Wars and conquests in the lake of Malanao
1. Inland from the coast which faces Bohol on the north of Mindanao,
and in the latter island, is located the lake of Malanao. [20] Its
shape is triangular; one of its angles extends about four leguas
eastward, another southward for three, and the third and longest
of all, westward. Its shores contain many small villages, where
live about six thousand inhabitants, although united to them is
the district of Butig, with about two thousand warriors. Through
this route they communicate with the Mindanaos, a circumstance
which renders them formidable. The land is sterile, and yields no
other products than rice and a few edible roots. Their clothing is
wretched, for cotton is scarce. All their textiles are of lanote,
a sort of wild hemp--not that it is that plant, but it resembles it
because of the fibers, which they obtain from a wild banana [i.e.,
abacá], to which they impart a blue color. This constitutes their
greatest gala attire. Heavy storms of wind and water are experienced
on this lake, and are called mangas by sailors. [21] [Here follows a
description of this peculiar form of storm--the waterspout--which was
much dreaded because of its fury and ravages.] This lake furnished
much convenience to the Mindanaos for their incursions, as the ports
nearest to our islands were easily reached by it. For since the deep
bay of Panguil penetrates far inland, and is quite near their lands,
they thus save many leguas of navigation--about one hundred--and a
rough coast. With such activity do they make a jest of the efforts
that were assured by the presidio of Zamboangan, with their resort
to more easy piratical raids. Since the said presidio was of no use
for this, it became necessary to devise another remedy.
2. For a complete understanding of the matter, we must make a
considerable step backward. The Augustinian Recollects had been
governed by vicar-provincials, who either selected certain appointed
individuals, if the nominations did not arrive in time from España,
or had the latter put into execution when they came sufficiently
beforehand. It was not a very stable government, nor the most suitable
for their administrations, as it was not constituted in regular form
as a province. This reform was obtained with the aid of his Catholic
Majesty, and the Recollects were erected into a congregation, having
or being assigned a vicar-general as superior prelate. At that time
the provinces were divided, and this province of Philipinas was
one of those which obtained the indult. They received their formal
despatches and met in chapter, in which the first provincial elected
was father Fray Onofre de la Madre de Dios, his election occurring
February six, one thousand six hundred and twenty-four. This religious
was a native of Perpiñan in the county of Rosellon, and a son of the
convent of Zaragoza. The Recollects drew up their triennial acts or
constitutions: namely, that the religious living in the missions
should observe the regular rules of the convents, with matins at
midnight, even should there be but one priest, that they should learn
within one year the language of the natives to whom they minister;
and that they may not receive guests into their convents, unless
it be the governors, bishops, religious, and alcaldes-mayor. It was
resolved that ministers should go to the district of Bayug, and that
they should extend their labors to the lake of Malanao, which was a
stronghold of heathendom, but great were the hopes inspired by their
excellent arrangements. Father Fray Juan de San Nicolas, an invincible
man and one accustomed to such labors, was chosen to forward the
gospel there. He went to the village of Bayug, where, gaining the
good-will of the influential people, he was well received and treated
with respect. One Dolomoyon was, as it were, superior of all those
natives. He was a man of excellent qualities, and immediately sent
his children to learn the catechism. Although he remained a heathen,
he favored Christianity greatly. The father went from that village to
Layavan, another settlement on the shore of another river that was
located near by. There he did not find the same response, but the
people were more obstinate in their heathen rites. That forced him
to put forth greater efforts, in order to effect an establishment in
that district. Leaving the care of Bayug to his companion, he went
on to Langaràn, a move that facilitated the conquest of the lake.
3. This aroused animosity in Corralat, the prince of Mindanao; for
if that district were to be converted, he would be greatly hindered
in his piratical raids. He began to harass the village of Cagayan,
so that the inhabitants could not go out freely to till their fields
and care for their crops. Consequently, the province of San Nicolas
established father Fray Pedro de San Agustin [22] as missionary in that
district. He was a person born for military undertakings. His native
place was the city of Valladolid and he was the son of Portuguese
parents. He had studied philosophy and theology at Salamanca, but
his inclination led him to read books of military deeds, in which
his taste found a particular pleasure; and he became very expert
in architecture, gunnery, and a great part of what is taught in
military practice. He made use of these qualifications and talents by
establishing and erecting the fort of Linao in the province of Caraga,
an advanced outpost among the heathen and Moros. Its structure was
well tested, for it resisted many assaults. He excellently instructed
the Indians whom he converted, in this natural method of defense, and
its utility has been proved in its always having been preserved. Then
this father went, after the new election, to Cagayan. That district had
before been tributary to Corralat, and the latter keenly resented its
change of religion from that of its prince; therefore, he was always
harassing them with wars and hostilities, in order to recover his
power over them. As soon as father Fray Agustin assumed that charge,
he exercised his skill in fortifying the village. He surrounded it
with a stout stockade, well proportioned in its outlines, defending its
curtains by communications of bulwarks. In the middle he raised another
small redoubt, as a place of retreat in case of a sudden invasion. He
disciplined the natives in the management of arms, and inspired them
with courage, so that they should not turn coward in time of danger,
or be intimidated by a multitude, which could not overcome them if
they were thoroughly accustomed to firearms. In fact, they resisted
excellently the surprises attempted by Corralat, who attacked them
often with many men, and obliged him to retire with heavy loss.
4. Corralat in his pride keenly resented the stout resistance of so
small a village, and resolved to invade it with superior forces. He
sent a squadron of thirty large boats to attack it, with a force of two
thousand Moros who were to land; and he ordered that all the people
of Cagayan should be put to the sword. Father Fray Agustin heard of
that order through his spies, and he made extensive preparations for
defense. He sent to Caraga for aid, and they gave him six soldiers
and one hundred Indians. He drilled the Indians in making sallies and
in handling their arquebuses. The hostile fleet arrived in sight of
the village, which awaited them very confidently and under arms. The
Moros disembarked, and attacked the village, but experienced resistance
that they had not expected. They attempted to make assaults by various
places, but everywhere found the same vigilance and defense. Seeing
the impossibility [of taking the village], and that they had lost a
considerable number of men in the assaults, they resolved to retire in
order. As soon as father Fray Agustin perceived that, he sallied forth
with his Indians, sword in hand. He attacked them, courageously and
caused the retreat to become a disorganized rout, in which but very
few escaped. Thus the father gained a complete victory out of almost
universal ruin. Corralat could not contain himself when he heard of
the loss. His wrath was all concentrated against the father, and he
planned to seize him by means of ambushes. The brave minister was not
unaware of this, and well did he look after the safety of the village,
and especially that of his own person, inasmuch as he was beset with
so many snares, and as he had to do generally with a treacherous
race. His duties obliged him to go to visit his parishioners who were
scattered in various adjoining villages. The Malanaos, who were vassals
of Corralat, and whom the latter had prepared to attack the village,
improved their opportunity. They succeeded in entering the village at
a point where the sentinels were careless. Many Indians were killed
in the surprise, the sacristy was profaned, and the enemy pillaged
as much as possible, until the invaded villagers, aroused, were able,
by rallying their men, to repel the foe with arms. Father Fray Agustin
grieved greatly over that reverse. At his return he hastened to repair
the havoc committed against divine worship, and to render the village
still more strongly fortified, so that it might remain free from such
surprises. The people themselves desired to obtain satisfaction from
those of the lake. Indians of courage were selected, and they went
to invade the enemy in their own land, in order to take vengeance
on them for their treacherous insults. They found no opposition on
their march. One village was sacked and burned, and sufficient booty
was found there to recompense the losses of Cagayan. They returned
to the latter village without having received any hurt, and the lake
of Malanao was left so intimidated that that enemy never returned to
Cagayan during the rule of father Fray Agustin.
5. Those raids could not be very much to the liking of the Jesuit
fathers, in whose district was comprehended the lake of Malanao. Their
affairs in Dapitan and Zamboangan having been made safe by this
time, they set their hearts on the possession of that lake. They
could not complain of the introduction of the Recollect fathers,
since they themselves had abandoned all that lake and left it without
ministers. To this end they inspired Governor Corcuera with the idea of
one adequate expedition, in order to finish once for all, if possible,
with the Moros--or at least to check their pride, which was occasioning
so much trouble to the islands. He charged the commander Almonte,
for that purpose, to withdraw all his operations from Corralat and
from the king of Bubayen with his fleet, in order to undertake the
invasion of the lake. The jurisdiction at Iligan and Dapitan was in
charge of Captain Don Francisco de Atienza y Vañez, a gentleman from
Toledo, and one very useful for such enterprises as he was a tried
warrior. The expedition of Malanao was entrusted to him. He was to
make it by means of soldiers from his presidios and Indians from his
province. By virtue of those orders, he chose fifty good soldiers and
eight hundred volunteer Caragas of courage. As father Fray Agustin
(whom his military prowess had gained the sobriquet of "Padre Capitan")
was famous because of his deeds, the alcalde-mayor, in order to ensure
the success of his measures, decided to take the father in his company,
that he might avail himself of all his experience. The father had gone
to Butuan, where he was in charge when these orders arrived with Don
Francisco de Atienza. The latter broached his plans to the father,
to which the father immediately agreed, as it fitted so well his
martial spirit.
