COURSE OF EVENTS FROM THE PEACE OF PARIS TO 1778.--MARITIME WAR
CONSEQUENT UPON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.--SEA BATTLE OFF USHANT.
If England had reason to complain that she had not reaped from the
Treaty of Paris all the advantages that her military achievements and
position entitled her to expect, France had every cause for discontent
at the position in which the war left her. The gain of England was
nearly measured by her losses; even the cession of Florida, made to
the conqueror by Spain, had been bought by France at the price of
Louisiana. Naturally the thoughts of her statesmen and of her people,
as they bent under the present necessity to bear the burden of the
vanquished, turned to the future with its possibilities of revenge and
compensation. The Duc de Choiseul, able though imperious, remained for
many years more at the head of affairs, and worked persistently to
restore the power of France from the effects of the treaty. The
Austrian alliance had been none of his seeking; it was already made
and working when he came to office in 1758; but he had even at the
first recognized that the chief enemy was England, and tried as far as
could be to direct the forces of the nation against her. The defeat of
Conflans having thwarted his projects of invasion, he next sought, in
entire consistency with his main purpose, to stir up Spain and gain
her alliance. The united efforts of the two kingdoms with their fine
seaboards could, under good administration and with time for
preparation, put afloat a navy that would be a fair counterpoise to
that of England. It was also doubtless true that weaker maritime
States, if they saw such a combination successfully made and working
efficiently, would pluck up heart to declare against a government
whose greatness excited envy and fear, and which acted with the
disregard to the rights and welfare of others common to all
uncontrolled power. Unhappily for both France and Spain, the alliance
came too late. The virtual annihilation of the French fleet in 1759
was indeed followed by an outburst of national enthusiasm for the
navy, skilfully fostered and guided by Choiseul. "Popular feeling took
up the cry, from one end of France to the other, 'The navy must be
restored.' Gifts of cities, corporations, and private individuals
raised funds. A prodigious activity sprang up in the lately silent
ports; everywhere ships were building and repairing." The minister
also recognized the need of restoring the discipline and tone, as well
as the material of the navy. The hour, however, was too late; the
middle of a great and unsuccessful war is no time to begin
preparations. "Better late than never" is not so safe a proverb as "In
time of peace prepare for war." The condition of Spain was better.
When war broke out, the English naval historian estimates that she had
one hundred ships of all sizes; of these, probably sixty were of the
line. Nevertheless, although the addition of Spain to her numerous
enemies might make the position of England seem critical, the
combination in her favor of numbers, skill, experience, and prestige,
was irresistible. With seventy thousand veteran seamen, she had only
to maintain a position already won. The results we know.
After the peace, Choiseul wisely remained faithful to his own first
ideas. The restoration of the navy continued, and was accompanied and
furthered by a spirit of professional ambition and of desire to excel,
among the officers of the navy, which has been before mentioned, and
which, in the peculiar condition of the United States navy at the
present day, may be commended as a model. The building of ships-of-war
continued with great activity and on a large scale. At the end of the
war, thanks to the movement begun in 1761, there were forty
ships-of-the-line in good condition. In 1770, when Choiseul was
dismissed, the royal navy numbered sixty-four of the line and fifty
frigates afloat. The arsenals and storehouses were filled, and a stock
of ship-timber laid up. At the same time the minister tried to improve
the efficiency of the officers by repressing the arrogant spirit of
those of noble birth, which showed itself both toward superiors and
toward another order of officers, not of the nobility, whose abilities
made them desired on board the fleet. This class-feeling carried with
it a curious sentiment of equality among officers of very different
grades, which injuriously affected the spirit of subordination.
Members, all, of a privileged social order, their equality as such was
more clearly recognized than their inequality as junior and senior.
