THE BATTLE OF PLASSEY
Meanwhile Clive had made every preparation for the advance of his
army. A considerable portion of it had been stationed at
Chandranagar. To that place he despatched on the 12th of June all the
soldiers available, and 150 sailors lent him by the Admiral, leaving
Calcutta guarded by a few sick Europeans, some sipahis to look after
the French prisoners, and a few gunners to man the guns on the
ramparts. On the 13th he quitted Chandranagar, the Europeans, with
the guns, munitions, and stores, proceeding by water in 200 boats,
towed by natives against the stream, the sipahis marching along the
right bank of the river, on the highroad made by the Mughal
Government from Hugli to Patna.[1] The force consisted, all told, of
about 900 Europeans, 200 men of mixed native and Portuguese blood who
served with the Europeans, a small detail of lascars, and 2100
sipahis. The artillery consisted of eight six-pounders and two small
howitzers.
[Footnote 1: Vide Broome's _History of the Bengal Army_, p. 137.]
{91}The day after the force had set out Clive despatched to the
Subahdar a communication tantamount to a declaration of war; and he
proceeded, as he approached the enemy's camp, to act as though such a
declaration had been accepted. On the 16th he reached Palti, a town
on the western bank of the Kasimbazar river about six miles above its
junction with the Jalangi. Twelve miles higher up he came within
striking distance of Katwa, the Governor of which was supposed to be
one of the conspirators. Clive, expecting that the opposition would
not be serious, despatched to occupy it, on the 17th, 200 Europeans
and 500 sipahis, under Major Eyre Coote. But either the Governor had
changed his mind or he had only feigned compliance, for he prepared
to resist Coote's attack. Coote at once made preparations for an
assault, and took such dispositions, that the garrison, recognizing
the futility of resistance, and fearing to be cut off, evacuated the
place, leaving large supplies in the hands of the victors.
The next day, the 18th, a terrific storm raging, the force halted.
The day following, Clive, who had committed himself to the enterprise
mainly on the conviction that Mir Jafar would support him, received a
letter from that nobleman, informing him that he had feigned
reconciliation with the Subahdar and had taken an oath not to assist
the English, but adding that 'the purport of his convention with them
must be carried into execution.' This strange letter from the man
upon whose co-operation he particularly {92}depended led Clive to
doubt whether, after all, Mir Jafar might not betray him. Under this
possibility, the sense of the extreme danger of the enterprise in
which he was engaged revealed itself to him more clearly than it had
ever presented itself before. To cross an unfordable river in the
face of a vastly superior enemy, at a distance of 150 miles from all
support, would, he felt, be a most hazardous undertaking. Should Mir
Jafar be faithless to him, as he had appeared to be to his master,
and should the English force be defeated, there would scarcely
survive a man to tell the tale. Again would Calcutta be in
jeopardy--this time probably beyond redemption. Under the influence
of such thoughts he resolved not to cross the river until he should
receive from Mir Jafar more definite assurances.
The next day, the 20th, a messenger arrived from his agent, Mr.
Watts, who was then at Kalna, carrying a letter to the effect that
before he quitted Murshidabad he had been engaged in an interview
with Mir Jafar and his son, when there entered some emissaries of the
Subahdar; that, in the presence of these, Mir Jafar had denounced Mr.
Watts as a spy, and had threatened to destroy the English if they
should attempt to cross the Bhagirathi. This letter decided Clive. He
resolved to summon a Council of War.
There came to that Council, about noon of the 21st of June, the
following officers: Colonel Clive, Majors Kilpatrick and Grant,
Captains Gaupp, {93}Rumbold, Fischer, Palmer, Le Beaume, Waggonner,
Corneille, and Jennings, Captain-Lieutenants Parshaw and
Molitore;--Major Eyre Coote, Captains Alexander Grant, Cudmore,
Armstrong, Muir, Campbell, and Captain-Lieutenant Carstairs. The
question submitted to them was: 'whether under existing
circumstances, and without other assistance, it would be prudent to
cross the river and come to action at once with the Nawab, or whether
they should fortify themselves at Katwa, and wait till the monsoon
was over, when the Marathas or some other country power might be
induced to join them.' Contrary to the usual custom, Clive spoke
first, the others following according to seniority. Clive spoke and
voted against immediate action. He was supported by the twelve
officers whose names immediately follow his own name in the list I
have given, and opposed by the owners of the seven last names, Major
Eyre Coote speaking very emphatically in favour of action; the
majority of the Council, we thus see, siding with Clive.