6. Between the two, the means most suitable for the expedition were
discussed; and they agreed that the force prepared was sufficient
to subdue all the lake. Since it is navigable, and its banks are
swampy and cut up by more than fifty rivers, the undertaking would
have to be conducted on the water. Consequently, it was determined to
construct six boats, [each] capable of holding fifty or one hundred
men, which were to be carried in sections on the shoulders of the
men, until they reached a point where they could be made effective,
where they could be put together easily and quickly. They made haste
in this mode of construction, and went with all that equipment to
the village of Bayog. They resolved to follow the way to Balooy--a
path indeed more severe and more tedious; however, that seemed more
suitable to them, for the way by that route led through the villages
of friends. Although they were only neutrals, their own advantage
did not fail to concur in this expedition. Dato Dolo Moyon, filled
with passion to revenge an intended marriage which had been repelled
with contempt by the inhabitants of the lake, joined them. That union
was very pleasing to our people, for it brought them additional arms
and men, and gave them a retreat and sufficient aid in that dato's
village. At that place their march was retarded by showers of rain. The
Malanaos abandoned their individual interests, and united for the
common defense to the number of about six thousand armed men. They
were not without some few firearms. The stay of our men in Balooy
caused many of the Malanaos to abandon the camp, as being a people
suddenly collected without any preparation for their maintenance; and
without pay it is difficult, if not impossible, to keep those people a
considerable time in the field and under military discipline. Noting
that desertion, the chiefs of the lake sent their ambassadors to our
camps, who offered the captain some wretched presents in the name of
the assembly of their chiefs. The ambassadors, treating in order the
matters with which they were charged, asked the Spaniards to go back,
and said that they were proposing those expedients quietly and in a
friendly spirit, in order to avoid greater damages; for, should the
Spaniards try to tempt fortune by pressing forward, only a remnant of
their men would escape death, and the undertaking would be costly and
disgraceful. The captain answered them frankly and discreetly that it
was better to die at their hands, for that would be an honored death,
than dishonorably to retain life by retreating like cowards. He advised
them to look closer to their own interests, in time, and to decide
whether it was more useful to them to secure these in a friendly way,
or to sacrifice them for their liberty. By this reply the Malanaos
understood the firm resolution of the Spaniards, and that it meant
their ultimate destruction. They discussed the matter in council;
and the opinions were various; some believed in submission, others in
liberty. The former urged a compliant submission until such time as,
the danger having been removed, they could throw off their subjection
without so much risk. Others did not approve such astute schemes;
for, if the Spaniards were to gain control of the lake, they would
establish and build presidios there, and would have war craft on
it, with which they would entirely rule the natives, at their own
pleasure. They said that it was more important to resist than to
allow their entrance. That dilatory resolution gave our troops time,
so that they came in sight of the lake on April four, one thousand
six hundred and thirty-nine, avoiding the passes which the enemy
had fortified. The latter did not dare to lose sight of the lake,
in order that they might have a safe retreat with their boats when
assaulted. That precaution was of use to our people; for, when the
Moros were discovered by our men, and attacked, they abandoned their
camp and many arms, and fled in their boats.
7. Thereupon our Captain Atienza put his portable fleet together,
which he made navigable in twenty-four hours. He went to attack
several boats, which were keeping to leeward under the shelter of a
fort; but scarcely did they perceive themselves to be attacked, when
they fled to the shore and abandoned their canoes. Our men burned the
only village on that coast, by name Vato. The night caused them to
retire; but on the following day, making use of the abandoned boats,
to about the number of forty, they turned their prows toward the
most populous shores. Peaceful ambassadors went out to meet them,
and offered submission in tribute and vassalage. Our captain accepted
that surrender, and suspended the rigors of war. In execution of it,
the registration of the inhabitants was immediately undertaken;
and fifty villages, governed by four datos or chiefs, subject to
Corralat were listed. They all rendered obedience to the king of
España, and there was declared in the list to be two thousand and
nine families. The number of families was much greater, but the
registration was not carried on with exact rigor, our commander
purposely displaying mildness with a cloak of tolerance, to those
who hid their numbers. The agreement regarding the tribute was
made, leaving to the supreme governor the decision of the amount and
kind. They were not to receive preachers, masters, or pundits of the
Mahometan religion; but were to receive preachers of the evangelical
law, and to erect churches for the ceremonies of the Christians and
the true worship. As surety for all the above, they gave as hostages
their brothers and children, who were to be sent to Manila.
8. In consequence of these treaties, holy baptism was administered by
the Recollect fathers (who were the only chaplains) to more than two
hundred persons. Their administration--together with that of other
old-time Christians, who had been made about the said lake through
the zeal of those religious--was taken charge of by the minister of
Bayug. Father Fray Agustin was of the opinion that a fort ought to
be constructed at a suitable site on that lake, in order to obviate
the easy danger of an insurrection from people so perfidious, and
that it should be well supplied with the necessities; but that,
if that was not done, the expedition was without any result. For,
as soon as the Spaniards retired, Corralat would immediately hasten
up to their relief, and stir up the Malanaos; and, as they were
defenseless and inclined to revolt, that would be obtained without
much resistance. It was most important [said the father] to have
there an established force and ministers. Such delay was not pleasing
to the Spaniards; and accordingly, as superior orders were lacking,
they excused themselves. Thereupon, the fleet resolved to retire,
taking with them seventeen Christian captives, and redeeming some
sacred ornaments. They took from the people their firearms--five versos
and thirty-seven arquebuses and muskets--thinking that by that means
peace was a settled thing.
9. Before leaving the lake, Captain Atienza sent a despatch to
General Almonte, who was commanding officer of all the conquest,
informing him of his successful enterprise. Almonte, in order to take
possession of the new jurisdiction, and to assure more completely
the submission of the natives, sent a troop of seventy Spaniards
and five hundred Visayans under charge of Sargento-mayor Don Pedro
Fernandez de el Rio, and, under the latter's orders, Captain Juan de
Heredia Hermastegui. That commandant crossed the lands of Corralat,
being opposed by the fierce nation of Butig, and forcing a passage
with his arms at the cost of many lives of the enemy. Captain
Atienza met him with his whole squadron, whereupon the Malanaos,
seeing so many Spaniards upon them, were even more intimidated;
they gave more security for their agreements, and the registration
proceeded more effectively. Father Pedro Gutierrez came with the
troop of Sargento-mayor Don Pedro; and he gave notice that that
conquest belonged to the Society, and that the Recollect fathers
had meddled in it. But the latter had been given sufficient title
for their introduction into that conquest by the inattention of
the Jesuits, besides the fact that for that same reason, they had
been given spiritual jurisdiction by the bishop of Zebu. If the
Jesuits were occupied in greater undertakings, they ought to have
abandoned those which they considered less profitable to the care
of those religious [i.e., the Recollects] who did not pay so much
attention to these considerations of advantage. The fact that such
territories were without ministers would influence the bishop of Zebu,
Don Fray Pedro de Arze; and he would give them rightly to those who
would occupy them, notwithstanding the great anxiety of the Society
for the absolute possession of Mindanao. That desire does not give
them the right, nor the fact that St. Francis Xavier had been in the
island--although this latter is not made sufficiently clear, for the
time when [he was there] does not appear from his voyages, nor does
the reason appear from his letters. The same reasons would lead the
royal Audiencia to give the possession when it was governing. Why,
if they were so importunate to govern the island and declared such
to be their right, did they not fill it with ministers? Now, indeed,
Father Gutierrez came forward, and asked the sargento-mayor for the
possession of the lake, and the latter gave it to him in the name
of his governor. Thereupon, the father having taken possession of
it, returned to Mindanao on the third day with the sargento-mayor,
who also went back to his general quarters. Captain Don Francisco
de Atienza fortified the village of Bayug with stockades, left his
adjutant to defend it, and retired to his province of Caraga.
10. Father Fray Agustin greatly regretted that the result of a so
fortunate expedition should be solely entrusted to the heathenism of
those barbarians, who upon seeing themselves free from subjection
to the presidio that was planned and proposed, would undoubtedly
reclaim their liberty; and would strongly arm themselves to defend
it, and the conquest would be more serious and difficult. He would be
no less influenced by the way in which he had been despoiled of that
administration by the hurried possession taken by Father Gutierrez,
who uselessly fatigued his Majesty's troops for this purpose. These
interests moved him to undertake a trip to Manila, accompanied by
several Malanao chiefs. They presented themselves to the governor,
and requested aid against the forces and approaches of Corralat,
saying that these could only be restrained by a well-garrisoned fort,
which could protect those who should submit and render obedience; but
that without this provision all things were in danger. The reports
of Captain Atienza, who desired to assure his glorious results,
confirmed these representations. The governor was delighted at
prostrating so hostile enemies, and did not delay in the provision
for all that looked toward such an end. He immediately agreed to the
establishment of the presidio, and determined to send troops for its
garrison and defense. The representations of the Jesuits prevented
that expedition, for they alleged that the spiritual administration
of Malanao belonged to them, as it was included in the territory
granted to them with sufficient formalities; that the introduction
of the Recollect fathers therein was an intrusion to be condemned;
that no right was conceded to the latter because Malanao, as well as
the villages of its immediate neighborhood, had been deserted by its
ministers, as they [i.e., the Jesuits] had been occupied in greater
undertakings; and that they would attend to it at present, as they
had a supply of ministers. A formal verbal process proceeded, and
the Jesuits obtained a favorable decision. Thereupon, the province
of San Nicolas was excluded from the lake, from Bayug, Layavan,
and Langaran. Consequently, father Fray Agustin betook himself
again to his mission of Butuan, and the chiefs his companions to the
lake--sad and furious at not having obtained the concession of those
fathers, for whom they had (and even to our times) preserved a great
affection and love. The last representation in which they begged the
same thing from the superior government was in the year one thousand
seven hundred and thirty; but it was not conceded to them, as it was
territory granted to the Society; and the latter always resisted such
a change, notwithstanding that the demarcation was very doubtful.