The droll story told by Marryatt of the midshipman, who represented to
his captain that a certain statement had been made in confidence,
seems to have had a realization on the French quarter-deck of that
day. "Confidence!" cried the captain; "who ever heard of confidence
between a post-captain and a midshipman!" "No sir," replied the
youngster, "not between a captain and a midshipman, but between two
gentlemen." Disputes, arguments, suggestions, between two gentlemen,
forgetful of their relative rank, would break out at critical moments,
and the feeling of equality, which wild democratic notions spread
throughout the fleets of the republic, was curiously forestalled by
that existing among the members of a most haughty aristocracy. "I saw
by his face," says one of Marryatt's heroes, "that the first
lieutenant did not agree with the captain; but he was too good an
officer to say so at such a moment." The phrase expresses one of the
deepest-rooted merits of the English system, the want of which is
owned by French writers:--
"Under Louis XVI. the intimacy and fellowship existing between
the chief and the subordinate led the latter to discuss the
orders which were given him.... The relaxation of discipline and
the spirit of independence were due also to another cause than
that pointed out; they can be partly attributed to the
regulation of the officers' messes. Admiral, captain, officers,
midshipmen, ate together; everything was in common. They
thee-and-thou'd each other like chums. In handling the ship, the
inferior gave his opinion, argued, and the chief, irritated,
often preferred to yield rather than make enemies. Facts of this
kind are asserted by witnesses whose truthfulness is above
suspicion."[113]
Insubordination of this character, to which weaker men gave way,
dashed in vain against the resolute and fiery temper of Suffren; but
the spirit of discontent rose almost to the height of mutiny, causing
him to say in his despatches to the minister of the navy, after his
fourth battle: "My heart is pierced by the most general defection. It
is frightful to think that I might four times have destroyed the
English fleet, and that it still exists." Choiseul's reforms broke
against this rock, which only the uprising of the whole nation finally
removed; but in the personnel of the crews a great improvement was
made. In 1767 he reorganized the artillery of the fleet, forming a
body of ten thousand gunners, who were systematically drilled once a
week during the ten years still to intervene before the next war with
England.
Losing sight of no part of his plans, Choiseul, while promoting the
naval and military power of France, paid special attention to the
alliance with Spain and judiciously encouraged and furthered the
efforts of that country in the path of progress under Charles III.,
the best of her kings of the Bourbon line. The Austrian alliance still
existing was maintained, but his hopes were chiefly fixed upon Spain.
The wisdom and insight which had at once fastened upon England as the
centre of enmity to France had been justified and further enlightened
by the whole course of the Seven Years' War. In Spain was the surest,
and, with good administration, the most powerful ally. The close
proximity of the two countries, the relative positions of their ports,
made the naval situation particularly strong; and the alliance which
was dictated by sound policy, by family ties, and by just fear of
England's sea power, was further assured to France by recent and still
existing injuries that must continue to rankle with Spain. Gibraltar,
Minorca, and Florida were still in the hands of England; no Spaniard
could be easy till this reproach was wiped out.
It may be readily believed, as is asserted by French historians, that
England viewed with disquietude the growth of the French navy, and
would gladly have nipped it betimes; but it is more doubtful whether
she would have been willing to force a war for that purpose. During
the years succeeding the Peace of Paris a succession of short
ministries, turning mainly upon questions of internal policy or
unimportant party arrangement, caused her foreign policy to present a
marked contrast to the vigorous, overbearing, but straightforward path
followed by Pitt. Internal commotions, such as are apt to follow great
wars, and above all the controversy with the North American colonies,
which began as early as 1765 with the well-known Stamp Act, conspired
with other causes to stay the hand of England. Twice at least during
the years of Choiseul's ministry there occurred opportunities which a
resolute, ready, and not too scrupulous government might easily have
converted into a cause of war; the more so as they involved that sea
power which is to England above all other nations the object of just
and jealous concern. In 1764 the Genoese, weary of their unsuccessful
attempts to control Corsica, again asked France to renew the
occupation of the ports which had been garrisoned by her in 1756. The
Corsicans also sent an ambassador to France in order to solicit
recognition of the independence of the island, in consideration of a
tribute equivalent to that which they had formerly paid to Genoa. The
latter, feeling its inability to reconquer the island, at length
decided practically to cede it. The transaction took the shape of a
formal permission for the King of France to exercise all the rights of
sovereignty over all the places and harbors of Corsica, as security
for debts owing to him by the republic. This cession, disguised under
the form of a security in order to palliate the aggrandizement of
France in the eyes of Austria and England, recalls the conditional and
thinly veiled surrender of Cyprus to England nine years ago,--a
transfer likely to be as final and far-reaching as that of Corsica.
