The coincidence of the arrival of the French army with the conquest of
Urbino and Camerino and the Tuscan troubles caused one more to be added
to that ceaseless stream of rumours that flowed through Italy concerning
the Borgias. This time the envy and malice that are ever provoked by
success and power gave voice in that rumour to the thing it hoped,
and there ensued as pretty a comedy as you shall find in the pages of
history.
The rumour had it that Louis XII, resentful and mistrustful of the
growth of Cesare’s might, which tended to weaken France in Italy and
became a menace to the French dominions, was come to make an end of him.
Instantly Louis’s Court in Milan was thronged by all whom Cesare had
offended--and they made up by now a goodly crowd, for a man may not rise
so swiftly to such eminence without raising a rich crop of enemies.
Meanwhile, however, Valentinois in the Montefeltre Palace at
Urbino remained extremely at ease. He was not the man to be without
intelligences. In the train of Louis was Francesco Troche, the Pope’s
confidential chamberlain and Cesare’s devoted servant, who, possessed
of information, was able to advise Valentinois precisely what were the
intentions of the King of France. Gathering from these advices that it
was Louis’s wish that the Florentines should not be molested further,
and naturally anxious not to run counter to the king’s intentions,
Cesare perceived that the time to take action had arrived, the time for
passivity in the affairs of Florence was at an end.
So he dispatched an envoy to Vitelli, ordering his instant evacuation
of Arezzo and his withdrawal with his troops from Tuscany, and he backed
the command by a threat to compel Vitelli by force of arms, and
to punish disobedience by depriving him of his state of Città di
Castello--“a matter,” Cesare informed him, “which would be easily
accomplished, as the best men of that State have already offered
themselves to me.”
It was a command which Vitelli had no choice but to obey, not being
in sufficient force to oppose the duke. So on July 29, with Gianpaolo
Baglioni, he relinquished the possession of Arezzo and departed out of
Tuscany, as he had been bidden. But so incensed was he against the duke
for this intervention between himself and his revenge, and so freely did
he express himself in the matter, that it was put about at once that he
intended to go against Cesare.
And that is the first hint of the revolt of the condottieri.
Having launched that interdict of his, Cesare, on July 25, in the garb
of a knight of St. John of Jerusalem, and with only four attendants,
departed secretly from Urbino to repair to Milan and King Louis. He
paused for fresh horses at Forli on the morrow, and on the 28th reached
Ferrara, where he remained for a couple of hours to visit Lucrezia, who
was now in convalescence. Ahead of him he dispatched, thence, a courier
to Milan to announce his coming, and, accompanied by Alfonso d’Este,
resumed his journey.
Meanwhile, the assembly of Cesare’s enemies had been increasing daily in
Milan, whither they repaired to support Louis and to vent their hatred
of Cesare and their grievances against him. There, amongst others,
might be seen the Duke of Urbino, Pietro Varano (one of the sons of
the deposed Lord of Camerino), Giovanni Sforza of Pesaro, and Francesco
Gonzaga of Mantua--which latter was ever ready to turn whichever way the
wind was blowing, and was now loudest in his denunciations of Cesare and
eagerly advocating the formation of a league against him.
Louis received the news of Cesare’s coming, and--endowed, it is clear,
with a nice sense of humour-kept the matter secret until within a
few hours of the duke’s actual arrival. On the morning of August 5,
according to Bernardi,(1) he whispered the information in Trivulzio’s
ear-and whispered it loudly enough to be overheard by those courtiers
who stood nearest.
1 Cronache Forlivesi.
Whatever check their satisfaction at the supposed state of things may
have received then was as nothing to their feelings a few hours later
when they witnessed the greeting that passed between king and duke.
Under their uneasy eyes Louis rode forth to meet his visitor, and gave
him a glad and friendly welcome, addressing him as “cousin” and “dear
relative,” and so, no doubt, striking dismay into the hearts of those
courtiers, who may well have deemed that perhaps they had expressed
themselves too freely.