11. Corcuera determined, after the hostilities had been quieted, that
the infantry captain Don Pedro Bermudez de Castro should go with fifty
Spaniards and five hundred Indians from Bohol, to fortify the lake,
and preserve what had been gained; or to employ themselves in its
recovery, if it had suffered any disturbances. The governor gave the
captain the hostages who had been detained to assure confidence, after
having treated them kindly and given them presents, in order that the
surrender might be more voluntary. The Jesuit fathers went with that
contingent of troops, the superior being Father Diego Patiño, and his
associate Father Gregorio Belin. They accompanied Captain Vermudez to
the lake to make the fortification that had been determined, and the
permanent presidio wherever it should prove most suitable. They did not
find the lake so peaceful as Captain Atienza had left it. The natives
thought of nothing less than the subjection and the tribute paying of
vassalage; and as soon as they had recovered from the fright into which
that invasion had thrown them, then they overthrew all the crosses and
burned the small buildings that had served as churches. Their fury
was still more excited when the chiefs returned without the beloved
pledges of the hostages who had been given up; for, considering
these already dead or captive, they burned to avenge them. That fury
was somewhat assuaged when the new troop gave them their brothers
and children, who spread abroad the kindness of the governor. But
that was not sufficient to overcome the course of their mistrust;
they were somewhat appeased, but all was only pretense, in order to
conceal their hostile minds. They tried to quiet our suspicions,
and showed themselves repentant for what had happened. They aided
with their labor as far as necessary in the building of the fort,
but their falsity was soon apparent. Suddenly they suspended their aid
and failed in their intercourse as friends, and busied themselves in
the preparation of obstacles and injury [to our people]. Their former
decision had been rebuked by Corralat; and he, being an astute man,
told them that such submission was arrant nonsense, and he brought
forward cogent arguments, which excited their fears and distrust. He
told them that they did not know to what that surrender bound them, and
that it was nothing else than a toilsome slavery under the domination
of the Spaniards. He bid them look at the nations subjected to us,
and these would be seen to be reduced to extreme misery. Let them
contemplate the Tagálogs and the Visayans, whom any Spaniard whatever
could trample under foot; and if they were not of better stuff than
these, they must not expect better treatment. They would be obliged
to row, to toil at the shipbuilding, and on other public works, and
would only experience severe treatment in doing these. With these
commonplace arguments, and without reflecting on the tyrannical
dominion of Corralat, the latter reduced those unhappy creatures
to the last stage of desperation. He offered to give them his aid,
and to employ the strength of his kingdom in their defense--[saying
that] even if the Spaniards were successful, it meant only the loss
of harvests for one year, but that they would obtain their liberty at
that small cost. All found it advisable. Manindin, the petty king of
Butig, recognized that, if the Spaniards were masters of the lake,
his authority was in danger. Corralat, surrounded in all parts,
and pressed by our arms, beheld his greatness very much reduced to a
very few leguas of coast. It was important to him that the diverted
undertakings should have no effect in any part, so that time and
expenses should cause them to desist. Consequently, these chiefs
so stirred up those of the lake that they agreed to resist with all
their power.
12. They carried their agreement into execution, and attacked the fort
with so great fury that they imagined that they were going to defeat
the Spaniards completely. They besieged the fort with all the severity
of war. They made their circumvallation, which they set with stakes and
ravelins at intervals, for the defense of their precincts. The fort
was then half-finished, and the captain rallied as well as he could
to its defense. He met the necessity as a prudent and valiant man,
so that he obliged the natives to try other artifices. They built
upon the lake some high towers on rafts, which they moored with a
rattan cable, which held an anchor that was fastened to the ground,
which they were able to do easily under cover of the night. They had
another cable, arranged similarly, across the lake. With the first
one, without any possibility of their being discovered, they hauled
or pulled until they reached the proper position, whence they could
discharge their firearms with effect. That being done, they retired
beyond the range of the fort to load their pieces, and then returned
to the combat with the same industry. The operation of bomb-vessels
in the bombardment of any city or castle is no different. It is an
ingenious invention, but not without great risk. Although truly those
small castles built upon the rafts were very ingenious, they could
not be of great resistance. Neither can we persuade ourselves that our
artillery would remain quiet; and even if it did, the Moro scheme was
very imperfect, because they accomplished nothing by such artifice. The
captain and his men resisted valiantly, and unceasingly. But they
were afflicted by another most invincible enemy, namely, the lack
of provisions. If the Malanaos were to continue in their obstinacy,
they would at last conquer the Spaniards through hunger. However,
the continual fatigue by day and night was not inconsiderable, and
must necessarily at the last sap their forces, and even first finish
them all; for the bombardment was killing some of them.
13. Such reflections forced the Spaniards to have recourse to other
avenues. They sent a despatch to Caraga to the alcalde-mayor, and
another to Butuan to father Fray Agustin, asking them to aid them in
that conflict without delay. The more significant despatch was that
from Father Belin to the father at Butuan. In it he declared that
it was impossible to endure, and that those at that lake would all
perish. He begged the father for God's sake, for whom he had sacrificed
himself to reduce and conquer it, to aid them with the greatest force
of that district; for their remedy consisted in his Reverence. He said
that the enemy had captured three boats from them, and, all the roads
to the beach being cut off, it was impossible to get help in. One who
attempted to bring help had been cut off by so great a force of Butig
and of the men of Corralat, in an ambush of more than four thousand
Moros, who threw the rearguard and the vanguard into disorder; and
that the father himself had gone out when they heard the shots, with
men to protect the convoy. With his aid the Moros were put to flight
after having killed some Spaniards and men of Bojol. By that means
they succeeded in getting some loads of rice into the fort, enough
to supply them for a month if they only had one meal per day. But so
great a multitude of Moros were coming to take part in the blockade
that, if he did [not] succor them, it was impossible for them not to
perish. "Father," said he, "let your Reverence forget your grievances;
and I give you my word, on my profession [i.e., as a priest], to
so influence the governor and my order that your Reverence and your
holy associates will obtain what you have so labored for. Consider
the honor of the king of España, the obligations with which you were
born, and the charity which obliges you on this occasion to come
to the succor of this troop, unfortunate in not having merited your
Reverence's company. Without it, surely, Captain Don Francisco would
not have had the good fortune that he had and obtained, although he
opposed leaving a presidio here. Father, there is danger in delay. I
petition your Reverence, for the love of God and that of His Mother,
and I hope for a great aid from all, etc. March nine, one thousand
six hundred and forty. Your Reverence's servant,
Gregorio Belin"
14. This despatch reached Butuan at a time when the alcalde-mayor,
Atienza, was there. Each one received his letter. Attentive to the
urgency of the danger, they arranged a speedy relief expedition. The
"Padre Capitan," Fray Agustin, and the alcalde-mayor set out in that
expedition with what men they could gather on the spur of the moment,
marching across mountains and conquering innumerable difficulties,
at the cost of immense hardships. Finally, they reached their
destination, making a jest of the passes filled with the enemy when
they came within sight of the besieged presidio. The fort was so beset
that its occupants no longer had any hopes of relief; for the Moros,
seeing their inventions of the rafts frustrated, arranged on land some
strong carts mounted on four wheels, which they filled with straw and
dry grass. They pushed these carts near the fort, and setting fire to
that combustible material, continued their bombarding under cover of
that heavy smoke. That would have proved so offensive to the besieged,
and much worse had the fire caught the fort, that they would have
been obliged to burn or surrender. But before those contrivances were
finished, the universal hunger which was weakening their stomachs was
proving more cruel than they; for the magazines contained only wine
for the masses, and hosts. They determined to take the last communion,
and to give up their lives to such ravage, on the twenty-ninth day
of so desperate a siege. The sight of the two captains rejoiced the
fort. They undertook to break up the siege. Arranging their troops in
order and drawing them up in military array, they attacked sword in
hand, and with so great valor and spirit that they caused the position
to be evacuated in less than two hours, and freed that presidio,
which was well near its ruin, from all the enemy.
15. Once masters of themselves, the Spaniards discussed a bloody
vengeance. They fitted up a boat, together with the other one that
they had captured. Then sailing out on the lake, they were joined by
some large boats, so that they formed a considerable squadron, with
which they attacked the settlements. Those settlements were deserted,
because all had taken to the mountains, after ruining their houses
and destroying their fields. It was a warning, to all, of the little
advance that the war made when they thus yielded the field to the
soldiers. Captain Vermudez, having been despatched, finished burning
and destroying the little that had remained. In order not to expose the
troops to another and more severe siege, he considered that expense
and fatigue as a useless thing, and determined to retreat, and with
those arms and stores to fortify Bayug. He left the arrangement of it
to the skill of father Fray Agustin, who so conducted the retreat in
the marches of the men and in the transportation of the artillery,
that he did not lose a single man, although there were ambushes and
dangerous passes. For so brilliant a feat, Father Belin and Captains
Atienza and Vermudez compared him in their letters to the heroes most
renowned in valor and military skill, so much did they accredit his
conduct. Had it not been a scheme of the Jesuits, these achievements
would have led to his remaining with Captain Vermudez; and the fort
would have been completed, and his fame alone would have subdued these
Moros. But the Jesuits caused such troubles that the well-planned
and extensive arrangements of the superior government were of none
effect. Therefore he descended to the seashore with all the men,
and they erected a fort upon the bar of the river of Iligan. The men
of the garrison were left in charge of Adjutant Francisco Alfaro,
a man of valor and experience, who was accustomed to fighting with
the Moros. Captain Vermudez returned to Manila to make a full report
of occurrences to the governor, and the necessity of the final
decision. The matter rested at this point for the time being.
NEWS FROM FILIPINAS, 1640-42
A true account by the discalced religious of the convent of
St. Francis of Filipinas, to be sent to the reverend fathers
and superiors of the order; containing in substance all that
happened in those parts and in Japon from the month of June, 1640
to the twenty-sixth of July in 1641. Notable miracles; glorious
martyrdoms; discoveries of new provinces, rich and fertile;
likewise news from the governor of Terrenate, and other matters.
