they honour still more the powers and ideas recognised by society; they
have been accustomed for millennia to go along with their hands folded
on their breasts, and their heads bent before everything dominant,
disapproving of all resistance to public authority. They therefore
unintentionally, and as if from instinct, hang themselves as a drag
on the wheels of free-spirited, independent endeavour, and in certain
circumstances make their husbands highly impatient, especially when the
latter persuade themselves that it is really love which prompts the
action of their wives. To disapprove of women's methods and generously
to honour the motives that prompt them--that is man's nature and often
enough his despair.
436.
_CETERUM CENSEO._--It is laughable when a company of paupers decree the
abolition of the right of inheritance, and it is not less laughable
when childless persons labour for the practical law-giving of a
country: they have not enough ballast in their ship to sail safely
over the ocean of the future. But it seems equally senseless if a man
who has chosen for his mission the widest knowledge and estimation of
universal existence, burdens himself with personal considerations for a
family, with the support, protection, and care of wife and child, and
in front of his telescope hangs that gloomy veil through which hardly a
ray from the distant firmament can penetrate. Thus I, too, agree with
the opinion that in matters of the highest philosophy all married men
are to be suspected.
437.
FINALLY.--There are many kinds of hemlock, and fate generally finds
an opportunity to put a cup of this poison to the lips of the free
spirit,--in order to "punish" him, as every one then says. What do the
women do about him then? They cry and lament, and perhaps disturb the
sunset-calm of the thinker, as they did in the prison at Athens. "Oh
Crito, bid some one take those women away!" said Socrates at last.
[Footnote 1: The opposite of this aphorism also holds good.--J.M.K.]
[Footnote 2: It may be remarked that Nietzsche changed his view
on this subject later on, and ascribed more importance to woman's
intuition. Cf. also Disraeli's reference to the "High Priestesses of
predestination."--J.M.K.]
EIGHTH DIVISION.
A GLANCE AT THE STATE.
438.
ASKING TO BE HEARD.--The demagogic disposition and the intention of
working upon the masses is at present common to all political parties;
on this account they are all obliged to change their principles into
great _al fresco_ follies and thus make a show of them. In this matter
there is no further alteration to be made: indeed, it is superfluous
even to raise a finger against it; for here Voltaire's saying applies:
"_Quand la populace se mêle de raisonner, tout est perdu."_ Since this
has happened we have to accommodate ourselves to the new conditions,
as we have to accommodate ourselves when an earthquake has displaced
the old boundaries and the contour of the land and altered the value
of property. Moreover, when it is once for all a question in the
politics of all parties to make life endurable to the greatest possible
majority, this majority may always decide what they understand by an
endurable life; if they believe their intellect capable of finding the
right means to this end why should we doubt about it? They _want,_
once for all, to be the architects of their own good or ill fortune;
and if their feeling of free choice and their pride in the five or
six ideas that their brain conceals and brings to light, really makes
life so agreeable to them that they gladly put up with the fatal
consequences of their narrow-mindedness, there is little to object to,
provided that their narrow-mindedness does not go so far as to demand
that _everything_ shall become politics in this sense, that _all_ shall
live and act according to this standard. For, in the first place, it
must be more than ever permissible for some people to keep aloof from
politics and to stand somewhat aside. To this they are also impelled
by the pleasure of free choice, and connected with this there may
even be some little pride in keeping silence when too many, and only
the many, are speaking. Then this small group must be excused if they
do not attach such great importance to the happiness of the majority
(nations or strata of population may be understood thereby), and are
occasionally guilty of an ironical grimace; for their seriousness lies
elsewhere, their conception of happiness is quite different, and their
aim cannot be encompassed by every clumsy hand that has just five
fingers. Finally, there comes from time to time--what is certainly
most difficult to concede to them, but must also be conceded--a moment
when they emerge from their silent solitariness and try once more the
strength of their lungs; they then call to each other like people lost
in a wood, to make themselves known and for mutual encouragement;
whereby, to be sure, much becomes audible that sounds evil to ears for
which it is not intended. Soon, however, silence again prevails in
the wood, such silence that the buzzing, humming, and fluttering of
the countless insects that live in, above, and beneath it, are again
plainly heard.
439.
CULTURE AND CASTE.--A higher culture can only originate where there are
two distinct castes of society: that of the working class, and that of
the leisured class who are capable of true leisure; or, more strongly
expressed, the caste of compulsory labour and the caste of free labour.
The point of view of the division of happiness is not essential when
it is a question of the production of a higher culture; in any case,
however, the leisured caste is more susceptible to suffering and
suffer more, their pleasure in existence is less and their task is
greater. Now supposing there should be quite an interchange between the
two castes, so that on the one hand the duller and less intelligent
families and individuals are lowered from the higher caste into the
lower, and, on the other hand, the freer men of the lower caste obtain
access to the higher, a condition of things would be attained beyond
which one can only perceive the open sea of vague wishes. Thus speaks
to us the vanishing voice of the olden time; but where are there still
ears to hear it?
