disorganized the financial administration. Various devices such as the
_toisé_ had been employed by the government to raise funds, but each
attempt had been met by fresh opposition. In 1647 recourse was had to a
tax known as the _édit du tarif_, which modified the existing
regulations upon the entry of provisions into Paris. Great opposition
was raised by the Parliament, which still more violently opposed in
January, 1648, a tax upon all possessors of lands. A _lit de justice_
was necessary to provide for the requirements of the government.
The operation of the unpopular tax, or _rachat_, as it was termed, was
postponed, and the creation of many new _maîtres de requêtes_ provided a
certain amount of money. At the lit de justice, Omer Talon, the intrepid
_avocat-général_, delivered an eloquent oration on the condition of the
French peasants. "For ten years, sire," he said, "the country has been
ruined, the peasants reduced to sleep upon straw, their furniture sold
to pay taxes. To minister to the luxury of Paris, millions of innocent
people are obliged to live upon rye and oat bread, and their only
protection is their poverty." The creation of new maîtres de requêtes
was stoutly opposed, but in vain, Broussel distinguishing himself by his
attack upon the government.
Thus, while victory was being prepared by Turenne, Condé, and Schomberg,
a revolution was breaking out in Paris, and in many other parts of the
kingdom resistance to the government was the order of the day. Brittany
and Toulouse showed especial audacity in their attacks on government
officials. At his wits' end for money, Emery resolved to demand as a
condition of the renewal of the _paulette_--a tax paid by those
officials whose offices were hereditary--a fine of four years' salary.
In the hope of conciliating the Parliament of Paris, the fine was not
imposed on that body. The Parliament, however, placed itself at the head
of the opposition, and on May 13, 1648, it and the sovereign courts--the
_chambre des comptes_, the _cour des aides_, and the _grand
conseil_--signed a bond in union, and the courts decided to send
representatives to a conference in the chamber of St. Louis. Like Louis
XVI, in 1789, the Queen mother endeavored to prevent the meeting of the
deputies. Like Louis, she failed in her object, and the court was forced
to yield. The Spaniards had taken Courtrai, and it was well to
temporize.
Money was urgently needed, and Mazarin hoped, by appealing to the
patriotism of the Parliament, to obtain the requisite supplies. He
represented that the conduct of the Parliament strengthened the cause of
Spain and ruined the credit of France. Unless money was forthcoming it
would be impossible to keep up the French armies or to maintain order at
home. Catalonia would have to be abandoned, the alliance with Sweden and
Hesse would be broken off; in a word, all would be lost. The Parliament,
however, was dead to all sense of patriotism, and was prepared to
sacrifice the nation to its own petty interests. Orléans, who had joined
the malcontents, promised that the deputies who had been imprisoned or
exiled by Mazarin should be restored. Mazarin, hoping for some striking
success on the frontier, determined to temporize, and on June 30, 1648,
in open defiance of the orders of the government, the chamber of St.
Louis was constituted as a permanent political body to carry out
reforms. With its establishment the First or Parliamentary Fronde began
its stormy career.
In appearance the Parliament of Paris was like the English Parliament,
bent on securing valuable constitutional rights. Its members demanded
proper control of the taxes, liberty for the individual, the abolition
of _lettres de cachet_. But in doing so they were encroaching on the
rights of the States-General, which was the only representative assembly
of the French nation. And, moreover, it was soon evident that the
Parliament aimed primarily at securing its own privileges. Each step in
the struggle between the Parliament and the Crown brings out more
conclusively the selfishness of the lawyers and their lack of
statesmanship. In the New or Second Fronde the nobles made no pretence
of securing for the nation constitutional rights. They openly demanded
provincial governments, pensions, and gifts of money.
Thus the principal cause of the failure of the Fronde movement was
apparent from the first. The Parliament had no constitutional basis; its
opposition to Mazarin, which was in many respects justified, was tainted
by the egoism and selfishness of its members. It had in reality no great
aims; it had no hold on the people. As time went on the movement was
rapidly wrecked by the intervention of the nobles and court ladies. De
Retz was under the influence of the Duchess of Chevreuse; the Duke of
Beaufort was governed by the Duchess of Montbazon; Condé revealed all
his plans to the Duchess of Châtillon, who conveyed them to Mazarin;
Turenne was encouraged in disloyalty by the Duchess of Longueville.