The Japanese have expelled from their kingdom all the Portuguese
of Macan who were there trading, notifying them that they were not
to return, under pain of death and loss of property. It seemed to
the Portuguese of Macan that Japon would change its decree if they
carried assurance from Filipinas that no religious would be sent to
Japon. With this embassy prominent persons came to Manila, in the name
of the city of Macan, to whom the archbishop, the governor, and all
the authorities and religious orders conceded, if not all that was
asked, at least what seemed to them sufficient for the purpose. This
probably would have been satisfactory, had the disposition of the
people of Macan been consistent; but while the question of what ought
to be done was still being debated in Manila, they, without waiting
for the final decision, departed for Japon (so the fullest account
says). Upon arriving in that country, the Japanese inflicted death,
which is regarded as that of martyrs, upon sixty or more persons who
sailed the ship of the embassy, burning them and the goods that they
carried. Thirteen or fourteen persons of the most ordinary class were
spared, that they might carry the news to Macan. Thus was closed the
traffic which that city had with Japon, which kept Macan alive and
to which it owed its existence.
In the year 41 on the fourth of January, at nine o'clock in the
morning, in all parts of these islands, the noise in the air of
musketry, artillery, and war drums was very distinctly and clearly
heard; and in whatever town or place it was heard, it seemed to be
about half a legua distant. This has given much cause for reflection,
because, although they say there has been a loud noise from a
volcano which was in a state of eruption in the kingdom of Mindanao,
[23] that does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation. Since
the various parts of the islands are so distant and separated, and
the wind must necessarily carry the sound to some parts, and drive
it away from others, it does not seem possible for the sound to be
alike everywhere. Among the common people it is considered a prodigy,
and causes not a little dread--especially on account of the Sangley
still being exasperated at the deaths and punishment of his people
in the insurrection of last year; and because the said Sangleys have
made friends with the Dutch, who are powerful in these parts by the
seizure of Malaca. [24]
During the month of May of this year, news arrived from reliable source
that the said city of Malaca had been taken--some say through famine
[of the besieged]; while others say it would not have been taken had
there not been traitors within the city, who delivered it up. This
was a great loss; and in writing of it the governor of Terrenate,
Don Francisco Suarez de Figueroa says:
Paragraph from the letter of the governor of Terrenate
"The latest news is that the enemy, the Dutch, have conquered Malaca
with twenty-five ships, with which they surrounded it. Some slanderers
say that the enemy could not have taken it had there not been traitors
within who delivered it up--and I understand that it was known who
they were, through letters by certain persons from Macazar who went to
that city. This is the greatest loss that has been suffered in these
parts. It is also said that by August next twenty-five ships will
come here, and that they are to go to Manila; of this I am notifying
the governor, that he may exercise vigilance. It is very necessary to
strengthen the defenses of the fort at Hilohilo, and to garrison it
with a hundred men, as it is there that the enemy goes first before
sailing to Manila." Thus writes the Governor of Terrenate.
Paragraph from the letter of father Fray Antonio de Santa Maria
In regard to the fears that were prevalent, Father Antonio de Santa
Maria, lecturer in theology and a trustworthy religious, wrote from
Macan the following paragraph:
"During the month of August last it was said in M [blank space in
original; probably "Macao that a"] grand mandarin of war, Yguan
by name, intended to go to Manila to avenge the deaths of his
countrymen. He was a notable pirate, but is now said to be a friend
of the Dutch, though he formerly gave battle to them and sometimes
burned their ships. He has with him a number of negroes, fugitives
from Macan, who understand very well the management of firearms. It
would not be a mistake to be on the lookout for them, and be supplied
with provisions and munition, because the Dutch are very arrogant. In
China they have lost their fear of the Spaniards; and Filipinas, when
I left there, were without men or vessels. Thus it would be seen that
this colony is actively threatened from all parts and has great reason
for fear. With the insurrection and war of the Sangleys, and with the
previous wars in Mindanao and Joló, the largest and best part of the
troops were destroyed; and those who were left are occupied in many
garrisons." Here ends the quotation from the letter of Fray Antonio.
The three Dutch ships which, the governor of Terrenate wrote, had
started for these islands about the eighth of April, arrived at
the Embocadero and cape of Espiritu Santo on the twenty-seventh of
said month; and thus far we know not whether they have set out from
there. On the other hand, daily advices come of the great vigilance
with which they scour those waters in various parts, in order to
seize the ships that are going or coming from Nueva España--for
which purpose they have a patache which goes ten leguas to sea in
the direction of the parallel of eleven and one-half degrees, which
is the route by which the ships [from Nueva España] must come. They
also have others, five or six lanchas or small boats, with which they
run from place to place in order to give warning to the galleons that
are in port. While this colony was in the distress that this emergency
must cause, our Lord was pleased to bring the ship from Nueva España
this year, miraculously, from among its enemies without their seeing
it. It made port outside the Embocadero, at a place called Borongan,
on the second of July this year; and on the nineteenth of the said
month a Spaniard arrived in this city with a letter from a father
of the Society, in which he announced that the ship had arrived that
day. He said that it came with Don N. Pacheco as commander and that the
commander who went from here had died; and that many of our religious
were coming, and others of St. Augustine. Thus and thus writes the
said father of the Society, because another had written it to him;
it is now one week that we have been waiting for the packets and
advices, and today, the twenty-sixth of July, we have no news of
a soul that had been aboard the ship, nor even a letter from that
place. Our perplexity begins anew, and some even doubt whether the
ship has reached land. If it has arrived, God brings this city help,
which will be a great defense for the future. And if on account of
our sins it may not arrive, little hope is entertained for aid if the
enemy come; and much more is he to be feared should he ally himself
with the Sangleys. May God prevent this, as He can.
Another paragraph from the letter of father Fray Antonio de Santa Maria
"They say also that the following prodigies have occurred in the
kingdom of China. In Pequin, where the court is, they say there was
a dense darkness for the space of three days; cinders rained in other
parts. The earth gushed forth blood, and a quantity of it was caught
in vases. A bell in one of their temples rang of its own accord;
and the rocks, when struck with blows, sounded like the beat of
drums. Two or three towns, not many days' journey from Macan, were
swallowed up by the earth with their people and buildings. And even
now in another town, not far from there, they say that serpents are
coming out of the sea--very large and hideous, with horns--and with
their assault they overthrow the buildings and houses, and slay the
people; and that returning to the water they again come out, make a
capture, and immediately return to the sea."
Besides the above-mentioned news from Japon concerning our religious,
the said father Fray Antonio, while drawing up authentic information
on behalf of our order, writes in his letter the following paragraph:
"In the year 1637, they also say, there were in Japon some three or
four religious of the Order of St. Francis who traveled through that
country to the remotest regions of the kingdom on the far north,
to a province of the said kingdom of Japan called Canga. [25] It
is said that the emperor commanded that the tono, or petty king,
of that province be notified that he should be most vigilant and
careful that no Christian whatever should enter his lands; and that
he responded to the emperor that quiet reigned in his territory, and
that there was no necessity to treat his vassals harshly. This petty
king, they say, is an uncle or relative of the true king of Japon,
who has disappeared. [26] This I saw in one of the relations written
by the Portuguese there in Japon."
I have just completed the official statements regarding our martyrs,
and have finished transcribing them; two copies of them I send now,
the other I will carry or send to your Lordship. The martyrs of whom
this report is made are: Fray Luys Gomez, Fray Gabriel, Fray Juan
Torrilla, Fray Gines de Quesada, and Fray Geronimo de la Cruz--who
is that Japanese priest who, when I came from Spain, was in that
church of the Japanese (in our war of Dilao [27]) at the side of,
or a little behind the well. The holy Fray Luys Gomez is one of those
who in former years were summoned by the emperor in order to question
them about our holy faith; he was eighty-four years of age and had
spent forty in Japon. He died hanged in a cave, head down, with two
Japanese helpers [dogicos], in company with Father Sebastian Viera,
and four other native helpers of theirs. In the official account
which the Society drew up about their father, our Fray Luys is also
included. The holy Fray Gabriel de la Madalena, or Fonseca, after
having suffered the torture of hot water was burned alive, in company
with Fray Geronimo, a Japanese, in the little cottage of the latter,
on the third of September, 1632; Fray Luis, on the sixth of June,
1634. Marvelous things, enough to fill a large book are related of Fray
Gabriel. It is common knowledge that when he prayed he was many times
raised above the ground, and that he often disappeared for a time from
the eyes of those present. From various small herbs that he gathered
he made medicines, with which he wrought miraculous cures. While he
was being burned, they say, he rose in the air two cubits [codos],
and while praying in the mountains this was an ordinary occurrence.
Besides the conversions in China and Japon, the Lord has revealed,
through the medium of his servants the sons of our father Saint
Francis, another and by no means small multitude of people who
desire with all sincerity to receive holy baptism, and to attain
the knowledge of the truth--regarding whom the governor of Terrenate
already mentioned says, in the following paragraph taken from one of
his letters:
Paragraph from the letter of the governor of Terrenate
"Father Fray Juan Iranço, [28] who is in Manados, [29] states,
in a letter which he has written to me, that there have been
discovered more than fifty villages, large and small; that the
people are numerous, for, counting men, women, and children, they
number more than fifteen thousand. In this estimate he falls short,
for the Spaniards who are there have told me that there are more
than a hundred thousand souls, who desire to be Christians. In this
connection I wrote to the governor last year, but his Lordship did
not answer me in regard to this, nor about many things which I have
written concerning the government. Reverend Father, for the love of
God, agitate this with the governor, and send religious. The soil is
fertile, the people are extremely industrious, of stout build, and
white. Rice and other grains abound. I am now sending a champan with
twelve Spaniards, and a religious of the order to accompany and aid
Father Juan Iranço. The latter sent thirteen or fourteen Indian chiefs
of Manados, in order that they might return to him as Christians; they
were baptized in this convent of San Antonio, and are now returning
in this champan. They made a great feast on the day when they were
baptized, dressing themselves with their shirts arranged after the
Spanish fashion. All this, and the conversion of Manados and Tabuca,
have been very fully described by father Fray Francisco Chavarria
and the other religious who are here and in Manados and Tacuba,
to whom I refer as being religious of exemplary life."
