IN THE JORDAN VALLEY
The outstanding events of the weeks following the capture of Jerusalem were
a brilliant exploit by the 52nd Division on the banks of the River Auja,
north of Jaffa, and the establishment of a through connection by rail from
Egypt to Jerusalem. The former enterprise was carried out just before
Christmas, partly to suppress the Turks who were very active in this
region, but chiefly to make the position of our left flank secure. The
Turks were very strongly entrenched at Muannis and elsewhere, and between
them and the attacking troops, as an additional protection, they had the
river, now swollen to many times its usual dimensions by the recent rains,
which had also made the ground on either bank little better than a morass.
Also, what fords there were had been rendered impassable by the floods, and
it was only after prolonged and searching examination, which had always to
be undertaken at night and by swimming the river many times, that fairly
suitable places were marked out as crossings. One thing only favoured the
Scotsmen on the night of the attack: the weather was as tempestuous as
could be desired, and the roar of the wind effectually drowned any
unavoidable noise and prevented the Turks from receiving intimation of
impending trouble. Most of the troops crossed by means of rafts which,
after the first one had safely reached the other side, were hauled across
by ropes and eventually formed into a rough bridge. Some men, however,
actually waded through the raging torrent in water up to the arm-pits, and
had the utmost difficulty in getting across safely.
When the division was in position on the other side the attack began at
once, in absolute silence, and everywhere the Turks were taken completely
by surprise. Practically all the enemy positions were taken at the point of
the bayonet, which weapon in the hands of the Scotsmen the enemy disliked
exceedingly, and not until shortly after dawn did the firing begin upon
those who had not already been killed or captured.
By this excellently stage-managed operation the British line on this part
of the front was secured against attack and the important work in
connection with the transport could be carried out in safety. The railway
was first continued from Gaza to Ludd, after which it swung eastwards to
Artuf, where the old Turkish line was utilised as far as Jerusalem; and
early in 1918 it was possible to leave Cairo at 6.15 p.m. and be in the
Holy City by a quarter to twelve the next morning, the whole journey, with
the exception of the ninety-eight miles between Cairo and Kantara, being
made on the military railway.
By this fine feat and by their incessant labours on the roads round about
Jerusalem the engineers made it possible for an attempt to be made to
improve our position on the right. The operations here were of a curiously
similar character to those on the left just described, for in each case a
swollen and turbulent river loomed large amongst the obstacles to be
overcome, and the object--to secure strong flank positions--was in each
case the same. But in the second attempt the geographical difficulties
alone were enormous. Eastwards from Jerusalem ran what was euphemistically
called a road, surely the worst in all Palestine, which led to Jericho and
the Jordan valley. From a height of two thousand feet above sea level it
descended in a series of jerks, sometimes abruptly, sometimes across a
short plateau; it wound round innumerable and execrable corners, it was
crossed by wadis and streams from all directions, through nearly twenty
miles of unimaginable desolation, and finally, after passing the awful
travesty that once was Jericho, it reached the river. This road was the
main artery in our communications on the right flank.
El Ghor, which comprises the whole of the Jordan Valley, lies thirteen
hundred feet below the level of the sea and is without parallel in the
universe.
Even in March the atmosphere is like that of a Turkish bath and between the
river and the mountains of Moab stretches a vast expanse of mud and
slippery rocks; a country less suitable for military operations could
scarcely be imagined. Thirty miles east of Jericho was the Turkish
stronghold Amman, a town on the Hedjaz railway and the objective of the
attack, which was undertaken mainly by the 60th (London) Division, the
Anzacs, and the "Cameliers."
Difficult as had been the crossing of the Auja, that of the Jordan was
infinitely worse, for the Turks had destroyed the Ghoraniyeh Bridge; the
river was unfordable there by reason of the floods and it was very nearly
impossible to cross by swimming elsewhere. Eventually, after many attempts,
some men of the 60th Division did succeed in performing the feat, after
which rafts were towed across filled with troops who hid in the dense
undergrowth lining the banks of the river. It was nearly two days before
all the raiding force was safely transported to the other side, for the men
as they landed had to beat off the attacks made by the Turks to prevent the
crossing and they were under heavy fire all the time. On March 24th, when
the enemy had been cleared out of the high ground near the Jordan, the
London division started off through the mud to attack the pass of Shunet
Nimrin, which commanded the road to Es Salt, a town in the mountains of
Moab and the first objective in the assault on Amman, a dozen miles
beyond. The cavalry struck across country farther to the south, making for
an important section of the Hedjaz railway which they hoped to blow up
before the Turks could rally in its defence. It was fortunate that the
delay in crossing the Jordan had been no greater; as it was, the 60th
Division had incalculable trouble in storming Shunet Nimrin, though their
difficulties came not so much from the opposition, desperately as the Turks
fought, as from the nature of the country leading to the pass, which
virtually precluded the use of artillery in support and forced the infantry
to bear the whole burden of the attack.