440.
OF GOOD BLOOD.--That which men and women of good blood possess much
more than others, and which gives them an undoubted right to be
more highly appreciated, are two arts which are always increased by
inheritance: the art of being able to command, and the art of proud
obedience. Now wherever commanding is the business of the day (as in
the great world of commerce and industry), there results something
similar to these families of good blood, only the noble bearing in
obedience is lacking which is an inheritance from feudal conditions and
hardly grows any longer in the climate of our culture.
441.
SUBORDINATION.--The subordination which is so highly valued in military
and official ranks will soon become as incredible to us as the secret
tactics of the Jesuits have already become; and when this subordination
is no longer possible a multitude of astonishing results will no longer
be attained, and the world will be all the poorer. It must disappear,
for its foundation is disappearing, the belief in unconditional
authority, in ultimate truth; even in military ranks physical
compulsion is not sufficient to produce it, but only the inherited
adoration of the princely as of something superhuman. In _freer_
circumstances people subordinate themselves only on conditions, in
compliance with a mutual contract, consequently with all the provisos
of self-interest.
442.
THE NATIONAL ARMY.--The greatest disadvantage of the national army,
now so much glorified, lies in the squandering of men of the highest
civilisation; it is only by the favourableness of all circumstances
that there are such men at all; how carefully and anxiously should we
deal with them, since long periods are required to create the chance
conditions for the production of such delicately organised brains! But
as the Greeks wallowed in the blood of Greeks, so do Europeans now in
the blood of Europeans: and indeed, taken relatively, it is mostly the
highly cultivated who are sacrificed, those who promise an abundant
and excellent posterity; for such stand in the front of the battle as
commanders, and also expose themselves to most danger, by reason of
their higher ambition. At present, when quite other and higher tasks
are assigned than _patria_ and _honor,_ the rough Roman patriotism is
either something dishonourable or a sign of being behind the times.
443.
HOPE AS PRESUMPTION.--Our social order will slowly melt away, as all
former orders have done, as soon as the suns of new opinions have shone
upon mankind with a new glow. We can only _wish_ this melting away in
the hope thereof, and we are only reasonably entitled to hope when we
believe that we and our equals have more strength in heart and head
than the representatives of the existing state of things. As a rule,
therefore, this hope will be a presumption, an _over-estimation._
444.
WAR.--Against war it may be said that it makes the victor stupid and
the vanquished revengeful. In favour of war it may be said that it
barbarises in both its above-named results, and thereby makes more
natural; it is the sleep or the winter period of culture; man emerges
from it with greater strength for good and for evil.
445.
IN THE PRINCE'S SERVICE.--To be able to act quite regardlessly it is
best for a statesman to carry out his work not for himself but for a
prince. The eye of the spectator is dazzled by the splendour of this
general disinterestedness, so that it does not see the malignancy and
severity which the work of a statesman brings with it.[1]
446.
A QUESTION OF POWER, NOT OF RIGHT.--As regards Socialism, in the eyes
of those who always consider higher utility, if it is _really_ a
rising against their oppressors of those who for centuries have been
oppressed and downtrodden, there is no problem of _right_ involved
(notwithstanding the ridiculous, effeminate question," How far
_ought_ we to grant its demands?") but only a problem of _power_;
the same, therefore, as in the case of a natural force,--steam, for
instance,--which is either forced by man into his service, as a
machine-god, or which, in case of defects of the machine, that is to
say, defects of human calculation in its construction, destroys it and
man together. In order to solve this question of power we must know how
strong Socialism is, in what modification it may yet be employed as
a powerful lever in the present mechanism of political forces; under
certain circumstances we should do all we can to strengthen it. With
every great force--be it the most dangerous--men have to think how they
can make of it an instrument for their purposes. Socialism acquires a
_right_ only if war seems to have taken place between the two powers,
the representatives of the old and the new, when, however, a wise
calculation of the greatest possible preservation and advantageousness
to both sides gives rise to a desire for a treaty. Without treaty no
right. So far, however, there is neither war nor treaty on the ground
in question, therefore no rights, no "ought."
447.