This is a summary of the information from here, concerning the
conversions as well as the state of these islands. May God our Lord
dispose all things as best pleases Him, for His greater glory and
for the good of all Christianity.
(Transcribed from the original letter in Ciudad de los Angeles [i.e.,
Puebla de los Angeles, in Mexico].)
All this country has been afflicted, not only by the great drouth
that prevails--for there has been no rain for eight months, which
occasions excessive heat; and the rice, the usual food in this
country, cannot be sown, and a great famine is feared--but because
four Dutch ships are in the passage through which comes the succor
from Mexico, the soldiers, silver, and other supplies; and as news
[of the galleon] did not come, some misfortune was feared. But on the
thirteenth of July God was pleased that it should make port in safety,
leaving the Dutchmen hoaxed; it did not arrive at the port of Cavite,
but at another, at a distance of three days' journey by land, and it
could not reach Cavite until September. With the ship came the news
of the revolutions in Portugal and Cataluña, a very unfortunate and
dangerous affair. The Portuguese who were here from Macan went to
the governor, and on the part of that city rendered anew obedience
to King Filipo Fourth (whom may God preserve). They declared that in
no event would they accept the Portuguese revolt, and that, in case
India joined the said rebellion, they would always desire to remain
under the protection of Castilla; and documents to this effect were
drawn up in due form. May God be pleased to quiet those great tumults,
and give peace to Christian people!
The usual enemy from Mindanao, Burney, Jolo, and Camucon, did not
inflict any damage on the islands this year, because they did not
sally out in force; but much trouble is feared for the coming year,
on which account negotiations for peace are being conducted with
the Mindanaos. For, although we have four forts in that island,
it is so large that its people go out to plunder without our being
able to stop them entirely. Joló is now at peace, for which much aid
was rendered by Father Francisco Colin, provincial of the Society,
who went to visit those islands; but I do not know whether the peace
will last. The Christian villages of Mindanao and Jolo are very
gradually being brought to a peaceable condition; and as those people
are devoted Moors [i.e., Mahometans], the gospel makes little headway
among them. Nevertheless, there are some conversions all the time; and
at least the children will be good Christians. [Here follow reports
of the news from the other countries named in the title.] This is a
summary of the matters of which I have present information. Manila,
July 25, 1642. [30]
DECREE REGARDING THE INDIANS
The King. To Don Sevastian Hurtado de Corcuera, knight of the Order of
Alcantara, my governor and captain-general of the Filipinas Islands,
and president of my royal Audiencia therein: I commanded the issue
of a decree of the following tenor:
"The King. To Don Sevastian Hurtado de Corcuera [here follow his titles
as above], or to the person or persons in whose charge the government
may be: it has been noticed in my royal Council of the Yndias that
the Indian natives of the province of Pampanga, those of Camarines,
and the Tagálogs have rendered service, and still do so, with much
affection and loyalty, ever since they were first conquered, without
any of them having rebelled; that they serve in war together with
the Spaniards, with extraordinary vigilance; and that they likewise
serve in that city [i.e., Manila] as oarsmen and pioneers, on all
occasions when armed fleets are equipped, with both their persons and
their property--especially the Pampangos and the Tagálogs. And because
it is just that they should know how much I value their fidelity and
watchfulness, I have thought best to ordain and command to you (as I
do) that, since these things are so, you shall be especially mindful
of the said Indians of the three provinces above mentioned, and give
them much encouragement, for this purpose summoning their chief men--in
order that they may always continue to serve me with the same zeal,
fidelity, and affection as they have hitherto displayed. Dated at
Madrid on the fifteenth of July in the year one thousand six hundred
and thirty-six.
I the King
By command of the king our sovereign: Don Gabriel de Ocaña y Alarcon"
And now on the part of Don Juan Grau y Monfalcon, permanent
procurator-general for that city of Manila, he has reminded me that
by the decree here inserted I commanded that you should summon the
headmen of the Indian natives of those islands, and in my royal name
thank them for the willingness with which they have always aided my
royal service, as is more fully set forth in the said decree; and
that more than ten thousand of them served me on the occasion of the
Sangley insurrection, with much valor and good-will, seconding the
citizens of that city. He declares that they deserve that I should
reward them, in order to encourage them to continue their service
when occasion shall offer; and entreats that I will be pleased to
command the issue of a decree giving them much praise, since it is
very desirable to give them prompt encouragement, that they may also
serve and conduct themselves with so great loyalty and faithfulness in
other so pressing emergencies. He asks that you will relieve them,
and exempt them from some of the many burdens that they carry;
for thus they will be encouraged to render me service. The matter
having been discussed in my royal Council of the Yndias, considering
how just it is to honor, favor, and reward them, in order that they
may render greater and more willing obedience to all that shall be
ordered to them for my service, I command that you immediately summon
the headmen of the Indians, and make known to them in my behalf the
esteem that I have for them personally for the courage, affection, and
good-will with which they have rendered assistance when emergencies
have arisen, and especially in the Sangley insurrection, by which
I consider myself well served. You shall give them thanks for this,
and favor and reward them in all possible ways, endeavoring to secure
their relief, convenience, and comfort. Such is my will; and I shall
especially appreciate all that you shall accomplish for their relief
and honor. Dated at Çaragoça, on the twenty-fourth of October in the
year one thousand six hundred and forty-two.
I the King
By command of the king our sovereign: Don Gabriel de Ocaña y Alarcon
Signed by the Council.
FORMOSA LOST TO SPAIN
Brief relation of the loss of the island of Hermosa; of the
strength and puissance which the Dutch enemy now has in those
parts of Yndia; and of his designs and intentions after having
made peace with the Portuguese, and having therefore ceased to
wage war against them in those regions of Yndia.
It is well known that it is the great desire of the Dutch enemy, which
he has always had, to make himself master of Yndia and its riches,
in order with these to continue and push forward his revolt [against
Spain], and to encourage attacks against the armies of the king our
sovereign--who so justly wages war against the Dutch, in order to
bring down their arrogance and destroy their wild heresies. These
desires have been very evident, since they have set themselves to
the task, and--God permitting this for our sins--have already seized
much territory in Yndia; and hardly is there a coast in that country
where they have not settled and fortified themselves, enjoying its
riches. In especial, they have now, in recent years, seized the city
of Malaca, a port and passage that is necessary and very useful for
going from Yndia to Great China and Japon; and in Ceilan [i.e., Ceylon]
they captured a stronghold called Punta de Gali, and, near the bar of
Goa, a carrack (a large galleon) which was coming from the kingdom of
Portugal, despatched after the insurrection. Besides this, they seized
near the same bar a patache which was coming from Macao with ivory,
and two hundred cates of gold, and other rich goods; and now they
actually occupy a post near Goa, and are expecting to make themselves
masters of all Yndia (unless our Lord shall intercept their designs),
by means of this unstable peace which they have now made with the
Portuguese. It is very plain that such is the case; for when the order
came from Holanda to the Dutch to establish peace with the Portuguese,
the former replied to the captain-general and those of his council to
the Prince of Orange, and to the Company, saying that peace was not
expedient for them in Yndia, because affairs were in such condition
that they were confident that Yndia could be conquered within four
years. Thereupon, reply was sent to them that, notwithstanding this
argument, they should negotiate the said peace, because that was
expedient at this time for the liberty of their native land--since,
the king of España having his attention thus diverted in Portugal,
the Dutch could find therein the opportunity to set their country free.
And not only has this their insatiable and lawless desire extended
to making themselves masters of Yndia, as has been already stated,
but they are eager to gain possession of what belongs to the crown of
Castilla--the city of Manila, Terrenate, Hermosa Island, and other
places--in order that thus they may remain alone and more free to
enjoy the produce and benefit of all the islands and kingdoms of those
regions. The truth of this is made evident by their frequently coming
to Manila with many galleons--twenty-two, twenty-four, or twenty-five;
but they did not succeed very well there. On that account, and because
they recognized that our strength was considerable, and since they were
occupied in Yndia against the Portuguese, they withdrew for several
years, and returned no more to Manila until now. At present they have
become fat on the labor of others, and are disengaged in Yndia; and,
knowing well that Manila has not much strength, they intend to wage a
very grievous war, carrying it on by weakening our forces, in order
thus more safely to make themselves masters of the city and possess
its wealth--which, they say with much glee, is very great. With this
object, they have come to the Embocadero, during the last two years
of 41 and 42, to await the ships which come from Nueva España. In this
year of 43 they were going again to the same place, with more ships and
forces, and with much caution; but, if they are not able to capture
the galleons, they will try to burn them with their own old ships,
which they take with them for this purpose. Moreover, this year they
are going to try to intercept the succor to Terrenate; and last year
they seized the island of Hermosa with a strong force, almost all
[the posts] at one time. This was something almost incredible to
those who have seen their strength and power in recent times; and
it was all done with the object of afterward attacking Manila with
the aid of the Sangleys--with whom, as I was told by a trustworthy
person in Jacatra, the Dutch had secret negotiations for an assault
on Manila. This is so certain that afterward, while I was in the
kingdom of Malaca, visiting the king, a letter came to him from the
Dutch. It was written in the Portuguese language, and he caused it
to be read in my presence and that of some Castilians and Portuguese
who were there. After complaining of the king because he had aided
the people of Amboino, the Dutch said in this letter that they had
already taken the island of Hermosa from the Castilians; and that in
a short time they would drive the latter from Maluco and the Manilas
([their name] for the Filipinas Islands).
Commencing, then, our relation, and first as regards the loss of
Hermosa Island, I say that it was and is a certain and notorious
fact that the Dutch enemy, carried away by his evil desire and
damnable intentions (as at the beginning has been stated), attacked
Hermosa Island about September in the past year of 1641; [31] and,
not being able to capture it, since God had blinded and hindered
him, remained more obstinate and hardened in his first object and
pretension. Accordingly, he desisted only until the following year,
1642, and about August he returned with a stronger force--so large a
one that with it he could overcome ours; and so he seized the island,
and made himself master of it, which occurred thus.
