Chapter Thirteen ~~ Survivals of the Non-Invidious Interests

In an increasing proportion as time goes on, the anthropomorphic

cult, with its code of devout observations, suffers a progressive

disintegration through the stress of economic exigencies and the decay

of the system of status. As this disintegration proceeds, there come to

be associated and blended with the devout attitude certain other motives

and impulses that are not always of an anthropomorphic origin, nor

traceable to the habit of personal subservience. Not all of these

subsidiary impulses that blend with the habit of devoutness in the later

devotional life are altogether congruous with the devout attitude or

with the anthropomorphic apprehension of the sequence of phenomena. The

origin being not the same, their action upon the scheme of devout

life is also not in the same direction. In many ways they traverse the

underlying norm of subservience or vicarious life to which the code of

devout observations and the ecclesiastical and sacerdotal institutions

are to be traced as their substantial basis. Through the presence of

these alien motives the social and industrial regime of status gradually

disintegrates, and the canon of personal subservience loses the support

derived from an unbroken tradition. Extraneous habits and proclivities

encroach upon the field of action occupied by this canon, and it

presently comes about that the ecclesiastical and sacerdotal structures

are partially converted to other uses, in some measure alien to the

purposes of the scheme of devout life as it stood in the days of the

most vigorous and characteristic development of the priesthood.

Among these alien motives which affect the devout scheme in its

later growth, may be mentioned the motives of charity and of social

good-fellowship, or conviviality; or, in more general terms, the various

expressions of the sense of human solidarity and sympathy. It may

be added that these extraneous uses of the ecclesiastical structure

contribute materially to its survival in name and form even among

people who may be ready to give up the substance of it. A still more

characteristic and more pervasive alien element in the motives

which have gone to formally uphold the scheme of devout life is that

non-reverent sense of aesthetic congruity with the environment, which is

left as a residue of the latter-day act of worship after elimination

of its anthropomorphic content. This has done good service for the

maintenance of the sacerdotal institution through blending with the

motive of subservience. This sense of impulse of aesthetic congruity

is not primarily of an economic character, but it has a considerable

indirect effect in shaping the habit of mind of the individual for

economic purposes in the later stages of industrial development;

its most perceptible effect in this regard goes in the direction of

mitigating the somewhat pronounced self-regarding bias that has been

transmitted by tradition from the earlier, more competent phases of the

regime of status. The economic bearing of this impulse is therefore seen

to transverse that of the devout attitude; the former goes to qualify,

if not eliminate, the self-regarding bias, through sublation of the

antithesis or antagonism of self and not-self; while the latter, being

and expression of the sense of personal subservience and mastery, goes

to accentuate this antithesis and to insist upon the divergence between

the self-regarding interest and the interests of the generically human

life process.

This non-invidious residue of the religious life--the sense of communion

with the environment, or with the generic life process--as well as the

impulse of charity or of sociability, act in a pervasive way to shape

men's habits of thought for the economic purpose. But the action of

all this class of proclivities is somewhat vague, and their effects are

difficult to trace in detail. So much seems clear, however, as that the

action of this entire class of motives or aptitudes tends in a direction

contrary to the underlying principles of the institution of the leisure

class as already formulated. The basis of that institution, as well

as of the anthropomorphic cults associated with it in the cultural

development, is the habit of invidious comparison; and this habit is

incongruous with the exercise of the aptitudes now in question. The

substantial canons of the leisure-class scheme of life are a conspicuous

waste of time and substance and a withdrawal from the industrial

process; while the particular aptitudes here in question assert

themselves, on the economic side, in a deprecation of waste and of

a futile manner of life, and in an impulse to participation in or

identification with the life process, whether it be on the economic side

or in any other of its phases or aspects.

It is plain that these aptitudes and habits of life to which they give

rise where circumstances favor their expression, or where they assert

themselves in a dominant way, run counter to the leisure-class scheme of

life; but it is not clear that life under the leisure-class scheme, as

seen in the later stages of its development, tends consistently to the

repression of these aptitudes or to exemption from the habits of

thought in which they express themselves. The positive discipline of the

leisure-class scheme of life goes pretty much all the other way. In its

positive discipline, by prescription and by selective elimination, the

leisure-class scheme favors the all-pervading and all-dominating primacy

of the canons of waste and invidious comparison at every conjuncture

of life. But in its negative effects the tendency of the leisure-class

discipline is not so unequivocally true to the fundamental canons of the

scheme. In its regulation of human activity for the purpose of

pecuniary decency the leisure-class canon insists on withdrawal from

the industrial process. That is to say, it inhibits activity in the

directions in which the impecunious members of the community habitually

put forth their efforts. Especially in the case of women, and more

particularly as regards the upper-class and upper-middle-class women

of advanced industrial communities, this inhibition goes so far as to

insist on withdrawal even from the emulative process of accumulation by

the quasi-predator methods of the pecuniary occupations.

The pecuniary or the leisure-class culture, which set out as an

emulative variant of the impulse of workmanship, is in its latest

development beginning to neutralize its own ground, by eliminating

the habit of invidious comparison in respect of efficiency, or even

of pecuniary standing. On the other hand, the fact that members of the

leisure class, both men and women, are to some extent exempt from the

necessity of finding a livelihood in a competitive struggle with

their fellows, makes it possible for members of this class not only to

survive, but even, within bounds, to follow their bent in case they are

not gifted with the aptitudes which make for success in the competitive

struggle. That is to say, in the latest and fullest development of the

institution, the livelihood of members of this class does not depend

on the possession and the unremitting exercise of those aptitudes are

therefore greater in the higher grades of the leisure class than in the

general average of a population living under the competitive system.

In an earlier chapter, in discussing the conditions of survival of

archaic traits, it has appeared that the peculiar position of the

leisure class affords exceptionally favorable chances for the survival

of traits which characterize the type of human nature proper to an

earlier and obsolete cultural stage. The class is sheltered from the

stress of economic exigencies, and is in this sense withdrawn from

the rude impact of forces which make for adaptation to the economic

situation. The survival in the leisure class, and under the

leisure-class scheme of life, of traits and types that are reminiscent

of the predatory culture has already been discussed. These aptitudes

and habits have an exceptionally favorable chance of survival under the

leisure-class regime. Not only does the sheltered pecuniary position of

the leisure class afford a situation favorable to the survival of such

individuals as are not gifted with the complement of aptitudes

required for serviceability in the modern industrial process; but

the leisure-class canons of reputability at the same time enjoin the

conspicuous exercise of certain predatory aptitudes. The employments

in which the predatory aptitudes find exercise serve as an evidence of

wealth, birth, and withdrawal from the industrial process. The survival

of the predatory traits under the leisure-class culture is furthered

both negatively, through the industrial exemption of the class, and

positively, through the sanction of the leisure-class canons of decency.

With respect to the survival of traits characteristic of the

ante-predatory savage culture the case is in some degree different.

The sheltered position of the leisure class favors the survival also of

these traits; but the exercise of the aptitudes for peace and good-will

does not have the affirmative sanction of the code of proprieties.

Individuals gifted with a temperament that is reminiscent of the

ante-predatory culture are placed at something of an advantage within

the leisure class, as compared with similarly gifted individuals outside

the class, in that they are not under a pecuniary necessity to

thwart these aptitudes that make for a non-competitive life; but such

individuals are still exposed to something of a moral constraint

which urges them to disregard these inclinations, in that the code of

proprieties enjoins upon them habits of life based on the predatory

aptitudes. So long as the system of status remains intact, and so long

as the leisure class has other lines of non-industrial activity to take

to than obvious killing of time in aimless and wasteful fatigation,

so long no considerable departure from the leisure-class scheme of

reputable life is to be looked for. The occurrence of non-predatory

temperament with the class at that stage is to be looked upon as a case

of sporadic reversion. But the reputable non-industrial outlets for

the human propensity to action presently fail, through the advance of

economic development, the disappearance of large game, the decline of

war, the obsolescence of proprietary government, and the decay of the

priestly office. When this happens, the situation begins to change.

Human life must seek expression in one direction if it may not in

another; and if the predatory outlet fails, relief is sought elsewhere.

As indicated above, the exemption from pecuniary stress has been

carried farther in the case of the leisure-class women of the advanced

industrial communities than in that of any other considerable group of

persons. The women may therefore be expected to show a more pronounced

reversion to a non-invidious temperament than the men. But there is also

among men of the leisure class a perceptible increase in the range and

scope of activities that proceed from aptitudes which are not to be

classed as self-regarding, and the end of which is not an invidious

distinction. So, for instance, the greater number of men who have to do

with industry in the way of pecuniarily managing an enterprise take

some interest and some pride in seeing that the work is well done and

is industrially effective, and this even apart from the profit which

may result from any improvement of this kind. The efforts of

commercial clubs and manufacturers' organizations in this direction of

non-invidious advancement of industrial efficiency are also well know.

The tendency to some other than an invidious purpose in life has worked

out in a multitude of organizations, the purpose of which is some work

of charity or of social amelioration. These organizations are often of

a quasi-religious or pseudo-religious character, and are participated in

by both men and women. Examples will present themselves in abundance

on reflection, but for the purpose of indicating the range of the

propensities in question and of characterizing them, some of the

more obvious concrete cases may be cited. Such, for instance, are the

agitation for temperance and similar social reforms, for prison reform,

for the spread of education, for the suppression of vice, and for the

avoidance of war by arbitration, disarmament, or other means; such

are, in some measure, university settlements, neighborhood guilds, the

various organizations typified by the Young Men's Christian Association

and Young People's Society for Christian Endeavor, sewing-clubs, art

clubs, and even commercial clubs; such are also, in some slight measure,

the pecuniary foundations of semi-public establishments for charity,

education, or amusement, whether they are endowed by wealthy individuals

or by contributions collected from persons of smaller means--in so far

as these establishments are not of a religious character.