England then remonstrated and talked angrily; but though Burke said,
"Corsica as a province of France is terrible to me," only one member
of the House of Commons, the veteran admiral Sir Charles Saunders, was
found to say "that it would be better to go to war with France than
consent to her taking possession of Corsica."[114] Having in view the
then well-recognized interests of England in the Mediterranean, it is
evident that an island so well situated as Corsica for influencing the
shores of Italy and checking the naval station at Minorca, would not
have been allowed to go into the hands of a strong master, if the
nation had felt ready and willing for war.
Again, in 1770, a dispute arose between England and Spain relative to
the possession of the Falkland Islands. It is not material to state
the nature of either claim to what was then but a collection of barren
islands, destitute of military as well as of natural advantages. Both
England and Spain had had a settlement, on which the national colors
were flying; and at the English station a captain in the navy
commanded. Before this settlement, called Port Egmont, there suddenly
appeared, in June, 1770, a Spanish expedition, fitted out in Buenos
Ayres, of five frigates and sixteen hundred soldiers. To such a force
the handful of Englishmen could make no serious resistance; so after a
few shots, exchanged for the honor of the flag, they capitulated.
The news of this transaction, which reached England in the following
October, showed by its reception how much more serious is an insult
than an injury, and how much more bitterly resented. The transfer of
Corsica had scarcely occasioned a stir outside the offices of
statesmen; the attack on Port Egmont roused the people and Parliament.
The minister to Madrid was ordered to demand the immediate restoration
of the islands, with a disavowal of the action of the officer who had
ordered the attack. Without waiting for a reply, ships were ordered
into commission, press-gangs swept the streets, and in a short time a
powerful fleet was ready at Spithead to revenge the insult. Spain,
relying upon the Bourbon family compact and the support of France, was
disposed to stand firm; but the old king, Louis XV., was averse to
war, and Choiseul, among whose enemies at court was the last mistress,
was dismissed. With his fall disappeared the hopes of Spain, which at
once complied with the demands of England, reserving, however, the
question as to the rights of sovereignty. This conclusion shows
clearly that England, though still wielding an effective sea power
able to control Spain, was not eager for a war merely in order to
break down the rival navies.
It is not wholly alien to the question of sea power to note, without
dwelling upon it, a great event which now happened, seemingly utterly
removed from all relation to the sea. The first partition of Poland
between Prussia, Russia, and Austria, carried out in 1772, was made
easier by the preoccupation of Choiseul with his naval policy and the
Spanish alliance. The friendship and support of Poland and Turkey, as
checks upon the House of Austria, were part of the tradition received
from Henry IV. and Richelieu; the destruction of the former was a
direct blow to the pride and interest of France. What Choiseul would
have done had he been in office, cannot be known; but if the result of
the Seven Years' War had been different, France might have interfered
to some purpose.
On the 10th of May, 1774, Louis XV. died, at the time when the
troubles in the North American colonies were fast coming to a head.