Having obtained a foothold, the said Dutch enemy spent part of
April and almost all of May in that year, with two champans and a
round sailing vessel called "filipote" [i.e., flyboat], near the
headland which they call Punta del Diablo, in sight of our forts,
[32] awaiting the succor which about that time was to come from
Manila. They retired to the river of Tan-Chuy, with a prize which
they made there, a small champan from China, which came from that
kingdom to Hermosa Island to carry supplies and merchandise; in it was
traveling a religious of St. Dominic, in the garb of a Sangley. With
this prize, and for another reason, that a sharp north wind suddenly
arose, they retired, as I have said, to Tan-Chuy. Just at this time
came the succor which the governor of Manila was sending; this ship,
arriving at the cape called Santa Catalina, received news that the
enemy was expecting it. On this account, our people took refuge in
the port of San Lorenzo, as they carried orders from Manila to do so,
in case they encountered enemies. They remained there seven or eight
days, until, having received information from the island that the
enemy had gone away, they left that port, and pursuing their voyage,
entered our harbor and fort.
Afterward (but not until the thirteenth of the month of August), one
afternoon at nightfall there arrived at our port a little champan,
so small that it made the Spaniards wonder at it when they saw it
approach. This vessel came, despatched in all haste, from the island
that they call Isla de Pescadores, which is twelve leguas from the
Dutch fort. In that island is an excellent harbor, in which the great
galleons of the Dutch anchor, because they cannot make an entrance
at their forts on account of the shallow water there. The little
champan came for the sole purpose of warning an infidel Sangley named
Gui-nu--who was captain of a champan that had arrived not long before
from Manila, to get wheat and cloth to carry to that city--that
the Dutch were ready to attack Hermosa Island within four or five
days. For this they had five ships, with five hundred Dutchmen,
and large supplies of provisions, besides other ships which had not
yet arrived; accordingly, word was sent to Gui-nu to leave our port
at once. He who wrote and sent the despatch, who was a friend of
the said Sangley, told him further to go away at all events, since
the enemy was coming, not as in the previous year, but with a much
greater force; and therefore it seemed to the writer that the Dutch
would seize the island without fail.
With news so reliable as this, and with the information obtained from
the Indians, the governor was persuaded of its truth, and that the
enemy was returning with the strength and force that was stated;
besides, he had heard of it in letters from Manila. Accordingly
he immediately took measures to put himself in as good a state of
defense as possible. As he was warned by Indians from the river of
Tan-Chuy that this year the enemy would come from the east side,
where there is a low sand-bank which extends from the sea to the
harbor, and on it is a fort or small tower, not very strong, he
ordered two pieces of artillery to be placed on an eminence which
commands the said tower. While they were finishing this fortification,
on the nineteenth of the month of August, the armada of the enemy
appeared in sight. This was composed of four large ships, a patache,
a large champan, and a flyboat; and besides all these vessels there
were four other ships which had not arrived. Each vessel trailed two
faluas astern, besides other and smaller boats which they carried
for landing their men. On that day when the enemy appeared, about
twelve or one o'clock, they stood inshore with the largest ship and
the patache, making for the eminence to which our men had retired;
but they tried to protect themselves from our artillery behind a
small hill that stood there, in order thus to land their men more
easily and safely. But as they could not shelter themselves as fully
as they wished, on account of the currents which drove the ships
beyond the hill, the artillery of our stronghold (the commander of
which was Don Martin de Arechaga) compelled the enemy to retire to the
sea--the chief pilot of their ship and other men having been killed,
as the Dutch afterward told us. The ship being pierced with three or
four cannon-balls, they retreated; on seeing this, the governor sent
what men he could spare to the lookout station.
That night the enemy remained at anchor in the place to which they
had retreated, until the morning of the next day. Then, having held
a council, they set sail, and all five of their sailing-vessels
directed their course toward the low sand-bank I have mentioned,
which is at the eastern side of the island, in order to attempt a
landing there, as we had already been informed. But the flagship,
on approaching and reconnoitering the narrow entrance, saw that it
had a new defense and guard in the tower below. The commander of this
tower, who was Alférez Diego Felipe, commanded that a cannon-shot be
fired; the enemy, seeing by this that they were recognized and their
designs forestalled, and that now they could not gain any advantage
there, turned the flagship back toward the sea, where the rest of the
ships were waiting for it. Having reached their station, the Dutch
commander called another council of the leaders and captains; the
upshot of this was, that, considering that their antagonists there
were already on the defensive, they should make an attack at once,
come what might, as they knew very well, through the Sangleys, how
many men we had. For even if they lost many of their own men they
were not in absolute need of so many [as they had], and they might
kill our men with but little loss; and, the lookout once gained,
all would be theirs, for they would have such an advantage over us
that they could always injure us, without our being able to harm them.
Their consultation being concluded about one o'clock, they forthwith
proceeded to take men with the faluas from two of the ships, which
remained with a few men, and with the champan and the flyboat, to
guard the entrances to the harbor; and the three other ships, with many
small boats which they carried for this purpose, approached near the
land, behind the shelter of the hill, where they would be entirely
out of the range of the artillery in our stronghold. Having cast
anchor there, they proceeded to send ashore their soldiers with the
faluas and small boats, landing them at the edge of the sea, because
they feared some of our musketeers who were on land. On this account,
having embarked the men [in the boats], they rowed rapidly toward the
shore, and meanwhile kept the field clear, from the ships, with their
artillery and musketry, while their trumpets sounded the attack. Thus
they came to land, where our men awaited them--twelve of our Spanish
soldiers, eight Pampangos, and thirty or forty Indian natives [i.e.,
of Formosa] who were bowmen. The governor had resolved to send this
number of men into the field, and no more, for he suspected that the
enemy would attempt to land more troops in another place. Our men made
a brave stand, and went down to the shore, and killed many of the
enemy as they landed, on account of the latter coming, as they did,
so crowded together in their boats. Thus our men fired their guns
at a crowd, and some used three balls at one shot; and the Indian
bowmen, who were very skilful, also inflicted much damage on the
Dutch, all the more as they came boldly on. They followed out their
design until they landed their men; and then, as they were numerous
and our men few, they steadily gained the upper hand and wounded
some of our soldiers. Thereupon the latter began to retreat slowly,
three of their men being seriously wounded--one of whom remained on
the field, where he soon died; the two others made their way as best
they could to the fort, where one died and the other recovered.
Thus the enemy proceeded to ascend the slope until they succeeded
in obtaining possession of the lookout and the height, where they
immediately stationed more than three hundred white men; this gave
opportunity for the rest of their men, five hundred more, to disembark
and come to land. Then they set up their tents, in a place where they
could store much food, and immediately sent ashore all their supplies,
on the side from which it could not be seen from our forts. Afterward
they also sent ashore much artillery and a mortar; of these pieces
they carried two to the lookout station--cannons of eight and ten
pound balls--and with other small pieces with which they bombarded us,
not only in the stronghold, but in the great fort below. Their balls
reached everything, on all sides, and everything was visible and
uncovered from the lookout station; this was very evident, since a
cannon-ball [struck] the parapet of the fosse belonging to the great
fort, and passed on, carrying away a stone from the cavalier of San
Sebastian in the same fort.
Affairs being now in the said condition, we continued to make ready
our retirade, [33] and were expecting that the enemy would begin
with baskets [i.e., filled with earth] or would be fortified in
some other manner in order to make an assault; but this did not
occur, as they made no fort at the lookout, which would rise above
the land about. However, on the side next the sea they made on the
mountain a large esplanade, from which they fired the cannons; and,
this done, they opened in the mountain itself two mouths, as it were,
in the shape of trenches, through which they brought the cannons to
bear, and bombarded us openly, while from our retirade we could not
discover their men or more than barely see the mouths of the cannon
in their artillery.
After this manner the war lasted five days, until the day of the
glorious apostle St. Bartholomew, the twenty-fourth of August, when
they bombarded and overthrew the wall of our retirade--which we had
finished building, but it was not finished inside, nor did it contain
any lodgings. As the Dutchmen afterward said, they fired that day,
with the two cannon and from the fleet, one hundred and eight times;
it was so arranged that while the cannon were being loaded there
was no cessation of firing from all the musketry--which they had
stationed at the top of the lookout, in files, directing the men to
shelter themselves behind the hill, and to load their muskets while
the artillery was at work. This they did so incessantly that it
seemed to be the Judgment Day; and they gave no respite to our men,
who were few in number and worn out with fatigue.
The wall being now thrown down, and many men being slain--among
them Alférez Juan de Valdes, a very valiant soldier--and many others
wounded, and the rest of the troops being exhausted with the incessant
fighting for five days and nights, and a palisade which we occupied
having been broken into with iron bars: the enemy formed four troops
for assaulting the retirade. This they did, and entered without
ladders, since the walls were thrown down, as I said. This being
perceived from above by our men, some of these, of the baser sort,
fled through the gate; while others leaped over the wall, on the
side next our fort, which they succeeded in reaching. Others who were
above with Captain Valentin de Arechaga, fighting with the enemies,
and, as they say, retreating, drove the enemy back on their haunches;
and thence they retreated to the fort below. Two others, Spanish boys,
hid themselves--one in the powder-house, the other in a water-tank;
the enemy slew the former, thinking that he intended to set fire to
the powder, and the other they took captive.
