we

could not expect that more than seventy destroyers and eight leaders

would be present with the Fleet, since, in addition to those absent

refitting, a considerable number were always engaged on trade protection

or anti-submarine work in northern waters which could not join up in

time to accompany the Fleet to sea. When the Scandinavian convoy was

started in April, 1917, one flotilla leader and six destroyers from the

Grand Fleet were used for its protection; other vessels in northern

waters also depended on Grand Fleet destroyers for protection. Any

further transference, therefore, of destroyers from the Grand Fleet to

southern waters for trade protection was a highly dangerous expedient,

involving increased risk from submarine attack on the heavy ships in the

event of the Fleet proceeding to sea, as well as disadvantages in a

Fleet action. The necessity, however, was so great that the risk had to

be faced, and for some months of 1917 from eight to twelve Grand Fleet

destroyers were used for trade protection in the Atlantic, principally

from Irish ports, in addition to those protecting trade in the North

Sea.

It is interesting to note the number of persons who claim to have been

the first to urge the Admiralty to adopt convoys as a method of

protecting merchant ships against submarine attack. The claimants for

this distinction are not confined to Great Britain; the great majority

of them are people without any knowledge of the sea and naval matters,

certainly none of them possessed any knowledge of the number of vessels

needed to afford protection to the ships under convoy, nor of the

vessels which we could produce for the purpose at the time.

Possibly the facts related above may serve to show that convoys were

commenced by Admiralty direction, and that they were started as soon as

and extended as rapidly as the necessary protecting vessels could be

provided. Those who argued then, or who have argued since, that we

should have reduced the number of destroyers with the Grand Fleet will

not, I think, meet with any support from those who served in that Fleet,

especially from the officers upon whom lay the responsibility for

countering any move of the High Sea Fleet.

The entry of the United States into the war early in April eased the

situation somewhat. First it was hoped that the United States Navy would

assist us with destroyers and other small craft, and secondly it was a

fact that the great majority of the material imported into countries

contiguous to Germany came from the United States. There was reason to

anticipate that steps would be taken by the United States authorities in

the direction of some form of rationing of these countries, and in these

circumstances it was justifiable to reduce gradually the strength of our

blockading squadron of armed merchant vessels known as the 10th Cruiser

Squadron. By this means we could at once provide additional vessels to

act as convoying cruisers.

Vice-Admiral W.S. Sims had arrived in this country in March, 1917, after

passing through an exciting experience, the ship in which he crossed

(the United States steamer _St. Louis_) being mined outside Liverpool.

He came to visit me at the Admiralty immediately after his arrival in

London, and from that day until I left the Admiralty at the end of the

year it was my privilege and pleasure to work in the very closest

co-operation with him. My friendship with the Admiral was of very long

standing. We had during many years exchanged views on different naval

subjects, but principally on gunnery questions. I, in common with other

British naval officers who had the honour of his acquaintance, had

always been greatly struck by his wonderful success in the post of

Inspector of Target Practice in the United States Navy. That success was

due not only to his intimate knowledge of gunnery, but also to his

attractive personality, charm of manner, keen sense of humour, and quick

and accurate grasp of any problem with which he was confronted. It was

fortunate indeed for the Allied cause that Admiral Sims should have been

selected to command the United States forces in European waters, for to

the qualities mentioned above he added a habit of speaking his mind with

absolutely fearless disregard of the consequences. This characteristic

has led him on more than one occasion into difficulty, but in the

circumstances with which we had to deal in 1917 it was just the quality

that was needed. It was a very difficult matter for those in authority

in the United States, separated as they were by 3,000 miles of sea from

the theatres of war, to realize the conditions in European waters, for

the Admiralty was not concerned only with the North Sea and Atlantic,

and the terse and straightforward reports of Admiral Sims, and his

convincing statements, went a long way towards bringing home to the

United States people at that time the extreme gravity of the situation

and the need for immediate action. He was consistently backed up by that

great ambassador, the late Mr. W.H. Page, who also honoured me with his

confidence, and to whom I spoke perfectly freely on all occasions.

The assistance from the United States that it was hoped was now in sight

made the prospect of success following on the adoption of the convoy

system far more favourable, and preparations were put in hand for the

institution of an ocean convoy system on a large scale. In order to gain

some experience of the difficulties attending the working of cargo

ships, directions were given for an experimental convoy to be collected

at Gibraltar. The necessary officers were sent out to Gibraltar with

orders to assemble the convoy, to instruct the masters in the work that

lay before them, and to explain to them the system of sailing, the

manner in which the convoy would be handled, and the protection that

would be afforded. This naturally took time, and the convoy did not

arrive in England until after the middle of May. The experience gained

showed, however, that the difficulties apprehended by the officers of

the Mercantile Marine were not insuperable, and that, given adequate

protection by cruisers and small fast craft, the system was at least

practicable. It was accordingly decided to put it into operation at

once, and to extend it as rapidly as the increase in the numbers of our

destroyers and sloops permitted.

The North Atlantic homeward-bound trade was brought under convoy in May,

1917, and the Gibraltar homeward-bound trade in July, but for some

months it was impossible to provide for the institution of a complete

convoy system. At first some 40 per cent, of the homeward-bound trade

was convoyed. Then the system was gradually extended to include first 60

per cent., then 80 per cent., and finally 100 per cent, of the homeward

Atlantic trade and the trade from Gibraltar, trawlers being used as

escorts for the Gibraltar trade, as the majority of the ships therein

engaged were slow. But trawlers are unsatisfactory escort vessels.

In the early stages of the convoy system difficulties were experienced

from the fact that all the available destroyers and most of the sloops

were used as escorts, with the result that the ships not under convoy

were left with but little protection.