II

_From the 17th of July 1789 to the 6th of Oct. 1789._

We have seen the military conditions under which the attempt at an armed

counter-revolution failed. There follows a short phase of less than

three months, whose character can be quickly described.

It was that moment of the Revolution in which ideas had the freest play,

in which least had been done to test their application, and most scope

remained for pure enthusiasm. That is why we find in the midst of that

short phase the spontaneous abandonment of the feudal rights by the

nobility. And that is why the violent uprisings all over France

continued. It is the period in which the Declaration of the Rights of

Man and of the Citizen, a document which may fittingly stand side by

side with the Declaration of Independence (for together they form the

noblest monuments of our modern origins), was promulgated. In the same

period were the elements of the future Constitution rapidly debated and

laid down, and notably that national policy of a _Single Chamber_ which

the modern French have imprudently abandoned. In that same period,

however, appeared, and towards the close of it, another form of

resistance on the part of the Crown and of those who advised the Crown.

The King hesitated to accept the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and

similarly hesitated to promulgate the Decree of the 4th of August in

which the nobility had abandoned their feudal dues. It would be foolish

to exaggerate the military aspect of what followed. Louis did call in

troops, but only in numbers sufficient for personal defence, and we can

hardly believe that he intended anything more than to police the

surroundings of his throne. But the brigade (for it was no more, nor was

it of full strength) which he summoned was sufficient to kindle

suspicion; and the determinedly false position of the Queen (who all her

life was haunted by the idea that the regular soldiers, especially if

they were well dressed and held themselves rigidly, were a sort of

talisman) provoked an explosion. A feast was given in which the officers

of the Regiment of Flanders, which had just reached Versailles, were

entertained by the officers of the Guard. It was made the occasion for a

good deal of drunkenness and a violent Royalist manifestation, at which

the Queen was present, which she approved, and which some thought she

had designed.

The failure of the harvest to relieve the scarcity of bread in Paris,

the permanent state of alarm in which Paris had remained, and of

suspicion for the safety of the Parliament which it continually

entertained since the early part of the summer, needed no more to

provoke an outbreak. It is an error to imagine that that outbreak was

engineered or that such a movement could have been factitious. Great

masses of women (in whom the movement originated), and after them a

whole flood of the populace, marched upon Versailles.

There was no direct attack upon the palace, though the palace feared

such an attack at any moment. The troops present were sufficient to

prevent violence.

La Fayette followed in the night at the head of his new Parisian militia

force.

Too much reliance was placed upon the military character of this force;

the palace was invaded in the early morning, an attempt to assassinate

the Queen on the part of the mob failed, though two of the Guards were

killed. And after scenes whose violence and apparent anarchy only masked

the common determination of the populace, the royal family were

compelled to abandon Versailles and to take up their place in the

Tuileries; the Parliament followed them to Paris, and neither King nor

Parliament returned again to the suburban palace.

This recapture of the King by Paris is much more significant than a mere

impulse of the mob. The King in Paris, the unison of his person with the

capital city, had been the very sacrament of French life for century

upon century. It was precisely a hundred years since Paris had been

abandoned by Louis XIV for Versailles. The significance of that error

may be understood by the citizens of an aristocratic country if they

will imagine the abandonment of their countrysides by the squires, or,

again, the future historian of our modern industrial civilisation may

understand it when he describes how the wealthy manufacturers abandoned

the cities in which their wealth was made, to dwell outside and apart

from the living interests of their people.

With the return of the royal family to Paris, and with the presence of

the Assembly within the heart of the national life, one prime factor

appears, which is this: that while the National Assembly proceeds step

by step to what it imagines to be a complete attainment of democracy

(though how partial will soon be seen), the resistance of the Crown is

transformed into a resistance of the mere Court. The attack on the

Revolution becomes a personal thing. The King is still wholly the chief

of the Executive; he can give what commands he wills to the armed force;

he controls receipts and payments; he is for all active purposes the

Government. But he is no longer considering that prime function of his,

nor even using it to restore his old power. He acts henceforward as an

individual, and an individual in danger. The Queen, whose view of the

Revolution and its dangers had always been a purely personal one, is the

directing will in the court-group from this moment, October 1789,

onwards; and the chief preoccupation of that group for eighteen months

is personal safety. Surrounded by the pomp of the Tuileries and amid all

the external appearances of a power still greater than that of any other

monarch in Europe, Louis and his wife and their very few immediate and

devoted friends and followers thought of the palace as a prison, and

never considered their position save as one intolerable.

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