Under his youthful successor, Louis XVI., the policy of peace on the
continent, of friendly alliance with Spain, and of building up the
navy in numbers and efficiency, was continued. This was the foreign
policy of Choiseul, directed against the sea power of England as the
chief enemy, and toward the sea power of France as the chief support,
of the nation. The instructions which, according to a French naval
author, the new king gave to his ministers show the spirit with which
his reign up to the Revolution was inspired, whether or not they
originated with the king himself:--
"To watch all indications of approaching danger; to observe by
cruisers the approaches to our islands and the entrance to the
Gulf of Mexico; to keep track of what was passing on the banks
of Newfoundland, and to follow the tendencies of English
commerce; to observe in England the state of the troops and
armaments, the public credit and the ministry; to meddle
adroitly in the affairs of the British colonies; to give the
insurgent colonists the means of obtaining supplies of war,
while maintaining the strictest neutrality; to develop actively,
but noiselessly, the navy; to repair our ships of war; to fill
our storehouses and to keep on hand the means for rapidly
equipping a fleet at Brest and at Toulon, while Spain should be
fitting one at Ferrol; finally, at the first serious fear of
rupture, to assemble numerous troops upon the shores of Brittany
and Normandy, and get everything ready for an invasion of
England, so as to force her to concentrate her forces, and thus
restrict her means of resistance at the extremities of the
empire."[115]
Such instructions, whether given all at once as a symmetrical,
well-thought-out plan, or from time to time, as occasion arose, showed
that an accurate forecast of the situation had been made, and breathed
a conviction which, if earlier felt, would have greatly modified the
history of the two countries. The execution was less thorough than the
conception.
In the matter of developing the navy, however, fifteen years of peace
and steady work showed good results. When war openly broke out in
1778, France had eighty ships-of-the-line in good condition, and
sixty-seven thousand seamen were borne on the rolls of the maritime
conscription. Spain, when she entered the war in 1779 as the ally of
France, had in her ports nearly sixty ships-of-the-line. To this
combination England opposed a total number of two hundred and
twenty-eight ships of all classes, of which about one hundred and
fifty were of the line. The apparent equality in material which would
result from these numbers was affected, to the disadvantage of
England, by the superior size and artillery of the French and
Spaniards; but on the other hand her strength was increased by the
unity of aim imparted by belonging to one nation. The allies were
destined to feel the proverbial weakness of naval coalitions, as well
as the degenerate administration of Spain, and the lack of habit--may
it not even be said without injustice, of aptitude for the sea--of
both nations. The naval policy with which Louis XVI. began his reign
was kept up to the end; in 1791, two years after the assembly of the
States-General, the French navy numbered eighty-six ships-of-the-line,
generally superior, both in dimensions and model, to English ships of
the same class.
We have come, therefore, to the beginning of a truly maritime war;
which, as will be granted by those who have followed this narrative,
had not been seen since the days of De Ruyter and Tourville. The
magnificence of sea power and its value had perhaps been more clearly
shown by the uncontrolled sway, and consequent exaltation, of one
belligerent; but the lesson thus given, if more striking, is less
vividly interesting than the spectacle of that sea power meeting a foe
worthy of its steel, and excited to exertion by a strife which
endangered, not only its most valuable colonies, but even its own
shores. Waged, from the extended character of the British Empire, in
all quarters of the world at once, the attention of the student is
called now to the East Indies and now to the West; now to the shores
of the United States and thence to those of England; from New York and
Chesapeake Bay to Gibraltar and Minorca, to the Cape Verde Islands,
the Cape of Good Hope, and Ceylon. Fleets now meet fleets of equal
size, and the general chase and the _mêlée_, which marked the actions
of Hawke, Boscawen, and Anson, though they still occur at times, are
for the most part succeeded by wary and complicated manoeuvres, too
often barren of decisive results as naval battles, which are the
prevailing characteristic of this coming war. The superior tactical
science of the French succeeded in imparting to this conflict that
peculiar feature of their naval policy, which subordinated the control
of the sea by the destruction of the enemy's fleets, of his organized
naval forces, to the success of particular operations, the retention
of particular points, the carrying out of particular ulterior
strategic ends. It is not necessary to endeavor to force upon others
the conviction of the present writer that such a policy, however
applicable as an exception, is faulty as a rule; but it is most
desirable that all persons responsible for the conduct of naval
affairs should recognize that the two lines of policy, in direct
contradiction to each other, do exist. In the one there is a strict
analogy to a war of posts; while in the other the objective is that
force whose destruction leaves the posts unsupported and therefore
sure to fall in due time. These opposing policies being recognized,
consideration should also be had of the results of the two as
exemplified in the history of England and France.