Being now masters of the retirade, they trained a cannon from it (for
they had no other left), mounted, against our men; and at the same
time they sent a white flag with one of their men, demanding that,
since they now held all the place as their own, we should surrender,
since there was still opportunity to escape with our lives. He said
that if we did not yield there would be no advantage for us in doing
so, and there would be nothing to expect but death. The governor
received this envoy, for he saw that what they said was true, and that
we had no hope or refuge in the world, nor could even hope to delay the
catastrophe; and he considered that by not accepting their proposal he
was exposing to death more than four hundred innocent souls--children,
women, servants, roadmakers, and soldiers--and that the soldiers did
not amount to forty effective men. He saw that there was no hope of
doing more than to die for the sake of dying; but if relief could be
hoped for by any means, or he could see any indication that they could
resist the enemy, he and his men were all determined to die rather
than yield up anything of their rights. But he concluded that they
were able to resist no longer, as I have said; and considered that
any one who understood the occasion well, and who knew the opportunity
and advantage and superior strength that the enemy had, and what our
men had done in every way, would not rashly condemn his course. For
in order to form a proper judgment of anything, to see it and be on
the spot is very different from hearing it afar, and, as they say,
talking from behind the palings. The governor replied to him who
came to offer this settlement that he would consult his officers
as to what ought to be done and what should seem most expedient;
and that afterward he would return answer in accordance with such
decision. Thereupon the bearer of the white flag went away, and the
governor placed the matter before his followers and the religious
who were there. It seemed to all that, considering that the enemy
had now demolished and gained the retirade and the eminence, which
was the mainstay and guard of the fort below, and that now without
any doubt the fort was practically in their possession--[which they
could accomplish] without the loss of a single man, but with the
death of all our people; without need for attacking us, but simply
by driving us out--the best possible terms ought to be secured, and
that accordingly we should surrender. For [they considered that, to
justify] exposing all those people to death there must be some hope
[of success or relief], of which there was none at that time. Nor
were they ignorant of the requirements of military honor and usage,
but these passed sentence [upon surrender] when the enemy were not so
sure of victory, and when they themselves had some grounds for hope;
but without such hope neither did God, nor consequently human law,
hold them under such rigorous obligation; and one law states that no
one is obliged to do what is impossible.
The conference being concluded, answer was made to the enemy in
conformity with the above decision. When they came to the terms of
surrender, our men stipulated that they should leave the fort with
their arms, flags flying, drums [beating], guns loaded, and matches
lighted. At first the enemy refused this, being willing only to
spare our lives; for they saw very plainly that everything was in
their power, and that what they were giving was only a favor. They
were not willing to give us the vessels that we asked from them,
but said that we all must go to Tay-Chuan, their fort; and that if
the governor of that place had orders he would give us boats. If
he did not, they said that we must voyage to Jacatra, to see the
commander-in-chief, [34] and that he would give us transportation;
for they themselves carried no orders for anything else [than the
seizure of the island]. With this the affair was ended--which is the
truth of the matter, without any pretense or cloak.
Having departed from the fort with the said terms they placed us all
in the convents of St. Domingo and St. Francis, with guards, while
they arranged their affairs; then they sent us to Tay-quan, a fort of
theirs on the other side. At the convents, the Dutch proceeded to take
from all our men their weapons and flags, on the pretext that they
must embark the Spaniards without these, for fear of some mutiny or
uprising. This was afterward told to the commander-in-chief at Jacatra
[now Batavia], and he replied that the guns and flags had been left
at Tay-quan; but that if the governor of that place, who was coming
by March or April, should bring them [to Jacatra], he would give them
up. On this account the [Spanish] governor remained at Jacatra to await
them, and to send away his men, and to be the last one. There was
great danger that some men would remain there, by their own choice;
or that, urged by the Dutch, they would say that they preferred to
remain. The Pampangos and Cagayans remained with the Dutch, who refused
to give them to us, although they had granted liberty to all [of our
men]. Although many remonstrances were made to them on this point,
they replied that they would pay those Indians as the Spaniards had
done, and that the former should serve them. Accordingly, some of the
Indians remained in Tay-quan, and the rest were taken by the Dutch in
their ships that were going against Amboino and Terrenate. Some free
servants were seized by certain Dutchmen in Tay-quan and in Hermosa
Island, who refused to give them back; and afterward we learned that
they had sold these servants to some of their countrymen. When this
was told to the commander-in-chief, he said that it could not be true,
and that he would make them give back all who remained in Tay-quan,
twelve in number. The affair remained thus, unsettled, a matter which
is certainly worthy of consideration; and it is sufficient cause for
keeping back, whenever opportunity offers, some of their men until
they return to us all those free and Christian people, who remain
with them at the risk of losing the faith.
From the convents where they had kept us, they embarked us in four
ships to convey us to the fortress of Tay-quan; and at the same time
six companies of the Dutch who remained in our forts set out by
land to go to the province of Torboan, in the eastern part of the
island, to find the gold mines that the natives possess there. The
latter obtain some gold from the sands of a river, of which fact
the Dutch were informed; and this was a powerful motive for their
seizing our forts. In order to carry out their purpose to search
for gold mines, they came provided with men who were skilled in
such work. This expedition marched until they reached the village
of Santiago, eight leguas of the journey, [where they were stopped]
by some precipices; they turned back, as they were not able to go
any farther on account of the bad weather and roads, and as their
provisions gave out--difficulties which, it seemed, they could ill
overcome. But, although they could make no farther progress, they sent
men with a champan to examine and reconnoitre the port of San Lorenzo,
of which some inconsiderate person, or the Indians, had informed them;
and they explored it very thoroughly.
The commander returned to the island with the said six companies, and
hanged six Indians of the natives of Hermosa Island, from the three
villages friendly to us--Santiago, Guimarri, and Taparri--because
they had not supplied the Dutch with food, nor gone with them, nor
guided them as the Dutch wished, the natives having promised to do so,
although through fear. The enemy were unmindful that, since the Indians
were our friends, they usually act thus, as it is their nature. The
Dutch also hanged another, a Tagálog boy, who served their commander,
because he ran away to the natives of that country; and two Dutchmen
whom they found in our garrison, in the pay of his Majesty. These
things, and the knowledge that the Indians have of them, have had
such an effect on the latter that whenever they can they will break
the heads of the Dutchmen, and will not accept their friendship. On
the contrary, they now deplore our absence, and in the shadow of the
Dutchmen the Spaniards are now almost saints; and the natives only
ask when the Spaniards will return.
They immediately fortified themselves on the river of Tanchuy, where
they erected a fort of logs, in the same place where our fort was
first built, and left their artillery and sixty soldiers--as afterward
we were told by some of our roadmakers whom they carried there to
work. All this was to make them masters of the trade--in sulphur,
rattan, pelts, and many other products that are found along that
river and in its vicinity. They also built at once a fort of stone,
although without lime, on the highest point of the island where our
forts were, the lookout station by which they won the retirade from us.
Finally, while our men were voyaging to their forts of Tay-quan, we
encountered the four other ships that were going to them with succor,
and with these came the general and leader of them all, who had been
unable to arrive before. [35] He went to our island, and began to
govern it and direct its affairs; and it was he who went to look for
gold, and who hanged the said Indians, and built a fort at Tanchuy. He
despatched four ships to the coasts and routes of Japon, in order that
they might attack the champans of the Sangleys who might go to trade
in that empire; for the Dutch say that those traders go without chapa
(or license) from their king. In Tay-quan they detained some of our
men a month and a half, or more; others they immediately sent away,
with our governor, in the first ship that sailed to Jacatra; and
afterward, at the end of October, those who remained in Tay-quan went
in four other ships. [36] Having thus sent all our men to Jacatra,
the Dutch again undertook an expedition to discover the gold mines
at Torboan; and they actually set out with a large force of men in
November, which is a rainy season in the Tay-quan region. On this
account, and because it is nearer, they crossed by land the middle
ridge which Hermosa Island has, from Tay-quan to Torboan; but, as we
afterward learned in Jacatra from the people on the other ship (which
sailed later from Tay-quan), they did not reach the river of gold,
on account of the great ruggedness of the mountains, and the bad
weather which through November and December prevails in the Torboan
region. Therefore they only punished some villages which lay nearer;
and they burned these because, years before, the natives had killed
a [Dutch] factor. With this they returned, leaving that expedition
for the spring-time; this will cost them much hardship and perhaps
many lives, for there is great difficulty in both the entrance and
the ascent; and the Indians who are now among them will have changed
their settlements, and will make great resistance to them--and will
do so quite safely--since in the mountains they are very dextrous
and experienced, and the Dutch clumsy.
It is certain that if they do not succeed in the search for gold they
will abandon our forts, retaining only that of Tan-chuy on account
of that river and its trade, as some of them said--since for their
trade with the Chinese and Japanese they occupy Tay-quan. That region
is a very pleasant one, with a good climate; and they have very good
fortifications, dwellings, and storehouses for their goods. They have
spent there more than one hundred thousand pesos, as one of them told
me; and there they possess a considerable trade and commerce with the
Chinese. Through this, they learn by means of the Chinese all that
passes in Manila and its provinces; for after the latter have sold to
the Dutchmen, at the proper time, what they need and what they have
to send to Jacatra, the Sangleys are occupied during the rest of the
year in bringing from China cloth and other commodities which find
a market in Manila and Pangasinan; [they bring these to Tay-quan]
in small champans, and immediately lade some large ones which they
keep at Tay-quan, and sail for Manila. Besides this, the reason why
the Dutch have made so great efforts to capture Hermosa Island, going
to attack it year after year, was that they had promised the Japanese
that they would do so, and would expel the Spaniards from it. I was
told this by a religious who was in the kingdom of Tonquin--where,
he said, this was related to him by a Christian from Antuerpia, who
was in the service of the Society [of Jesus]; and this occurred even
before the island was taken.
As for the second [topic], the power which the Dutch enemy possess
in those regions, which is greater than we could imagine of them:
According to what I myself have seen, and what trustworthy and reliable
persons who have traded have told me, the Dutch have at this time
more than one hundred and fifty ships and pataches, at a moderate
estimate--all equipped and provided with seamen, soldiers, artillery,
and other necessary supplies. And they are under such discipline
that even when they are in the port of Jacatra--as I saw, and was
well informed thereon--every ship keeps its people on board, so that
no one may go ashore without special permission; and when they come
from any voyage, before entering the port, all engage in repairing and
cleaning and calking their ships. As a result, when they reach their
anchorage in the port they can immediately, without delay, again go
forth and make a voyage, save when some ship needs unusual repairing;
in short, all their men serve as if they were servants receiving wages.