There was no lack of ability on the side of the opposition; Molé and De
Retz represented talents of different qualities, and the latter remained
the most brilliant pamphleteer of the period. Rochefoucauld, who at one
time was under the sway of the Duchess of Longueville, gives ample
evidence in his _Maximes_ of consummate ability and of a profound
knowledge of human nature; while Turenne and Condé, who at the period
were united against the crown, were the two ablest generals of the day.
Among other conspicuous men of the day who opposed Mazarin, Chavigny and
Châteauneuf were perhaps the most dangerous. But the association of most
of these heroes of the Fronde with the court ladies ruined all chances
of success. Love-affairs and politics became hopelessly intermingled,
and the New Fronde has remained a ridiculous episode in French history.
Though the Old Fronde was narrow-minded and selfish, and the New Fronde
absurd, the movements were fraught with great danger to the monarchy. In
1648 Mazarin at first failed to recognize the gravity of the situation,
and he thought that he had only to combat the intrigues of some of the
nobles. In the later phases of the struggle he often erred through his
belief in diplomacy and his tendency to follow moderate counsels. But he
never faltered in his determination to preserve the rights of the
French monarchy; he easily outmatched his opponents in intrigue; and
eventually, supported by the _bourgeoisie_ and the mass of the nation,
he triumphed over both the Parliament and the nobles.
Throughout the early months of 1648 the opposition of the Parliament was
intensified by the folly and unpopularity of Emery, the superintendent
of the finances, and by the failure of Mazarin to master the details of
the French administrative system. Moreover, he had given some
justification for the attacks made upon him by the favors which he
showered upon his own relations, and by the means employed in order to
secure for his brother the title of cardinal. The truth is Mazarin cared
little for home affairs, and gave no thought to matters connected with
the commerce and agriculture of France. Unlike Henry IV and Richelieu,
he made no attempt to open up new sources of prosperity for France by
founding colonies, encouraging trade, introducing manufactures, or
protecting agriculture. His neglect of the internal administration was
largely answerable for the financial embarrassments of France, for the
misery of the people, and to a large extent for the outbreak of the
First Fronde.
At the same time it must be remembered that his predecessor was in some
measure responsible for the troubles which ensued after his death.
Richelieu had made no efforts to reform the financial administration of
France, and both the direct and indirect taxes were levied unfairly and
oppressively. The financiers who farmed the indirect taxes made enormous
fortunes out of the taxpayers; fraud and peculation were common; the
provinces were in a state of wretchedness. The sale of offices, the
system of farming the taxes, and the _gabelle_ or tax on salt were left
untouched; the enormous and harmful concessions given to the nobles
during the minority of Louis XIII had not been revoked or diminished. On
his accession to office Mazarin found that the revenues of the next
three years had been spent. Moreover, on Richelieu's death few men of
marked capacity were to be found in France. Like Frederick the Great in
the next century, Richelieu was jealous of any initiative on the part of
his colleagues. He gradually concentrated in his own hands all the
threads of the administration and controlled the generals in the field.
His system produced useful agents, but neither statesmen nor able
commanders. The concentration of all authority in his own hands checked
reforms in the government departments, and one writer has stated that
"the Fronde would never have taken place if Richelieu had thought more
of securing efficiency in those departments to which he could not give
sufficient personal attention, and less on concentrating all authority
in his own hands."
After Richelieu's death a policy of firmness, if not severity, was
required. The easy rule of Anne of Austria, with its pardons and
concessions, resulted in an increase of independence on the part of the
nobles, and led ultimately to the Fronde. The policy of leniency brought
numerous difficulties and dangers which Mazarin in the end succeeded in
overcoming. That he was able to do so was probably due partly to his own
perseverance, partly to the policy of Richelieu, who had weakened the
nobles and the Parliament and deprived them of all substantial power.
