The Crisis of the
Naval War
By
ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET
VISCOUNT JELLICOE OF SCAPA
G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.
_With 8 Plates and 6 Charts_
1920
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
1. ADMIRALTY ORGANIZATION: THE CHANGES IN 1917
2. SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN IN THE EARLY PART OF 1917
3. ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS
4. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM
5. THE CONVOY SYSTEM AT WORK
6. THE ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES: OUR NAVAL POLICY EXPLAINED
7. PATROL CRAFT AND MINESWEEPING SERVICES
8. THE DOVER PATROL AND THE HARWICH FORCES
9. THE SEQUEL
10. "PRODUCTION" AT THE ADMIRALTY DURING 1917
11. NAVAL WORK
12. THE FUTURE
INDEX
LIST OF PLATES
A Mine Exploding
A German Submarine of the U-C Type
A German Submarine of the later Cruiser Class
A Smoke Screen for a Convoy
The Dummy Deck-house of a Decoy Ship
A Convoy Zigzagging
A Convoy with an Airship
Drifters at Sea
A Paddle Minesweeper
A German Mine on the Surface
Two Depth Charges after Explosion
The Tell-tale Oil Patch
A Submarine Submerging
Periscope of Submerged Submarine Travelling at Slow Speed
A Submarine Submerged
LIST OF CHARTS
(CONTAINED IN THE POCKET AT THE END OF THE BOOK)
A. Approach Areas and Typical Routes.
B. Typical Approach Lines.
C. Barred Zones Proclaimed by the Germans.
D. Patrol Areas, British Isles.
E. Patrol and Minesweeping Zones in the Mediterranean.
F. Showing French and British Ports within Range of the
German Bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge.
To
The Officers and Men
of our
Convoy, Escort, Patrol and Minesweeping Vessels
and their
Comrades of the Mercantile Marine
by whose splendid gallantry, heroic self-sacrifice, and
unflinching endurance the submarine
danger was defeated
INTRODUCTION
Owing to the peculiar nature and demands of naval warfare, but few
dispatches, corresponding to those describing the work and achievements
of our great armies, were issued during the progress of the war. In a
former volume I attempted to supply this defect in the historical
records, which will be available for future generations, so far as the
Grand Fleet was concerned, during my period as its Commander-in-Chief.
The present volume, which was commenced and nearly completed in 1918,
was to have been published at the same time. My departure on a Naval
mission early in 1919 prevented me, however, from putting the finishing
touches to the manuscript until my return this spring.
I hesitated as to the publication of this portion of what is in effect
one complete narrative, but eventually decided not to depart from my
original purpose. There is some reason to believe that the account of
the work of the Grand Fleet gave the nation a fuller conception of the
services which the officers and men of that force rendered in
circumstances which were necessarily not easily appreciated by landsmen.
This second volume, dealing with the defeat of the enemy's submarine
campaign, the gravest peril which ever threatened the population of this
country, as well as of the whole Empire, may not be unwelcome as a
statement of facts. They have been set down in order that the sequence
and significance of events may be understood, and that the nation may
appreciate the debt which it owes, in particular, to the seamen of the
Royal Navy and the Mercantile Marine, who kept the seas during the
unforgettable days of the intensive campaign.
This book, therefore, gives the outline of the work accomplished by the
Navy in combating the unrestricted submarine warfare instituted by the
Central Powers in February, 1917. It would have been a labour of love to
tell at greater length and in more detail how the menace was gradually
overcome by the gallantry, endurance and strenuous work of those serving
afloat in ships flying the White or the Red Ensigns, but I had not the
necessary materials at my disposal for such an exhaustive record.
The volume is consequently largely concerned with the successive steps
taken at the Admiralty to deal with a situation which was always
serious, and which at times assumed a very grave aspect. The ultimate
result of all Naval warfare must naturally rest with those who are
serving afloat, but it is only just to the Naval officers and others who
did such fine work at the Admiralty in preparing for the sea effort,
that their share in the Navy's final triumph should be known. The
writing of this book appeared also to be the only way in which I could
show my keen appreciation of the loyalty and devotion to duty of the
Naval Staff, of the many clever, ingenious and audacious schemes
developed and carried through for the destruction of submarines and the
safeguarding of ocean-borne trade, and of the skilful organization which
brought into being, and managed with such success, that great network of
convoys by which the sea communications of the Allies were kept open.
The volume shows how the officers who accompanied me to the Admiralty
from the Grand Fleet at the end of 1916, in association with those
already serving in Whitehall and others who joined in 1917, with the
necessary and valuable assistance of our comrades of the Mercantile
Marine, gradually produced the measures by which the Sea Service
conquered the gravest danger which has ever faced the Empire.
There were at times inevitable set-backs as the enemy gained experience
of our methods, and new ones had then to be devised, and we were always
most seriously handicapped by the strain imposed upon the Fleet by our
numerous military and other commitments overseas, and by the difficulty
of obtaining supplies of material, owing to the pre-occupation of our
industries in meeting the needs of our Armies in equipment and
munitions; but, generally speaking, it may be said that in April, 1917,
the losses reached their maximum, and that from the following month and
onwards the battle was being slowly but gradually won. By the end of the
year it was becoming apparent that success was assured.
The volume describes the changes carried out in the Admiralty Staff
organization; the position of affairs in regard to submarine warfare in
the early part of 1917; and the numerous anti-submarine measures which
were devised and brought into operation during the year. The
introduction and working of the convoy system is also dealt with. The
entry of the United States of America into the war marked the opening of
a new phase of the operations by sea, and it has been a pleasure to give
particulars of our cordial co-operation with the United States Navy. The
splendid work of the patrol craft and minesweepers is described all too
briefly, and I have had to be content to give only a brief summary of
the great services of the Dover and Harwich forces.
Finally, an effort has been made to suggest the range and character of
the work of the Production Departments at the Admiralty. It is
impossible to tell this part of the story without conveying some
suggestion of criticism since the output never satisfied our
requirements. I have endeavoured also to indicate where it seemed to me
that changes in organization were not justified by results, so that in
future years we may benefit by the experience gained. But I would not
like it to be thought that I did not, and do not, realize the
difficulties which handicapped production, or that I did not appreciate
to the full the work done by all concerned.
It is unfortunate that attempts to draw attention to the lessons taught
us by the war are regarded by many people either as complaints of lack
of devotion to the country's interests on the part of some, or as
criticisms of others who, in the years before the war or during the war,
were responsible for the administration of the Navy. In anticipation of
such an attitude, I wish to state emphatically that, where mention is
made of apparent shortcomings or of action which, judged by results, did
not seem, to meet a particular situation, this is done solely in order
that on any future occasion of a similar character--and may the day be
long postponed--the nation may profit by experience.
Those who are inclined to indulge in criticism should ever bear in mind
that the Navy was faced with problems which were never foreseen, and
could not have been foreseen, by anyone in this country. Who, for
instance, would have ever had the temerity to predict that the Navy,
confronted by the second greatest Naval Power in the world, would be
called upon to maintain free communications across the Channel for many
months until the months became years, in face of the naval forces of the
enemy established on the Belgian coast, passing millions of men across
in safety, as well as vast quantities of stores and munitions? Who would
have prophesied that the Navy would have to safeguard the passage of
hundreds of thousands of troops from the Dominions to Europe, as well as
the movement of tens of thousands of labourers from China and elsewhere?
Or who, moreover, would have been believed had he stated that the Navy
would be required to keep open the sea communications of huge armies in
Macedonia, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia and East Africa, against attack
by surface vessels, submarines and mines, whilst at the same time
protecting the merchant shipping of ourselves, our Allies, and neutral
Powers against similar perils, and assisting to ensure the safety of the
troops of the United States when they, in due course, were brought
across the Atlantic? Compare those varied tasks with the comparatively
modest duties which in pre-war days were generally assigned to the Navy,
and it will be seen how much there may be to learn of the lessons of
experience, and how sparing we should be of criticism. Wisdom distilled
from events which were unforeseeable should find expression not in
criticisms of those who did their duty to the best of their ability, but
in the taking of wise precautions for the future.
Little mention is made in this volume of the work of the Grand Fleet
during the year 1917, but, although that Fleet had no opportunity of
showing its fighting power, it must never be forgotten that without the
Grand Fleet, under the distinguished officer who succeeded me as
Commander-in-Chief at the end of 1916, all effort would have been of no
avail, since every operation by sea, as well as by land, was carried out
under the sure protecting shield of that Fleet, which the enemy could
not face.
I am conscious of many shortcomings in the book, but it may prove of
interest to those who desire to know something of the measures which
gradually wore down the German submarine effort, and, at any rate, it is
the only record likely to be available in the near future of the work of
fighting the submarines in 1917.
June, 1920.
CHAPTER I
ADMIRALTY ORGANIZATION; THE CHANGES IN 1917
It is perhaps as well that the nation generally remained to a great
extent unconscious of the extreme gravity of the situation which
developed during the Great War, when the Germans were sinking an
increasing volume of merchant tonnage week by week. The people of this
country as a whole rose superior to many disheartening events and never
lost their sure belief in final victory, but full knowledge of the
supreme crisis in our history might have tended to undermine in some
quarters that confidence in victory which it was essential should be
maintained, and, in any event, the facts could not be disclosed without
benefiting the enemy. But the position at times was undoubtedly
extremely serious.
At the opening of the war we possessed approximately half the merchant
tonnage of the world, but experience during the early part of the
struggle revealed that we had not a single ship too many for the great
and increasing oversea military liabilities which we were steadily
incurring, over and above the responsibility of bringing to these shores
the greater part of the food for a population of forty-five million
people, as well as nearly all the raw materials which were essential for
the manufacture of munitions. The whole of our war efforts, ashore as
well as afloat, depended first and last on an adequate volume of
merchant shipping.