It was not, however, with such cautious views that the new king at
first sought to impress his admirals. In the instructions addressed to
the Count d'Orvilliers, commanding the first fleet sent out from
Brest, the minister, speaking in the name of the king, says:--
"Your duty now is to restore to the French flag the lustre with
which it once shone; past misfortunes and faults must be buried
out of sight; only by the most illustrious actions can the navy
hope to succeed in doing this. His Majesty has the right to
expect the greatest efforts from his officers.... Under whatever
circumstances the king's fleet may be placed, his Majesty's
orders, which he expressly charges me to impress upon you, as
well as upon all officers in command, are that his ships attack
with the greatest vigor, and defend themselves, on all
occasions, to the last extremity."
More follows to the same effect; upon which a French officer, who has
not before been quoted in connection with this phase of French naval
policy, says:--
"How different this language from that held to our admirals
during the last war; for it would be an error to believe that
they followed by choice and temper the timid and defensive
system which predominated in the tactics of the navy. The
government, always finding the expenses exacted by the
employment of the navy excessive, too often prescribed to its
admirals to keep the sea as long as possible without coming to
pitched battles, or even to brushes, generally very expensive,
and from which might follow the loss of ships difficult to
replace. Often they were enjoined, if driven to accept action,
carefully to avoid compromising the fate of their squadron by
too decisive encounters. They thought themselves, therefore,
obliged to retreat as soon as an engagement took too serious a
turn. Thus they acquired the unhappy habit of voluntarily
yielding the field of battle as soon as an enemy, even inferior,
boldly disputed it with them. Thus to send a fleet to meet the
enemy, only to retire shamefully from his presence; to receive
action instead of offering it; to begin battles only to end them
with the semblance of defeat; to ruin moral force in order to
save physical force,--that was the spirit which, as has been
very judiciously said by M. Charles Dupin, guided the French
ministry of that epoch. The results are known."[116]
The brave words of Louis XVI. were followed almost immediately by
others, of different and qualifying tenor, to Admiral d'Orvilliers
before he sailed. He was informed that the king, having learned the
strength of the English fleet, relied upon his prudence as to the
conduct to be followed at a moment when he had under his orders all
the naval force of which France could dispose. As a matter of fact the
two fleets were nearly equal; it would be impossible to decide which
was the stronger, without detailed information as to the armament of
every ship. D'Orvilliers found himself, as many a responsible man has
before, with two sets of orders, on one or the other of which he was
sure to be impaled, if unlucky; while the government, in the same
event, was sure of a scape-goat.
The consideration of the relative force of the two navies, material
and moral, has necessarily carried us beyond the date of the opening
of the American Revolutionary War. Before beginning with that
struggle, it may be well to supplement the rough estimate of England's
total naval force, given, in lack of more precise information, by the
statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty made in the House of
Lords in November, 1777, a very few months before the war with France
began. Replying to a complaint of the opposition as to the smallness
of the Channel fleet, he said:--
"We have now forty-two ships-of-the-line in commission in Great
Britain (without counting those on foreign service), thirty-five
of which are completely manned, and ready for sea at a moment's
warning.... I do not believe that either France or Spain
entertains any hostile disposition toward us; but from what I
have now submitted to you, I am authorized to affirm that our
navy is more than a match for that of the whole House of
Bourbon."[117]
It must, however, be said that this pleasing prospect was not realized
by Admiral Keppel when appointed to command in the following March,
and looking at his fleet with (to use his own apt expression) "a
seaman's eye;"[118] and in June he went to sea with only twenty ships.
It is plainly undesirable to insert in a narrative of this character
any account of the political questions which led to the separation of
the United States from the British Empire. It has already been
remarked that the separation followed upon a succession of blunders by
the English ministry,--not unnatural in view of the ideas generally
prevalent at that day as to the relations of colonies to the
mother-country. It needed a man of commanding genius to recognize, not
only the substantial justice of the American claims,--many did
that,--but also the military strength of their situation, as before
indicated. This lay in the distance of the colonies from home, their
nearness to each other independently of the command of the sea, the
character of the colonists,--mainly of English and Dutch stock,--and
the probable hostility of France and Spain. Unfortunately for England,
the men most able to cope with the situation were in the minority and
out of office.