Had Richelieu lived the Fronde could never have occurred; that it did
occur "was due to Mazarin's inability to rule with the same iron hand as
his more illustrious predecessor."
Rarely had a minister, occupied in carrying on a prolonged war, been so
involved in internal difficulties as was Mazarin. He had to superintend
the movements of French generals in Flanders, Germany, Italy, and Spain,
and at the same time to keep in constant communication with his agents
at Munster, who carried on complicated peace negotiations under his
instructions.
During the earlier part of his ministry successes abroad strengthened
the government at home and enabled it to take up a firm attitude toward
its opponents. In 1643 the victory of Rocroi had aided in the
establishment of Anne of Austria's regency; in 1645 the triumph at
Nordlingen had enabled Mazarin to suppress the rising opposition of the
Parliament of Paris; and in 1646 the capture of Mardyke, Dunkirk,
Piombino, and Porto Longone had effaced the recollection of the failure
at Orbitello. But in 1648 the situation at home was more critical and
political passions ran high. Mazarin's neglect of the internal
administration had led to the revival of the cabals suppressed in 1643,
while the Parliament of Paris found in the general misery and
misgovernment of the country some justification for its opposition to
the court and the minister. Turenne's victory of Zusmarshausen in May,
1648, passed almost unnoticed in Paris, which was then seething with
discontent. Mazarin, however, hoped that a victory won by the popular
Condé in Flanders would at any rate arrest attention, strike the
imagination of the Parisians, and enable the Court to deal a telling
blow at its opponents.
That the opposition had any real ground of complaint Mazarin never seems
to have acknowledged, and he certainly at this time failed to grasp the
gravity of the situation. The leaders of the Parliamentary Fronde were
to a great extent men who "represented the highest type of citizen life"
and who had the welfare of France at heart. In attacking a wasteful
administration and a ruinous system of taxation, the Fronde movement is
deserving of respect. There was much to urge against the frauds of
contractors, unjust imprisonments, and the creation of new offices, and
many of the suggested reforms of the chamber of St. Louis were
excellent. On May 15, 1648, delegates from the four sovereign
courts--the parliament, the grand conseil, the chambre des comptes, the
cour des aides--had met in the chamber of St. Louis "to reform the
abuses which had crept into the state." The thirty-two delegates who sat
in that chamber formulated their demands, and practically claimed a
share in the legislative authority. Their principal demands were:
(1) That no tax should be levied unless previously voted by the
Parliament of Paris; (2) that no one should be kept in prison for more
than twenty-four hours without being tried; (3) that an investigation
into the extortions of the farmers of the taxes should be made; (4) that
a quarter of the _taille_ should be remitted, and that money gained from
that source should be strictly appropriated to the wars; (5) that the
intendants should be abolished; (6) that no new office should be created
without the agreement of the Parliament of Paris.
The Parliament of Paris thus proposed to take up a position similar to
that occupied by the English Parliament. But the Parliament of Paris was
unfitted to be a legislative body. It was merely a close corporation of
hereditary lawyers, whose claim to political functions had been
summarily dismissed by Richelieu. The demand for the abolition of the
intendants at once testifies to its want of statesmanship.
Among Richelieu's beneficial measures none was more valuable than the
appointment of the intendants. By abolishing them the Parliament of
Paris was threatening the unity of the whole internal administration.
Without the intendants the provinces would once again fall into the
incapable hands of the nobles, feudalism would again be rampant, and
general confusion and anarchy would ensue. The Parliament no doubt
attacked the intendants in the hope of succeeding to their functions and
thus securing a considerable voice in the administration of the
provinces. The intendants, too, whose full title was "intendants of
justice, police, and finance," had often infringed upon the jurisdiction
of the Parliament, which was always jealous of any invasion of its
judicial powers. The proposals of the chamber of St. Louis constituted a
distinct attack on the royal power; they also implied on the part of the
sovereign courts an invasion of the rights of the nation. The King alone
had legislative power, and the States-General alone had the right to
present to him their grievances. At this crisis it is evident that the
Parliament wished to supersede the States-General and to take their
place. Such a usurpation on the part of a body of lawyers could not be
tolerated either by the government or by the nation, and the resistance
of the former eventually received the full support of the French people.