It is small wonder, therefore, that those who watched from day to day
the increasing toll which the enemy took of the country's sea-carrying
power, were sometimes filled with deep concern for the future.
Particularly was this the case during the early months of unrestricted
submarine warfare in 1917. For if the menace had not been mastered to a
considerable extent, and that speedily, not only would the victory of
the Allies have been imperilled, but this country would have been
brought face to face with conditions approaching starvation. In pre-war
days the possibility of these islands being blockaded was frequently
discussed; but during the dark days of the unrestricted submarine
campaign there was ample excuse for those with imagination to picture
the implication of events which were happening from week to week. The
memories of those days are already becoming somewhat dim, and as a
matter of history and a guide to the future, it is perhaps well that
some account should be given, however inadequate, of the dangers which
confronted the country and of the means which were adopted to avert the
worst consequences of the enemy's campaign without ceasing to exert the
increasing pressure of our sea power upon his fighting efficiency, and
without diminishing our military efforts overseas.
The latter points were of great importance. It was always necessary to
keep the Grand Fleet at a strength that would ensure its instant
readiness to move in waters which might be infested by submarines in
large numbers should the Germans decide upon some operation by the High
Sea Fleet. The possibility of action between the fleets necessitated the
maintenance of very strong destroyer forces with the Grand Fleet.
Similarly our oversea military expeditions, with the consequent large
number of merchant ships in use as transports or supply ships, required
a considerable force of destroyers and other small craft. These
commitments greatly reduced the means at our disposal for dealing with
the hostile submarines that were attempting to prevent the import of
food and raw materials into the country.
Readers of books, and particularly books dealing with war, show a
natural avidity for what may be described as the human side of a contest
as well as for the dramatic events. But, whether it be prosecuted by sea
or by land, war is largely a matter of efficient and adequate
organization. It is a common saying that we muddle through our wars, but
we could not afford to muddle in face of the threat which the enemy's
unrestricted submarine campaign represented. It is impossible,
therefore, to approach the history of the successful efforts made by sea
to overcome this menace without describing in some detail the work of
organization which was carried out at the Admiralty in order to enable
the Fleet to fulfil its new mission. In effect those responsible for the
naval policy of the country conducted two wars simultaneously, the one
on the surface, and the other under the surface. The strategy, tactics
and weapons which were appropriate to the former, were to a large extent
useless in the contest against mines and submarines which the enemy
employed with the utmost persistency and no little ingenuity. Even in
the Russo-Japanese war, where the mine was little used, it exerted a
marked influence on the course of the war; the Germans based their hopes
of victory in the early days of the struggle entirely on a war of
attrition, waged against men-of-war, as well as merchant ships. The
submarine, which was thrown into the struggle in increasing numbers,
represented an entirely new development, for the submarine is a vessel
which can travel unseen beneath the water and, while still unseen,
except for a possible momentary glimpse of a few inches of periscope,
can launch a torpedo at long or short range and with deadly accuracy. In
these circumstances it became imperative to organize the Admiralty
administration to meet new needs, and to press into the service of the
central administration a large number of officers charged with the sole
duty of studying the new forms of warfare which the enemy had adopted
and of evolving with scientific assistance novel methods of defeating
his tactics.
Whilst the enemy's campaign against merchant shipping always gave rise
to anxiety, there were certain periods of greatly increased activity.
During the summer months of 1916 the losses from submarine attack and
from submarine-laid mines were comparatively slight, and, in fact, less
than during the latter half of 1915, but in the autumn of 1916 they
assumed very serious proportions. This will be seen by reference to the
following table, which gives the monthly losses in British, neutral and
Allied mercantile gross tonnage from submarine and mine attack _alone_
for the months of May to November inclusive:
May ... 122,793
June ... 111,719
July ... 110,757
August ... 160,077
September ... 229,687
October ... 352,902
November ... 327,245
Another disturbing feature was the knowledge that we were not sinking
enemy submarines at any appreciable rate, whilst we knew that the
Germans had under construction a very large number of these vessels, and
that they were thus rapidly adding to their fleet. It was a matter also
of common knowledge that our output of new merchant ships was
exceedingly small, and I, in common with others, had urged a policy of
greatly increased mercantile ship construction. These facts, combined
with the knowledge that our reserves of food and essential raw materials
for war purposes were very low, led me, when commanding the Grand Fleet,
to the inevitable conclusion that it was essential to concentrate all
our naval efforts so far as possible on the submarine menace, and to
adopt the most energetic measures for the protection of our sea
communications and the destruction of the enemy's submarines. Although
it was not easy to see the exact means by which this could be achieved,
it appeared necessary as a first step to form an organization having as
its sole duty the study of the question, comprising such officers as
would be most likely to deal effectively with the problem, supported by
the necessary authority to push forward their ideas. Another necessity
was the rapid production of such material as was found to be required
for anti-submarine measures.
With these ideas in my mind I had written letters to the Admiralty on
the subject, and was summoned to a conference in London on November 1 by
Mr. Balfour, the First Lord. The whole question of the submarine warfare
was fully discussed with Mr. Balfour and Sir Henry Jackson (then First
Sea Lord) during the two days spent in London. I had at that time formed
and expressed the view that there was very little probability of the
High Sea Fleet putting to sea again to risk a Fleet action until the new
submarine campaign had been given a thorough trial. With the High Sea
Fleet "in being" we could not afford to deplete the Grand Fleet of
destroyers, which could under other conditions be employed in
anti-submarine work, and therefore the probable German strategy in these
circumstances was to keep the Fleet "in being." At the same time the
situation appeared so serious that I went so far as to suggest that one
Grand Fleet flotilla of destroyers might under certain conditions be
withdrawn for anti-submarine duties in southern waters.
The misgivings which I entertained were, of course, shared by all those
in authority who were acquainted with the facts of the case, including
the Board of Admiralty.
On November 24 Mr. Balfour telegraphed offering me the post of First Sea
Lord, and in the event of acceptance requesting me to meet him in
Edinburgh to discuss matters. After consultation with Sir Charles
Madden, my Chief of Staff, I replied that I was prepared to do what was
considered best for the Service.
During the conference with Mr. Balfour in Edinburgh on November 27,
1916, and after I had agreed to go to the Admiralty, he informed me of
the consequent changes which he proposed to make in flag officers'
appointments in the Grand Fleet. Amongst the changes he included Admiral
Sir Cecil Burney, who would be relieved of his post as second in command
of the Grand Fleet and commander of the 1st Battle Squadron, as he had
practically completed his term of two years in command. I thereupon
asked that he might be offered the post of Second Sea Lord, and that
Commodore Lionel Halsey, who had been serving as Captain of the Fleet,
might be offered that of Fourth Sea Lord. In my view it was very
desirable that an officer with the great experience in command possessed
by Sir Cecil Burney should occupy the position of Second Sea Lord under
the conditions which existed, and that one who had served afloat during
the war in both an executive and administrative capacity should become
Fourth Sea Lord. I also informed Mr. Balfour of my desire to form an
Anti-Submarine Division of the War Staff at the Admiralty, and asked
that Rear-Admiral A.L. Duff, C.B., should be offered the post of
Director of the Division, with Captain F.C. Dreyer, C.B., my Flag
Captain in the _Iron Duke_, as his assistant.
All these appointments were made.
Although I arrived in London on November 29, I did not actually take
office as First Sea Lord until December 5, owing to an attack of
influenza. On that day I relieved Sir Henry Jackson, but only held
office under Mr. Balfour for two or three days, as the change of
Government took place just at this period, and Sir Edward Carson came to
the Admiralty in place of Mr. Balfour.
This book is intended to record facts, and not to touch upon personal
matters, but I cannot forbear to mention the extreme cordiality of Sir
Edward Carson's relations with the Board in general and myself in
particular. His devotion to the naval service was obvious to all, and in
him the Navy possessed indeed a true and a powerful friend.
The earliest conversations between the First Lord and myself had
relation to the submarine menace, and Sir Edward Carson threw himself
wholeheartedly into the work. This was before the days of the
unrestricted submarine campaign, and although ships were frequently
torpedoed, very large numbers were still being sunk by gun-fire. The
torpedo did not come into general use until March, 1917.
One of the most pressing needs of this period of attack by gun-fire was
consequently a great increase in the number of guns for use in
defensively armed merchant vessels, and here Sir Edward Carson's
assistance was of great value. He fully realized the urgent necessities
of the case, and was constant in his efforts to procure the necessary
guns. The work carried out in this connection is given in detail in
Chapter III (p. 68).
During Sir Edward's tenure of office the reorganization of the Naval
Staff was taken in hand. Changes from which great benefit resulted were
effected in the Staff organization. Sir Edward very quickly saw the
necessity for a considerable strengthening of the Staff. In addition to
the newly formed and rapidly expanding Anti-Submarine Division of the
Naval Staff, he realized that the Operations Division also needed
increased strength, and that it was essential to relieve the First Sea
Lord of the mass of administrative work falling upon his shoulders,
which had unfortunately been greatly magnified by the circumstances
already described.
It is as well at this point to describe the conditions in regard to
Staff organization that existed at the Admiralty at the end of 1916, and
to show how those conditions had been arrived at.
Prior to 1909 there was no real Staff, although the organization at the
Admiralty included an Intelligence Department and a Mobilization
Division. The Director of Naval Intelligence at that time acted in an
advisory capacity as Chief of the Staff. Indeed prior to 1904 there were
but few naval officers at the Admiralty at all beyond those in the
technical departments of the Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes
and the members of the Board itself. The Sea Lords were even without
Naval Assistants and depended entirely on the help of a secretary
provided by the civilian staff at the Admiralty.
In 1910 a new branch was formed termed the Mobilization and Movements
Department under a Director. This branch was a first step towards an
Operations Division.