It is of course not intended to say that these efforts proceed entirely

from other motives than those of a self-regarding kind. What can be

claimed is that other motives are present in the common run of cases,

and that the perceptibly greater prevalence of effort of this kind under

the circumstances of the modern industrial life than under the unbroken

regime of the principle of status, indicates the presence in modern life

of an effective scepticism with respect to the full legitimacy of an

emulative scheme of life. It is a matter of sufficient notoriety to have

become a commonplace jest that extraneous motives are commonly present

among the incentives to this class of work--motives of a self-regarding

kind, and especially the motive of an invidious distinction. To such an

extent is this true, that many ostensible works of disinterested public

spirit are no doubt initiated and carried on with a view primarily to

the enhance repute or even to the pecuniary gain, of their promoters. In

the case of some considerable groups of organizations or establishments

of this kind the invidious motive is apparently the dominant motive both

with the initiators of the work and with their supporters. This last

remark would hold true especially with respect to such works as lend

distinction to their doer through large and conspicuous expenditure; as,

for example, the foundation of a university or of a public library

or museum; but it is also, and perhaps equally, true of the more

commonplace work of participation in such organizations. These serve

to authenticate the pecuniary reputability of their members, as well as

gratefully to keep them in mind of their superior status by pointing

the contrast between themselves and the lower-lying humanity in whom the

work of amelioration is to be wrought; as, for example, the university

settlement, which now has some vogue. But after all allowances and

deductions have been made, there is left some remainder of motives of

a non-emulative kind. The fact itself that distinction or a decent good

fame is sought by this method is evidence of a prevalent sense of

the legitimacy, and of the presumptive effectual presence, of a

non-emulative, non-invidious interest, as a consistent factor in the

habits of thought of modern communities.

In all this latter-day range of leisure-class activities that proceed

on the basis of a non-invidious and non-religious interest, it is to

be noted that the women participate more actively and more persistently

than the men--except, of course, in the case of such works as require

a large expenditure of means. The dependent pecuniary position of the

women disables them for work requiring large expenditure. As regards

the general range of ameliorative work, the members of the priesthood

or clergy of the less naively devout sects, or the secularized

denominations, are associated with the class of women. This is as the

theory would have it. In other economic relations, also, this clergy

stands in a somewhat equivocal position between the class of women and

that of the men engaged in economic pursuits. By tradition and by the

prevalent sense of the proprieties, both the clergy and the women of

the well-to-do classes are placed in the position of a vicarious leisure

class; with both classes the characteristic relation which goes to form

the habits of thought of the class is a relation of subservience--that

is to say, an economic relation conceived in personal terms; in both

classes there is consequently perceptible a special proneness to

construe phenomena in terms of personal relation rather than of causal

sequence; both classes are so inhibited by the canons of decency from

the ceremonially unclean processes of the lucrative or productive

occupations as to make participation in the industrial life process

of today a moral impossibility for them. The result of this ceremonial

exclusion from productive effort of the vulgar sort is to draft a

relatively large share of the energies of the modern feminine

and priestly classes into the service of other interests than the

self-regarding one. The code leaves no alternative direction in which

the impulse to purposeful action may find expression. The effect of a

consistent inhibition on industrially useful activity in the case of the

leisure-class women shows itself in a restless assertion of the impulse

to workmanship in other directions than that of business activity. As

has been noticed already, the everyday life of the well-to-do women and

the clergy contains a larger element of status than that of the average

of the men, especially than that of the men engaged in the modern

industrial occupations proper. Hence the devout attitude survives in a

better state of preservation among these classes than among the common

run of men in the modern communities. Hence an appreciable share of the

energy which seeks expression in a non-lucrative employment among these

members of the vicarious leisure classes may be expected to eventuate in

devout observances and works of piety. Hence, in part, the excess of

the devout proclivity in women, spoken of in the last chapter. But it

is more to the present point to note the effect of this proclivity

in shaping the action and coloring the purposes of the non-lucrative

movements and organizations here under discussion. Where this

devout coloring is present it lowers the immediate efficiency of

the organizations for any economic end to which their efforts may be

directed. Many organizations, charitable and ameliorative, divide their

attention between the devotional and the secular well-being of the

people whose interests they aim to further. It can scarcely be doubted

that if they were to give an equally serious attention and effort

undividedly to the secular interests of these people, the immediate

economic value of their work should be appreciably higher than it is.

It might of course similarly be said, if this were the place to say it,

that the immediate efficiency of these works of amelioration for the

devout might be greater if it were not hampered with the secular motives

and aims which are usually present.

Some deduction is to be made from the economic value of this class of

non-invidious enterprise, on account of the intrusion of the devotional

interest. But there are also deductions to be made on account of the

presence of other alien motives which more or less broadly traverse

the economic trend of this non-emulative expression of the instinct

of workmanship. To such an extent is this seen to be true on a closer

scrutiny, that, when all is told, it may even appear that this general

class of enterprises is of an altogether dubious economic value--as

measured in terms of the fullness or facility of life of the individuals

or classes to whose amelioration the enterprise is directed.

For instance, many of the efforts now in reputable vogue for the

amelioration of the indigent population of large cities are of the

nature, in great part, of a mission of culture. It is by this means

sought to accelerate the rate of speed at which given elements of the

upper-class culture find acceptance in the everyday scheme of life of

the lower classes. The solicitude of "settlements," for example, is in

part directed to enhance the industrial efficiency of the poor and to

teach them the more adequate utilization of the means at hand; but it

is also no less consistently directed to the inculcation, by precept and

example, of certain punctilios of upper-class propriety in manners and

customs. The economic substance of these proprieties will commonly be

found on scrutiny to be a conspicuous waste of time and goods. Those

good people who go out to humanize the poor are commonly, and advisedly,

extremely scrupulous and silently insistent in matters of decorum and

the decencies of life. They are commonly persons of an exemplary life

and gifted with a tenacious insistence on ceremonial cleanness in the

various items of their daily consumption. The cultural or civilizing

efficacy of this inculcation of correct habits of thought with respect

to the consumption of time and commodities is scarcely to be overrated;

nor is its economic value to the individual who acquires these higher

and more reputable ideals inconsiderable. Under the circumstances of

the existing pecuniary culture, the reputability, and consequently

the success, of the individual is in great measure dependent on his

proficiency in demeanor and methods of consumption that argue habitual

waste of time and goods. But as regards the ulterior economic bearing

of this training in worthier methods of life, it is to be said that

the effect wrought is in large part a substitution of costlier or

less efficient methods of accomplishing the same material results, in

relations where the material result is the fact of substantial economic

value. The propaganda of culture is in great part an inculcation of

new tastes, or rather of a new schedule of proprieties, which have been

adapted to the upper-class scheme of life under the guidance of the

leisure-class formulation of the principles of status and pecuniary

decency. This new schedule of proprieties is intruded into the

lower-class scheme of life from the code elaborated by an element of

the population whose life lies outside the industrial process; and this

intrusive schedule can scarcely be expected to fit the exigencies of

life for these lower classes more adequately than the schedule already

in vogue among them, and especially not more adequately than the

schedule which they are themselves working out under the stress of

modern industrial life.

All this of course does not question the fact that the proprieties

of the substituted schedule are more decorous than those which they

displace. The doubt which presents itself is simply a doubt as to the

economic expediency of this work of regeneration--that is to say, the

economic expediency in that immediate and material bearing in which the

effects of the change can be ascertained with some degree of confidence,

and as viewed from the standpoint not of the individual but of the

facility of life of the collectivity. For an appreciation of the

economic expediency of these enterprises of amelioration, therefore,

their effective work is scarcely to be taken at its face value, even

where the aim of the enterprise is primarily an economic one and where

the interest on which it proceeds is in no sense self-regarding or

invidious. The economic reform wrought is largely of the nature of a

permutation in the methods of conspicuous waste.

But something further is to be said with respect to the character of the

disinterested motives and canons of procedure in all work of this

class that is affected by the habits of thought characteristic of the

pecuniary culture; and this further consideration may lead to a further

qualification of the conclusions already reached. As has been seen in

an earlier chapter, the canons of reputability or decency under the

pecuniary culture insist on habitual futility of effort as the mark of a

pecuniarily blameless life. There results not only a habit of disesteem

of useful occupations, but there results also what is of more decisive

consequence in guiding the action of any organized body of people that

lays claim to social good repute. There is a tradition which requires

that one should not be vulgarly familiar with any of the processes or

details that have to do with the material necessities of life. One may

meritoriously show a quantitative interest in the well-being of the

vulgar, through subscriptions or through work on managing committees and

the like. One may, perhaps even more meritoriously, show solicitude in

general and in detail for the cultural welfare of the vulgar, in the

way of contrivances for elevating their tastes and affording them

opportunities for spiritual amelioration. But one should not betray an

intimate knowledge of the material circumstances of vulgar life, or of

the habits of thought of the vulgar classes, such as would effectually

direct the efforts of these organizations to a materially useful end.

This reluctance to avow an unduly intimate knowledge of the lower-class

conditions of life in detail of course prevails in very different

degrees in different individuals; but there is commonly enough of

it present collectively in any organization of the kind in question

profoundly to influence its course of action. By its cumulative action

in shaping the usage and precedents of any such body, this shrinking

from an imputation of unseemly familiarity with vulgar life tends

gradually to set aside the initial motives of the enterprise, in favor

of certain guiding principles of good repute, ultimately reducible to

terms of pecuniary merit. So that in an organization of long standing

the initial motive of furthering the facility of life in these classes

comes gradually to be an ostensible motive only, and the vulgarly

effective work of the organization tends to obsolescence.

What is true of the efficiency of organizations for non-invidious

work in this respect is true also as regards the work of individuals

proceeding on the same motives; though it perhaps holds true with more

qualification for individuals than for organized enterprises. The habit

of gauging merit by the leisure-class canons of wasteful expenditure and

unfamiliarity with vulgar life, whether on the side of production or of

consumption, is necessarily strong in the individuals who aspire to do

some work of public utility. And if the individual should forget his

station and turn his efforts to vulgar effectiveness, the common sense

of the community-the sense of pecuniary decency--would presently

reject his work and set him right. An example of this is seen in the

administration of bequests made by public-spirited men for the single

purpose (at least ostensibly) of furthering the facility of human life

in some particular respect. The objects for which bequests of this class

are most frequently made at present are

are schools, libraries, hospitals, and asylums for the infirm or

unfortunate. The avowed purpose of the donor in these cases is the

amelioration of human life in the particular respect which is named

in the bequest; but it will be found an invariable rule that in

the execution of the work not a little of other motives, frequency

incompatible with the initial motive, is present and determines the

particular disposition eventually made of a good share of the means

which have been set apart by the bequest. Certain funds, for instance,

may have been set apart as a foundation for a foundling asylum or a

retreat for invalids. The diversion of expenditure to honorific waste in

such cases is not uncommon enough to cause surprise or even to raise a

smile. An appreciable share of the funds is spent in the construction

of an edifice faced with some aesthetically objectionable but expensive

stone, covered with grotesque and incongruous details, and designed, in

its battlemented walls and turrets and its massive portals and strategic

approaches, to suggest certain barbaric methods of warfare. The interior

of the structure shows the same pervasive guidance of the canons of

conspicuous waste and predatory exploit. The windows, for instance,

to go no farther into detail, are placed with a view to impress their

pecuniary excellence upon the chance beholder from the outside, rather

than with a view to effectiveness for their ostensible end in the

convenience or comfort of the beneficiaries within; and the detail of

interior arrangement is required to conform itself as best it may to

this alien but imperious requirement of pecuniary beauty.

