affirms that "all authors are to be banished from school except those
that give a knowledge of useful things." Wisdom is certainly not to be
opposed to knowledge, but it depends more on a man's power of
discrimination, combination, and imagination than on the extent of his
mental store of facts. Were it not so, our whole secondary education,
and all the purely disciplinal part of our university instruction would
be very far astray. If the ancient tongues are to be learned simply with
a view to the sum of knowledge they contain, it would be absurd to waste
the time of our youth over them. It would be better to impose on our
universities the duty of furnishing guaranteed translations for the use
of the public. We shall not, however, involve ourselves in controversy
here, as our object is merely to point out, generally, the strong and
weak points of our author.
Next in importance to pansophy or encyclopædism, and closely connected
with it, is the principle that a knowledge of words and of things should
go hand in hand. Words are to be learned through things. Properly
interpreted, and under due limitations, this principle will, we presume,
be now generally accepted. We say, under due limitations, because it is
manifest that the converse preposition, that "things are learned through
words," is easily capable of proof, and is indeed, in our opinion, the
stronghold of humanistic teaching in its earlier or school stages.
It is in the department of method, however, that we recognize the chief
contribution of Comenius to education. The mere attempt to systematize
was a great advance. In seeking, however, for foundations on which to
erect a coherent system, he had had to content himself with first
principles which were vague and unscientific.
Modern psychology was in its infancy, and Comenius had little more than
the generalizations of Plato and Aristotle, and those not strictly
investigated by him, for his guide. In training to virtue, moral truth
and the various moralities were assumed as if they emerged full-blown in
the consciousness of man. In training to godliness, again, Christian
dogma was ready to his hand. In the department of knowledge, that is to
say, knowledge of the outer world, Comenius rested his method on the
scholastic maxim, _"Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in
sensu_." This maxim he enriched with the Baconian induction,
comprehended by him, however, only in a general way. It was chiefly,
however, the imagined harmony of physical and mental process that
yielded his method. He believed that the process of the growth of
external things had a close resemblance to the growth of the mind. Had
he lived in these days he would doubtless have endeavored to work out
the details of his method on a purely psychological basis; but in the
then state of psychology he had to find another thread through the
labyrinth. The mode of demonstration which he adopted was thus, as he
himself called it, the syncretic or analogical. Whatever may be said of
the harmony that exists between the growth of nature and of mind, there
can be no doubt that the observation of the former is capable of
suggesting, if it does not furnish, many of the rules of educational
method.
From the simple to the complex, from the particular to the general, the
concrete before the abstract, and all, step by step, and even by
insensible degrees--these were among his leading principles of method.
But the most important of all his principles was derived from the
scholastic maxim quoted above. As all is from sense, let the thing to be
known be itself presented to the senses, and let every sense be engaged
in the perception of it. When it is impossible, from the nature of the
case, to present the object itself, place a vivid picture of it before
the pupil. The mere enumeration of these few principles, even if we drop
out of view all his other contributions to method and school-management,
will satisfy any man familiar with all the more recent treatises on
education, that Comenius, even after giving his precursors their due, is
to be regarded as the true founder of modern method, and that he
anticipates Pestalozzi and all of the same school.
When we come to consider Comenius' method as applied specially to
language, we recognize its general truth, and the teachers of Europe and
America will now be prepared to pay it the homage of theoretical
approval at least. To admire, however, his own attempt at working out
his linguistic method is impossible, unless we first accept his
encyclopædism. The very faults with which he charged the school
practices of the time are simply repeated by himself in a new form. The
boy's mind is overloaded with a mass of words--the name and qualities of
everything in heaven, on the earth, and under the earth. It was
impossible that all these things, or even pictures of them, could be
presented to sense, and hence his books must have inflicted a heavy
burden on the merely verbal memory of boys. We want children to grow
into knowledge, not to swallow numberless facts made up into boluses.
Again, the amount that was to be acquired within a given time was beyond
the youthful capacity. Any teacher will satisfy himself of this who will
simply count the words and sentences in the _Janua_ and _Orbis_ of
Comenius, and then try to distribute these over the schooltime allowed
them. Like all reformers, Comenius was oversanguine. I do not overlook
the fact that command over the Latin tongue as a vehicle of expression
was necessary to those who meant to devote themselves to professions and
to learning, and that Comenius had his justification for introducing a
mass of vocables now wholly useless to the student of Latin. But even
for his own time, Comenius, under the influence of his encyclopædic
passion, overdid his task. His real merits in language-teaching lie in
the introduction of the principle of graduated reading-books, in the
simplification of Latin grammar, in his founding instruction in foreign
tongues on the vernacular, and in his insisting on method in
instruction. But these were great merits, too soon forgotten by the dull
race of schoolmasters, if, indeed, they were ever fully recognized by
them till quite recent times.