Under Mr. Churchill's regime at the Admiralty in 1911 a more regular
Staff organization was introduced and a Chief of the War Staff, acting
under the First Sea Lord, was appointed. The organization introduced
during his term of office is thus shown graphically:
CHIEF OF STAFF
|
------------------------------------------------------------
| | |
Director of Director of Director of
Operations Division. Intelligence Division. Mobilization Division.
In addition to other duties, the Mobilization Division was charged with
the responsibility for the supply of fuel to the Fleet, from the Staff
point of view.
In the organization introduced in 1911 the duties of the Chief of the
Staff were defined as being of an advisory nature. He possessed no
executive powers. Consequently all orders affecting the movements of
ships required the approval of the First Sea Lord before issue, and the
consequence of this over-centralization was that additional work was
thrown on the First Sea Lord. The resultant inconvenience was not of
much account during peace, but became of importance in war, and as the
war progressed the Chief of the Staff gradually exercised executive
functions, orders which were not of the first importance being issued by
the Staff in accordance with the policy approved generally by the First
Sea Lord. The fault in the organization appeared to me to lie in
non-recognition of the fact that the First Sea Lord was in reality the
Chief of the Naval Staff, since he was charged with the responsibility
for the preparation and readiness of the Fleet for war and for all
movements. Another anomaly existing at the Admiralty, which was not
altered in the 1911 reorganization of the War Staff, was that the orders
to the Fleet were not drafted and issued by the War Staff, but by the
Military Branch of the Secretary's Department.
The system was only workable because the very able civil servants of the
Military Branch were possessed of wide Admiralty experience and worked
in the closest co-operation with the naval officers. Their work was of
the most strenuous nature and was carried out with the greatest
devotion, but the system was manifestly wrong in principle.
On the outbreak of war the necessity for placing the War Registry (a
part of the Military Branch) directly under the Chief of the Staff
became apparent, and this was done.
In December, 1916, when I took up the post of First Sea Lord, the
Admiralty War Staff was still being worked on the general lines of the
organization introduced by Mr. Churchill in 1911, but it had, of course,
expanded to a very considerable extent to meet war conditions, and a
most important Trade Division, which dealt with all questions connected
with the Mercantile Marine, had been formed at the outbreak of war under
the charge of Captain Richard Webb. This Division, under that very able
officer, had carried out work of the greatest national importance with
marked success.
The successive changes in the Staff organization carried out during the
year 1917 were as follows:
In December, 1916, an Anti-Submarine Division of the Staff was formed.
This Division did not, for some reason, appear in the Navy List as part
of the Staff organization until some months had elapsed, although it
started work in December, 1916. The officers who composed the Division
were shown as borne on the books of H.M.S. _President_.
The Division relieved the Operations Division of the control of all
vessels, including aircraft, which were engaged in anti-submarine
offensive and defensive work, and took over also the control of
mine-sweeping operations. The Division was also charged with the duty of
examining and perfecting all experimental devices for combating the
submarine menace and of producing fresh schemes for the destruction of
enemy submarines. This organization is open to the criticism that
matters concerning operations and material came under the same head, but
they were so closely allied at this stage that it was deemed advisable
to accept this departure from correct Staff organization. The personnel
of the Division came with me from the Grand Fleet, and at the outset
consisted of one flag officer--Rear-Admiral A.L. Duff, C.B.--two
captains, four commanders, three lieutenant-commanders, and two engineer
officers, in addition to the necessary clerical staff. The small staff
of four officers already at the Admiralty engaged in anti-submarine
experimental work, which had done much to develop this side of warfare,
was absorbed. The new Division worked directly under me, but in close
touch with the then Chief of the War Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry
Oliver.
In the early spring of 1917 the illogical nature of the War Staff
organization became apparent, in that it had no executive functions, and
as the result of discussions between Sir Edward Carson and myself the
decision was taken that the duties of the Naval Staff (the term decided
upon in place of that of War Staff) should be made executive, and that
the First Sea Lord should assume his correct title as Chief of the Naval
Staff, as he had, in fact, already assumed the position.
At the same time the operational work of the Staff was grouped under two
heads, the first mainly concerned with operations against the enemy's
surface vessels, and the second with the protection of trade and
operations against the enemy's under-water warfare, whether the means he
employed were submarines or mines.
The officer, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, K.C.B., charged with the
supervision of the first-named work was styled Deputy Chief of the Naval
Staff (D.C.N.S.), and the officer connected with the second,
Rear-Admiral A.L. Duff, C.B., was given the title of Assistant Chief of
the Naval Staff (A.C.N.S.).
The duties of Director of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Staff,
hitherto carried out by Admiral Duff, were at this time taken over by
Captain W.W. Fisher, C.B., who was brought down from the Grand Fleet for
the purpose. Captain Dreyer, who had been Admiral Duff's original
assistant, had in the meantime been appointed Director of Naval
Ordnance, and had been succeeded by Captain H. Walwyn, D.S.O.
The Mine-Sweeping Division of the Staff was also formed, and the
importance of the question of signal communications was recognized by
forming a Signal Section of the Staff.
The adoption of the title of Chief of the Naval Staff by the First Sea
Lord necessarily made the functions of the Staff executive instead of
advisory.
The Staff organization at this period is shown graphically below.
C.N.S.
|
+-- D.C.N.S.
| . |
| . +-- Operations Division.
| . | |
| . | +-- Home
| . | +-- Foreign
| . +-- Mobilization Division.
| . +-- Signal Section.
| . +-- Intelligence Division.
| .
+-- A.C.N.S.
|
+-- Trade Division.
+-- Convoys Section.
+-- Anti-Submarine Division.
+-- Mine-Sweeping Division.
Stress was laid in a Staff memorandum issued by me on the fact that the
various divisions were on no account to work in watertight compartments,
but were to be in the closest touch with one another. The dotted line
connecting the D.C.N.S. and the A.C.N.S. in the graph was defined as
indicating that there should be the fullest co-operation between the
different portions of the Staff.
In the summer of 1917 the growth of the convoy system necessitated
further expansion of the Naval Staff, and a Mercantile Movements
Division was added. The duties of this division were to organize and
regulate the movements of convoys of merchant ships. A staff of officers
had been by this time sent abroad to the ports from which convoys were
directed to sail, and the Mercantile Movements Division, acting in close
touch with the Ministry of Shipping, arranged the assembly and movements
of the convoys and their protection.
The organization of the portion of the Staff under the A.C.N.S. at this
stage is shown below.
A.C.N.S.
|
------------------------------------------------
| | | |
Director of Director of Director of Director of
Mercantile Trade Anti-Sub- Mine-Sweeping
Movements Division. marine Division.
Division. (Captain R.N.) Division. (Captain R.N.)
(Captain R.N.) | (Captain R.N.) |
| Staff. | Staff.
-------------- Staff.
| |
Convoy Movements
Section. Section.
The portion of the organization under the A.C.N.S. comprised the
following numbers in December, 1917:
Mercantile Movements Division, 36 Officers, with a clerical staff.
Trade Division, 43 Officers, with a clerical staff of 10 civilians.
Anti-Submarine Division, 26 Officers, with a clerical staff.
Mine-Sweeping Division, 8 Officers, with a clerical staff.
Of this number practically the whole of the Mercantile Movements and
Anti-Submarine Divisions were added during the year 1917, whilst large
additions were also made to the Trade Division, owing to the great
increase of work.
During the first half of the year 1917 the Operations Division of the
Naval Staff received a much needed increase of strength by the
appointment of additional officers, charged, under the Director of the
Operations Division, with the detailed preparation of plans for
operations. Further additions to this branch of the Staff were made in
the latter half of the year.
Matters were in this position with the reorganization of the Naval Staff
in hand and working towards a definite conclusion when, to the intense
regret of those who had been privileged to work with him, Sir Edward
Carson left the Admiralty to become a member of the War Cabinet.
Before leaving the subject of work at the Admiralty during Sir Edward
Carson's administration, mention should be made of the progress made in
the difficult task of providing officers for the rapidly expanding
Fleet. The large programme of small craft started in the early part of
1917 involved the eventual provision of a great number of additional
officers. Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, the Second Sea Lord, took this
matter in hand with conspicuous success, and the measures which he
introduced tided us over a period of much difficulty and made provision
for many months ahead. Sir Cecil Burney, by reason of his intimate
knowledge of the personnel--the result of years of command afloat--was
able to settle also many problems relating to personnel which had been
the cause of dissatisfaction in the past.
Sir Edward Carson, on leaving the Admiralty, was succeeded by Sir Eric
Geddes as First Lord. Sir Eric had been brought into the Admiralty in
May, 1917, in circumstances which I will describe later. (_Vide_ Chapter
X.) One of his first steps as First Lord which affected Admiralty
organization was the appointment of a Deputy First Sea Lord. This
appointment was frankly made more as a matter of expediency than because
any real need had been shown for the creation of such an office. It is
unnecessary here to enter into the circumstances which led to the
appointment to which I saw objections, owing to the difficulty of
fitting into the organization an officer bearing the title of Deputy
First Sea Lord.
Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss--who had come to England for the purpose
of conferring with the Admiralty before taking up the post of British
Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean--was selected by the First Lord
as Deputy First Sea Lord.
Shortly after assuming office as First Lord, Sir Eric Geddes expressed a
wish for a further consideration of the question of Admiralty
organization. To this end he appointed a joint War Office and Admiralty
Committee to compare the two organizations.
Having received the report of the Committee, the First Lord and I both
formulated ideas for further reorganization. My proposals, so far as
they concerned the Naval Staff, were conceived on the general lines of
an extension of the organization already adopted since my arrival at the
Admiralty, but I also stated that the time had arrived when the whole
Admiralty organization should be divided more distinctly into two sides,
viz., the Operational side and the _Materiél_ or Administrative side,
and indicated that the arrangement existing in the time of the old Navy
Board might be largely followed, in order that questions of Operations
and _Materiél_ should be quite clearly separated. This, indeed, was the
principle of the Staff organization which I had adopted in the Grand
Fleet, and I was anxious to extend it to the Admiralty.