The subsequent career of Eyre Coote, especially in Southern India,
proved very clearly that as a commander in the field he fell far
short of Robert Clive, but on this occasion he was the wiser of the
two. Some years later Clive, giving his evidence before a Select
Committee of the House of Commons, emphatically stated that had he
abided by the decision of the Council it would have caused the ruin
of the East India Company. As it was, he reconsidered his vote the
moment the Council was over. It is said that he {94}sat down under a
clump of trees, and began to turn over in his mind the arguments on
both sides. He was still sitting when a despatch from Mir Jafar[2]
reached him, containing favourable assurances. Clive then resolved to
fight. All doubt had disappeared from his mind. He was again firm,
self-reliant, confident. Meeting Eyre Coote as he returned to his
quarters, he simply informed him that he had changed his mind and
intended to fight, and then proceeded to dictate in his own tent the
orders for the advance.
[Footnote 2: Vide Ives's _Voyage and Historical Narrative_, p. 150.
Mr. Ives was surgeon of the _Kent_ during the expedition to Bengal,
and was a great friend of Admiral Watson.]
At sunrise on the 22nd the force commenced the passage of the river.
By four o'clock it was safe on the other side. Here a letter was
received from Mir Jafar, informing Clive of the contemplated
movements of the Nawab. Clive replied that he 'would march to Plassey
without delay, and would the next morning advance six miles further
to the village of Daudpur, but if Mir Jafar did not join him there,
he would make peace with the Nawab.' Two hours later, about sunset,
he commenced his march amid a storm of heavy rain which wetted the
men to the skin. In all respects, indeed, the march was particularly
trying, for the recent rains had inundated the country, and for eight
hours the troops had to follow the line of the river, the water
constantly reaching their waists. They reached Plassey, a distance of
fifteen miles, at one o'clock on the morning of the 23rd of June, and
lay {95}down to sleep in a mango-grove, the sound of drums and other
music in the camp of the Nawab solacing rather than disturbing them.
The Subahdar had reached his headquarters twelve hours before them.
The mango-tope in which the English were resting was but a mile
distant from the intrenched position occupied by Siraj-ud-daula's
army. It was about 800 yards in length and 300 in breadth, the trees
planted in regular rows. All round it was a bank of earth, forming a
good breastwork. Beyond this was a ditch choked with weeds and
brambles. The length of the grove was nearly diagonal to the river,
the north-west angle being little more than 50 yards from the bank,
whilst at the south-west corner it was more than 200 yards distant. A
little in advance, on the bank of the river, stood a hunting-box
belonging to the Nawab, encompassed by a wall of masonry. In this,
during the night, Clive placed 200 Europeans and 300 natives, with
two field-pieces. But in the morning he withdrew the greater part of
them.[3] He had with him 950 European infantry and artillery, 200
topasses, men of mixed race, armed and equipped as Europeans, 50
sailors with seven midshipmen attached, 2100 sipahis, a detail of
lascars, and the field-pieces already mentioned.
[Footnote 3: Vide Orme's _History of India_, and Broome's _History of
the Bengal Army_.]
On the spot which the Nawab had selected for his intrenched camp the
river makes a bend in the form of a horseshoe, with the points much
contracted, {96}forming a peninsula of about three miles in
circumference, the neck of which was less than a quarter of a mile in
breadth. The intrenchment commenced a little below the southern point
of this gorge, resting on the river, and extending inland for about
200 yards, and sweeping thence round to the north for about three
miles. At this angle was a redoubt, on which the enemy had mounted
several pieces of cannon. About 300 yards to the eastward of this
redoubt was a hillock covered with jungle, and about 800 yards to the
south, nearer Clive's grove, was a tank, and 100 yards further south
was a second and larger one. Both of these were surrounded by large
mounds of earth, and, with the hillock, formed important positions
for either army to occupy. The Subahdar's army was encamped partly in
this peninsula, partly in rear of the intrenchment. He had 50,000
infantry of sorts, 18,000 horse of a better quality, and 53 guns,
mostly 32, 24, and 18-pounders. The infantry was armed chiefly with
matchlocks, swords, pikes, bows and arrows, and possessed little or
no discipline; the cavalry was well-trained and well-mounted; the
guns were mounted on large platforms, furnished with wheels, and
drawn by forty or fifty yoke of powerful oxen, assisted by elephants.