In Tay-quan, during the months of September and October, 1642, there
were seventeen ships and a patache, all belonging to the enemy. Of
these, nine had come to Jacatra for the capture of Hermosa Island, four
of them having first remained in the Embocadero of Manila, waiting
for our ships from Castilla. Four others had come from Japon, and
the rest were held in reserve at Tay-quan. Of these seventeen ships,
five went to carry our people to Jacatra, and were laden with sugar
and preserved ginger for Holanda; iron or steel from Japan; loaves of
sulphur; and stuffs, silver, and other merchandise. Four other ships
departed to seize the champans of Chinese who were coming from Japon;
and the eight vessels that were left remained in Tay-quan, in order
that their men might go to search for the gold that was reported to
exist in Torboan. This last-named fleet was to sail afterward (by
February of 1643) from Tay-quan, with the governor of that place,
to Jacatra; and on the way they were to inflict punishment on the
king of Cochinchina for the death of some Dutchmen who were wrecked
on that coast, in two ships.
Besides the said ships, we found when we arrived at Jacatra more than
twenty others, very well equipped with supplies and artillery; and
more than thirty or forty cannon, which I myself counted there. Besides
all these vessels another was there, the great three-decked carrack or
galleon from Yndia, which the Dutch had captured from the Portuguese
at the bar of Goa. Five other ships had sailed a few days before
for Malaca, and these were met by the vessels that were carrying our
people from Tay-quan. Six others were then blockading the bar of Goa;
but on account of the treaty of peace, the Dutch have ordered these
to withdraw, and as yet these have not come back. [Still another
squadron of] five vessels well equipped was sent at the beginning of
November, 1642, to Terrenate, to await the relief ship from Manila;
and with them was another ship, which they keep in reserve at the fort
of Malayo. They will wait there until the end of April, or May, until
the arrival of thirty-two other ships, which were besieging Amboino,
with more than fifteen hundred men; and all together will go to attack
Terrenate. For this purpose they took from Jacatra, in December, 1642,
great quantities of supplies, as was seen by myself and by our men who
came hither; and when they go to Terrenate, after making the Amboino
expedition, it will be a question whether they seize the relief ship
for Terrenate--although, perhaps, they will not capture it at all,
confident in their own power.
Besides the said ships, I was told by a sub-factor of the English
that the Dutch have seventeen more ships on the coasts of Yndia,
Ceilan, and Persia, and all of these are supplied from Jacatra. In
this number are not included the vessels that they send to their
factories, to each of which sail one, two, or more, according to the
amount of trade there; and their factories are so numerous that there
is not any kingdom, whether of infidels or Moors, in those regions
where they have not an establishment--Japon, Tonquin, Camboja, Siam,
the kingdom of Achen, Bantan Xambi, Mazarmasin, [37] Macasar, Solor,
and Amboino (which is entirely in their power, and where there is a
great quantity of cloves, so that it is exceedingly valuable). In other
regions also they have factories and much trade; I would never end if
I were to enumerate all. Moreover, there went to Holanda this year,
in December and January, eleven large ships, which I saw, and almost
every month fresh ships arrive from that country; so that there are
always ships coming and going between Holanda and these islands.
Then as for the men that they have here, there is a large force. For,
besides those who are engaged or sail in all the ships that I have
mentioned, those in the garrisons of their forts and presidios, and
the men in the six ships that were blockading Goa, who have not yet
come back, they are now sending a large armada against Amboino and
Terrenate--all the men in which are experienced and trained soldiers,
as I saw in Jacatra. Not only this, but all the men who were engaged
in the capture of Hermosa Island remained there (where they now are),
to support the pretensions of the Dutch which I recounted above,
to discover the gold mines in Torboan, and for the punishment of
Cochinchina. Besides all the said troops, another ship arrived at
Jacatra from Holanda in January, which carried more than one hundred
and fifty fresh soldiers; and this year these Dutch have urgently
requested more men from Holanda, for the purpose of attacking Manila,
now that they see an opportunity for it and that the affairs [of Spain]
are in a disturbed condition.
As for provisions from Holanda--biscuit, pork, beef, wine, oil,
vinegar, etc.--the amount that they have cannot be told or imagined;
for of these articles alone they have enough for two or three years. I
mention only the Castilian wine, of delicious quality, which they
consume more freely than if they were in España; and when they go to
draw it [from the keg], they rinse the glasses with it, and waste it;
and yet this goes on without causing a scarcity of it. Then they have
storehouses full of ammunition and military supplies, an enormous
number of anchors, and stables that contain fifty war-horses, to
handle which they are well trained.
As for the great wealth that they have acquired: In December of this
year, 1642, when I was in Jacatra, they sent ten large galleons, and
another in January of 1643, all the eleven ships laden with drugs of
the highest value in Europe--such as cloves, pepper, cinnamon--sugar,
silks, precious stones, gold, and many other rich articles. According
to what they said, these ships carried goods to the value of thirteen
millions here--which, delivered in Holanda, would amount to an
incredible sum. With this wealth they wage war on us in Flandes,
in these regions, and throughout the world. On this account we might
expect that if his Majesty the king of España would wage war against
them in this quarter, he would certainly subdue them very soon in
Flandes. For he who would cut off a great river, and stop its flow,
does not undertake to do this near the sea, where its current is broad
and deep, and it already seems like [a part of] the sea, where such
attempt will be exceedingly difficult, or even impossible; but he goes
to the beginning or origin of the stream, where the task will be very
easy for him. And so, to wage war against the Dutch in Flandes alone
is to try to cut off a river near the sea, where it has a great flow;
it is therefore almost impossible to do so by sending there more troops
and money. But if vigorous measures were taken to send four thousand
men to Filipinas, it would be very easy thus to destroy them here,
where they are so successful, and make an end of their power.
As for the third and last topic that I mentioned--the designs and
intentions of the Dutch enemy, now that they have made peace in Yndia
with the Portuguese: It is very important to consider this, since
they have always been eager, as I have related, to get possession of
Manila and its fortified places, and to drive out the Spaniards from
these regions. This was doubtful until now, when they find themselves
puissant, and disengaged from other wars; and, on the other hand,
they know that Manila has not very strong defenses, and that it
will not receive abundant aid because the affairs of España are so
disturbed. Accordingly they will exert all their strength to carry
out these desires of theirs, as greedy as of long standing; and this
is so much the fact that, as I know perfectly well, they talk among
themselves of nothing else than how they will gain Manila, and load
themselves with silver. Therefore they have urgently demanded troops
from Holanda; and until these shall come they are making every effort
to capture the ships from Castilla, and are actually undertaking this
with a large and powerful fleet. If they cannot capture the Spanish
ships, they will try to burn them, even if it be by burning two or
more of their own; and they will take with them some old ships for
this purpose.
Besides this, they intend, as I have related, to take Terrenate; and
they have actually gone to those forts to deprive them of the relief
sent, with as large a force as they can send. Likewise, they will
be continually infesting and harassing the coasts of Manila and its
environs, and will not allow any ships worth mention to enter or leave
that port, and will do this, even if it causes them great expense; and
for this purpose they will be continually receiving succor--either by
way of Terrenate, in May, June, and July; or else from Hermosa Island,
from September until April--since for all this they have extra ships,
much wealth, and great energy.
They intend, also, to seize or to obstruct the champans from China
which may go to trade at Manila; and to avail themselves secretly of
the Sangleys to cause a diversion [of the Spanish forces] in Manila
at the time when the Dutch shall attack it. All this was fully
explained to me by a religious person who was in Jacatra, and was
on very intimate terms with some of the Dutchmen, as he understood
their language and customs. The expedition against Manila would be,
as they thought, in May or in October of the year 1644; and, if at
the latter time, it would go by way of Tay-quan.
Among the injuries which they will meanwhile try to inflict upon us,
not the least will be an attempt to burn the galleons and our vessels
that may be in Cavite, or in other places; or corrupting through
clandestine spies whomsoever they can among our men, or effecting
an entrance at night, and by stratagem--both of which they did at
Goa. Recently they burned the galleons of the Portuguese, which lay
within the port, at anchor, and with the usual guard. With this they
tied the hands of the Portuguese, and rendered it impossible for them
to sally out and resist the Dutch. There is no doubt that they will,
if they have the opportunity, do much worse than what I have told;
for this is an astute and cautious enemy, who knows whatever occurs
among our people; and we live in anxieties. Dated in the kingdom of
Macasar, in March, 1643.
Fray Juan de los Angeles
of the Order of St. Dominic.
[To this document we append the following additional information,
obtained from Ferrando and Fonseca's Historia de los PP. Dominicos
en las Islas Filipinas (Madrid, 1870), ii, pp. 440-447:]
Governor Corcuera, who regarded with much indifference that goodly
conquest, [38] failed to recognize its importance as an advanced
and strategic point for checking the aggressions of the Dutch; and,
engaged in making new conquests which he could not preserve, he had
entirely abandoned it [i.e., Formosa]. A wretched company of invalids
and raw recruits was the only force allotted for the defense of that
island against a victorious enemy, who, flushed with the triumphs
that they had obtained over the Portuguese possessions, believed (and
with some reason) that everything must give way to their triumphal
progress through these seas, [Their first attack on Tanchuy, in 1641,
is "almost miraculously repulsed by its feeble garrison;" but in this
expedition the Dutch learn the topography of that region, the condition
of the Spanish forts, etc., and plan anew its conquest.] Their plans
were not hidden from the commandant of the fort, nor from our good
religious, who mingled their counsels with those of the men who were
defending the cause of religion and native land. All quickly saw the
urgent necessity of reënforcing the garrison, and of demanding fresh
troops from the government at Manila.