This principle was accepted--although the term "Navy Board" was not
reinstituted--the Admiralty Board being divided into two Committees, one
for _Operations_ and one for _Materiél_, the whole Board meeting at
least once a week, as required, to discuss important questions affecting
both sides. Whilst it was necessary that the Maintenance Committee
should be kept acquainted with the requirements in the shape of material
needed for operations in which the Fleet was engaged--and to the Deputy
Chief of Naval Staff was assigned this particular liaison duty--I was
not in favour of _discussing_ questions affecting ordinary operations
with the whole Board, since, in addition to the delay thereby involved,
members of the Maintenance Committee could not keep in sufficiently
intimate touch with such matters, and opinions might be formed and
conclusions expressed on an incomplete knowledge of facts. Questions of
broad policy or of proposed major operations were, of course, in a
different category, and the above objections did not apply.
The further alterations in Naval Staff organization were not adopted
without considerable discussion and some difference of opinion as to
detail, particularly on the subject of the organization of the
Operations Division of the Naval Staff, which I considered should
embrace the Plans Division as a sub-section in order to avoid
overlapping and delay. In my view it was undesirable for a body of
officers not working under the authority of those in close touch with
the daily operations of the Fleet to put forward plans for operations
which necessarily involved the use of the same vessels and material, as
such a procedure must inevitably lead to impracticable suggestions and
consequent waste of time; the system which I favoured was that in use in
the Army, where the Operations Section of the Staff dealt also with the
working out of plans.
The Admiralty Staff organization necessarily differed somewhat from that
at the War Office, because during the war the Admiralty in a sense
combined, so far as Naval operations were concerned, the functions both
of the War Office and of General Headquarters in France. This was due
primarily to the fact that intelligence was necessarily centred at the
Admiralty, and, secondly, because the Admiralty acted in a sense as
Commander-in-Chief of all the forces working in the vicinity of the
British Isles. It was not possible for the Commander-in-Chief of the
Grand Fleet to assume this function, since he could not be provided with
the necessary knowledge without great delay being caused, and, further,
when he was at sea the other commands would be without a head. The
Admiralty therefore necessarily assumed the duty, whilst supplying each
command with all the information required for operations. The general
lines of the Staff organizations at the War Office and at General
Headquarters in France are here given for the sake of comparison with
the Naval Staff organization.
1.--_The British War Office._
The approximate organization is shown as concisely as possible in the
following diagram:
CHIEF OF IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF
Director of Staff Duties.
Staff duties Organization and training.
War Organization of forces.
General questions of training.
Signals and communications.
Director of Military Operations.
Operations on all fronts.
Director of Military Intelligence.
Intelligence.
Espionage.
The Press.
The other important departments of the War Office on the administration
side are those of the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General,
the former dealing with all questions relating to the personnel of the
Army under the various headings of organization, mobilization, pay and
discipline, and the latter with all questions of supply and transport.
A Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff was attached to the Chief
of the Imperial General Staff. His main duty was to act as a liaison
between the General Staff and the administrative departments of the War
Office.
The whole organization of the British War Office is, of course, under
the direction and control of the Secretary of State for War.
2.--_The Staff Organization at General Headquarters in France._
FIELD MARSHAL
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
Chief of the General Staff
G.S. (a) (Operations) Plans and Execution Intelligence.
G.S. (b) (Staff Duties) War Organizations and
Establishments Liason between G.S. (a) and
Administrative Services.
Adjutant General (Personnel, Discipline, etc.)
Quartermaster General (Transport and Supply, etc.)
ATTACHED TO GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.
(BUT NOT STAFF OFFICERS.)
|
----------------------------------------------------
| | |
Artillery Adviser Engineer-in-Chief. Inspector of
(Advises Chief of Advises as in case of Training.
General Stall on Artillery.
Artillery matters
and operations).
|
Advises Administrative
Departments as
necessary.
N.B.--The Inspector of Training works in consultation with the Chief of
the General Staff.
It will be seen that whilst at the War Office the liaison between the
General Staff and the administrative side was maintained by a Deputy
Chief of the General Staff, in the organization in the field the same
function was performed by the Staff Officer known as G.S. (b).
It will also be seen that neither at General Headquarters nor in the
case of an Army command does the Chief of the General Staff exercise
control over the administrative side.
After some discussion the Admiralty organizations shown in the Tables A
and B on page 20 (below) were adopted, and I guarded as far as possible
against the objection to keeping the Plans Division separate from the
Operations Division by the issue of detailed orders as to the conduct of
the business of the Staff, in which directions were given that the
Director of the Plans Division should be in close touch with the
Director of the Operations Division before submitting any proposals to
the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff or myself.
During the remainder of my service at the Admiralty the organization
remained as shown in Tables A and B on p. 20 below. It was not entirely
satisfactory, for reasons already mentioned and because I did not obtain
all the relief from administrative work which was so desirable.
TABLE A
First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff.
Director of Intelligence Division.
Director of Signals Division.
Director of Operations Division.
Deputy-Director of Operations
Operations at home.
Assistant Director Operations Division and Staff.
Operations abroad.
Director of Plans Division.
Preparation of Plans for operations at home and abroad.
Consideration of and proposals for use of new
weapons and material. Building programmes to
carry out approved policy.
Deputy First Sea Lord.
Director of Training and Staff Duties.
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff.
Director of Trade Division.
Director of Mercantile Movements.
Director of Mine-sweeping.
Director of Anti-Submarine Division.
TABLE B
Board of Admiralty.
Operations Committee.
Naval Staff.
Maintenance Committee.
Shipbuilding and Armaments.
Stores.
Air.
Finance.
Personnel and Discipline, etc.
Works.
Early in 1918, after my departure from the Admiralty, the following
announcement appeared in the Press:
The _Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement_:--
The Letters Patent for the new Board of Admiralty having now been
issued, it may be desirable to summarize the changes in the personnel of
the Board and to indicate briefly the alterations in organization that
have been decided upon.
Acting Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver now brings to a close his long
period of valuable service on the Naval Staff and will take up a
sea-going command, being succeeded as D.C.N.S. by Rear-Admiral Sydney
Fremantle. Rear-Admiral George P.W. Hope has been selected for the
appointment of Deputy First Sea Lord, formerly held by Admiral Wemyss,
but with changed functions. Commodore Paine, Fifth Sea Lord and Chief of
Naval Air Service, leaves the Board of Admiralty in consequence of the
recent creation of the Air Council, of which he is now a member, and
formal effect is now given to the appointment of Mr. A.F. Pease as
Second Civil Lord, which was announced on Thursday last.
In view of the formal recognition now accorded, as explained by the
First Lord in his statement in the House of Commons on the 1st November,
to the principle of the division of the work of the Board under the two
heads of Operations and Maintenance, the Members of the new Board (other
than the First Lord) may be grouped as follows:--
OPERATIONS. MAINTENANCE.
First Sea Lord Second Sea Lord.
and (Vice-Admiral Sir H.L. Heath.)
Chief of Naval Staff.
(Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss.)
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. Third Sea Lord.
(Rear-Admiral S.R. Fremantle.) (Rear-Admiral L. Halsey.)
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff. Fourth Sea Lord.
(Rear-Admiral A.L. Duff.) (Rear-Admiral H.H.D.
Tothill.)
Deputy First Sea Lord. Civil Lord.
(Rear-Admiral G.P.W. Hope.) (Right Hon. E.G. Pretyman,
M.P.)
Controller.
(Sir A.G. Anderson.)
Second Civil Lord.
(Mr. A.F. Pease.)
Financial Secretary.
(Right Hon. T.J. Macnamara, M.P.)
Permanent Secretary.
(Sir O. Murray.)
The principle of isolating the work of planning and directing naval war
operations from all other work, in order that it may receive the entire
attention of the Officers selected for its performance, is now being
carried a stage further and applied systematically to the organization
of the Operations side of the Board and that of the Naval Staff.
In future the general distribution of duties between the Members of the
Board belonging to the Naval Staff will be as follows:--
FIRST SEA LORD AND CHIEF Naval policy and general direction
OF NAVAL STAFF of operations.
DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL War operations in Home
STAFF Waters.
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL Trade Protection and
STAFF anti-submarine operations.
DEPUTY FIRST SEA LORD General policy questions and
operations outside Home
Waters.
The detailed arrangements have been carefully worked out so as to
relieve the first three of these officers of the necessity of dealing
with any questions not directly connected with the main operations of
the war, and the great mass of important paper work and administrative
detail which is inseparably and necessarily connected with Staff work,
but which has hitherto tended to compete for attention with Operations
work generally will under the new organization be diverted to the Deputy
First Sea Lord.
The grouping of the Directors of the Naval Staff Divisions will be
governed by the same principle.
The only two Directors that will work immediately under the First Sea
Lord will be the Director of Intelligence Division (Rear-Admiral Sir
Reginald Hall) and the Director of Training and Staff Duties
(Rear-Admiral J. C. Ley), whose functions obviously affect all the other
Staff Divisions alike.
Under the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff will be grouped three Directors
whose duties will relate entirely to the planning and direction of
operations in the main sphere of naval activity, viz.:--
Director of Operations Division Captain A.D.P. Pound.
(Home)
Director of Plans Division Captain C.T.M. Fuller,
C.M.G., D.S.O.
Director of Air Division Wing Captain F.R. Scarlett,
D.S.O.
together with the Director of Signals Division, Acting-Captain R.L.
Nicholson, D.S.O., whose duties relate to the system of Fleet
communications.
Under the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff will be grouped four Directors,
whose duties relate to Trade Protection and Anti-Submarine Operations,
viz:--
Director of Anti-Submarine Captain W.W. Fisher, C.B.
Division
Director of Mine-sweeping Captain L.G. Preston, C.B.
Division
Director of Mercantile Movements Captain F.A. Whitehead.