In all this, of course, it is not to be presumed that the donor would

have found fault, or that he would have done otherwise if he had taken

control in person; it appears that in those cases where such a personal

direction is exercised--where the enterprise is conducted by direct

expenditure and superintendence instead of by bequest--the aims and

methods of management are not different in this respect. Nor would the

beneficiaries, or the outside observers whose ease or vanity are not

immediately touched, be pleased with a different disposition of the

funds. It would suit no one to have the enterprise conducted with a view

directly to the most economical and effective use of the means at hand

for the initial, material end of the foundation. All concerned, whether

their interest is immediate and self-regarding, or contemplative only,

agree that some considerable share of the expenditure should go to

the higher or spiritual needs derived from the habit of an invidious

comparison in predatory exploit and pecuniary waste. But this only goes

to say that the canons of emulative and pecuniary reputability so far

pervade the common sense of the community as to permit no escape or

evasion, even in the case of an enterprise which ostensibly proceeds

entirely on the basis of a non-invidious interest.

It may even be that the enterprise owes its honorific virtue, as a means

of enhancing the donor's good repute, to the imputed presence of this

non-invidious motive; but that does not hinder the invidious interest

from guiding the expenditure. The effectual presence of motives of an

emulative or invidious origin in non-emulative works of this kind

might be shown at length and with detail, in any one of the classes of

enterprise spoken of above. Where these honorific details occur, in such

cases, they commonly masquerade under designations that belong in the

field of the aesthetic, ethical or economic interest. These special

motives, derived from the standards and canons of the pecuniary culture,

act surreptitiously to divert effort of a non-invidious kind from

effective service, without disturbing the agent's sense of good

intention or obtruding upon his consciousness the substantial futility

of his work. Their effect might be traced through the entire range

of that schedule of non-invidious, meliorative enterprise that is so

considerable a feature, and especially so conspicuous a feature, in the

overt scheme of life of the well-to-do. But the theoretical bearing is

perhaps clear enough and may require no further illustration; especially

as some detailed attention will be given to one of these lines of

enterprise--the establishments for the higher learning--in another

connection.

Under the circumstances of the sheltered situation in which the leisure

class is placed there seems, therefore, to be something of a reversion

to the range of non-invidious impulses that characterizes the

ante-predatory savage culture. The reversion comprises both the sense of

workmanship and the proclivity to indolence and good-fellowship. But

in the modern scheme of life canons of conduct based on pecuniary or

invidious merit stand in the way of a free exercise of these impulses;

and the dominant presence of these canons of conduct goes far to divert

such efforts as are made on the basis of the non-invidious interest to

the service of that invidious interest on which the pecuniary culture

rests. The canons of pecuniary decency are reducible for the present

purpose to the principles of waste, futility, and ferocity. The

requirements of decency are imperiously present in meliorative

enterprise as in other lines of conduct, and exercise a selective

surveillance over the details of conduct and management in any

enterprise. By guiding and adapting the method in detail, these canons

of decency go far to make all non-invidious aspiration or effort

nugatory. The pervasive, impersonal, un-eager principle of futility is

at hand from day to day and works obstructively to hinder the effectual

expression of so much of the surviving ante-predatory aptitudes as is to

be classed under the instinct of workmanship; but its presence does not

preclude the transmission of those aptitudes or the continued recurrence

of an impulse to find expression for them.

In the later and farther development of the pecuniary culture, the

requirement of withdrawal from the industrial process in order to

avoid social odium is carried so far as to comprise abstention from

the emulative employments. At this advanced stage the pecuniary culture

negatively favors the assertion of the non-invidious propensities

by relaxing the stress laid on the merit of emulative, predatory,

or pecuniary occupations, as compared with those of an industrial

or productive kind. As was noticed above, the requirement of such

withdrawal from all employment that is of human use applies more

rigorously to the upper-class women than to any other class, unless the

priesthood of certain cults might be cited as an exception, perhaps

more apparent than real, to this rule. The reason for the more extreme

insistence on a futile life for this class of women than for the men

of the same pecuniary and social grade lies in their being not only an

upper-grade leisure class but also at the same time a vicarious

leisure class. There is in their case a double ground for a consistent

withdrawal from useful effort.

It has been well and repeatedly said by popular writers and speakers who

reflect the common sense of intelligent people on questions of social

structure and function that the position of woman in any community

is the most striking index of the level of culture attained by the

community, and it might be added, by any given class in the community.

This remark is perhaps truer as regards the stage of economic

development than as regards development in any other respect. At the

same time the position assigned to the woman in the accepted scheme of

life, in any community or under any culture, is in a very great degree

an expression of traditions which have been shaped by the circumstances

of an earlier phase of development, and which have been but partially

adapted to the existing economic circumstances, or to the existing

exigencies of temperament and habits of mind by which the women living

under this modern economic situation are actuated.

The fact has already been remarked upon incidentally in the course of

the discussion of the growth of economic institutions generally, and

in particular in speaking of vicarious leisure and of dress, that the

position of women in the modern economic scheme is more widely and

more consistently at variance with the promptings of the instinct of

workmanship than is the position of the men of the same classes. It

is also apparently true that the woman's temperament includes a larger

share of this instinct that approves peace and disapproves futility.

It is therefore not a fortuitous circumstance that the women of modern

industrial communities show a livelier sense of the discrepancy

between the accepted scheme of life and the exigencies of the economic

situation.

The several phases of the "woman question" have brought out in

intelligible form the extent to which the life of women in modern

society, and in the polite circles especially, is regulated by a body of

common sense formulated under the economic circumstances of an earlier

phase of development. It is still felt that woman's life, in its civil,

economic, and social bearing, is essentially and normally a vicarious

life, the merit or demerit of which is, in the nature of things, to

be imputed to some other individual who stands in some relation of

ownership or tutelage to the woman. So, for instance, any action on the

part of a woman which traverses an injunction of the accepted schedule

of proprieties is felt to reflect immediately upon the honor of the man

whose woman she is. There may of course be some sense of incongruity

in the mind of any one passing an opinion of this kind on the woman's

frailty or perversity; but the common-sense judgment of the community in

such matters is, after all, delivered without much hesitation, and few

men would question the legitimacy of their sense of an outraged tutelage

in any case that might arise. On the other hand, relatively little

discredit attaches to a woman through the evil deeds of the man with

whom her life is associated.

The good and beautiful scheme of life, then--that is to say the scheme

to which we are habituated--assigns to the woman a "sphere" ancillary

to the activity of the man; and it is felt that any departure from the

traditions of her assigned round of duties is unwomanly. If the

question is as to civil rights or the suffrage, our common sense in the

matter--that is to say the logical deliverance of our general scheme

of life upon the point in question--says that the woman should be

represented in the body politic and before the law, not immediately in

her own person, but through the mediation of the head of the

household to which she belongs. It is unfeminine in her to aspire to a

self-directing, self-centered life; and our common sense tells us that

her direct participation in the affairs of the community, civil or

industrial, is a menace to that social order which expresses our habits

of thought as they have been formed under the guidance of the traditions

of the pecuniary culture. "All this fume and froth of 'emancipating

woman from the slavery of man' and so on, is, to use the chaste and

expressive language of Elizabeth Cady Stanton inversely, 'utter rot.'

The social relations of the sexes are fixed by nature. Our entire

civilization--that is whatever is good in it--is based on the home."

The "home" is the household with a male head. This view, but commonly

expressed even more chastely, is the prevailing view of the woman's

status, not only among the common run of the men of civilized

communities, but among the women as well. Women have a very alert sense

of what the scheme of proprieties requires, and while it is true that

many of them are ill at ease under the details which the code imposes,

there are few who do not recognize that the existing moral order, of

necessity and by the divine right of prescription, places the woman in

a position ancillary to the man. In the last analysis, according to her

own sense of what is good and beautiful, the woman's life is, and in

theory must be, an expression of the man's life at the second remove.

But in spite of this pervading sense of what is the good and natural

place for the woman, there is also perceptible an incipient development

of sentiment to the effect that this whole arrangement of tutelage and

vicarious life and imputation of merit and demerit is somehow a mistake.

Or, at least, that even if it may be a natural growth and a good

arrangement in its time and place, and in spite of its patent aesthetic

value, still it does not adequately serve the more everyday ends of life

in a modern industrial community. Even that large and substantial body

of well-bred, upper and middle-class women to whose dispassionate,

matronly sense of the traditional proprieties this relation of status

commends itself as fundamentally and eternally right-even these, whose

attitude is conservative, commonly find some slight discrepancy in

detail between things as they are and things as they should be in this

respect. But that less manageable body of modern women who, by force of

youth, education, or temperament, are in some degree out of touch with

the traditions of status received from the barbarian culture, and

in whom there is, perhaps, an undue reversion to the impulse of

self-expression and workmanship--these are touched with a sense of

grievance too vivid to leave them at rest.

In this "New-Woman" movement--as these blind and incoherent efforts to

rehabilitate the woman's pre-glacial standing have been named--there

are at least two elements discernible, both of which are of an economic

character. These two elements or motives are expressed by the double

watchword, "Emancipation" and "Work." Each of these words is recognized

to stand for something in the way of a wide-spread sense of grievance.

The prevalence of the sentiment is recognized even by people who do not

see that there is any real ground for a grievance in the situation as

it stands today. It is among the women of the well-to-do classes, in the

communities which are farthest advanced in industrial development, that

this sense of a grievance to be redressed is most alive and finds most

frequent expression. That is to say, in other words, there is a demand,

more or less serious, for emancipation from all relation of status,

tutelage, or vicarious life; and the revulsion asserts itself especially

among the class of women upon whom the scheme of life handed down from

the regime of status imposes with least litigation a vicarious life, and

in those communities whose economic development has departed farthest

from the circumstances to which this traditional scheme is adapted. The

demand comes from that portion of womankind which is excluded by the

canons of good repute from all effectual work, and which is closely

reserved for a life of leisure and conspicuous consumption.