Finally, Comenius' views as to the inner organization of a school were
original, and have proved themselves in all essential respects correct.
The same may be said of his scheme for the organization of a state
system--a scheme which is substantially, _mutatis mutandis_, at this
moment embodied in the highly developed system of Germany.
When we consider, then, that Comenius first formally and fully developed
educational method, that he introduced important reforms into the
teaching of languages, that he introduced into schools the study of
nature, that he advocated with intelligence, and not on purely
sentimental grounds, a milder discipline, we are justified in assigning
to him a high, if not the highest, place among modern educational
writers. The voluminousness of his treatises, their prolixity, their
repetitions, and their defects of styles have all operated to prevent
men studying him. The substance of what he has written has been, I
believe, faithfully given by me, but it has not been possible to
transfer to these pages the fervor, the glow, and the pious aspirations
of the good old bishop.
FOOTNOTES:
[34] Mr. Laurie's work was written in 1881. Considerable changes have
since been made along the lines which he suggests.
FIRST WRITTEN FREE CONSTITUTION IN THE WORLD
EARLIEST UNION AMONG AMERICAN COLONIES
A.D. 1639-1643
G. H. HOLLISTER JOHN MARSHALL
That a colonizing people should, almost at the moment of their
arrival in a new home, proceed to enact the fundamental law of
a civil state is a remarkable fact in history. The manner in
which this was done in Connecticut, and the character of the
constitution there made in 1639, six years after the first
English settlement, render it a memorable event in the
development of American government.
As the Connecticut Constitution was not only the first
instrument of its kind, but also formed, in many respects, a
pattern for others which became the organic laws of American
States, so the first union of colonies, in 1643, is important
not alone as being the first, but also as foreshadowing the
later confederation and the final union of the States
themselves.
This model of an American union, following so closely upon the
earliest creation of an American civil constitution, is
concisely described by the great Chief Justice Marshall.
G. H. HOLLISTER
We read, in treatises upon elementary law, of a time antecedent to all
law, when men theoretically are said to have met together and
surrendered a part of their rights for a more secure enjoyment of the
remainder. Hence, we are told, human governments date their origin. This
dream of the enthusiast as applied to ages past, in Connecticut for the
first time and upon the American soil became a recorded verity.
Here at last we are permitted to look on and see the foundations of a
political structure laid. We can count the workmen, and we have become
familiar with the features of the master-builders. We see that they are
most of them men of a new type. Bold men they are, who have cut loose
from old associations, old prejudices, old forms; men who will take the
opinions of no man unless he can back them up with strong reasons;
clear-sighted, sinewy men, in whom the intellect and the moral nature
predominate over the more delicate traits that mark an advanced stage of
social life. Such men as these will not, however, in their zeal to cast
off old dominions, be solicitous to free themselves and their posterity
from all restraint; for no people are less given up to the sway of
unbridled passions. Indeed, they have made it a main part of their
business in life to subdue their passions. Laws, therefore, they must
and will have, and laws that, whatever else they lack, will not want the
merit of being fresh and original.
As it has been, and still is, a much debated question, what kind of men
they were--some having overpraised and others rashly blamed them--let
us, without bigotry, try if we cannot look at them through a medium that
shall render them to us in all their essential characteristics as they
were. That medium is afforded us by the written constitution that they
made of their own free will for their own government. This is said to
give the best portrait of any people; though in a nation that has been
long maturing, the compromise between the past and present, written upon
almost every page of its history, cannot have failed in some degree to
make the likeness dim. Yet, of such a people as we are describing, who
may be said to have no past, who live not so much in the present as in
the future, and who forge as with one stroke the constitution that is to
be a basis of their laws--are we not provided with a mirror that
reflects every lineament with the true disposition of light and shade?
If it is a stern, it is yet a truthful, mirror. It flatters neither
those who made it nor those blear-eyed maskers, who, forgetful of their
own distorted visages, look in askance, and are able to see nothing to
admire in the sober, bright-eyed faces of their fathers who gaze down
upon them from the olden time.
The preamble of this constitution begins by reciting the fact that its
authors are, "under Almighty God, inhabitants and residents of Windsor,
Hartford, and Wethersfield, upon the river of Connecticut." It also
states that, in consonance with the word of God, in order to maintain
the peace and union of such a people, it is necessary that "there should
be an orderly and decent government established," that shall "dispose
of the affairs of _the people_ at all seasons." "We do therefore," say
they, "associate and conjoin ourselves to be as one public state or
commonwealth." They add, further, that the first object aimed at by them
is to preserve the liberty and the purity of the gospel and the
discipline of their own churches; and, in the second place, to govern
their _civil affairs_ by such rules as their written constitution and
the laws enacted under its authority shall prescribe. To provide for
these two objects--the liberty of the Gospel, as they understood it, and
the regulation of their own civil affairs, they sought to embody in the
form of distinct decrees, substantially the following provisions:
1. That there shall be every year two general assemblies or courts, one
on the second Thursday of April, the other on the second Thursday of
September; that the one held in April shall be called the court of
election, wherein shall be annually chosen the magistrates--one of whom
shall be the governor--and other public officers, who are to administer
justice according to the laws here established; where there are no laws
provided to do it in accordance with the laws of God; and that these
rulers shall be elected by all the freemen within the limits of the
commonwealth, who have been admitted inhabitants of the towns where they
severally live, and who have taken the oath of fidelity to the new
state; and that they shall all meet at one place to hold this election.