Division
Director of Trade Division Captain A.G. Hotham.
Under the Deputy First Sea Lord there will be one _Director of
Operations Division (Foreign)_--Captain C.P.R. Coode, D.S.O.
The chief change on the Maintenance side of the Board relates to the
distribution of duties amongst the Civil Members. The continuance of the
war has caused a steady increase in the number of cases in which
necessary developments of Admiralty policy due to the war, or experience
resulting from war conditions give rise to administrative problems of
great importance and complexity, of which a solution will have to be
forthcoming either immediately upon or very soon after the conclusion of
the war. The difficulty of concentrating attention on these problems of
the future in the midst of current administrative work of great urgency
may easily be appreciated, and the Civil Lord has consented to take
charge of this important matter, with suitable naval and other
assistance. He will, therefore, be relieved by the Second Civil Lord of
the administration of the programme of Naval Works, including the
questions of priority of labour and material requirements arising
therefrom and the superintendence of the Director of Works Department.
It has further been decided that the exceptional labour and other
difficulties now attending upon the execution of the very large
programme of urgent naval works in progress have so greatly transformed
the functions of the Director of Works Department of the Admiralty that
it is desirable, whilst these abnormal conditions last, to place that
Department under the charge of an expert in the rapid execution of large
engineering works.
The Army Council have consented, at the request of the First Lord of the
Admiralty, to lend for this purpose the services of Colonel Alexander
Gibb, K.B.E., C.B., R.E., Chief Engineer, Port Construction, British
Armies in France. Colonel Gibb (of the Firm of Easton, Gibb, Son and
Company, which built Rosyth Naval Base) will have the title of Civil
Engineer-in-Chief, and will be assisted by the Director of Works, who
retains his status as such, and the existing Staff of the Department,
which will be strengthened as necessary.
Another important change has reference to the organization of the
Admiralty Board of Invention and Research, and has the object at once of
securing greater concentration of effort in connection with scientific
research and experiment, and ensuring that the distinguished scientists
who are giving their assistance to the Admiralty are more constantly in
and amongst the problems upon which they are advising.
Mr. Charles H. Merz, M.Inst.C.E., the well-known Electrical Consulting
Engineer, who has been associated with the Board of Invention and
Research (B.I.R.) since its inception, has consented to serve as
Director of Experiments and Research (unpaid) at the Admiralty to direct
and supervise all the executive arrangements in connection with the
organization of scientific Research and Experiments. Mr. Merz will also
be a member of the Central Committee of the B.I.R. under the presidency
of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher. The functions of the Central
Committee will, as hitherto, be to initiate, investigate, develop and
advise generally upon proposals in respect to the application of Science
and Engineering to Naval Warfare, but the distinguished scientific
experts at present giving their services will in future work more much
closely with the Technical Departments of the Admiralty immediately
concerned with the production and use of apparatus required for specific
purposes.
The general arrangements in regard to the organization of scientific
research and experiment will in future come under the direct supervision
of the First Lord.
Possibly by reason of the manner in which the announcement was made, the
Press appeared to assume that the whole of this Admiralty organization
was new. Such was not the case. Apart from the changes in the personnel
of the Board itself and a slight rearrangement of their duties and those
due to the establishment of an Air Ministry (which had been arranged by
the Cabinet before December, 1917), there were but slight alterations in
the organization shown in Table A [above], as will be seen by comparing
it with Table C on p. 27 [below], which indicates graphically the
organization given in the Admiralty communique.
TABLE C
FIRST SEA LORD AND CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF.
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff.
Director of Signals Division.
Director of Operations Division (Home).
Director of Plans Division.
Director of Air Division.
Deputy First Sea Lord.
Director of Operations Division (Foreign) and
Administrative detail work.
Director of Intelligence Division.
Director of Training and Staff Duties.
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff.
Director of Trade Division.
Director of Mercantile Movements.
Director of Mine-sweeping.
Director of Anti-Submarine Division.
It will be seen that the alterations in Naval Staff organization were as
follows:
(a) The new Deputy First Sea Lord--Rear-Admiral Hope--who since the
spring of 1917 had been Director of the Operations Division, was given
the responsibility for operations in foreign waters, with a Director of
Operations (foreign) under him, and was also definitely charged with the
administrative detail involving technical matters. The special gifts,
experience and aptitude of this particular officer for such work enabled
him, no doubt, to relieve the pressure on the First Sea Lord for
administrative detail very materially.
(b) The Operations Division was separated into two parts (home and
foreign), with a Director for each, instead of there being a Deputy
Director for home and an Assistant Director for foreign work, both
working under the Director. This was a change in name only, as the same
officer continued the foreign work under the new arrangement.
(c) The Director of the Intelligence Division and the Director of
Training and Staff Duties were shown as working immediately under the
First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff.
(d) A Director of the Air Division was introduced as a result of the
Naval Air Service having been separated from the Admiralty and placed
under the Air Ministry. A larger Admiralty Staff organization for aerial
matters thus became necessary, since the Staff could no longer refer to
the Naval Air Service.
There were no other changes in the Staff organization. As regards the
general Admiralty organization, there was no change except that caused
by the disappearance of the separate Naval Air Service, the addition of
a Second Civil Lord, and some reorganization of the Board of Invention
and Research which had been under discussion for some months previously.
It is probable that in 1918 the Chief of the Naval Staff had more time
at his disposal than was the case in 1917, owing to the changes in
organization initiated in the later year having reached some finality
and to the fact that the numerous anti-submarine measures put in hand in
1917 had become effective in 1918.
The future Admiralty Naval Staff organization, which was in my mind at
the end of 1917, was a development of that shown in Table A, p. 20,
subject to the following remarks:
In the organization then adopted the personality and experience during
the war of many of the officers in high positions were of necessity
considered, and the organization to that extent adapted to
circumstances. This resulted in somewhat overloading the staff at the
head, and the principle on which the Board of Admiralty works, i.e.,
that its members are colleagues one of another, and seniority in rank
does not, theoretically, give greater weight in council, was not
altogether followed. Thus the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, the
Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, and the Deputy First Sea Lord were,
by the nature of their duties, subordinate to the Chief of the Naval
Staff and yet were members of the Board. The well-known loyalty of naval
officers to one another tended to minimize any difficulties that might
have arisen from this anomaly, but the arrangement might conceivably
give rise to difficulty, and is best avoided if the Board system is to
remain.
The situation would be clearer if two of the three officers concerned
were removed altogether from the Board, viz., the Deputy First Sea Lord
and the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, leaving only the Deputy
Chief of the Naval Staff as a member of the Board to act in the absence
of the Chief of the Naval Staff and to relieve him of the administrative
and technical work not immediately connected with operations.
The work of the two officers thus removed should, under these
conditions, be undertaken by officers who should preferably be Flag
Officers, with experience in command at sea, having the titles of
Directors of Operations, whose emoluments should be commensurate with
their position and responsibilities.
I did not consider it advisable to carry out this alteration during the
war, and it was also difficult under the hour to hour stress of war to
rearrange all the duties of the Naval Staff in the manner most
convenient to the conduct of Staff business, although its desirability
was recognized during 1917.
It may be as well to close this chapter by a few remarks on Staff work
generally in the Navy. In the first place it is necessary in the Navy to
give much weight to the opinions of specialist officers, and for this
reason it is desirable that they should be included in the Staff
organization, and not "attached" to it as was the case with our Army in
pre-war days. The reason for this is that in the Army there is, except
in regard to artillery, little "specialization." The training received
by an officer of any of the fighting branches of the Army at the Staff
College may fit him to assist in the planning and execution of
operations, provided due regard is paid to questions of supply,
transport, housing, etc.
This is not so in a navy. A ship and all that she contains is the
weapon, and very intimate knowledge of the different factors that go to
make a ship an efficient weapon is necessary if the ship is to be used
effectively and if operations in which the ship takes so prominent a
part are to be successfully planned and executed, or if a sound opinion
is to be expressed on the training necessary to produce and maintain her
as an efficient weapon.
The particular points in which this specially intimate knowledge is
required are:
(a) The science of navigation and of handling ships of all types and
classes.
(b) Gunnery.
(c) Torpedoes and mines.
It is the case at present (and the conditions are not likely to alter)
that each one of these subjects is a matter for specialist training.
Every executive officer has a general knowledge of each subject, but it
is not possible for any one officer to possess the knowledge of all
three which is gained by the specialist, and if attempts are made to
plan operations without the assistance of the specialists grave errors
may be made, and, indeed, such errors were made during the late war,
perhaps from this cause.
In my view, therefore, it is desirable that specialist officers should
be included in a Naval Staff organization and not be merely "attached"
to it. It may be said that a Staff can take the advice of specialist
officers who are _attached_ to it for that purpose. But there is a
danger that the specialist advice may never reach the heads of the
Staff. Human nature being what it is, the safest procedure is to place
the specialist officer where his voice must be heard, i.e. to give him a
position on the Staff, for one must legislate for the _average_
individual and for normal conditions of work.
The Chief of a Staff _might_ have specialist knowledge himself, or he
_might_ assure himself that due weight had been given to the opinions of
specialists attached to a Staff; but, on the other hand, it is possible
that he might not have that knowledge and that he might ignore the
opinions of the specialists. The procedure suggested is at least as
necessary when considering the question of training as it is in the case
of operations.
In passing from this point I may say that I have heard the opinion
expressed by military Staff officers that the war has shown that
artillery is so all important that it would be desirable to place the
Major-General of the Royal Artillery, now _attached_ to General
Headquarters, on the Staff for operational matters.
Finally, great care should be exercised to prevent the Staff becoming
larger than is necessary, and there is some danger that the ignorant may
gauge the value of the Staff by its size.
Von Schellendorff says on this subject:
"The principle strictly followed throughout the German Service of
reducing all Staffs to the smallest possible dimensions is moreover
vindicated by restricting every Staff to what is absolutely necessary,
and by not attaching to every Army, Army Corps and Divisional Staff
representatives of all the various branches and departments according to
any fixed rule.