More than one critic of this new-woman movement has misapprehended its

motive. The case of the American "new woman" has lately been summed

up with some warmth by a popular observer of social phenomena: "She is

petted by her husband, the most devoted and hard-working of husbands in

the world.... She is the superior of her husband in education, and

in almost every respect. She is surrounded by the most numerous and

delicate attentions. Yet she is not satisfied.... The Anglo-Saxon 'new

woman' is the most ridiculous production of modern times, and destined

to be the most ghastly failure of the century." Apart from the

deprecation--perhaps well placed--which is contained in this

presentment, it adds nothing but obscurity to the woman question. The

grievance of the new woman is made up of those things which this typical

characterization of the movement urges as reasons why she should be

content. She is petted, and is permitted, or even required, to consume

largely and conspicuously--vicariously for her husband or other

natural guardian. She is exempted, or debarred, from vulgarly useful

employment--in order to perform leisure vicariously for the good repute

of her natural (pecuniary) guardian. These offices are the conventional

marks of the un-free, at the same time that they are incompatible with

the human impulse to purposeful activity. But the woman is endowed

with her share-which there is reason to believe is more than an even

share--of the instinct of workmanship, to which futility of life or of

expenditure is obnoxious. She must unfold her life activity in response

to the direct, unmediated stimuli of the economic environment with which

she is in contact. The impulse is perhaps stronger upon the woman

than upon the man to live her own life in her own way and to enter the

industrial process of the community at something nearer than the second

remove.

So long as the woman's place is consistently that of a drudge, she is,

in the average of cases, fairly contented with her lot. She not only

has something tangible and purposeful to do, but she has also no time or

thought to spare for a rebellious assertion of such human propensity to

self-direction as she has inherited. And after the stage of universal

female drudgery is passed, and a vicarious leisure without strenuous

application becomes the accredited employment of the women of the

well-to-do classes, the prescriptive force of the canon of pecuniary

decency, which requires the observance of ceremonial futility on their

part, will long preserve high-minded women from any sentimental leaning

to self-direction and a "sphere of usefulness." This is especially true

during the earlier phases of the pecuniary culture, while the leisure

of the leisure class is still in great measure a predatory activity, an

active assertion of mastery in which there is enough of tangible

purpose of an invidious kind to admit of its being taken seriously as an

employment to which one may without shame put one's hand. This condition

of things has obviously lasted well down into the present in some

communities. It continues to hold to a different extent for different

individuals, varying with the vividness of the sense of status and with

the feebleness of the impulse to workmanship with which the individual

is endowed. But where the economic structure of the community has so

far outgrown the scheme of life based on status that the relation of

personal subservience is no longer felt to be the sole "natural" human

relation; there the ancient habit of purposeful activity will begin

to assert itself in the less conformable individuals against the more

recent, relatively superficial, relatively ephemeral habits and views

which the predatory and the pecuniary culture have contributed to our

scheme of life. These habits and views begin to lose their coercive

force for the community or the class in question so soon as the habit of

mind and the views of life due to the predatory and the quasi-peaceable

discipline cease to be in fairly close accord with the later-developed

economic situation. This is evident in the case of the industrious

classes of modern communities; for them the leisure-class scheme of life

has lost much of its binding force, especially as regards the element of

status. But it is also visibly being verified in the case of the upper

classes, though not in the same manner.

The habits derived from the predatory and quasi-peaceable culture are

relatively ephemeral variants of certain underlying propensities and

mental characteristics of the race; which it owes to the protracted

discipline of the earlier, proto-anthropoid cultural stage of peaceable,

relatively undifferentiated economic life carried on in contact with a

relatively simple and invariable material environment. When the habits

superinduced by the emulative method of life have ceased to enjoy the

section of existing economic exigencies, a process of disintegration

sets in whereby the habits of thought of more recent growth and of a

less generic character to some extent yield the ground before the more

ancient and more pervading spiritual characteristics of the race.

In a sense, then, the new-woman movement marks a reversion to a more

generic type of human character, or to a less differentiated

expression of human nature. It is a type of human nature which is to be

characterized as proto-anthropoid, and, as regards the substance if not

the form of its dominant traits, it belongs to a cultural stage that may

be classed as possibly sub-human. The particular movement or evolutional

feature in question of course shares this characterization with the rest

of the later social development, in so far as this social development

shows evidence of a reversion to the spiritual attitude that

characterizes the earlier, undifferentiated stage of economic

revolution. Such evidence of a general tendency to reversion from the

dominance of the invidious interest is not entirely wanting, although it

is neither plentiful nor unquestionably convincing. The general decay

of the sense of status in modern industrial communities goes some way as

evidence in this direction; and the perceptible return to a disapproval

of futility in human life, and a disapproval of such activities as serve

only the individual gain at the cost of the collectivity or at the

cost of other social groups, is evidence to a like effect. There is a

perceptible tendency to deprecate the infliction of pain, as well as to

discredit all marauding enterprises, even where these expressions of the

invidious interest do not tangibly work to the material detriment of

the community or of the individual who passes an opinion on them. It

may even be said that in the modern industrial communities the average,

dispassionate sense of men says that the ideal character is a character

which makes for peace, good-will, and economic efficiency, rather than

for a life of self-seeking, force, fraud, and mastery.

The influence of the leisure class is not consistently for or against

the rehabilitation of this proto-anthropoid human nature. So far

as concerns the chance of survival of individuals endowed with an

exceptionally large share of the primitive traits, the sheltered

position of the class favors its members directly by withdrawing them

from the pecuniary struggle; but indirectly, through the leisure-class

canons of conspicuous waste of goods and effort, the institution of a

leisure class lessens the chance of survival of such individuals in the

entire body of the population. The decent requirements of waste absorb

the surplus energy of the population in an invidious struggle and leave

no margin for the non-invidious expression of life. The remoter, less

tangible, spiritual effects of the discipline of decency go in the same

direction and work perhaps more effectually to the same end. The

canons of decent life are an elaboration of the principle of invidious

comparison, and they accordingly act consistently to inhibit all

non-invidious effort and to inculcate the self-regarding attitude.

Chapter Fourteen ~~ The Higher Learning as an Expression of

the Pecuniary Culture

To the end that suitable habits of thought on certain heads may be

conserved in the incoming generation, a scholastic discipline is

sanctioned by the common sense of the community and incorporated into

the accredited scheme of life. The habits of thought which are so

formed under the guidance of teachers and scholastic traditions have

an economic value--a value as affecting the serviceability of the

individual--no less real than the similar economic value of the habits

of thought formed without such guidance under the discipline of everyday

life. Whatever characteristics of the accredited scholastic scheme and

discipline are traceable to the predilections of the leisure class or to

the guidance of the canons of pecuniary merit are to be set down to the

account of that institution, and whatever economic value these features

of the educational scheme possess are the expression in detail of the

value of that institution. It will be in place, therefore, to point out

any peculiar features of the educational system which are traceable to

the leisure-class scheme of life, whether as regards the aim and method

of the discipline, or as regards the compass and character of the body

of knowledge inculcated. It is in learning proper, and more particularly

in the higher learning, that the influence of leisure-class ideals is

most patent; and since the purpose here is not to make an exhaustive

collation of data showing the effect of the pecuniary culture upon

education, but rather to illustrate the method and trend of the

leisure-class influence in education, a survey of certain salient

features of the higher learning, such as may serve this purpose, is all

that will be attempted.

In point of derivation and early development, learning is somewhat

closely related to the devotional function of the community,

particularly to the body of observances in which the service rendered

the supernatural leisure class expresses itself. The service by which it

is sought to conciliate supernatural agencies in the primitive cults is

not an industrially profitable employment of the community's time and

effort. It is, therefore, in great part, to be classed as a vicarious

leisure performed for the supernatural powers with whom negotiations

are carried on and whose good-will the service and the professions of

subservience are conceived to procure. In great part, the early learning

consisted in an acquisition of knowledge and facility in the service of

a supernatural agent. It was therefore closely analogous in character to

the training required for the domestic service of a temporal master. To

a great extent, the knowledge acquired under the priestly teachers of

the primitive community was knowledge of ritual and ceremonial; that

is to say, a knowledge of the most proper, most effective, or most

acceptable manner of approaching and of serving the preternatural

agents. What was learned was how to make oneself indispensable to these

powers, and so to put oneself in a position to ask, or even to require,

their intercession in the course of events or their abstention from

interference in any given enterprise. Propitiation was the end, and this

end was sought, in great part, by acquiring facility in subservience.

It appears to have been only gradually that other elements than those

of efficient service of the master found their way into the stock of

priestly or shamanistic instruction.

The priestly servitor of the inscrutable powers that move in the

external world came to stand in the position of a mediator between these

powers and the common run of unrestricted humanity; for he was possessed

of a knowledge of the supernatural etiquette which would admit him into

the presence. And as commonly happens with mediators between the vulgar

and their masters, whether the masters be natural or preternatural, he

found it expedient to have the means at hand tangibly to impress upon

the vulgar the fact that these inscrutable powers would do what he might

ask of them. Hence, presently, a knowledge of certain natural processes

which could be turned to account for spectacular effect, together with

some sleight of hand, came to be an integral part of priestly lore.

Knowledge of this kind passes for knowledge of the "unknowable", and

it owes its serviceability for the sacerdotal purpose to its recondite

character. It appears to have been from this source that learning, as an

institution, arose, and its differentiation from this its parent stock

of magic ritual and shamanistic fraud has been slow and tedious, and is

scarcely yet complete even in the most advanced of the higher seminaries

of learning.

The recondite element in learning is still, as it has been in all ages,

a very attractive and effective element for the purpose of impressing,

or even imposing upon, the unlearned; and the standing of the savant in

the mind of the altogether unlettered is in great measure rated in terms

of intimacy with the occult forces. So, for instance, as a typical case,

even so late as the middle of this century, the Norwegian peasants have

instinctively formulated their sense of the superior erudition of such

doctors of divinity as Luther, Malanchthon, Peder Dass, and even so late

a scholar in divinity as Grundtvig, in terms of the Black Art. These,

together with a very comprehensive list of minor celebrities, both

living and dead, have been reputed masters in all magical arts; and a

high position in the ecclesiastical personnel has carried with it,

in the apprehension of these good people, an implication of profound

familiarity with magical practice and the occult sciences. There is

a parallel fact nearer home, similarly going to show the close

relationship, in popular apprehension, between erudition and the

unknowable; and it will at the same time serve to illustrate, in

somewhat coarse outline, the bent which leisure-class life gives to

the cognitive interest. While the belief is by no means confined to the

leisure class, that class today comprises a disproportionately large

number of believers in occult sciences of all kinds and shades. By those

whose habits of thought are not shaped by contact with modern industry,

the knowledge of the unknowable is still felt to the ultimate if not the

only true knowledge.