Anne of Austria, in her determination to preserve for her son all the
royal prerogatives intact, was furious at the demands of the sovereign
courts, and was prepared to enter upon a contest with them without
delay. Mazarin, however, persuaded her to temporize. Orléans, on July
7th, presided over a conference in his palace, and certain concessions
were made by Mazarin to the opposition. The superintendent, Emery, was
dismissed, and the incapable Marshal de la Meilleraye substituted. A
chamber of justice was set up, to deal with all abuses connected with
the financial administration. Over the abolition of the intendants there
was much angry discussion. Eventually Anne gave a reluctant consent to
the suppression of all except those in Languedoc, Provence, the
Lyonnais, Picardy, and Champagne. During these conferences Orléans
showed a sympathy with the Frondeurs and it was evident that he would
not uphold the royal cause. Being determined at the first opportunity to
resist the pretensions of the Parliament, and being desirous to sound
the loyalty of Condé, Anne and Mazarin summoned the Prince to Paris. It
was probably arranged at some interviews which took place on July 19th
and the following day that the Prince should first crush the Archduke
Leopold and then return to aid the government in overcoming the
resistance of the Parliament.
Till Condé had won a decisive victory the government thought it well to
continue to temporize, and Anne of Austria simulated a desire to satisfy
all the demands of the Frondeurs. On July 31st a royal declaration
agreed to the majority of the claims made by the sovereign courts in the
chamber of St. Louis. No satisfactory guarantee was, however, given with
regard to the personal liberty of the subject, and Broussel and other
extremists continued to agitate. The situation, which in many respects
resembled that of 1792, remained critical, the Frondeurs desiring
further radical changes, while the court anxiously awaited developments
on the frontier. At last, on August 22, 1648, arrived the news of
Condé's victory at Lens.
"Heaven has at last declared in our favor," wrote Mazarin, "in the Low
Countries no less than in other places." The victories of Zusmarshausen,
Tortosa, and Prague had now been crowned by the victory of Lens. The
superiority of the French arms was proved, and the courts prepared to
crush the opposition of the Parliament. The success at Lens would in
Mazarin's opinion enable him to force Spain to make peace, and to
triumph over the Parliament. By the advice of the Count of Chavigny, the
King's council--which included, besides the Queen Regent and Mazarin,
the Dukes of Orléans and Longueville, the chancellor, Seguier, and
Meilleraye, the superintendent of the finances--decided, like the court
of Louis XVI in July, 1789, to carry out a _coup d'état_ and to arrest
three members of the Parliament--Broussel, Blancmesnil, and Charton. The
arrests were to take effect in August. On August 26th, the day on which
a _Te Deum_ was being sung in Notre Dame in honor of the victory at
Lens, the attempt to carry out the coup d'état was made. Unlike Charles
I in his attempt to arrest the five members, the action of the French
government was partially successful. Charton indeed escaped, but
Broussel and Blancmesnil were seized. The populace of Paris at once rose
and erected barricades. The whole city was in an uproar. The news that
Masaniello had headed a rising in Naples against the tax-gatherers
helped to excite the mob, just as the victories of the English
Parliament had encouraged the aspirations of the French Parliament. At
this point Paul de Gondi, better known as the Cardinal de Retz, the
intriguing coadjutor of the Archbishop of Paris, became prominent. He
appeared at the Palais Royal and advised the Queen Regent to yield to
the popular wish and release Broussel and Blancmesnil. Having failed in
his object, he set to work to inflame still more the passions of the
multitude. On August 27th the situation became yet more serious, and the
chancellor, Seguier, attacked by the mob, nearly lost his life.
The Parliament endeavored, at first without success, to induce Anne to
release the prisoners; but at length, yielding to the advice of Orléans
and Mazarin, she consented to a compromise. The Parliament agreed not to
interfere in political matters, and Broussel and Blancmesnil were
released. The barricades disappeared and outwardly Paris was pacified.