"There cannot be the slightest doubt that the addition of every
individual not absolutely required on a Staff is in itself an evil. In
the first place, it unnecessarily weakens the strength of the regiment
from which an officer is taken. Again it increases the difficulty of
providing the Staff with quarters, which affects the troops that may
happen to be quartered in the same place; and these are quite ready
enough, as it is, occasionally to look with a certain amount of
dislike--though in most cases it is entirely uncalled for--on the
personnel of the higher Staffs. Finally, it should be remembered--and
this is the most weighty argument against the proceeding--that _idleness
is at the root of all mischief_. When there are too many officers on a
Staff they cannot always find the work and occupation essential for
their mental and physical welfare, and their superfluous energies soon
make themselves felt in all sorts of objectionable ways. Experience
shows that whenever a Staff is unnecessarily numerous the ambitious
before long take to intrigue, the litigious soon produce general
friction, and the vain are never satisfied. These failings, so common to
human nature, even if all present, are to a great extent counteracted if
those concerned have plenty of hard and constant work. Besides, the
numbers of a Staff being few, there is all the greater choice in the
selection of the men who are to fill posts on it. In forming a Staff for
war the qualifications required include not only great professional
knowledge and acquaintance with service routine, but above all things
character, self-denial, energy, tact and discretion."
CHAPTER II
THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN IN THE EARLY PART OF 1917
The struggle against the depredations of the enemy submarines during the
year 1917 was two-fold; _offensive_ in the direction of anti-submarine
measures (this was partly the business of the Anti-Submarine Division of
the Naval Staff and partly that of the Operations Division); _defensive_
in the direction of protective measures for trade, whether carried in
our own ships or in ships belonging to our Allies or to neutrals, this
being the business of the Trade and Mercantile Movements Divisions.
Prior to the formation of the Mercantile Movements Division the whole
direction of trade was in the hands of the Trade Division of the Staff.
The difficulty with which we were constantly faced in the early part of
1917, when the effective means of fighting the submarine were very
largely confined to the employment of surface vessels, was that of
providing a sufficient number of such vessels for _offensive_ operations
without incurring too heavy risks for our trade by the withdrawal of
vessels engaged in what might be termed _defensive_ work. There was
always great doubt whether any particular offensive operation undertaken
by small craft would produce any result, particularly as the numbers
necessary for success were not available, whilst there was the practical
_certainty_ that withdrawal of defensive vessels would increase our
losses; the situation was so serious in the spring of 1917 that we could
not carry out experiments involving grave risk of considerably increased
losses.
On the other hand, the sinking of one enemy submarine meant the possible
saving of a considerable number of merchant ships. It was difficult to
draw the line between the two classes of operations.
The desire of the Anti-Submarine Division to obtain destroyers for
offensive use in hunting flotillas in the North Sea and English Channel
led to continual requests being made to me to provide vessels for the
purpose. I was, of course, anxious to institute offensive operations,
but in the early days of 1917 we could not rely much on depth-charge
attack, owing to our small stock of these charges, and my experience in
the Grand Fleet had convinced me that for success in the alternative of
hunting submarines for a period which would exhaust their batteries and
so force them to come to the surface, a large number of destroyers was
required, unless the destroyers were provided with some apparatus which
would, by sound or otherwise, locate the submarine. This will be
realized when the fact is recalled that a German submarine could remain
submerged at slow speed for a period which would enable her to travel a
distance of some 80 miles. As this distance could be covered in any
direction in open waters such as the North Sea, it is obvious that only
a very numerous force of destroyers steaming at high speed could cover
the great area in which the submarine might come to the surface. She
would, naturally, select the dark hours for emergence, as being the
period of very limited range of vision for those searching for her. In
confined waters such as those in the eastern portion of the English
Channel the problem became simpler. Requests for destroyers constantly
came from every quarter, such as the Commanders-in-Chief at Portsmouth
and Devonport, the Senior Naval Officer at Gibraltar, the Vice-Admiral,
Dover, the Rear-Admiral Commanding East Coast, and the Admiral at
Queenstown. The vessels they wanted did not, however, exist.
Eventually, with great difficulty, a force of six destroyers was
collected from various sources in the spring of 1917, and used in the
Channel solely for hunting submarines; this number was really quite
inadequate, and it was not long before they had to be taken for convoy
work.
Evidence of the difficulty of successfully hunting submarines was often
furnished by the experiences of our own vessels of this type, sometimes
when hunted by the enemy, sometimes when hunted in error by our own
craft. Many of our submarines went through some decidedly unpleasant
experiences at the hands of our own surface vessels and occasionally at
the hands of vessels belonging to our Allies. On several such occasions
the submarine was frequently reported as having been sunk, whereas she
had escaped.
As an example of a submarine that succeeded not only in evading
destruction, but in getting at least even with the enemy, the case of
one of our vessels of the "E" class, on patrol in the Heligoland Bight,
may be cited. This submarine ran into a heavy anti-submarine net, and
was dragged, nose first, to the bottom. After half an hour's effort,
during which bombs were exploding in her vicinity, the submarine was
brought to the surface by her own crew by the discharge of a great deal
of water from her forward ballast tanks. It was found, however, that the
net was still foul of her, and that a Zeppelin was overhead, evidently
attracted by the disturbance in the water due to the discharge of air
and water from the submarine. She went to the bottom again, and after
half an hour succeeded in getting clear of the net. Meanwhile the
Zeppelin had collected a force of trawlers and destroyers, and the
submarine was hunted for fourteen hours by this force, assisted by the
airship. During this period she succeeded in sinking one of the German
destroyers, and was eventually left unmolested.
For a correct appreciation of submarine warfare it is necessary to have
a clear idea of the characteristics and qualities of the submarine
herself, of the numbers possessed by the enemy, and of the rate at which
they were being produced. It is also necessary, in order to understand
the difficulty of introducing the counter measures adopted by the Royal
Navy, to know the length of time required to produce the vessels and the
weapons which were employed or which it was intended to employ in the
anti-submarine war.
The German submarines may be divided into four classes, viz.: Submarine
cruisers, U-boats, U.B.-boats, U.C.-boats. There were several variations
of each class.
The earlier _submarine cruisers_ of the "Deutschland" class were
double-hulled vessels, with a surface displacement of 1,850 tons, and
were about 215 feet long; they had a surface speed of about 12 knots and
a submerged speed of about 6 knots. They carried two 5.9-inch guns, two
22 pounders, two torpedo tubes, and 12 torpedoes. They could keep the
sea for quite four months without being dependent on a supply ship or
base.
The later _submarine cruisers_ were double-hulled, 275-320 feet long,
had a surface speed of 16-18 knots, and a submerged speed of about 7 to
8 knots. They carried either one or two 5.9-inch guns, six torpedo
tubes, and about 10 torpedoes. They had a very large radius of action,
viz., from 12,000 to 20,000 miles, at a speed of 6 knots. A large number
(some 30 to 40) of these boats were under construction at the time of
the Armistice, but very few had been completed.
There were two or three types of _U-boats_. The earlier vessels were 210
to 220 feet long, double-hulled, with a surface displacement of about
750 tons, a surface speed of 15 to 16 knots, and a submerged speed of
about 8 knots. They carried one or two 4.1-inch guns, four to six
torpedo tubes, and about 10 torpedoes.
Later vessels of the class were 230 to 240 feet long, and of 800 to 820
tons surface displacement, and carried six torpedo tubes and 16
torpedoes. Some of them, fitted as minelayers, carried 36 mines, and two
torpedo tubes, but only two torpedoes. A later and much larger class of
minelayers carried a 5.9-inch gun, four torpedo tubes, 42 mines, and a
larger number of torpedoes. The earlier _U-boats_ could keep the sea for
about five weeks without returning to a base or a supply ship; the later
_U-boats_ had much greater sea endurance.
The smaller _U.B.-boats_ were single-hulled, and about 100 feet long,
had a surface speed of 7 to 9 knots and a submerged speed of about 5
knots, and carried one 22-pounder gun, two torpedo tubes and four
torpedoes. These boats could keep the sea for about two weeks without
returning to a base or supply ship. A later class were double-hulled,
180 feet long, with greater endurance (8,000 miles at 6 knots), a
surface speed of 13 knots and a submerged speed of 8 knots; they carried
one 4.1-inch gun, five tubes and 10 torpedoes.
The earliest _U.C.-boats_ were 111 feet long, with a surface
displacement of 175 tons, a surface speed of 6-½ knots, and a submerged
speed of 5 knots. They carried 12 mines, but no torpedo tubes, and as
they had a fuel endurance of only 800 miles at 5-½ knots, they could
operate only in southern waters.
The later _U.C.-boats_ were 170 to 180 feet long, double-hulled, had a
surface speed of 11 to 12 knots and a submerged speed of about 7 knots,
carried 18 mines, three torpedo tubes, five torpedoes, and one
22-pounder gun, and their fuel endurance was 8,000 to 10,000 miles at a
speed of 7 to 8 knots.
At the end of February, 1917, it was estimated that the enemy had a
total of about 130 submarines of all types available for use in home
waters, and about 20 in the Mediterranean. Of this total an average of
between one-half and one-third was usually at sea. During the year about
eight submarines, on the average, were added monthly to this total. Of
this number some 50 per cent, were vessels of the mine-laying type.
All the German submarines were capable of prolonged endurance submerged.
The U-boats could travel under water at the slowest speed for some 48
hours, at about 4 knots for 20 hours, at 5 knots for about 12 hours, and
at 8 knots for about 2 hours.
They were tested to depths of at least 180 feet, but many submerged to
depths exceeding 250 feet without injury. They did not usually lie on
the bottom at depths greatly exceeding 20 fathoms (120 feet).