2. It is provided that after the voters have all met and are ready to
proceed to an election, the first officer to be chosen shall be a
governor, and after him a body of magistrates and other officers. Every
voter is to bring in, to those who are appointed to receive it, a piece
of paper with the name of him whom he would have for governor written
upon it, and he that has the greatest number of papers with his name
written upon them was to be governor for that year. The other
magistrates were elected in the following manner. The names of all the
candidates were first given to the secretary for the time being, and
written down by him, in the order in which they were given; the
secretary was then to read the list over aloud and severally nominate
each person whose name was so written down, in its order, in a distinct
voice, so that all the citizen voters could hear it. As each name was
read, they were to vote by ballot, either for or against it, as they
liked; those who voted in favor of the nominee did it by writing his
name upon the ballot--those who voted against him simply gave in a blank
ballot; and those only were elected whose names were written upon a
majority of all the paper ballots handed in under each nomination. These
papers were to be received and counted by sworn officers appointed by
the court for that purpose. Six magistrates, besides the governor, were
to be elected in this way. If they failed to elect so many by a majority
vote, then the requisite number was to be filled up by taking the names
of those who had received the highest number of votes.
3. The men thus to be nominated and balloted for were to be propounded
at some general court held before the court of election, the deputies of
each town having the privilege of nominating any two whom they chose.
Other nominations might be made by the court.
4. No person could be chosen governor oftener than once in two years. It
was requisite that this officer should be a member of an approved
congregation, and that he should be taken from the magistrates of the
commonwealth. But no qualification was required in a candidate for the
magistracy, except that he should be chosen from the freemen. Both
governor and magistrates were required to take a solemn oath of office.
5. To this court of election the several towns were to send their
deputies, and after the elections were over the court was to proceed, as
at other courts, to make laws or do whatever was necessary to further
the interests of the commonwealth.
6. These two regular courts were to be convened by the governor himself,
or by his secretary, by sending out a warrant to the constables of every
town, a month at least before the day of session. In times of danger or
public exigency the governor and a majority of the magistrates might
order the secretary to summon a court, with fourteen days' notice, or
even less, if the case required it, taking care to state their reasons
for so doing to the deputies when they met. If, on the other hand, the
governor should neglect to call the regular courts, or, with the major
part of the magistrates, should fail to convene such special ones as
were needed, then the freemen, or a major part of them, were required
to petition them to do it. If this did not serve, then the freemen, or a
majority of them, were clothed with the power to order the constables to
summon the court, after which they might meet, choose a moderator, and
do any act that it was lawful for the regular courts to do.
7. On receiving the warrants for these general courts the constables of
each town were to give immediate notice to the freemen, either at a
public gathering or by going from house to house, that at a given place
and time they should meet to elect deputies to the general court, about
to convene, and "to agitate the affairs of the commonwealth." These
deputies were to be chosen by vote of the electors of the town who had
taken the oath of fidelity; and no man not a freeman was eligible to the
office of deputy. The deputies were to be chosen by a major vote of all
the freemen present, who were to make their choice by written paper
ballots--each voter giving in as many papers as there were deputies to
be chosen, with a single name written on each paper. The names of the
deputies when chosen were indorsed by the constables, on the back of
their respective warrants, and returned into court.
8. The three towns of the commonwealth were each to have the privilege
of sending four deputies to the general court. If other towns were
afterward added to the jurisdiction, the number of their deputies was to
be fixed by the court. The deputies represented the towns, and could
bind them by their votes in all legislative matters.
9. The deputies had power to meet after they were chosen and before the
session of the general court, to consult for the public good, and to
examine whether those who had been returned as members of their own body
were legally elected. If they found any who were not so elected, they
might seclude them from their assembly, and return their names to the
court, with their reasons for so doing. The court, on finding these
reasons valid, could issue orders for a new election, and impose a fine
upon such men as had falsely thrust themselves upon the towns as
candidates.