Learning, then, set out by being in some sense a by-product of the

priestly vicarious leisure class; and, at least until a recent date,

the higher learning has since remained in some sense a by-product or

by-occupation of the priestly classes. As the body of systematized

knowledge increased, there presently arose a distinction, traceable

very far back in the history of education, between esoteric and exoteric

knowledge, the former--so far as there is a substantial difference

between the two--comprising such knowledge as is primarily of no

economic or industrial effect, and the latter comprising chiefly

knowledge of industrial processes and of natural phenomena which were

habitually turned to account for the material purposes of life.

This line of demarcation has in time become, at least in popular

apprehension, the normal line between the higher learning and the lower.

It is significant, not only as an evidence of their close affiliation

with the priestly craft, but also as indicating that their activity to

a good extent falls under that category of conspicuous leisure known

as manners and breeding, that the learned class in all primitive

communities are great sticklers for form, precedent, gradations of rank,

ritual, ceremonial vestments, and learned paraphernalia generally.

This is of course to be expected, and it goes to say that the higher

learning, in its incipient phase, is a leisure-class occupation--more

specifically an occupation of the vicarious leisure class employed in

the service of the supernatural leisure class. But this predilection for

the paraphernalia of learning goes also to indicate a further point of

contact or of continuity between the priestly office and the office of

the savant. In point of derivation, learning, as well as the priestly

office, is largely an outgrowth of sympathetic magic; and this magical

apparatus of form and ritual therefore finds its place with the learned

class of the primitive community as a matter of course. The ritual and

paraphernalia have an occult efficacy for the magical purpose; so

that their presence as an integral factor in the earlier phases of the

development of magic and science is a matter of expediency, quite as

much as of affectionate regard for symbolism simply.

This sense of the efficacy of symbolic ritual, and of sympathetic effect

to be wrought through dexterous rehearsal of the traditional accessories

of the act or end to be compassed, is of course present more obviously

and in larger measure in magical practice than in the discipline of the

sciences, even of the occult sciences. But there are, I apprehend,

few persons with a cultivated sense of scholastic merit to whom the

ritualistic accessories of science are altogether an idle matter. The

very great tenacity with which these ritualistic paraphernalia persist

through the later course of the development is evident to any one

who will reflect on what has been the history of learning in our

civilization. Even today there are such things in the usage of the

learned community as the cap and gown, matriculation, initiation,

and graduation ceremonies, and the conferring of scholastic degrees,

dignities, and prerogatives in a way which suggests some sort of a

scholarly apostolic succession. The usage of the priestly orders is

no doubt the proximate source of all these features of learned ritual,

vestments, sacramental initiation, the transmission of peculiar

dignities and virtues by the imposition of hands, and the like; but

their derivation is traceable back of this point, to the source from

which the specialized priestly class proper came to be distinguished

from the sorcerer on the one hand and from the menial servant of

a temporal master on the other hand. So far as regards both their

derivation and their psychological content, these usages and the

conceptions on which they rest belong to a stage in cultural development

no later than that of the angekok and the rain-maker. Their place in the

later phases of devout observance, as well as in the higher educational

system, is that of a survival from a very early animistic phase of the

development of human nature.

These ritualistic features of the educational system of the present and

of the recent past, it is quite safe to say, have their place primarily

in the higher, liberal, and classic institutions and grades of learning,

rather than in the lower, technological, or practical grades, and

branches of the system. So far as they possess them, the lower and less

reputable branches of the educational scheme have evidently borrowed

these things from the higher grades; and their continued persistence

among the practical schools, without the sanction of the continued

example of the higher and classic grades, would be highly improbable,

to say the least. With the lower and practical schools and scholars, the

adoption and cultivation of these usages is a case of mimicry--due to

a desire to conform as far as may be to the standards of scholastic

reputability maintained by the upper grades and classes, who have

come by these accessory features legitimately, by the right of lineal

devolution.

The analysis may even be safely carried a step farther. Ritualistic

survivals and reversions come out in fullest vigor and with the freest

air of spontaneity among those seminaries of learning which have to

do primarily with the education of the priestly and leisure classes.

Accordingly it should appear, and it does pretty plainly appear, on

a survey of recent developments in college and university life, that

wherever schools founded for the instruction of the lower classes in the

immediately useful branches of knowledge grow into institutions of the

higher learning, the growth of ritualistic ceremonial and paraphernalia

and of elaborate scholastic "functions" goes hand in hand with

the transition of the schools in question from the field of homely

practicality into the higher, classical sphere. The initial purpose of

these schools, and the work with which they have chiefly had to do at

the earlier of these two stages of their evolution, has been that of

fitting the young of the industrious classes for work. On the higher,

classical plane of learning to which they commonly tend, their dominant

aim becomes the preparation of the youth of the priestly and the leisure

classes--or of an incipient leisure class--for the consumption of

goods, material and immaterial, according to a conventionally accepted,

reputable scope and method. This happy issue has commonly been the fate

of schools founded by "friends of the people" for the aid of struggling

young men, and where this transition is made in good form there is

commonly, if not invariably, a coincident change to a more ritualistic

life in the schools.

In the school life of today, learned ritual is in a general way best at

home in schools whose chief end is the cultivation of the "humanities".

This correlation is shown, perhaps more neatly than anywhere else, in

the life-history of the American colleges and universities of recent

growth. There may be many exceptions from the rule, especially among

those schools which have been founded by the typically reputable and

ritualistic churches, and which, therefore, started on the conservative

and classical plane or reached the classical position by a short-cut;

but the general rule as regards the colleges founded in the newer

American communities during the present century has been that so long

as the constituency from which the colleges have drawn their pupils

has been dominated by habits of industry and thrift, so long the

reminiscences of the medicine-man have found but a scant and precarious

acceptance in the scheme of college life. But so soon as wealth begins

appreciably to accumulate in the community, and so soon as a given

school begins to lean on a leisure-class constituency, there comes

also a perceptibly increased insistence on scholastic ritual and on

conformity to the ancient forms as regards vestments and social and

scholastic solemnities. So, for instance, there has been an approximate

coincidence between the growth of wealth among the constituency

which supports any given college of the Middle West and the date of

acceptance--first into tolerance and then into imperative vogue--of

evening dress for men and of the décolleté for women, as the scholarly

vestments proper to occasions of learned solemnity or to the seasons

of social amenity within the college circle. Apart from the mechanical

difficulty of so large a task, it would scarcely be a difficult matter

to trace this correlation. The like is true of the vogue of the cap and

gown.

Cap and gown have been adopted as learned insignia by many colleges of

this section within the last few years; and it is safe to say that this

could scarcely have occurred at a much earlier date, or until there had

grown up a leisure-class sentiment of sufficient volume in the community

to support a strong movement of reversion towards an archaic view as to

the legitimate end of education. This particular item of learned ritual,

it may be noted, would not only commend itself to the leisure-class

sense of the fitness of things, as appealing to the archaic propensity

for spectacular effect and the predilection for antique symbolism;

but it at the same time fits into the leisure-class scheme of life as

involving a notable element of conspicuous waste. The precise date at

which the reversion to cap and gown took place, as well as the fact that

it affected so large a number of schools at about the same time,

seems to have been due in some measure to a wave of atavistic sense

of conformity and reputability that passed over the community at that

period.

It may not be entirely beside the point to note that in point of time

this curious reversion seems to coincide with the culmination of a

certain vogue of atavistic sentiment and tradition in other directions

also. The wave of reversion seems to have received its initial impulse

in the psychologically disintegrating effects of the Civil War.

Habituation to war entails a body of predatory habits of thought,

whereby clannishness in some measure replaces the sense of solidarity,

and a sense of invidious distinction supplants the impulse to equitable,

everyday serviceability. As an outcome of the cumulative action of these

factors, the generation which follows a season of war is apt to witness

a rehabilitation of the element of status, both in its social life and

in its scheme of devout observances and other symbolic or ceremonial

forms. Throughout the eighties, and less plainly traceable through the

seventies also, there was perceptible a gradually advancing wave of

sentiment favoring quasi-predatory business habits, insistence on

status, anthropomorphism, and conservatism generally. The more direct

and unmediated of these expressions of the barbarian temperament, such

as the recrudescence of outlawry and the spectacular quasi-predatory

careers of fraud run by certain "captains of industry", came to a

head earlier and were appreciably on the decline by the close of the

seventies. The recrudescence of anthropomorphic sentiment also seems to

have passed its most acute stage before the close of the eighties. But

the learned ritual and paraphernalia here spoken of are a still remoter

and more recondite expression of the barbarian animistic sense; and

these, therefore, gained vogue and elaboration more slowly and reached

their most effective development at a still later date. There is reason

to believe that the culmination is now already past. Except for the new

impetus given by a new war experience, and except for the support which

the growth of a wealthy class affords to all ritual, and especially to

whatever ceremonial is wasteful and pointedly suggests gradations of

status, it is probable that the late improvements and augmentation of

scholastic insignia and ceremonial would gradually decline. But while it

may be true that the cap and gown, and the more strenuous observance

of scholastic proprieties which came with them, were floated in on this

post-bellum tidal wave of reversion to barbarism, it is also no doubt

true that such a ritualistic reversion could not have been effected in

the college scheme of life until the accumulation of wealth in the

hands of a propertied class had gone far enough to afford the requisite

pecuniary ground for a movement which should bring the colleges of the

country up to the leisure-class requirements in the higher learning. The

adoption of the cap and gown is one of the striking atavistic features

of modern college life, and at the same time it marks the fact that

these colleges have definitely become leisure-class establishments,

either in actual achievement or in aspiration.

As further evidence of the close relation between the educational system

and the cultural standards of the community, it may be remarked that

there is some tendency latterly to substitute the captain of industry in

place of the priest, as the head of seminaries of the higher learning.