All German submarines, except possibly the _cruiser class_, could dive
from diving trim in from 30 seconds to one minute. The _U.B. class_ had
particularly rapid diving qualities, and were very popular boats with
the German submarine officers. Perhaps the most noticeable features of
the German submarines as a whole were their excellent engines and their
great strength of construction.
Prior to the month of February, 1917, it was the usual practice of the
enemy submarine in the warfare against merchant ships to give some
warning before delivering her attack. This was by no means a universal
rule, particularly in the case of British merchant vessels, as is
evidenced by the attacks on the _Lusitania, Arabic_, and scores of other
ships.
In the years 1915 and 1916, however, only 21 and 29 per cent.
respectively of the British merchant ships sunk by enemy submarines were
destroyed without warning, whilst during the first four months of the
unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 the figure rose to 64 per cent.,
and went higher and higher as the months progressed.
Prior to February, 1917, the more general method of attack on ships was
to "bring them to" by means of gun-fire; they were then sunk by
gun-fire, torpedo, or bomb. This practice necessitated the submarine
being on the surface, and so gave a merchant ship defensively armed a
chance of replying to the gun-fire and of escaping, and it also gave
armed decoy ships a good opportunity of successful action if the
submarine could be induced to close to very short range.
The form of attack on commerce known as "unrestricted submarine warfare"
was commenced by Germany with the object of forcing Great Britain to
make peace by cutting off her supplies of food and raw material. It has
been acknowledged by Germans in high positions that the German Admiralty
considered that this form of warfare would achieve its object in a
comparatively short time, in fact in a matter of some five or six
months.
Experienced British naval officers, aware of the extent of the German
submarine building programme, and above all aware of the shadowy nature
of our existing means of defence against such a form of warfare, had
every reason to hold the view that the danger was great and that the
Allies were faced with a situation, fraught with the very gravest
possibilities.
The principal doubt was as to the ability of the enemy to train
submarine crews with sufficient rapidity to keep pace with his building
programme.
However, it was ascertained that the Germans had evidently devoted a
very great number of their submarines to training work during the period
September, 1915, to March, 1916, possibly in anticipation of the
unrestricted warfare, since none of their larger boats was operating in
our waters between these months; this fact had a considerable bearing on
the problem.
As events turned out it would appear either that the training given was
insufficient or that the German submarine officer was lacking in
enterprise.
There is no doubt whatever that had the German craft engaged in the
unrestricted submarine warfare been manned by British officers and men,
adopting German methods, there would have been but few Allied or neutral
merchant ships left afloat by the end of 1917.
So long as the majority of the German submarine attacks upon shipping
were made by gun-fire, the method of defence was comparatively simple,
in that it merely involved the supply to merchant ships of guns of
sufficient power to prevent the submarine engaging at ranges at which
the fire could not be returned. Whilst the _method_ of defence was
apparent, the problem of _supplying_ suitable guns in sufficient numbers
was a very different matter. It involved arming all our merchant ships
with guns of 4-inch calibre and above. In January, 1917, only some 1,400
British ships had been so armed since the outbreak of war.
It will be seen, therefore, that so long as ships sailed singly, very
extensive supplies of guns were required to meet gun attack, and as
there was most pressing need for the supply of guns for the Army in
France, as well as for the anti-aircraft defence of London, the prospect
of arming merchant ships adequately was not promising.
When the enemy commenced unrestricted submarine warfare attack by
gun-fire was gradually replaced by attack by torpedo, and the problem at
once became infinitely more complicated.
Gun-fire was no longer a protection, since the submarine was rarely
seen. The first intimation of her presence would be given by the track
of a torpedo coming towards the ship, and no defence was then possible
beyond an endeavour to manoeuvre the ship clear of the torpedo. Since,
however, a torpedo is always some distance ahead of the bubbles which
mark its track (the speed of the torpedo exceeding 30 knots an hour),
the track is not, as a rule, seen until the torpedo is fairly close to
the ship unless the sea is absolutely calm. The chance of a ship of low
speed avoiding a hit by a timely alteration of course after the torpedo
has been fired is but slight. Further, the only difficulty experienced
by a submarine in hitting a moving vessel by torpedo-fire, once she has
arrived in a position suitable for attack, lies in estimating correctly
the course and speed of the target. In the case of an ordinary cargo
ship there is little difficulty in guessing her speed, since it is
certain to be between 8 and 12 knots, and her course can be judged with
fair accuracy by the angle of her masts and funnel, or by the angle
presented by her bridge.
It will be seen, then, how easy was the problem before the German
submarine officers, and how very difficult was that set to our Navy and
our gallant Mercantile Marine.
It will not be out of place here to describe the methods which were in
force at the end of 1916 and during the first part of 1917 for affording
protection to merchant shipping approaching our coasts from the
direction of the Atlantic Ocean.
The general idea dating from the early months of the war was to disperse
trade on passage over wide tracts of ocean, in order to prevent the
successful attacks which could be so easily carried out if shipping
traversed one particular route. To carry out such a system it was
necessary to give each vessel a definite route which she should follow
from her port of departure to her port of arrival; unless this course
was adopted, successive ships would certainly be found to be following
identical, or practically identical, routes, thereby greatly increasing
the chance of attack. In the early years of the war masters of ships
were given approximate tracks, but when the unrestricted submarine
campaign came into being it became necessary to give exact routes.
The necessary orders were issued by officers stationed at various ports
at home and abroad who were designated Shipping Intelligence or
Reporting Officers. It was, of course, essential to preserve the secrecy
of the general principles governing the issue of route orders and of the
route orders themselves. For this reason each master was only informed
of the orders affecting his own ship, and was directed that such orders
should on no account fall into the hands of the enemy.
The route orders were compiled on certain principles, of which a few may
be mentioned:
(a) Certain definite positions of latitude and longitude were given
through which the ship was required to pass, and the orders were
discussed with the master of each vessel in order to ensure that they
were fully understood.
(b) Directions were given that certain localities in which submarines
were known to operate, such as the approaches to the coast of the United
Kingdom, were, if possible, to be crossed at night. It was pointed out
that when the speed of the ship did not admit of traversing the whole
danger area at night, the portion involving the greatest danger (which
was the inshore position) should, as a rule, be crossed during dark
hours.
(c) Similarly the orders stated that ships should, as a rule, leave port
so as to approach the dangerous area at dusk, and that they should make
the coast at about daylight, and should avoid, as far as possible, the
practice of making the land at points in general use in peace time.
(d) Orders were definite that ships were to zigzag both by day and at
night in certain areas, and if kept waiting outside a port.
(e) Masters were cautioned to hug the coast, as far as navigational
facilities admitted, when making coastal passages.
The orders (b), (c) and (d) were those in practice in the Grand Fleet
when circumstances permitted during my term in that command.
A typical route order from New York to Liverpool might be as follows:
"After passing Sandy Hook, hug the coast until dark, then make a good
offing before daylight and steer to pass through the following
positions, viz:
Lat. 38° N. Long. 68° W.
Lat. 41° N. Long. 48° W.
Lat. 46° N. Long. 28° W.
Lat. 51° 30' N. Long. 14° W.
"Thence make the coast near the Skelligs approximately at daylight, hug
the Irish coast to the Tuskar, up the Irish coast (inside the banks if
possible), and across the Irish Channel during dark hours. Thence hug
the coast to your port; zigzag by day and night after passing, Long. 20°
W."
Sometimes ships were directed to cross to the English coast from the
south of Ireland, and to hug the English coast on their way north.
The traffic to the United Kingdom was so arranged in the early part of
1917 as to approach the coast in four different areas, which were known
as Approach A, B, C, and D.
Approach A was used for traffic bound towards the western approach to
the English Channel.
Approach B for traffic making for the south of Ireland.
Approach C for traffic making for the north of Ireland.
Approach D for traffic making for the east coast of England via the
north of Scotland.
The approach areas in force during one particular period are shown on
Chart A (in pocket at the end of the book). They were changed
occasionally when suspicion was aroused that their limits were known to
the enemy, or as submarine attack in an area became intense.
[Transcriber's note: Chart A is a navigational map of the waters
southwest of England, with approach routes marked.]
The approach areas were patrolled at the time, so far as numbers
admitted, by patrol craft (trawlers, torpedo-boat destroyers, and
sloops), and ships with specially valuable cargoes were given directions
to proceed to a certain rendezvous on the outskirts of the area, there
to be met by a destroyer or sloop, if one was available for the purpose.
The areas were necessarily of considerable length, by reason of the
distance from the coast at which submarines operated, and of
considerable width, owing to the necessity for a fairly wide dispersion
of traffic throughout the area. Consequently, with the comparatively
small number of patrol craft available, the protection afforded was but
slight, and losses were correspondingly heavy. In the early spring of
1917, Captain H.W. Grant, of the Operations Division at the Admiralty,
whose work in the Division was of great value, proposed a change in
method by which the traffic should be brought along certain definite
"lines" in each approach area. Typical lines are shown in Chart B.
[Transcriber's note: Chart B is a navigational map of the waters
southwest of Ireland, with approach routes marked.]
The idea was that the traffic in, say, Approach Route B, should,
commencing on a certain date, be ordered by the Routeing Officer to pass
along the line Alpha. Traffic would continue along the line for a
certain period, which was fixed at five days, when it would be
automatically diverted to another line, say Gamma, but the traffic along
Gamma would not commence until a period of 24 hours had elapsed since
discontinuance of the use of the line Alpha. This was necessary in order
to give time for the patrol craft to change from one line to the other.
During this period of 24 hours the arrangement for routeing at the ports
of departure ensured that no traffic would reach the outer end of any of
the approach lines, and consequently that traffic would cease on line
Alpha 24 hours before it commenced on line Gamma. After a further period
of five days the line would again change automatically.