But all danger was by no means over. The Duke of Longueville had during
the troubles held a very ambiguous attitude, and it was evident that he
and other nobles were not loyal to the court. The troops had shown signs
of mutiny; the days of the League seemed likely to return. On August
29th Mazarin made certain suggestions to the Regent which testified to
his foresight and determination. He was resolved to restore the royal
authority and to subdue the Parliament. He was determined to enforce the
supremacy of the King in Paris, and till that had been accomplished the
reputation of France would suffer abroad, trade would languish, the
conclusion of the war would be deferred. Like Mirabeau, Mazarin
recognized the necessity of removing the King and court from the
influence of the capital. He therefore advised the departure of the
court to Rueil, Conflans, or St. Maur, where the return of Condé could
be awaited. On that general's arrival Paris could, if necessary, be
coerced by force of arms. Meanwhile he urged the adoption of temporizing
measures and of a policy of conciliation, with the object of dividing
the enemies of the royal authority. Many of the bourgeoisie were opposed
to the late seditious conduct of Paris, and the older members of the
Parliament were disposed to peace. But a powerful party in the
Parliament was determined to regain its political powers, and on the
instigation of De Retz held meetings in order to consult upon the
necessary measures to be taken. Moreover, the Count of Chavigny had
deserted the cause of the court and urged the Parliament to resist
Mazarin to the uttermost. It was obvious that a further collision
between the royal authority and the Parliament was inevitable.
Mazarin's mind was made up. On September 13th the court moved to Rueil,
where it was joined by Orléans, Seguier, Meilleraye, and Condé. Two of
the Cardinal's opponents, the Marquis of Châteauneuf and the Count of
Chavigny, at once felt the heavy hand of the minister. The former was
exiled; the latter was placed under arrest. The attempt of a deputation
of the Parliament, headed by its president, Matthieu Molé, to secure the
release of Chavigny and to induce the Queen Regent to return to Paris,
failed, and the King's council annulled the decree of the Parliament
itself. The Parliament prepared to take defensive measures, but the
outbreak of hostilities was averted by the temporary triumph of a
pacific spirit in the court. It is difficult to account for this sudden
change; it was probably due to the fact that Mazarin could not depend
upon the whole-hearted support of Condé in carrying out an energetic
policy. Condé indeed stood apart from De Retz and looked with contempt
upon the "long-robed" Parliament as much as he did upon the _canaille_.
Like Napoleon he scorned mob rule and disorder. But for years he had
been alienated from Mazarin, and hated him as much as he despised the
Frondeurs.
Yielding to the persuasions of De Retz, Condé advocated the assembling
of a conference, hoping to bring about Mazarin's exclusion from its
meetings. The conference first met at St. Germain on September 25th, the
royal authority being represented by Orléans, Condé, Conti, and
Longueville; and it lasted ten days, till October 4th. After long
discussions the members agreed to an ordinance, which was published on
October 22, 1648, and known as the Declaration of St. Germain. Most of
the demands of the chamber of St. Louis were conceded. The financial,
judicial, and commercial administration of the kingdom was regulated,
and measures were taken to check arbitrary arrests and to reform the
methods of taxation. This ordinance was the most important act of the
First or Parliamentary Fronde, and represents the high-water mark of
constitutional advance made by the Parliament and its supporters. It
almost seemed that constitutional life was at last to begin in France.
But if examined closely the Declaration of October 22d bears full
evidence as to the selfish and narrow aims of the Parliament, and shows
how every so-called constitutional effort on its part was tainted by its
determination to secure its own privileges. In the declaration it is
specially stated that the charges and privileges of the Parliament
should be guaranteed. Though the regular payment of the _rentes_ of the
Hôtel de Ville--a matter in which the bourgeoisie was interested--was
enforced, and though there was a reference in general terms to the
amelioration of the lot of the mass of the people, the declaration was
principally concerned with securing and confirming the privileges of the
Parliament.