Now struggling through the heavy mud, now scrambling over the rocks, in
places so steep that the men had to climb on to each other's shoulders in
order to proceed, the Londoners rushed the Turkish positions, and following
up their success hustled the enemy to such purpose that Es Salt was
captured practically without opposition. But the advance did not stop here,
for every moment was of value, and though they had now been marching and
fighting for four days in unspeakable conditions, the infantry began their
twenty-mile march to Amman. The road was utterly impossible for wheeled
traffic, and, in the pitiless downpour, next to impossible for the
infantry, bowed down by the weight of saturated packs and clothing, whose
boots were clogged with mud and hampered the already dragging feet.
It was _three days_ before the Amman plain was reached! The cavalry and the
"Cameliers," advancing from the south, were obliged to travel over tracks
which would have given a mountain goat the horrors, across wadis and
nullahs so steep that the horses had to be let down by ropes and hauled up
the other side, while the "Cameliers" had to build their roads as they went
along, a camel being rather an inconvenient beast on which to scale the
slippery sides of a cliff. So, slithering, scrambling, and fighting all the
way, they came at last to Amman, like the infantry, almost too spent for
further exertions. With never a pause for rest, however, the combined
forces on March 28th made an attack on the Turkish positions, having little
artillery support--two batteries of R.H.A. had, I think, succeeded in
getting their guns through the mud--and already weakened by their terrible
privations.
[Illustration: IN THE JORDAN VALLEY--WADI AUJA. [_To face p. 240._]
For three days the battle raged, wave after wave of infantry staggering
forward undaunted, hardly knowing their direction except that it was
towards the enemy, while the cavalry made repeated efforts to storm the
great hill defending the town and the "Cameliers" operated in the centre.
But the odds were too great: not only did the Turks possess all the
advantage of ground, for their positions could only be approached across a
plain swept from end to end by rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire, but
from the Judæan hills reinforcements poured into Amman to aid in its
defence and to cut off if possible the whole of the raiding force.
It was this latter contingency as well as the utter futility of persevering
in the assault, that made a retirement imperative, and on the third night
of the battle the exhausted men began their march back to the Jordan,
picking up on their way the garrisons left at Shunet Nimrin and Es Salt,
together with some hundreds of prisoners. A large proportion of the
Christian inhabitants of the latter place who feared, with good reason,
ill-treatment by the Turks, also joined the column with such meagre
belongings as they could hurriedly snatch together. This influx of extra
mouths to feed strained the already overburdened resources to the utmost,
but the refugees were well looked after both on the retreat and afterwards
in Jerusalem, and most of the children were brought along by the mounted
troops so that they should not suffer undue fatigue.
It is but piling on the agony to dwell upon the details of the retreat to
the Jordan; it is sufficient to say that it seemed to be the concentrated
essence of all that had gone before, and that on the eleventh day after the
commencement of the raid the crossing was again safely accomplished.
Although it was unsuccessful, I suggest that as a triumph over privation
and fatigue, and for extreme gallantry under most trying conditions of
battle, the venture is without parallel in British military history,
especially in regard to the infantry, who had marched and fought almost
continuously for ten days. The mounted troops would, I think, be the first
to grant them pride of place, for, as I have tried to show elsewhere,
whatever happened, we counted ourselves fortunate who had a horse or a
camel to ride in Palestine. Poor brutes! Those who returned from the raid
on Amman were in a pitiable plight. Some of the camels had not had their
heavy saddles off for eight days, and when at last they were removed the
flesh of the flanks and back came away with them.
The net result of this affair was the formation of a bridgehead at
Ghoraniyeh, which during the first fortnight in April the Turks made strong
attempts to retake, without success; and they finally contented themselves
with fortifying the pass of Shunet Nimrin and placing a powerful garrison
there in order to frustrate any further raids on Amman.