It was necessary that Shipping Intelligence Officers should have in
their possession the orders for directing traffic on to the various
lines for some considerable time ahead, and the masters of ships which
were likely to be for some time at sea were informed of the dates
between which the various lines were to be used, up to a date sufficient
to cover the end of their voyage. There was, therefore, some danger of
this information reaching the enemy if a vessel were captured by a
submarine and the master failed to destroy his instructions in time.
There was also some danger in giving the information to neutrals.
However, the system, which was adopted, did result in a reduction of
losses during the comparatively short time that it was in use, and the
knowledge that patrol craft on the line would be much closer together
than they would be in an approach area certainly gave confidence to the
personnel of the merchant ships, and those who had been forced to
abandon their ship by taking to the boats were afforded a better chance
of being picked up.
Various arrangements were in existence for effecting rapidly a diversion
of shipping from one route to another in the event of submarines being
located in any particular position, and a continual change of the
signals for this purpose was necessary to guard against the possibility
of the code being compromised by having fallen into enemy hands, an
event which, unfortunately, was not infrequent.
Elaborate orders were necessary to regulate coastal traffic, and fresh
directions were continually being issued as danger, especially danger
from mines, was located. Generally speaking, the traffic in home waters
was directed to hug the coast as closely as safe navigation permitted.
Two reasons existed for this, (a) in water of a depth of less than about
eight fathoms German submarines did not care to operate, and (b) under
the procedure indicated danger from submarine attack was only likely on
the side remote from the coast.
Here is an example of the instructions for passing up Channel:
_From Falmouth to Portland Bill._--Hug the coast, following round the
bays, except when passing Torbay. (Directions followed as to the
procedure here.)
_From Portland Bill to St. Catherines._--Pass close south of the
Shambles and steer for Anvil Point, thence hug the coast, following
round the bays.
And so on.
As it was not safe navigationally to follow round the bays during
darkness, the instructions directed that ships were to leave the
daylight route at dusk and to join the dark period route, showing dimmed
bow lights whilst doing so.
Two "dark period routes" were laid down, one for vessels bound up
Channel, and another for vessels bound down Channel, and these routes
were some five miles apart in order to minimize the danger of collision,
ships being directed not to use their navigation lights except for
certain portions of the route, during which they crossed the route of
transports and store ships bound between certain southern British ports
(Portsmouth, Southampton and Devonport) and French ports.
Routes were similarly laid down for ships to follow when navigating to
or from the Bristol Channel, and for ships navigating the Irish Sea.
Any system of convoy was at this time out of the question, as neither
the cruisers to marshal the convoy to the submarine area, nor the
destroyers to screen it when there, were available.
There was one very important factor in the situation, viz., the
comparative rate at which the Germans could produce submarines and at
which we could build vessels suitable for anti-submarine warfare and for
defence of commerce. The varying estimates gave cause for grave anxiety.
Our average output of _destroyers_ was four to five per month. Indeed,
this is putting the figure high; and, of course, we suffered losses. The
French and Italians were not producing any vessels of this type, whilst
the Japanese were, in the early part of 1917, not able to spare any for
work in European waters, although later in the year they lent twelve
destroyers, which gave valuable assistance in the Mediterranean. The
United States of America were not then in the war. Consequently measures
for the defence of the Allied trade against the new menace depended on
our own production.
Our _submarines_ were being produced at an average rate of about two per
month only, and--apart from motor launches, which were only of use in
the finest weather and near the coast--the only other vessels suitable
for anti-submarine work that were building at the time, besides some
sloops and P-boats, were trawlers, which, whilst useful for protection
patrol, were too slow for most of the escort work or for offensive
duties. The Germans' estimate of their own submarine production was
about twelve per month, although this figure was never realized, the
average being nearer eight. But each submarine was capable of sinking
many merchant ships, thus necessitating the employment of a very large
number of our destroyers; and therein lay the gravity of the situation,
as we realized at the Admiralty early in 1917 that no effort of ours
could increase the output of destroyers for at least fifteen months, the
shortest time then taken to build a destroyer in this country.
And here it is interesting to compare the time occupied in the
production of small craft in Great Britain and in Germany during the
war.
In pre-war days we rarely built a destroyer in less than twenty-four
months, although shortly before the war efforts were made to reduce the
time to something like eighteen to twenty months. Submarines occupied
two years in construction.
In starting the great building programme of destroyers and submarines at
the end of 1914, Lord Fisher increased very largely the number of firms
engaged in constructing vessels of both types. Hopes were held out of
the construction both of destroyers and of submarines in about twelve
months; but labour and other difficulties intervened, and although some
firms did complete craft of both classes during 1915 in less than twelve
months, by 1916 and 1917 destroyers _averaged_ about eighteen months and
submarines even longer for completion.
The Germans had always built their small craft rapidly, although their
heavy ships were longer in construction than our own. Their destroyers
were completed in a little over twelve months from the official date of
order in pre-war days. During the early years of the war it would seem
that they maintained this figure, and they succeeded in building their
smaller submarines of the U.B. and U.C. types in some six to eight
months, as U.B. and U.C. boats began to be delivered as early as April,
1915, and it is certain that they were not ordered before August, 1914.
The time taken by the Germans to build submarines of the U type was
estimated by us at twelve months, and that of submarine cruisers at
eighteen months. German submarine officers gave the time as eight to ten
months for a U-boat and eighteen months for a submarine cruiser.
(It is to be observed that Captain Persius in a recent article gives a
much longer period for the construction of the German submarines. It is
not stated whether he had access to official figures, and his statement
is not in agreement with the figures given by German submarine
officers.)
It is of interest to note here the rate of ship production attained by
some firms in the United States of America during the war.
As I mention later (_Vide_ Chapter vi, p. 157), the Bethlehem Steel
Company, under Mr. Schwab's guidance, produced ten submarines for us in
five months from the date of the order. Mr. Schwab himself informed me
that towards the end of the war he was turning out large destroyers in
six weeks. The Ford Company, as is well known, produced submarine
chasers of the "Eagle" type in even a shorter period, but these vessels
were of special design and construction.
I have dealt so far with the question of anti-submarine measures
involving only the use of destroyers and other small surface craft.
There were, of course, other methods both in use and under consideration
early in 1917 when we took stock of the situation.
For some time we had been using _Decoy vessels_, and with some success;
it was possible to increase the number of these ships at the cost of
taking merchant ships off the trade routes or by building. A very
considerable increase was arranged.
The use of our own _submarines_ offensively against enemy submarines had
also been tried, and had met with occasional success, but our numbers
were very limited (the total in December, 1916, fit for oversea or
anti-submarine work was about forty). They were much needed for
reconnaissance and offensive work against surface men-of-war in enemy
waters, and only a few were at the time available for anti-submarine
operations, and then only at the cost of other important services.
The _hydrophone_ had been in the experimental stage and under trial for
a considerable period, but it had not so far developed into an effective
instrument for locating submarines, and although trials of the different
patterns which had been devised were pushed forward with energy, many
months elapsed before it became a practicable proposition.
One of the best offensive measures against the enemy submarines, it was
realized, was the _mine_, if laid in sufficiently large numbers.
Unfortunately, in January, 1917, we did not possess a mine that was
satisfactory against submarines.
Our deficiency in this respect was clearly shown in the course of some
trials which I ordered, when one of our own submarines was run against a
number of our mines, with the result that only about 33 per cent. of the
mines (fitted, of course, only with small charges) exploded. The Germans
were well aware that our mines were not very effective against
submarines.
We possessed at the time mines of two patterns, and whilst proving
unsatisfactory against submarines, they were also found to be somewhat
unreliable when laid in minefields designed to catch surface vessels,
owing to a defect in the mooring apparatus. This defect was remedied,
but valuable time was lost whilst the necessary alterations were being
carried out, and although we possessed in April, 1917, a stock of some
20,000 mines, only 1,500 of them were then fit for laying. The position,
therefore, was that our mines were not a satisfactory anti-submarine
weapon.
A _new pattern mine_, which had been designed on the model of the German
mine during Sir Henry Jackson's term of office as First Sea Lord in
1916, was experimented with at the commencement of 1917, and as soon as
drawings could be prepared orders for upwards of 100,000 were placed in
anticipation of its success. There were some initial difficulties before
all the details were satisfactory, and, in spite of the greatest
pressure on manufacturers, it was not until November, 1917, that mines
of this pattern were being delivered in large numbers. The earliest
minefields laid in the Heligoland Bight in September and October, 1917,
with mines of the new pattern met with immediate success against enemy
submarines, as did the minefields composed of the same type of mine, the
laying of which commenced in November, 1917, in the Straits of Dover.
When it became possible to adopt the system of bringing merchant ships
in convoys through the submarine zone under the escort of a screen of
destroyers, this system became in itself, to a certain extent, an
offensive operation, since it necessarily forced the enemy submarines
desirous of obtaining results into positions in which they themselves
were open to violent attack by depth charges dropped by destroyers.
During the greater part of the year 1917, however, it was only possible
to supply destroyers with a small number of _depth charges_, which was
their principal anti-submarine weapon; as it became feasible to increase
largely the supply of these charges to destroyers, so the violence of
the attack on the submarines increased, and their losses became heavier.
The position then, as it existed in the early days of the year 1917, is
described in the foregoing remarks.
The _result_ measured in loss of shipping (British, Allied, and neutral)
from submarine and mine attack in the first half of the year was as
follows in gross tonnage:
January - 324,016
February - 500,573
March - 555,991
April - 870,359
May - 589,754
June - 675,154
Because of the time required for production, it was a sheer
impossibility to _put into effect_ any fresh devices that might be
adopted for dealing with submarine warfare for many months, and all that
could be done was to try new methods of approach to the coast and, as
the number of small craft suitable for escort duty increased, to extend
gradually the convoy system already in force to a certain extent for the
French coal trade and the Scandinavian trade.
In the chapters which follow the further steps which were taken to deal
with the problem, and the degree of success which attended them, will be
described.