It has been said before that, had the thirteen colonies been islands,
the sea power of Great Britain would have so completely isolated them
that their fall, one after the other, must have ensued. To this it may
be added that the narrowness of the strip then occupied by civilized
man, and the manner in which it was intersected by estuaries of the
sea and navigable rivers, practically reduced to the condition of
islands, so far as mutual support went, great sections of the
insurgent country, which were not large enough to stand alone, yet too
large for their fall not to have been a fatal blow to the common
cause. The most familiar case is that of the line of the Hudson, where
the Bay of New York was held from the first by the British, who also
took the city in September, 1776, two months after the Declaration of
Independence. The difficulties in the way of moving up and down such a
stream were doubtless much greater to sailing vessels than they now
are to steamers; yet it seems impossible to doubt that active and
capable men wielding the great sea power of England could so have held
that river and Lake Champlain with ships-of-war at intervals and
accompanying galleys as to have supported a sufficient army moving
between the head-waters of the Hudson and the lake, while themselves
preventing any intercourse by water between New England and the States
west of the river. This operation would have closely resembled that by
which in the Civil War the United States fleets and armies gradually
cut in twain the Southern Confederacy by mastering the course of the
Mississippi, and the political results would have been even more
important than the military; for at that early stage of the war the
spirit of independence was far more general and bitter in the section
that would have been cut off,--in New England,--than in New York and
New Jersey, perhaps than anywhere except in South Carolina.[119]
In 1777 the British attempted to accomplish this object by sending
General Burgoyne from Canada to force his way by Lake Champlain to the
Hudson. At the same time Sir Henry Clinton moved north from New York
with three thousand men, and reached West Point, whence he sent by
shipping a part of his force up the river to within forty miles of
Albany. Here the officer in command learned of the surrender of
Burgoyne at Saratoga, and returned; but what he did at the head of a
detachment from a main body of only three thousand, shows what might
have been done under a better system. While this was happening on the
Hudson, the English commander-in-chief of the troops acting in America
had curiously enough made use of the sea power of his nation to
transport the bulk of his army--fourteen thousand men--from New York
to the head of Chesapeake Bay, so as to take Philadelphia in the rear.
This eccentric movement was successful as regarded its objective,
Philadelphia; but it was determined by political considerations,
because Philadelphia was the seat of Congress, and was contrary to
sound military policy. The conquest therefore was early lost; but it
was yet more dearly won, for by this diversion of the British forces
the different corps were placed out of mutual support, and the control
of the water-line of the Hudson was abandoned. While Burgoyne, with
seven thousand regular troops, besides auxiliaries, was moving down to
seize the head-waters of the river, fourteen thousand men were removed
from its mouth to the Chesapeake. The eight thousand left in or near
New York were consequently tied to the city by the presence of the
American army in New Jersey. This disastrous step was taken in August;
in October Burgoyne, isolated and hemmed in, surrendered. In the
following May the English evacuated Philadelphia, and after a painful
and perilous march through New Jersey, with Washington's army in close
pursuit, regained New York.
This taking of the British fleet to the head of the Chesapeake,
coupled with the ascent of the Potomac in 1814 by English
sailing-frigates, shows another weak line in the chain of the American
colonies; but it was not, like that of the Hudson and Champlain, a
line both ends of which rested in the enemy's power,--in Canada on the
one hand, on the sea on the other.
As to the sea warfare in general, it is needless to enlarge upon the
fact that the colonists could make no head against the fleets of Great
Britain, and were consequently forced to abandon the sea to them,
resorting only to a cruising warfare, mainly by privateers, for which
their seamanship and enterprise well fitted them, and by which they
did much injury to English commerce. By the end of 1778 the English
naval historian estimates that American privateers had taken nearly a
thousand merchant-ships, valued at nearly £2,000,000; he claims,
however, that the losses of the Americans were heavier. They should
have been; for the English cruisers were both better supported and
individually more powerful, while the extension of American commerce
had come to be the wonder of the statesmen of the mother-country. When
the war broke out, it was as great as that of England herself at the
beginning of the century.