The substitution is by no means complete or unequivocal. Those heads of

institutions are best accepted who combine the sacerdotal office with

a high degree of pecuniary efficiency. There is a similar but less

pronounced tendency to intrust the work of instruction in the higher

learning to men of some pecuniary qualification. Administrative ability

and skill in advertising the enterprise count for rather more than

they once did, as qualifications for the work of teaching. This applies

especially in those sciences that have most to do with the everyday

facts of life, and it is particularly true of schools in the

economically single-minded communities. This partial substitution of

pecuniary for sacerdotal efficiency is a concomitant of the modern

transition from conspicuous leisure to conspicuous consumption, as

the chief means of reputability. The correlation of the two facts is

probably clear without further elaboration.

The attitude of the schools and of the learned class towards the

education of women serves to show in what manner and to what extent

learning has departed from its ancient station of priestly and

leisure-class prerogatives, and it indicates also what approach has

been made by the truly learned to the modern, economic or industrial,

matter-of-fact standpoint. The higher schools and the learned

professions were until recently tabu to the women. These establishments

were from the outset, and have in great measure continued to be, devoted

to the education of the priestly and leisure classes.

The women, as has been shown elsewhere, were the original subservient

class, and to some extent, especially so far as regards their nominal

or ceremonial position, they have remained in that relation down to the

present. There has prevailed a strong sense that the admission of

women to the privileges of the higher learning (as to the Eleusianin

mysteries) would be derogatory to the dignity of the learned craft. It

is therefore only very recently, and almost solely in the industrially

most advanced communities, that the higher grades of schools have

been freely opened to women. And even under the urgent circumstances

prevailing in the modern industrial communities, the highest and most

reputable universities show an extreme reluctance in making the move.

The sense of class worthiness, that is to say of status, of a honorific

differentiation of the sexes according to a distinction between superior

and inferior intellectual dignity, survives in a vigorous form in these

corporations of the aristocracy of learning. It is felt that the woman

should, in all propriety, acquire only such knowledge as may be classed

under one or the other of two heads: (1) such knowledge as conduces

immediately to a better performance of domestic service--the domestic

sphere; (2) such accomplishments and dexterity, quasi-scholarly and

quasi-artistic, as plainly come in under the head of a performance of

vicarious leisure. Knowledge is felt to be unfeminine if it is knowledge

which expresses the unfolding of the learner's own life, the acquisition

of which proceeds on the learner's own cognitive interest, without

prompting from the canons of propriety, and without reference back to a

master whose comfort or good repute is to be enhanced by the employment

or the exhibition of it. So, also, all knowledge which is useful as

evidence of leisure, other than vicarious leisure, is scarcely feminine.

For an appreciation of the relation which these higher seminaries of

learning bear to the economic life of the community, the phenomena which

have been reviewed are of importance rather as indications of a general

attitude than as being in themselves facts of first-rate economic

consequence. They go to show what is the instinctive attitude and

animus of the learned class towards the life process of an industrial

community. They serve as an exponent of the stage of development, for

the industrial purpose, attained by the higher learning and by the

learned class, and so they afford an indication as to what may fairly be

looked for from this class at points where the learning and the life of

the class bear more immediately upon the economic life and efficiency

of the community, and upon the adjustment of its scheme of life to

the requirements of the time. What these ritualistic survivals go

to indicate is a prevalence of conservatism, if not of reactionary

sentiment, especially among the higher schools where the conventional

learning is cultivated.

To these indications of a conservative attitude is to be added another

characteristic which goes in the same direction, but which is a symptom

of graver consequence that this playful inclination to trivialities

of form and ritual. By far the greater number of American colleges

and universities, for instance, are affiliated to some religious

denomination and are somewhat given to devout observances. Their

putative familiarity with scientific methods and the scientific point

of view should presumably exempt the faculties of these schools

from animistic habits of thought; but there is still a considerable

proportion of them who profess an attachment to the anthropomorphic

beliefs and observances of an earlier culture. These professions

of devotional zeal are, no doubt, to a good extent expedient and

perfunctory, both on the part of the schools in their corporate

capacity, and on the part of the individual members of the corps of

instructors; but it can not be doubted that there is after all a very

appreciable element of anthropomorphic sentiment present in the

higher schools. So far as this is the case it must be set down as the

expression of an archaic, animistic habit of mind. This habit of

mind must necessarily assert itself to some extent in the instruction

offered, and to this extent its influence in shaping the habits of

thought of the student makes for conservatism and reversion; it acts

to hinder his development in the direction of matter-of-fact knowledge,

such as best serves the ends of industry.

The college sports, which have so great a vogue in the reputable

seminaries of learning today, tend in a similar direction; and, indeed,

sports have much in common with the devout attitude of the colleges,

both as regards their psychological basis and as regards their

disciplinary effect. But this expression of the barbarian temperament

is to be credited primarily to the body of students, rather than to the

temper of the schools as such; except in so far as the colleges or the

college officials--as sometimes happens--actively countenance and foster

the growth of sports. The like is true of college fraternities as

of college sports, but with a difference. The latter are chiefly

an expression of the predatory impulse simply; the former are more

specifically an expression of that heritage of clannishness which is

so large a feature in the temperament of the predatory barbarian. It is

also noticeable that a close relation subsists between the fraternities

and the sporting activity of the schools. After what has already been

said in an earlier chapter on the sporting and gambling habit, it

is scarcely necessary further to discuss the economic value of this

training in sports and in factional organization and activity.

But all these features of the scheme of life of the learned class,

and of the establishments dedicated to the conservation of the higher

learning, are in a great measure incidental only. They are scarcely

to be accounted organic elements of the professed work of research and

instruction for the ostensible pursuit of which the schools exists. But

these symptomatic indications go to establish a presumption as to the

character of the work performed--as seen from the economic point of

view--and as to the bent which the serious work carried on under their

auspices gives to the youth who resort to the schools. The presumption

raised by the considerations already offered is that in their work also,

as well as in their ceremonial, the higher schools may be expected to

take a conservative position; but this presumption must be checked by a

comparison of the economic character of the work actually performed, and

by something of a survey of the learning whose conservation is

intrusted to the higher schools. On this head, it is well known that

the accredited seminaries of learning have, until a recent date, held

a conservative position. They have taken an attitude of depreciation

towards all innovations. As a general rule a new point of view or a new

formulation of knowledge have been countenanced and taken up within the

schools only after these new things have made their way outside of

the schools. As exceptions from this rule are chiefly to be mentioned

innovations of an inconspicuous kind and departures which do not bear

in any tangible way upon the conventional point of view or upon the

conventional scheme of life; as, for instance, details of fact in the

mathematico-physical sciences, and new readings and interpretations of

the classics, especially such as have a philological or literary bearing

only. Except within the domain of the "humanities", in the narrow sense,

and except so far as the traditional point of view of the humanities has

been left intact by the innovators, it has generally held true that the

accredited learned class and the seminaries of the higher learning

have looked askance at all innovation. New views, new departures in

scientific theory, especially in new departures which touch the theory

of human relations at any point, have found a place in the scheme of

the university tardily and by a reluctant tolerance, rather than by

a cordial welcome; and the men who have occupied themselves with such

efforts to widen the scope of human knowledge have not commonly been

well received by their learned contemporaries. The higher schools have

not commonly given their countenance to a serious advance in the methods

or the content of knowledge until the innovations have outlived their

youth and much of their usefulness--after they have become commonplaces

of the intellectual furniture of a new generation which has grown

up under, and has had its habits of thought shaped by, the new,

extra-scholastic body of knowledge and the new standpoint. This is true

of the recent past. How far it may be true of the immediate present it

would be hazardous to say, for it is impossible to see present-day

facts in such perspective as to get a fair conception of their relative

proportions.

So far, nothing has been said of the Maecenas function of the

well-to-do, which is habitually dwelt on at some length by writers

and speakers who treat of the development of culture and of social

structure. This leisure-class function is not without an important

bearing on the higher and on the spread of knowledge and culture. The

manner and the degree in which the class furthers learning through

patronage of this kind is sufficiently familiar. It has been frequently

presented in affectionate and effective terms by spokesmen whose

familiarity with the topic fits them to bring home to their hearers the

profound significance of this cultural factor. These spokesmen, however,

have presented the matter from the point of view of the cultural

interest, or of the interest of reputability, rather than from that of

the economic interest. As apprehended from the economic point of view,

and valued for the purpose of industrial serviceability, this function

of the well-to-do, as well as the intellectual attitude of members of

the well-to-do class, merits some attention and will bear illustration.

By way of characterization of the Maecenas relation, it is to be noted

that, considered externally, as an economic or industrial relation

simply, it is a relation of status. The scholar under the patronage

performs the duties of a learned life vicariously for his patron, to

whom a certain repute inures after the manner of the good repute imputed

to a master for whom any form of vicarious leisure is performed. It is

also to be noted that, in point of historical fact, the furtherance of

learning or the maintenance of scholarly activity through the Maecenas

relation has most commonly been a furtherance of proficiency in

classical lore or in the humanities. The knowledge tends to lower rather

than to heighten the industrial efficiency of the community.

Further, as regards the direct participation of the members of the

leisure class in the furtherance of knowledge, the canons of reputable

living act to throw such intellectual interest as seeks expression among

the class on the side of classical and formal erudition, rather than

on the side of the sciences that bear some relation to the community's

industrial life. The most frequent excursions into other than classical

fields of knowledge on the part of members of the leisure class are made

into the discipline of law and the political, and more especially the

administrative, sciences. These so-called sciences are substantially

bodies of maxims of expediency for guidance in the leisure-class office

of government, as conducted on a proprietary basis. The interest with

which this discipline is approached is therefore not commonly the

intellectual or cognitive interest simply. It is largely the practical

interest of the exigencies of that relation of mastery in which the

members of the class are placed. In point of derivation, the office of

government is a predatory function, pertaining integrally to the archaic

leisure-class scheme of life. It is an exercise of control and coercion

over the population from which the class draws its sustenance. This

discipline, as well as the incidents of practice which give it its

content, therefore has some attraction for the class apart from all

questions of cognition. All this holds true wherever and so long as

the governmental office continues, in form or in substance, to be a

proprietary office; and it holds true beyond that limit, in so far as

the tradition of the more archaic phase of governmental evolution has

lasted on into the later life of those modern communities for whom

proprietary government by a leisure class is now beginning to pass away.