But the most efficient portion of his force was a small party of
forty to fifty Frenchmen, commanded by M. St. Frais, formerly one of
the Council of Chandranagar. This party had attached to it four light
field-pieces.[4]
[Footnote 4: For these details see Orme, Broome, Clive's _Evidence
before the Committee of the House of Commons_, Clive's _Report to the
Court of Directors_, Sir Eyre Coote's _Narrative_, and Ives's _Voyage
and Historical Narrative_. The account which follows is based
entirely on these authorities.]
{97}At daybreak on the 23rd of June the Nawab moved his entire army
out of the intrenchment and advanced towards the position occupied by
Clive, the several corps marching in compact order. In front was St.
Frais, who took post at the larger tank, that nearest Clive's grove.
On a line to his right, near the river, were a couple of heavy guns,
under the orders of a native officer. Behind these two advanced
parties, and within supporting distance, was a chosen body of 5000
horse and 7000 foot, under the immediate command of the Nawab's most
faithful general, Mir Madan.[5] The rest of the Nawab's army extended
in a curve, its right resting on the hillock near the camp; thence
sweeping round in dense columns of horse and foot to the eastward of
the south-east angle of the grove. Here, nearest to the English, were
placed the troops of Mir Jafar, then those of Yar Lutf Khan, beyond
these Raja Dulab Ram. The English within the grove were thus almost
surrounded by the river and the enemy; but in view of the promised
treachery of Mir Jafar, the greatest danger was to be apprehended
from their immediate front, viz. from St. Frais, with his little body
of Frenchmen, and from Mir Madan.
[Footnote 5: See Elliot's _History of India_, vol. viii. p. 428.]
From the roof of the hunting-house Clive watched his enemy take up
the positions which would hold {98}him, if their generals were true
to their master, in a vice. 'They approached apace,' he wrote in a
letter of July 26 to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors,
'and by six began to attack us with a number of heavy cannon,
supported by the whole army, and continued to play on us very briskly
for several hours, during which our situation was of the utmost
service to us, being lodged in a large grove, with good mud banks. To
succeed in an attempt on their cannon was next to impossible, as they
were planted in a manner round us, and at considerable distances from
each other. We therefore remained quiet in our post, in expectation
of a successful attack upon their camp at night. About noon the enemy
drew off their artillery and returned to their camp.'
So far, up to mid-day, we have the outline of the fight as narrated
by Clive; it is, however, but an outline. It would seem that the
action commenced by a discharge of one of the four guns of St. Frais.
This discharge killed one and wounded another of the men of the
European battalion. Immediately afterwards the whole of the enemy's
guns opened fire, but their shots flew high, and did but little
mischief. Clive meanwhile had drawn up his troops in line in front of
the grove, their left resting on the hunting-box, with the exception
of two guns and two howitzers which he had posted at some brick-kilns
some 200 yards in front of the hunting-box spoken of. These, as soon
as the enemy opened, replied promptly and effectively. The remaining
six guns, placed three on {99}each flank of the European battalion
which formed the centre of his line, answered the heavy batteries of
the enemy, but, from their small calibre, made but little impression.
After a cannonade of half an hour, the English having lost ten
Europeans and twenty sipahis in killed and wounded, Clive withdrew
them under shelter of the grove, leaving one detachment at the
brick-kilns, another at the hunting-box. This retrograde movement
greatly encouraged the enemy. They brought their guns much nearer,
and their fire became more vigorous and sustained. But its effect was
less fatal, for the English troops were protected by the trees and
the mud bank, and, sitting down, were but little exposed. This
warfare continued till about eleven o'clock, the casualties being far
greater on the side of the Nawab's army than among the English. Then
Clive summoned his principal officers to a conference, and it was
resolved that the troops should occupy their existing positions until
midnight, and should then attack the Nawab's camp. We may regard the
close of the conference as occurring about the same time as the
withdrawal of the enemy's artillery indicated by Clive in the above
extract from his despatch.