Louis, in person, accompanied Valentinois to the apartments prepared
for him in the Castle of Milan, and on the morrow gave a banquet and
commanded merry-makings in his visitor’s honour.
Conceive the feelings of those deposed tyrants and their friends, and
the sudden collapse of the hopes which they had imagined the king to be
encouraging. They did, of course, the only thing there was to do. They
took their leave precipitately and went their ways--all save Gonzaga,
whom the king retained that he might make his peace with Cesare, and
engage in friendship with him, a friendship consolidated there and then
by the betrothal of their infant children: little Francesco Gonzaga
and Louise de Valentinois, aged two, the daughter whom Cesare had never
beheld and was never to behold.
Two factors were at work in the interests of Valentinois--the coming war
in Naples with the Spaniard, which caused Louis to desire to stand well
with the Pope; and the ambition of Louis’s friend and counsellor, the
Cardinal d’Amboise, to wear the tiara, which caused this prelate to
desire to stand well with Cesare himself, since the latter’s will in
the matter of a Pope to succeed his father should be omnipotent with the
Sacred College.
Therefore, that they might serve their interests in the end, both king
and cardinal served Cesare’s in the meantime.
The Duke of Valentinois’s visit to Milan had served to increase the
choler of Vitelli, who accounted that by this action Cesare had put him
in disgrace with the King of France; and Vitelli cried out that thus was
he repaid for having sought to make Cesare King of Tuscany. In such high
dudgeon was the fierce Tyrant of Città di Castello that he would not go
to pay his court to Louis, and was still the more angry to hear of the
warm welcome accorded in Milan to the Cardinal Orsini. In this he
read approval of the Orsini for having stood neutral in the Florentine
business, and, by inference from that, disapproval of himself.
Before accusing Valentinois of treachery to his condottieri, before
saying that he shifted the blame of the Tuscan affair on to the
shoulders of his captains, it would be well to ascertain that there was
any blame to shift--that is to say, any blame that must originally have
fallen upon Cesare. Certainly he made no effort to restrain Vitelli
until the King of France had arrived and he had secret information which
caused him to deem it politic to intervene. But of what avail until that
moment, would any but an armed intervention have been with so vindictive
and one-idea’d a man, and what manner of fool would not Cesare have
been to have spent his strength in battle with his condottieri for the
purpose of befriending a people who had never shown themselves other
than his own enemies?
Like the perfect egotist he was, he sat on the fence, and took pleasure
in the spectacle of the harassing of his enemies by his friends,
prepared to reap any advantages there might be, but equally prepared to
avoid any disadvantages.
It was not heroic, it was not noble; but it was extremely human.
Cesare was with the King of France in Genoa at the end of August, and
remained in his train until September 2, when finally he took his leave
of him. When they heard of his departure from the Court of Louis, his
numerous enemies experienced almost as much chagrin as that which had
been occasioned them by his going thither. For they had been consoling
themselves of late with a fresh rumour; and again they were believing
what it pleased them to believe. Rumours, you perceive, were never
wanting where the Borgias were concerned, and it may be that you are
beginning to rate these voces populi at their proper value, and to
apprehend the worth of many of those that have been embalmed as truths
in the abiding records.
This last one had it that Louis was purposely keeping Cesare by him, and
intended ultimately to carry him off to France, and so put an end to the
disturbances the duke was creating in Italy. What a consolation would
not that have been to those Italian princelings to whose undoing he had
warred! And can you marvel that they believed and circulated so readily
the thing for which they hoped so fondly? By your appreciation of that
may you measure the fresh disappointment that was theirs.
So mistaken were they, indeed, as it now transpired, that Louis had
actually, at last, removed his protection from Bologna, under the
persuasion of Cesare and the Pope. Before the duke took his departure
from King Louis’s Court, the latter entered into a treaty with him in
that connection to supply him with three hundred lances: “De bailler au
Valentinois trois cents lances pour l’aider à conquérir Bologne au nome
de l’Eglise, et opprimer les Ursins, Baillons et Vitelozze.”