With the end of the rains and the rapid approach of summer came a period of
sheer torment for our troops in the Jordan Valley. The mud changed to a
fine, powdery dust, which rose in clouds at the slightest movement, myriads
of flies awoke from their long winter sleep, and clouds of mosquitoes
arrived for their annual feast. Drill shorts, which formerly had been the
general summer wear, were now strictly forbidden to the mounted troops, who
were forced to endure the sticky agony of riding-breeches every hour of the
twenty-four in order to expose as little as possible of their persons to
the unremitting attacks of these pestilential insects. Also, the bivouac
areas were infested with small but poisonous snakes who had, like
scorpions, a fondness for army blankets; and it is no exaggeration to say
that a man went to sleep every night with the full consciousness that he
might never wake again. Finally, as if these inflictions were not enough,
droves of Turkish aeroplanes came over daily and scientifically bombed all
the camps in the valley. The camels in particular made an excellent mark
and suffered severely, though apart from this, they were the only living
creatures appertaining to the army who flourished and waxed fat in that
blistering lime-kiln.
Towards the end of April a heavy concentration of cavalry round Jericho
made it evident that another attempt was to be made east of the Jordan, and
on the night of the 28th-29th the 1st Australian Mounted Division crossed
the river and advanced due north, between the east bank and the foothills,
towards the Turkish road from Nablus to Es Salt and the ford known as Jisr
ed Damieh, whence they were to march east for the purpose of cutting off
the retreat of the garrison at Shunet Nimrin should the attack of the 60th
Division on that place prevail. Soon after dawn the cavalry came under very
heavy fire, but pushed forward and attained their objectives, where two
brigades, without artillery, went off to help the Londoners. The latter
marched all night, and, taking the Turks by surprise in the early hours,
stormed part of the pass, but despite all their efforts could make no
further headway.
Meanwhile the 4th Light Horse and a brigade of horse-artillery were heavily
engaged till dusk in holding off reinforcements from Nablus who were
attempting to cross by the Jisr ed Damieh ford. After nightfall this
brigade and the batteries retired a short distance and took up a position
commanding the road, in a deep wadi where the guns had to be man-handled
into place, after which the waggons and limbers were let down the sides of
the wadi by means of drag-ropes, and the horses scrambled down as best they
could. Dawn brought the news that the Turks had successfully crossed the
Jordan during the night, and had followed the river southwards in the
direction of our second bridgehead at El Auja, intending to come at the
left flank of the Light Horse, which was absolutely in the air.
At seven o'clock they attacked, and plastered the batteries in the wadi
with shells till, at the end of two hours, the position became untenable,
and an attempt was made to shift the guns. It was incomparably more
difficult to get out of the wadi than it had been to get in, and moving was
but out of the frying-pan into the fire, for one wadi led into another, and
the sides were so precipitous that the horses were almost useless for
dragging out the guns. Four teams were hooked into a gun, but the ground
made it impossible for more than half a dozen horses at a time to be in
draught, and when at last the position was cleared the horses slithered
down the sides of the wadis, and guns and waggons overturned at the bottom
in hopeless and inextricable confusion.
Frantically the gunners strove to get them out, some harnessing themselves
to the drag-ropes and others shoving on the wheels; but every effort was to
no purpose, and meanwhile horses and men were being shot down on all hands
by the advancing Turks, whose cries of "Allah! Allah!" could now be plainly
heard. At last the inevitable order was given to clear out with such horses
as remained, for it was impossible to move, much less save the guns, and
after these had been rendered useless to the enemy, the gallant gunners
reluctantly withdrew.
The moment they were clear of the foothills they galloped into an inferno
of machine-gun fire at close quarters from the Germans and Turks occupying
wadis and shell-holes all over the plain. Horses were shot down right and
left, and a team of eight which had not been unhooked were all hit,
together with two of the drivers, who fortunately managed to get safely
away. Finally the shattered remnants of the artillery brigade assembled at
Ghoraniyeh bridgehead, while the Light Horse fell back towards Es Salt,
which the other two brigades had succeeded in occupying. By their clever
manoeuvring, however, the Turks had rendered the position both of the
Australians in Es Salt and the 60th Division in front of Nimrin so
precarious that another withdrawal was urgently necessary, and after the
Londoners had made a last desperate attempt to storm the pass, the
retirement was carried out successfully and without loss, though in bitter
disappointment at a second failure; that it was the only time in the whole
campaign when British guns were captured by the Turks was remarkably poor
consolation.