An interesting indication of the number of the seafaring population of
North America at that time is given by the statement in Parliament by
the First Lord of the Admiralty, "that the navy had lost eighteen
thousand of the seamen employed in the last war by not having
America,"[120]--no inconsiderable loss to a sea power, particularly if
carried over to the ranks of the enemy.
The course of warfare on the sea gave rise, as always, to grievances
of neutrals against the English for the seizures of their ships in the
American trade. Such provocation, however, was not necessary to
excite the enmity and the hopes of France in the harassed state of the
British government. The hour of reckoning, of vengeance, at which the
policy of Choiseul had aimed, seemed now at hand. The question was
early entertained at Paris what attitude should be assumed, what
advantage drawn from the revolt of the colonies. It was decided that
the latter should receive all possible support short of an actual
break with England; and to this end a Frenchman named Beaumarchais was
furnished with money to establish a business house which should supply
the colonists with warlike stores. France gave a million francs, to
which Spain added an equal sum, and Beaumarchais was allowed to buy
from government arsenals. Meanwhile agents were received from the
United States, and French officers passed into its service with little
real hindrance from their government. Beaumarchais' house was started
in 1776; in December of that year Benjamin Franklin landed in France,
and in May, 1777, Lafayette came to America. Meanwhile the
preparations for war, especially for a sea war, were pushed on; the
navy was steadily increased, and arrangements were made for
threatening an invasion from the Channel, while the real scene of the
war was to be in the colonies. There France was in the position of a
man who has little to lose. Already despoiled of Canada, she had every
reason to believe that a renewal of war, with Europe neutral and the
Americans friends instead of enemies, would not rob her of her
islands. Recognizing that the Americans, who less than twenty years
before had insisted upon the conquest of Canada, would not consent to
her regaining it, she expressly stipulated that she would have no such
hopes, but exacted that in the coming war she should retain any
English West Indian possessions which she could seize. Spain was
differently situated. Hating England, wanting to regain Gibraltar,
Minorca, and Jamaica,--no mere jewels in her crown, but
foundation-stones of her sea power,--she nevertheless saw that the
successful rebellion of the English colonists against the hitherto
unrivalled sea power of the mother-country would be a dangerous
example to her own enormous colonial system, from which she yearly
drew so great subsidies. If England with her navy should fail, what
could Spain achieve? In the introductory chapter it was pointed out
that the income of the Spanish government was drawn, not as a light
tax upon a wealthy sea power, built upon the industry and commerce of
the kingdom, but from a narrow stream of gold and silver trickling
through a few treasure-ships loaded with the spoils of colonies
administered upon the narrowest system. Spain had much to lose, as
well as to gain. It was true still, as in 1760, that she was the power
with which England could war to the greatest advantage. Nevertheless,
existing injuries and dynastic sympathy carried the day. Spain entered
upon the secretly hostile course pursued by France.
To this explosive condition of things the news of Burgoyne's surrender
acted as a spark. The experience of former wars had taught France the
worth of the Americans as enemies, and she was expecting to find in
them valuable helpers in her schemes of revenge; now it seemed that
even alone they might be able to take care of themselves, and reject
any alliance. The tidings reached Europe on the 2d of December, 1777;
on the 16th the French foreign minister informed the commissioners of
Congress that the king was ready to recognize the independence of the
United States, and to make with them a commercial treaty and
contingent defensive alliance. The speed with which the business was
done shows that France had made up her mind; and the treaty, so
momentous in its necessary consequences, was signed on the 6th of
February, 1778.
It is not necessary to give the detailed terms of the treaty; but it
is important to observe, first, that the express renunciation of
Canada and Nova Scotia by France foreshadowed that political theory
which is now known as the Monroe doctrine, the claims of which can
scarcely be made good without an adequate sea-force; and next, that
the alliance with France, and subsequently with Spain, brought to the
Americans that which they above all needed,--a sea power to
counterbalance that of England. Will it be too much for American
pride to admit that, had France refused to contest the control of the
sea with England, the latter would have been able to reduce the
Atlantic seaboard? Let us not kick down the ladder by which we
mounted, nor refuse to acknowledge what our fathers felt in their hour
of trial.