It was a double-dealing age, and Louis’s attitude in this affair
sorted well with it. Feeling that he owed Bologna some explanation, he
presently sent a singularly lame one by Claude de Seyssel. He put it
that the Bentivogli personally were none the less under his protection
than they had been hitherto, but that the terms of the protection
provided that it was granted exclusively of the rights and authority
of the Holy Roman See over Bologna, and that the king could not embroil
himself with the Pope. With such a shifty message went M. de Seyssel
to make it quite clear to Bentivogli what his position was. And on the
heels of it came, on September 2, a papal brief citing Bentivogli and
his two sons to appear before the Pontiff within fifteen days for the
purpose of considering with his Holiness the matter of the pacification
and better government of Bologna, which for so many years had been so
disorderly and turbulent. Thus the Pope’s summons, with a menace that
was all too thinly veiled.
But Bentivogli was not taken unawares. He was not even astonished. Ever
since Cesare’s departure from Rome in the previous spring he had been
disposing against such a possibility as this--fortifying Bologna,
throwing up outworks and erecting bastions beyond the city, and levying
and arming men, in all of which he depended largely upon the citizens
and particularly upon the art-guild, which was devoted to the House of
Bentivogli.
Stronger than the affection for their lord--which, when all is said,
was none too great in Bologna--was the deep-seated hatred of the clergy
entertained by the Bolognese. This it was that rallied to Bentivogli
such men as Fileno della Tuate, who actually hated him. But it was a
choice of evils with Fileno and many of his kidney. Detesting the ruling
house, and indignant at the injustices it practised, they detested the
priests still more--so much that they would have taken sides with Satan
himself against the Pontificals. In this spirit did they carry their
swords to Bentivogli.
Upon the nobles Bentivogli could not count--less than ever since the
cold-blooded murder of the Marescotti; but in the burghers’ adherence he
deemed himself secure, and indeed on September 17 he had some testimony
of it.
On that date--the fortnight’s grace expiring--the brief was again read
to the Reggimento; but it was impossible to adopt any resolution. The
people were in arms, and, with enormous uproar, protested that they
would not allow Giovanni Bentivogli or his sons to go to Rome, lest they
should be in danger once they had left their own State.
Italy was full of rumours at the time of Cesare’s proposed emprise
against Bologna, and it was added that he intended, further, to make
himself master of Città di Castello and Perugia, and thus, by depriving
them of their tyrannies, punish Vitelli and Baglioni for their
defection.
This was the natural result of the terms of Cesare’s treaty with France
having become known; but the part of it which regarded the Orsini,
Vitelli, and Baglioni was purely provisional. Considering that these
condottieri were now at odds with Cesare, they might see fit to consider
themselves bound to Bentivogli by the Treaty of Villafontana, signed by
Vitelli and Orsini on the duke’s behalf at the time of the capitulation
of Castel Bolognese. They might choose to disregard the fact that this
treaty had already been violated by Bentivogli himself, through the
non-fulfilment of the terms of it, and refuse to proceed against him
upon being so bidden by Valentinois.
It was for such a contingency as this that provision was made by the
clause concerning them in Cesare’s treaty with Louis.
The Orsini were still in the duke’s service, in command of troops levied
for him and paid by him, and considering that with them Cesare had no
quarrel, it is by no means clear why they should have gone over to the
alliance of the condottieri that was now forming against the duke. Join
it, however, they did. They, too, were in the Treaty of Villafontana;
but that they should consider themselves bound by it, would have
been--had they urged it--more in the nature of a pretext than a reason.
But they chose a pretext even more slender. They gave out that in Milan
Louis XII had told Cardinal Orsini that the Pope’s intention was to
destroy the Orsini.