For, scarcely was the conference over, than the skies poured down a
fierce shower, such as occurs often during the rainy season, which
lasted an hour. Then it was that the enemy's artillery fire slackened
by degrees almost to the point of ceasing, for the rain had damaged
their ammunition, left almost completely {100}without cover. Clive
had been more careful of his powder, so that when the enemy's horse,
believing the English guns as powerless as their own, advanced
towards the grove to charge, they were received with a fire which
emptied many a saddle, and sent them reeling back. In this charge Mir
Madan, previously referred to, was killed.[6]
[Footnote 6: Elliot states, on the authority of the J'ami'ut
Taw'ari'kh, that he was accidentally struck by a cannon-ball.
_History of India_, vol. viii. p. 427.]
The death of this brave and faithful soldier greatly disheartened the
Subahdar. He sent for Mir Jafar, and implored him to remain faithful
to his oath. Taking off his turban and casting it at the feet of his
uncle,[7] he exclaimed in humble tones, 'Jafar, that turban thou must
defend.' Mir Jafar promised, but instead of performing, the
degenerate Muhammadan returned to his confederates and sent a
despatch to Clive, informing him of all that had passed, and begging
him to push on immediately, or, if that were impossible, not to fail
to attack during the night. His letter did not reach Clive till late
in the evening. Meanwhile other influences had been at work to bring
about a similar result.
[Footnote 7: Mir Jafar had married the sister of Ali Vardi Khan, the
Nawab's father.]
It is impossible not to feel sympathy for the youthful prince,
surrounded by traitors, his one true adherent killed. Scarcely had
Mir Jafar quitted him when there came to him another traitor, Raja
Dulab Ram, who commanded the army corps nearest to the position
{101}he had taken. The Raja found his master in a state of great
agitation. The English were showing themselves in the open; his own
men were giving way; hope was vanishing quickly. Instead of
encouraging the Subahdar to fight it out, the treacherous Raja gave
fuel to his fears, told him the day was lost, and urged him to flee
to Murshidabad. In an evil hour for his dynasty and for himself,
Siraj-ud-daula yielded to his persuasions, and, ordering his troops
to retire within the intrenchment, mounted a swift dromedary, and
fled, accompanied by 2000 horsemen, to his capital.
It was then two o'clock. The first hour since Clive's conference had
been marked by the heavy rain; the second by the repulse of the
Subahdar's horsemen; the following up of the repulsed attack; the
conversations of the Subahdar with his two treacherous generals. By
two o'clock the enemy's attack had completely ceased, and they were
observed yoking their oxen preparatory to withdrawing within the
intrenchment as the Subahdar had ordered. There remained only on the
ground that body of forty gallant Frenchmen under St. Frais, whom I
have described as occupying the ground about the larger tank, that
nearest to the grove. The post was an important one, for from it the
English could have taken the retreating enemy in flank, and have
inflicted heavy loss upon them. St. Frais was nearly isolated, but
he, too, had seen the advantage the English would derive from
occupying the position, and, faithful amid the faithless, he, with
the gallantry of his nation, {102}resolved to defend it until it
should be no longer defensible.
There was with the army a very gallant officer, Major James
Kilpatrick, who had greatly distinguished himself in Southern India,
and who, on this occasion, commanded the Company's troops. Kilpatrick
had noted the firm front displayed by St. Frais, the great advantage
to be derived from occupying the position he held, the disadvantage
of leaving him to hold it whilst the English force should advance. He
resolved, then, to expel him: so sending word to Clive of his
intentions, and of the reason which prompted his action, he marched
with two companies towards St. Frais.