UTILISING THE MOST TRIVIAL DISHONESTY.--The power of the press consists
in the fact that every individual who ministers to it only feels
himself bound and constrained to a very small extent. He usually
expresses _his_ opinion, but sometimes also does _not_ express it
in order to serve his party or the politics of his country, or
even himself. Such little faults of dishonesty, or perhaps only of
a dishonest silence, are not hard to bear by the individual, but
the consequences are extraordinary, because these little faults are
committed by many at the same time. Each one says to himself: "For such
small concessions I live better and can make my income; by the want of
such little compliances I make myself impossible." Because it seems
almost morally indifferent to write a line more (perhaps even without
signature), or not to write it, a person who has money and influence
can make any opinion a public one. He who knows that most people are
weak in trifles, and wishes to attain his own ends thereby, is always
dangerous.
448.
Too LOUD A TONE IN GRIEVANCES.--Through the fact that an account of a
bad state of things (for instance, the crimes of an administration,
bribery and arbitrary favour in political or learned bodies) is greatly
exaggerated, it fails in its effect on intelligent people, but has
all the greater effect on the unintelligent (who would have remained
indifferent to an accurate and moderate account). But as these latter
are considerably in the majority, and harbour in themselves stronger
will-power and more impatient desire for action, the exaggeration
becomes the cause of investigations, punishments, promises, and
reorganisations. In so far it is useful to exaggerate the accounts of
bad states of things.
449.
THE APPARENT WEATHER--MAKERS OF POLITICS.--Just as people tacitly
assume that he who understands the weather, and foretells it about a
day in advance, makes the weather, so even the educated and learned,
with a display of superstitious faith, ascribe to great statesmen as
their most special work all the important changes and conjunctures that
have taken place during their administration, when it is only evident
that they knew something thereof a little earlier than other people and
made their calculations accordingly,--thus they are also looked upon as
weather-makers--and this belief is not the least important instrument
of their power.
450.
NEW AND OLD CONCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT.--To draw such a distinction
between Government and people as if two separate spheres of power,
a stronger and higher, and a weaker and lower, negotiated and came
to terms with each other, is a remnant of transmitted political
sentiment, which still accurately represents the historic establishment
of the conditions of power in _most_ States. When Bismarck, for
instance, describes the constitutional system as a compromise between
Government and people, he speaks in accordance with a principle which
has its reason in history (from whence, to be sure, it also derives
its admixture of folly, without which nothing human can exist). On
the other hand, we must now learn--in accordance with a principle
which has originated only in the _brain_ and has still to _make_
history--that Government is nothing but an organ of the people,--not
an attentive, honourable "higher" in relation to a "lower" accustomed
to modesty. Before we accept this hitherto unhistorical and arbitrary,
although logical, formulation of the conception of Government, let us
but consider its consequences, for the relation between people and
Government is the strongest typical relation, after the pattern of
which the relationship between teacher and pupil, master and servants,
father and family, leader and soldier, master and apprentice, is
unconsciously formed. At present, under the influence of the prevailing
constitutional system of government, all these relationships are
changing a little,--they are becoming compromises. But how they will
have to be reversed and shifted, and change name and nature, when that
newest of all conceptions has got the upper hand everywhere in people's
minds!--to achieve which, however, a century may yet be required. In
this matter there is nothing _further_ to be wished for except caution
and slow development.
451.
JUSTICE AS THE DECOY-CRY OF PARTIES.--Well may noble (if not exactly
very intelligent) representatives of the governing classes asseverate:
"We will treat men equally and grant them equal rights"; so far a
socialistic mode of thought which is based on _justice_ is possible;
but, as has been said, only within the ranks of the governing class,
which in this case _practises_ justice with sacrifices and abnegations.
On the other hand, to _demand_ equality of rights, as do the Socialists
of the subject caste, is by no means the outcome of justice, but of
covetousness. If you expose bloody pieces of flesh to a beast, and
withdraw them again, until it finally begins to roar, do you think that
roaring implies justice?
452.
POSSESSION AND JUSTICE.--When the Socialists point out that the
division of property at the present day is the consequence of countless
deeds of injustice and violence, and, _in summa,_ repudiate obligation
to anything with so unrighteous a basis, they only perceive something
isolated. The entire past of ancient civilisation is built up on
violence, slavery, deception, and error; we, however, cannot annul
ourselves, the heirs of all these conditions, nay, the concrescences
of all this past, and are not entitled to demand the withdrawal of a
single fragment thereof. The unjust disposition lurks also in the souls
of non-possessors; they are not better than the possessors and have no
moral prerogative; for at one time or another their ancestors have been
possessors. Not forcible new distributions, but gradual transformations
of opinion are necessary; justice in all matters must become greater,
the instinct of violence weaker.
453.