To accept such a statement as true, we should have to believe in a
disloyalty and a double-dealing on the part of Louis XII altogether
incredible. To what end should he, on the one side, engage to assist
Cesare with 300 lances to “oppress” the Orsini--if necessary, and among
others--whilst, on the other, he goes to Orsini with the story which
they attribute to him? What a mean, treacherous, unkingly figure must
he not cut as a consequence! He may have been--we know, indeed, that he
was--no more averse to doubledealing than any other Cinquecentist; but
he was probably as averse to being found out in a meanness and made
to look contemptible as any double-dealer of our own times. It is a
consideration worth digesting.
When word of the story put about by the Orsini was carried to the
Pope he strenuously denied the imputation, and informed the Venetian
ambassador that he had written to complain of this to the King of
France, and that, far from such a thing being true, Cesare was so
devoted to the Orsini as to be “more Orsini than Borgian.”
It is further worth considering that the defection of the Orsini was
neither immediate nor spontaneous, as must surely have been the case had
the story been true. It was the Baglioni and Vitelli only who first met
to plot at Todi, to declare that they would not move against their ally
of Bologna, and to express the hope that they might bring the Orsini to
the same mind. They succeeded so well that the second meeting was held
at Magione--a place belonging to the powerful Cardinal Orsini, situated
near the Baglioni’s stronghold of Perugia. Vitellozzo was carried
thither on his bed, so stricken with the morbo gallico--which in Italy
was besetting most princes, temporal and ecclesiastical--that he was
unable to walk.
Gentile and Gianpaolo Baglioni, Cardinal Gianbattista Orsini, Francesco
Orsini, Duke of Gravina, Paolo Orsini, the bastard son of the Archbishop
of Trani, Pandolfo Petrucci--Lord of Siena--and Hermes Bentivogli were
all present. The last-named, prone to the direct methods of murder by
which he had rid Bologna of the Marescotti, is said to have declared
that he would kill Cesare Borgia if he but had the opportunity, whilst
Vitelli swore solemnly that within a year he would slay or capture the
duke, or else drive him out of Italy.
From this it will be seen that the Diet of Magione was no mere defensive
alliance, but actually an offensive one, with the annihilation of Cesare
Borgia for its objective.
They certainly had the power to carry out their resolutions, for
whilst Cesare disposed at that moment of not more than 2,500 foot, 300
men-at-arms, and the 100 lances of his Caesarean guard of patricians,
the confederates had in arms some 9,000 foot and 1,000 horse. Conscious
of their superior strength, they determined to strike at once, before
Cesare should be further supported by the French lances, and to make
sure of him by assailing him on every side at once. To this end it was
resolved that Bentivogli should instantly march upon Imola, where Cesare
lay, whilst the others should possess themselves of Urbino and Pesaro
simultaneously.
They even approached Florence and Venice in the matter, inviting the
Republics to come into the league against Valentinois.
The Florentines, however, could not trust such enemies of their own as
Vitelli and the Orsini, nor dared they join in an enterprise which had
for scope to make war upon an ally of France; and they sent word to
Cesare of their resolve to enter into no schemes against him.
The Venetians would gladly have moved to crush a man who had snatched
the Romagna from under their covetous eyes; but in view of the league
with France they dared not. What they dared, they did. They wrote to
Louis at length of the evils that were befalling Italy at the hands of
the Duke of Valentinois, and of the dishonour to the French crown which
lay for Louis in his alliance with Cesare Borgia. They even went so
far--and most treacherously, considering the league--as to allow their
famous captain, Bartolomeo d’Alviano, to reconduct Guidobaldo to Urbino,
as we shall presently see.
Had the confederates but kept faith with one another Cesare’s knell
had soon been tolled. But they were a weak-kneed pack of traitors,
irresolute in their enmity as in their friendships. The Orsini hung
back. They urged that they did not trust themselves to attack Cesare
with men actually in his pay; whilst Bentivogli--treacherous by nature
to the back-bone of him--actually went so far as to attempt to open
secret negotiations with Cesare through Ercole d’Este of Ferrara.