10. Every regular general court was to consist of the governor and at
least four other magistrates, with the major part of the deputies chosen
from the several towns. But if any court happened to be called by the
freemen, through the default of the governor and magistrates, that court
was to consist of a majority of the freemen present, or their deputies,
and a _moderator_, chosen by them. In the general court was lodged the
"_supreme power of the commonwealth_." In this court the governor or
moderator had power to command liberty of speech, to silence all
disorders, and to put all questions that were to be made the subject of
legislative action, but not to vote himself unless the court was equally
divided, when he was to give the casting vote. But he could not adjourn
or dissolve the court without the major vote of the members. Taxes also
were to be ordered by the court; and when they had agreed upon the sum
to be raised, a committee was to be appointed of an equal number of men
from each town to decide what part of that sum each town should pay.
This first constitution of the New World was simple in its terms,
comprehensive in its policy, methodical in its arrangement, beautiful in
its adaptation of parts to a whole, of means to an end. Compare it with
any of the constitutions of the Old World then existing. I say nothing
of those libels upon human nature, the so-called constitutions of the
Continent of Europe--compare it reverently, as children speak of a
father's roof, with that venerated structure, the British Constitution.
How complex is the architecture of the latter! here exhibiting the
clumsy work of the Saxon, there the more graceful touch of later
conquerors; the whole colossal pile, magnificent with turrets and
towers, and decorated with armorial devices and inscriptions, written in
a language not only dead, but never native to the island; all eloquent,
indeed, with the spirit of ages past, yet haunted with the cry of
suffering humanity and the clanking of chains that come up from its
subterranean dungeons.
Mark, too, the rifts and seams in its gray walls--traces of convulsion
and revolution. Proud as it is, its very splendor shows the marks of a
barbarous age. Its tapestry speaks a language dissonant to the ears of
freemen. It tells of exclusive privileges, of divine rights, not in the
people, but in the king, of primogeniture, of conformities, of
prescriptions, of serfs and lords, of attainder that dries up like a
leprosy the fountains of inheritable blood; and, lastly, it discourses
of the rights of British subjects, in eloquent language, but sometimes
with qualifications that startle the ears of men who have tasted the
sweets of a more enlarged liberty. Such was the spirit of the British
Constitution, and code of the seventeenth century. I do not blame it
that it was not better; perhaps it could not then have been improved
without risk. Improvement in an old state is the work of time. But I
have a right to speak with pride of the more advanced freedom of our
own.
The Constitution of Connecticut sets out with the practical recognition
of the doctrine that all ultimate power is lodged with the people. The
body of the people is the body politic. From the people flow the
fountains of law and justice. The governor and the other magistrates,
the deputies themselves, are but a kind of committee, with delegated
powers to act for the free planters. Elected from their number, they
must spend their short official term in the discharge of the trust, and
then descend to their old level of citizen voters. Here are to be no
interminable parliaments. The majority of the general court can adjourn
it at will. Nor is there to be an indefinite prorogation of the
Legislature at the will of a single man. Let the governor and the
magistrates look to it. If they do not call a general court, the
planters will take the matter into their own hands and meet in a body to
take care of their neglected interests.
One of the most striking features in this new and at the same time
strange document is that it will tolerate no rotten-borough system.
Every deputy who goes to the Legislature is to go from his own town, and
is to be a free planter of that town. In this way he will know what is
the will of his constituents and what their wants are.
This paper has another remarkable trait. There is to be no taxation
without representation in Connecticut. The towns, too, are recognized as
independent municipalities. They are the primary centres of power older
than the constitution--the makers and builders of the State. They have
given up to the State a part of their corporate powers, as they received
them from the free planters, that they may have a safer guarantee for
the keeping of the rest. Whatever they have not given up they hold in
absolute right.
How strange, too, that in defining so carefully and astutely the limits
of the government, these constitution-makers should have forgotten the
King. One would but suppose that those who indited this paper were even
aware of the existence of titled majesty beyond what belonged to the
King of kings. They mention no supreme power save that of the
commonwealth, which speaks and acts through the general court.
Such was the Constitution of Connecticut. I have said it was the oldest
of the American constitutions. More than this, I might say, it is the
mother of them all. It has been modified in different States to suit the
circumstances of the people and the size of their respective
territories; but the representative system peculiar to the American
republics was first unfolded by Ludlow--who probably drafted the
Constitution of Connecticut--and by Hooker, Haynes, Wolcott, Steele,
Sherman, Stone, and the other far-sighted men of the colony, who must
have advised and counselled to do what they and all the people in the
three towns met together in a mass to sanction and adopt as their own.
Let me not be understood to say that I consider the framers of this
paper perfect legislators or in all respects free from bigotry and
intolerance. How could they throw off in a moment the shackles of custom
and old opinion? They saw more than two centuries beyond their own era.
England herself at this day has only approximated, without reaching, the
elevated table-land of constitutional freedom, whose pure air was
breathed by the earliest planters of Connecticut. Under this
constitution they passed, it is true, some quaint laws, that sometimes
provoke a smile, and, in those who are unmindful of the age in which
they lived, sometimes a sneer.