For that field of learning within which the cognitive or intellectual

interest is dominant--the sciences properly so called--the case is

somewhat different, not only as regards the attitude of the leisure

class, but as regards the whole drift of the pecuniary culture.

Knowledge for its own sake, the exercise of the faculty of comprehensive

without ulterior purpose, should, it might be expected, be sought by

men whom no urgent material interest diverts from such a quest. The

sheltered industrial position of the leisure class should give free

play to the cognitive interest in members of this class, and we should

consequently have, as many writers confidently find that we do have, a

very large proportion of scholars, scientists, savants derived from

this class and deriving their incentive to scientific investigation and

speculation from the discipline of a life of leisure. Some such result

is to be looked for, but there are features of the leisure-class

scheme of life, already sufficiently dwelt upon, which go to divert the

intellectual interest of this class to other subjects than that causal

sequence in phenomena which makes the content of the sciences. The

habits of thought which characterize the life of the class run on

the personal relation of dominance, and on the derivative, invidious

concepts of honor, worth, merit, character, and the like. The casual

sequence which makes up the subject matter of science is not visible

from this point of view. Neither does good repute attach to knowledge of

facts that are vulgarly useful. Hence it should appear probable that the

interest of the invidious comparison with respect to pecuniary or other

honorific merit should occupy the attention of the leisure class, to the

neglect of the cognitive interest. Where this latter interest asserts

itself it should commonly be diverted to fields of speculation or

investigation which are reputable and futile, rather than to the quest

of scientific knowledge. Such indeed has been the history of priestly

and leisure-class learning so long as no considerable body of

systematized knowledge had been intruded into the scholastic discipline

from an extra-scholastic source. But since the relation of mastery and

subservience is ceasing to be the dominant and formative factor in the

community's life process, other features of the life process and other

points of view are forcing themselves upon the scholars. The true-bred

gentleman of leisure should, and does, see the world from the point of

view of the personal relation; and the cognitive interest, so far as

it asserts itself in him, should seek to systematize phenomena on this

basis. Such indeed is the case with the gentleman of the old school, in

whom the leisure-class ideals have suffered no disintegration; and such

is the attitude of his latter-day descendant, in so far as he has fallen

heir to the full complement of upper-class virtues. But the ways of

heredity are devious, and not every gentleman's son is to the manor

born. Especially is the transmission of the habits of thought which

characterize the predatory master somewhat precarious in the case of a

line of descent in which but one or two of the latest steps have lain

within the leisure-class discipline. The chances of occurrence of a

strong congenital or acquired bent towards the exercise of the cognitive

aptitudes are apparently best in those members of the leisure class who

are of lower class or middle class antecedents--that is to say, those

who have inherited the complement of aptitudes proper to the industrious

classes, and who owe their place in the leisure class to the possession

of qualities which count for more today than they did in the times when

the leisure-class scheme of life took shape. But even outside the range

of these later accessions to the leisure class there are an appreciable

number of individuals in whom the invidious interest is not sufficiently

dominant to shape their theoretical views, and in whom the proclivity to

theory is sufficiently strong to lead them into the scientific quest.

The higher learning owes the intrusion of the sciences in part to these

aberrant scions of the leisure class, who have come under the dominant

influence of the latter-day tradition of impersonal relation and who

have inherited a complement of human aptitudes differing in certain

salient features from the temperament which is characteristic of

the regime of status. But it owes the presence of this alien body of

scientific knowledge also in part, and in a higher degree, to members of

the industrious classes who have been in sufficiently easy circumstances

to turn their attention to other interests than that of finding daily

sustenance, and whose inherited aptitudes and anthropomorphic point of

view does not dominate their intellectual processes. As between

these two groups, which approximately comprise the effective force of

scientific progress, it is the latter that has contributed the most. And

with respect to both it seems to be true that they are not so much

the source as the vehicle, or at the most they are the instrument of

commutation, by which the habits of thought enforced upon the community,

through contact with its environment under the exigencies of modern

associated life and the mechanical industries, are turned to account for

theoretical knowledge.

Science, in the sense of an articulate recognition of causal sequence in

phenomena, whether physical or social, has been a feature of the Western

culture only since the industrial process in the Western communities has

come to be substantially a process of mechanical contrivances in which

man's office is that of discrimination and valuation of material forces.

Science has flourished somewhat in the same degree as the industrial

life of the community has conformed to this pattern, and somewhat in

the same degree as the industrial interest has dominated the community's

life. And science, and scientific theory especially, has made headway

in the several departments of human life and knowledge in proportion

as each of these several departments has successively come into closer

contact with the industrial process and the economic interest;

or perhaps it is truer to say, in proportion as each of them has

successively escaped from the dominance of the conceptions of personal

relation or status, and of the derivative canons of anthropomorphic

fitness and honorific worth.

It is only as the exigencies of modern industrial life have enforced the

recognition of causal sequence in the practical contact of mankind with

their environment, that men have come to systematize the phenomena of

this environment and the facts of their own contact with it in terms

of causal sequence. So that while the higher learning in its best

development, as the perfect flower of scholasticism and classicism, was

a by-product of the priestly office and the life of leisure, so modern

science may be said to be a by-product of the industrial process.

Through these groups of men, then--investigators, savants, scientists,

inventors, speculators--most of whom have done their most telling work

outside the shelter of the schools, the habits of thought enforced

by the modern industrial life have found coherent expression and

elaboration as a body of theoretical science having to do with the

causal sequence of phenomena. And from this extra-scholastic field of

scientific speculation, changes of method and purpose have from time to

time been intruded into the scholastic discipline.

In this connection it is to be remarked that there is a very perceptible

difference of substance and purpose between the instruction offered in

the primary and secondary schools, on the one hand, and in the higher

seminaries of learning, on the other hand. The difference in point

of immediate practicality of the information imparted and of the

proficiency acquired may be of some consequence and may merit the

attention which it has from time to time received; but there is more

substantial difference in the mental and spiritual bent which is favored

by the one and the other discipline. This divergent trend in discipline

between the higher and the lower learning is especially noticeable as

regards the primary education in its latest development in the advanced

industrial communities. Here the instruction is directed chiefly to

proficiency or dexterity, intellectual and manual, in the apprehension

and employment of impersonal facts, in their casual rather than in their

honorific incidence. It is true, under the traditions of the earlier

days, when the primary education was also predominantly a leisure-class

commodity, a free use is still made of emulation as a spur to diligence

in the common run of primary schools; but even this use of emulation as

an expedient is visibly declining in the primary grades of instruction

in communities where the lower education is not under the guidance

of the ecclesiastical or military tradition. All this holds true in

a peculiar degree, and more especially on the spiritual side, of such

portions of the educational system as have been immediately affected by

kindergarten methods and ideals.

The peculiarly non-invidious trend of the kindergarten discipline, and

the similar character of the kindergarten influence in primary education

beyond the limits of the kindergarten proper, should be taken in

connection with what has already been said of the peculiar spiritual

attitude of leisure-class womankind under the circumstances of the

modern economic situation. The kindergarten discipline is at its

best--or at its farthest remove from ancient patriarchal and pedagogical

ideals--in the advanced industrial communities, where there is a

considerable body of intelligent and idle women, and where the system of

status has somewhat abated in rigor under the disintegrating influence

of industrial life and in the absence of a consistent body of

military and ecclesiastical traditions. It is from these women in easy

circumstances that it gets its moral support. The aims and methods of

the kindergarten commend themselves with especial effect to this class

of women who are ill at ease under the pecuniary code of reputable life.

The kindergarten, and whatever the kindergarten spirit counts for

in modern education, therefore, is to be set down, along with the

"new-woman movement," to the account of that revulsion against futility

and invidious comparison which the leisure-class life under modern

circumstances induces in the women most immediately exposed to its

discipline. In this way it appears that, by indirection, the institution

of a leisure class here again favors the growth of a non-invidious

attitude, which may, in the long run, prove a menace to the stability

of the institution itself, and even to the institution of individual

ownership on which it rests.

During the recent past some tangible changes have taken place in the

scope of college and university teaching. These changes have in the main

consisted in a partial displacement of the humanities--those branches

of learning which are conceived to make for the traditional "culture",

character, tastes, and ideals--by those more matter-of-fact branches

which make for civic and industrial efficiency. To put the same thing

in other words, those branches of knowledge which make for efficiency

(ultimately productive efficiency) have gradually been gaining ground

against those branches which make for a heightened consumption or a

lowered industrial efficiency and for a type of character suited to the

regime of status. In this adaptation of the scheme of instruction the

higher schools have commonly been found on the conservative side; each

step which they have taken in advance has been to some extent of

the nature of a concession. The sciences have been intruded into

the scholar's discipline from without, not to say from below. It is

noticeable that the humanities which have so reluctantly yielded ground

to the sciences are pretty uniformly adapted to shape the character

of the student in accordance with a traditional self-centred scheme of

consumption; a scheme of contemplation and enjoyment of the true,

the beautiful, and the good, according to a conventional standard of

propriety and excellence, the salient feature of which is leisure--otium

cum dignitate. In language veiled by their own habituation to the

archaic, decorous point of view, the spokesmen of the humanities have

insisted upon the ideal embodied in the maxim, fruges consumere nati.

This attitude should occasion no surprise in the case of schools which

are shaped by and rest upon a leisure-class culture.

The professed grounds on which it has been sought, as far as might be,

to maintain the received standards and methods of culture intact

are likewise characteristic of the archaic temperament and of the

leisure-class theory of life. The enjoyment and the bent derived from

habitual contemplation of the life, ideals, speculations, and methods of

consuming time and goods, in vogue among the leisure class of classical

antiquity, for instance, is felt to be "higher", "nobler", "worthier",

than what results in these respects from a like familiarity with the

everyday life and the knowledge and aspirations of commonplace humanity

in a modern community, that learning the content of which is an

unmitigated knowledge of latter-day men and things is by comparison

"lower", "base", "ignoble"--one even hears the epithet "sub-human"

applied to this matter-of-fact knowledge of mankind and of everyday

life.