THE HELMSMAN OF THE PASSIONS.--The statesman excites public passions in
order to have the advantage of the counter-passions thereby aroused. To
give an example: a German statesman knows quite well that the Catholic
Church will never have the same plans as Russia; indeed, that it would
far rather be allied with the Turk than with the former country; he
likewise knows that Germany is threatened with great danger from an
alliance between France and Russia. If he can succeed, therefore, in
making France the focus and fortress of the Catholic Church, he has
averted this danger for a lengthy period. He has, accordingly, an
interest in showing hatred against the Catholics in transforming, by
all kinds of hostility, the supporters of the Pope's authority into an
impassioned political power which is opposed to German politics, and
must, as a matter of course, coalesce with France as the adversary of
Germany; his aim is the catholicising of France, just as necessarily
as Mirabeau saw the salvation of his native land in de-catholicising
it. The one State, therefore, desires to muddle millions of minds
of another State in order to gain advantage thereby. It is the same
disposition which supports the republican form of government of a
neighbouring State--_le désordre organisé,_ as Mérimée says--for the
sole reason that it assumes that this form of government makes the
nation weaker, more distracted, less fit for war.
454.
THE DANGEROUS REVOLUTIONARY SPIRITS.--Those who are bent on
revolutionising society may be divided into those who seek something
for themselves thereby and those who seek something for their children
and grandchildren. The latter are the more dangerous, for they have the
belief and the good conscience of disinterestedness. The others can be
appeased by favours: those in power are still sufficiently rich and
wise to adopt that expedient. The danger begins as soon as the aims
become impersonal; revolutionists seeking impersonal interests may
consider all defenders of the present state of things as personally
interested, and may therefore feel themselves superior to their
opponents.
455.
THE POLITICAL VALUE OF PATERNITY.--When a man has no sons he has not a
full right to join in a discussion concerning the needs of a particular
community. A person must himself have staked his dearest object along
with the others: that alone binds him fast to the State; he must have
in view the well-being of his descendants, and must, therefore, above
all, have descendants in order to take a right and natural share in
all institutions and the changes thereof. The development of higher
morality depends on a person's having sons; it disposes him to be
un-egoistic, or, more correctly, it extends his egoism in its duration
and permits him earnestly to strive after goals which lie beyond his
individual lifetime.
456.
PRIDE OF DESCENT.--A man may be justly proud of an unbroken line of
_good_ ancestors down to his father,--not however of the line itself,
for every one has that. Descent from good ancestors constitutes the
real nobility of birth; a single break in the chain, one bad ancestor,
therefore, destroys the nobility of birth. Every one who talks about
his nobility should be asked: "Have you no violent, avaricious,
dissolute, wicked, cruel man amongst your ancestors?" If with good
cognisance and conscience he can answer No, then let his friendship be
sought.
457.
SLAVES AND LABOURERS.--The fact that we regard the gratification of
vanity as of more account than all other forms of well-being (security,
position, and pleasures of all sorts), is shown to a ludicrous
extent by every one wishing for the abolition of slavery and utterly
abhorring to put any one into this position (apart altogether from
political reasons), while every one must acknowledge to himself that
in all respects slaves live more securely and more happily than modern
labourers, and that slave labour is very easy labour compared with that
of the "labourer." We protest in the name of the "dignity of man"; but,
expressed more simply, that is just our darling vanity which feels
non-equality, and inferiority in public estimation, to be the hardest
lot of all. The cynic thinks differently concerning the matter,
because he despises honour:--and so Diogenes was for some time a slave
and tutor.
458.
LEADING MINDS AND THEIR INSTRUMENTS.--We see that great statesmen, and
in general all who have to employ many people to carry out their plans,
sometimes proceed one way and sometimes another; they either choose
with great skill and care the people suitable for their plans, and then
leave them a comparatively large amount of liberty, because they know
that the nature of the persons selected impels them precisely to the
point where they themselves would have them go; or else they choose
badly, in fact take whatever comes to hand, but out of every piece of
clay they form something useful for their purpose. These latter minds
are the more high-handed; they also desire more submissive instruments;
their knowledge of mankind is usually much smaller, their contempt of
mankind greater than in the case of the first mentioned class, but the
machines they construct generally work better than the machines from
the workshops of the former.
459.
ARBITRARY LAW NECESSARY.--Jurists dispute whether the most perfectly
thought-out law or that which is most easily understood should prevail
in a nation. The former, the best model of which is Roman Law, seems
incomprehensible to the layman, and is therefore not the expression of
his sense of justice. Popular laws, the Germanic, for instance, have
been rude, superstitious, illogical, and in part idiotic, but they
represented very definite, inherited national morals and sentiments.
But where, as with us, law i no longer custom, it can only _command_
and be compulsion; none of us any longer possesses a traditional sense
of justice; we must therefore content ourselves with _arbitrary laws,_
which are the expressions of the necessity that there _must be_ law.
The most logical is then in any case the most acceptable, because it
is the most _impartial,_ granting even that in every case the smallest
unit of measure in the relation of crime and punishment is arbitrarily
fixed.
460.