Clive, meanwhile, seeing the enemy's attack broken, yet deeming it
better, not having received Mir Jafar's letter, to wait till the sun
should have descended before making the decisive attack, had
proceeded to the hunting-box to rest after so many hours of fatigue
and excitement, to be followed, he believed, by many more, having
first given orders that he should be informed of any change that
might occur in the enemy's position. He was there when the message of
Kilpatrick reached him. Rising, he hurried to the spot, met
Kilpatrick as he was advancing to the assault, reprimanded him for
having taken such a step without orders, but seeing him so far
forward, he took himself the command of the detachment, sending back
Kilpatrick to the grove to bring the remainder of the troops. When
St. Frais recognized {103}the earnestness of the English, and that he
was entirely without support, he evacuated the post, and retreated to
the redoubt at the corner of the intrenchment. There he placed his
guns ready for action.[8]
[Footnote 8: This episode is not specially mentioned by Clive, but it
rests on irrefragable evidence. Vide Orme, vol. ii. p. 176: see also
Sir Eyre Coote's _Narrative_; also Malcolm's _Life of Lord Clive_,
vol. i. p. 260.]
Meanwhile, whilst the English force was thus advancing, the army
corps commanded by Mir Jafar was observed to linger behind the rest
of the retreating enemy. It was noticed, further, that when it had
advanced almost abreast of the northern line of the grove, it faced
to its left and advanced in that direction. For a time it seemed to
the English officers as though the troops composing it were about to
make a raid on their baggage, and a party with a field-piece was sent
forward to check them. The corps then halted, remained so for a time,
then slowly retired, taking, however, a direction which led it apart
from the other corps of the enemy. We shall return to them in a few
moments.
Whilst this corps was executing the manoeuvre I have described, Clive
had advanced to a position whence he could cannonade the enemy's
camp. The effect of this fire was to cause great loss and confusion
amongst the troops of the Subahdar, at the same time that the
English, giving, by their advance, their flank to the French in the
redoubt, suffered also. To put {104}an end to this cross-fire Clive
saw that the one remedy was to storm the redoubt. He was unwilling,
however, to risk his troops in a severe contest with the French so
long as the army corps, the movements of which I have described in
the preceding paragraph, should continue to occupy its apparently
threatening position. That corps might be the corps of Mir Jafar, but
there was no certainty that it was so, for Clive had not then
received Mir Jafar's letter, nor was he aware of the flight of the
Nawab. It was just at this critical moment that he observed the corps
in question making the retrograde movement I have referred to. Then
all doubt was over in his mind. It must, he was convinced, be the
corps of his adherent. Certain now that he would not be molested, he
hurled his troops against the redoubt and the hillock to the east of
it. St. Frais displayed a bold front, but, abandoned almost
immediately by his native allies, and deeming it wiser to preserve
his handful of Europeans for another occasion, he evacuated the
redoubt, leaving his field-pieces behind him. His resistance was the
last opposition offered to the English. The clocks struck five as he
fell back, thus tolling the memorable hour which gave to England the
richest province in India; which imposed upon her the necessity to
advance upwards from its basis until she should reach the rocky
region called with some show of reason the 'Glacis of the Fortress of
Hindustan.'
Just as the beaten and betrayed army was moving {105}off with its
impedimenta, its elephants, its camels, leaving to be scrambled for
an enormous mass of baggage, stores, cattle, and camp equipage, Clive
received messengers from Mir Jafar requesting an interview. Clive
replied by appointing a meeting for the morrow at Daudpur, a village
twenty miles to the south of Murshidabad. Thither the bulk of the
troops, their spirits cheered by the promise made them that they
would receive a liberal donation in money, marched that evening;
whilst a detachment under Eyre Coote went forward in pursuit, to
prevent the enemy from rallying. After a short halt, to enable the
commissariat to exchange their small and worn-out bullocks for the
splendid oxen of the Subahdar, the troops pressed on, and at eight
o'clock the entire force was united at Daudpur.
Such was the battle of Plassey. The loss of the English force was
extremely small, amounting to seven Europeans and sixteen sipahis
killed, and thirteen Europeans and thirty-six sipahis wounded. No
officer was killed: two were wounded, but their names are not
recorded. A midshipman of the _Kent_, Shoreditch by name, was shot in
the thigh, whilst doing duty with the artillery. The enemy's
casualties were far greater. It was calculated to be, in killed and
wounded, about a thousand, including many officers. They had been far
more exposed than the English. Writing, in the letter already
referred to, of the phases of the action between two and five
o'clock, Clive states that their horse exposed {106}themselves a
great deal; that 'many of them were killed, amongst the rest four or
five officers of the first distinction.'
Clive had gained his victory. We have now to record the use that he
made of it.
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