This contention of the leisure-class spokesmen of the humanities

seems to be substantially sound. In point of substantial fact, the

gratification and the culture, or the spiritual attitude or habit of

mind, resulting from an habitual contemplation of the anthropomorphism,

clannishness, and leisurely self-complacency of the gentleman of an

early day, or from a familiarity with the animistic superstitions

and the exuberant truculence of the Homeric heroes, for instance, is,

aesthetically considered, more legitimate than the corresponding results

derived from a matter-of-fact knowledge of things and a contemplation

of latter-day civic or workmanlike efficiency. There can be but little

question that the first-named habits have the advantage in respect of

aesthetic or honorific value, and therefore in respect of the "worth"

which is made the basis of award in the comparison. The content of the

canons of taste, and more particularly of the canons of honor, is in the

nature of things a resultant of the past life and circumstances of

the race, transmitted to the later generation by inheritance or by

tradition; and the fact that the protracted dominance of a predatory,

leisure-class scheme of life has profoundly shaped the habit of mind and

the point of view of the race in the past, is a sufficient basis for an

aesthetically legitimate dominance of such a scheme of life in very much

of what concerns matters of taste in the present. For the purpose in

hand, canons of taste are race habits, acquired through a more or less

protracted habituation to the approval or disapproval of the kind

of things upon which a favorable or unfavorable judgment of taste is

passed. Other things being equal, the longer and more unbroken the

habituation, the more legitimate is the canon of taste in question. All

this seems to be even truer of judgments regarding worth or honor than

of judgments of taste generally.

But whatever may be the aesthetic legitimacy of the derogatory judgment

passed on the newer learning by the spokesmen of the humanities, and

however substantial may be the merits of the contention that the

classic lore is worthier and results in a more truly human culture and

character, it does not concern the question in hand. The question in

hand is as to how far these branches of learning, and the point of

view for which they stand in the educational system, help or hinder an

efficient collective life under modern industrial circumstances--how

far they further a more facile adaptation to the economic situation

of today. The question is an economic, not an aesthetic one; and

the leisure-class standards of learning which find expression in the

deprecatory attitude of the higher schools towards matter-of-fact

knowledge are, for the present purpose, to be valued from this point of

view only. For this purpose the use of such epithets as "noble", "base",

"higher", "lower", etc., is significant only as showing the animus

and the point of view of the disputants; whether they contend for the

worthiness of the new or of the old. All these epithets are honorific or

humilific terms; that is to say, they are terms of invidious comparison,

which in the last analysis fall under the category of the reputable or

the disreputable; that is, they belong within the range of ideas that

characterizes the scheme of life of the regime of status; that is, they

are in substance an expression of sportsmanship--of the predatory and

animistic habit of mind; that is, they indicate an archaic point of view

and theory of life, which may fit the predatory stage of culture and of

economic organization from which they have sprung, but which are,

from the point of view of economic efficiency in the broader sense,

disserviceable anachronisms.

The classics, and their position of prerogative in the scheme of

education to which the higher seminaries of learning cling with such a

fond predilection, serve to shape the intellectual attitude and lower

the economic efficiency of the new learned generation. They do this

not only by holding up an archaic ideal of manhood, but also by the

discrimination which they inculcate with respect to the reputable and

the disreputable in knowledge. This result is accomplished in two ways:

(1) by inspiring an habitual aversion to what is merely useful, as

contrasted with what is merely honorific in learning, and so shaping the

tastes of the novice that he comes in good faith to find gratification

of his tastes solely, or almost solely, in such exercise of the

intellect as normally results in no industrial or social gain; and (2)

by consuming the learner's time and effort in acquiring knowledge which

is of no use except in so far as this learning has by convention become

incorporated into the sum of learning required of the scholar, and has

thereby affected the terminology and diction employed in the useful

branches of knowledge. Except for this terminological difficulty--which

is itself a consequence of the vogue of the classics of the past--a

knowledge of the ancient languages, for instance, would have no

practical bearing for any scientist or any scholar not engaged on work

primarily of a linguistic character. Of course, all this has nothing to

say as to the cultural value of the classics, nor is there any intention

to disparage the discipline of the classics or the bent which their

study gives to the student. That bent seems to be of an economically

disserviceable kind, but this fact--somewhat notorious indeed--need

disturb no one who has the good fortune to find comfort and strength in

the classical lore. The fact that classical learning acts to derange

the learner's workmanlike attitudes should fall lightly upon the

apprehension of those who hold workmanship of small account in

comparison with the cultivation of decorous ideals: Iam fides et pax et

honos pudorque Priscus et neglecta redire virtus Audet.

Owing to the circumstance that this knowledge has become part of the

elementary requirements in our system of education, the ability to use

and to understand certain of the dead languages of southern Europe

is not only gratifying to the person who finds occasion to parade his

accomplishments in this respect, but the evidence of such knowledge

serves at the same time to recommend any savant to his audience, both

lay and learned. It is currently expected that a certain number of

years shall have been spent in acquiring this substantially useless

information, and its absence creates a presumption of hasty and

precarious learning, as well as of a vulgar practicality that is

equally obnoxious to the conventional standards of sound scholarship and

intellectual force.

The case is analogous to what happens in the purchase of any article of

consumption by a purchaser who is not an expert judge of materials or

of workmanship. He makes his estimate of value of the article chiefly

on the ground of the apparent expensiveness of the finish of those

decorative parts and features which have no immediate relation to the

intrinsic usefulness of the article; the presumption being that some

sort of ill-defined proportion subsists between the substantial value of

an article and the expense of adornment added in order to sell it. The

presumption that there can ordinarily be no sound scholarship where

a knowledge of the classics and humanities is wanting leads to a

conspicuous waste of time and labor on the part of the general body of

students in acquiring such knowledge. The conventional insistence on a

modicum of conspicuous waste as an incident of all reputable scholarship

has affected our canons of taste and of serviceability in matters of

scholarship in much the same way as the same principle has influenced

our judgment of the serviceability of manufactured goods.

It is true, since conspicuous consumption has gained more and more on

conspicuous leisure as a means of repute, the acquisition of the dead

languages is no longer so imperative a requirement as it once was,

and its talismanic virtue as a voucher of scholarship has suffered a

concomitant impairment. But while this is true, it is also true that the

classics have scarcely lost in absolute value as a voucher of scholastic

respectability, since for this purpose it is only necessary that

the scholar should be able to put in evidence some learning which is

conventionally recognized as evidence of wasted time; and the classics

lend themselves with great facility to this use. Indeed, there can be

little doubt that it is their utility as evidence of wasted time and

effort, and hence of the pecuniary strength necessary in order to

afford this waste, that has secured to the classics their position of

prerogative in the scheme of higher learning, and has led to their being

esteemed the most honorific of all learning. They serve the decorative

ends of leisure-class learning better than any other body of knowledge,

and hence they are an effective means of reputability.

In this respect the classics have until lately had scarcely a rival.

They still have no dangerous rival on the continent of Europe, but

lately, since college athletics have won their way into a recognized

standing as an accredited field of scholarly accomplishment, this latter

branch of learning--if athletics may be freely classed as learning--has

become a rival of the classics for the primacy in leisure-class

education in American and English schools. Athletics have an obvious

advantage over the classics for the purpose of leisure-class learning,

since success as an athlete presumes, not only waste of time, but also

waste of money, as well as the possession of certain highly unindustrial

archaic traits of character and temperament. In the German universities

the place of athletics and Greek-letter fraternities, as a leisure-class

scholarly occupation, has in some measure been supplied by a skilled and

graded inebriety and a perfunctory duelling.

The leisure class and its standard of virtue--archaism and waste--can

scarcely have been concerned in the introduction of the classics into

the scheme of the higher learning; but the tenacious retention of the

classics by the higher schools, and the high degree of reputability

which still attaches to them, are no doubt due to their conforming so

closely to the requirements of archaism and waste.

"Classic" always carries this connotation of wasteful and archaic,

whether it is used to denote the dead languages or the obsolete or

obsolescent forms of thought and diction in the living language, or to

denote other items of scholarly activity or apparatus to which it is

applied with less aptness. So the archaic idiom of the English language

is spoken of as "classic" English. Its use is imperative in all speaking

and writing upon serious topics, and a facile use of it lends dignity to

even the most commonplace and trivial string of talk. The newest form

of English diction is of course never written; the sense of that

leisure-class propriety which requires archaism in speech is present

even in the most illiterate or sensational writers in sufficient

force to prevent such a lapse. On the other hand, the highest and

most conventionalized style of archaic diction is--quite

characteristically--properly employed only in communications between an

anthropomorphic divinity and his subjects. Midway between these extremes

lies the everyday speech of leisure-class conversation and literature.

Elegant diction, whether in writing or speaking, is an effective means

of reputability. It is of moment to know with some precision what is

the degree of archaism conventionally required in speaking on any given

topic. Usage differs appreciably from the pulpit to the market-place;

the latter, as might be expected, admits the use of relatively new and

effective words and turns of expression, even by fastidious persons. A

discriminative avoidance of neologisms is honorific, not only because it

argues that time has been wasted in acquiring the obsolescent habit of

speech, but also as showing that the speaker has from infancy habitually

associated with persons who have been familiar with the obsolescent

idiom. It thereby goes to show his leisure-class antecedents. Great

purity of speech is presumptive evidence of several lives spent in other

than vulgarly useful occupations; although its evidence is by no means

entirely conclusive to this point.

As felicitous an instance of futile classicism as can well be found,

outside of the Far East, is the conventional spelling of the English

language. A breach of the proprieties in spelling is extremely annoying

and will discredit any writer in the eyes of all persons who are

possessed of a developed sense of the true and beautiful. English

orthography satisfies all the requirements of the canons of reputability

under the law of conspicuous waste. It is archaic, cumbrous, and

ineffective; its acquisition consumes much time and effort; failure to

acquire it is easy of detection. Therefore it is the first and readiest

test of reputability in learning, and conformity to its ritual is

indispensable to a blameless scholastic life.

On this head of purity of speech, as at other points where a

conventional usage rests on the canons of archaism and waste, the

spokesmen for the usage instinctively take an apologetic attitude. It

is contended, in substance, that a punctilious use of ancient and

accredited locutions will serve to convey thought more adequately and

more precisely than would be the straightforward use of the latest form

of spoken English; whereas it is notorious that the ideas of today are

effectively expressed in the slang of today. Classic speech has the

honorific virtue of dignity; it commands attention and respect as being

the accredited method of communication under the leisure-class scheme

of life, because it carries a pointed suggestion of the industrial

exemption of the speaker. The advantage of the accredited locutions lies

in their reputability; they are reputable because they are cumbrous and

out of date, and therefore argue waste of time and exemption from the

use and the need of direct and forcible speech.

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