Before going on with the story of this maritime war, the military
situation as it existed in the different parts of the world should be
stated.
The three features which cause it to differ markedly from that at the
opening of the Seven Years' War, in 1756, are--(1) the hostile
relation of America to England; (2) the early appearance of Spain as
the ally of France; and (3) the neutrality of the other continental
States, which left France without preoccupation on the land side.
On the North American continent the Americans had held Boston for two
years. Narragansett Bay and Rhode Island were occupied by the English,
who also held New York and Philadelphia. Chesapeake Bay and its
entrance, being without strong posts, were in the power of any fleet
that appeared against them. In the South, since the unsuccessful
attack upon Charlestown in 1776, no movement of importance had been
made by the English; up to the declaration of war by France the chief
events of the war had been north of the Chesapeake (of Baltimore). In
Canada, on the other hand, the Americans had failed, and it remained
to the end a firm base to the English power.
In Europe the most significant element to be noted is the state of
preparedness of the French navy, and to some extent of the Spanish, as
compared with previous wars. England stood wholly on the defensive,
and without allies; while the Bourbon kings aimed at the conquest of
Gibraltar and Port Mahon, and the invasion of England. The first two,
however, were the dear objects of Spain, the last of France; and this
divergence of aims was fatal to the success of this maritime
coalition. In the introductory chapter allusion was made to the
strategic question raised by these two policies.
In the West Indies the grip of the two combatants on the land was in
fact about equal, though it should not have been so. Both France and
England were strongly posted in the Windward Islands,--the one at
Martinique, the other at Barbadoes. It must be noted that the position
of the latter, to windward of all others of the group, was a decided
strategic advantage in the days of sail. As it happened, the fighting
was pretty nearly confined to the neighborhood of the Lesser Antilles.
Here, at the opening of the struggle, the English island of Dominica
lay between the French Martinique and Guadeloupe; it was therefore
coveted and seized. Next south of Martinique lay Sta. Lucia, a French
colony. Its strong harbor on the lee side, known as Gros Ilot Bay, was
a capital place from which to watch the proceedings of the French navy
in Fort Royal, Martinique. The English captured the island, and from
that safe anchorage Rodney watched and pursued the French fleet before
his famous action in 1782. The islands to the southward were of
inferior military consequence. In the greater islands, Spain should
have outweighed England, holding as she did Cuba, Porto Rico, and,
with France, Hayti, as against Jamaica alone. Spain, however, counted
here for nothing but a dead-weight; and England had elsewhere too much
on her hands to attack her. The only point in America where the
Spanish arms made themselves felt was in the great region east of the
Mississippi, then known as Florida, which, though at that time an
English possession, did not join the revolt of the colonies.
In the East Indies it will be remembered that France had received back
her stations at the peace of 1763; but the political predominance of
the English in Bengal was not offset by similar control of the French
in any part of the peninsula. During the ensuing years the English had
extended and strengthened their power, favored in so doing by the
character of their chief representatives, Clive and Warren Hastings.
Powerful native enemies had, however, risen against them in the south
of the peninsula, both on the east and west, affording an excellent
opportunity for France to regain her influence when the war broke out;
but her government and people remained blind to the possibilities of
that vast region. Not so England. The very day the news of the
outbreak of war reached Calcutta, July 7, 1778, Hastings sent orders
to the governor of Madras to attack Pondicherry, and set the example
by seizing Chandernagore. The naval force of each nation was
insignificant; but the French commodore, after a brief action, forsook
Pondicherry, which surrendered after a siege by land and sea of
seventy days. The following March, 1779, Mahé, the last French
settlement, fell, and the French flag again disappeared; while at the
same time there arrived a strong English squadron of six
ships-of-the-line under Admiral Hughes. The absence of any similar
French force gave the entire control of the sea to the English until
the arrival of Suffren, nearly three years later. In the mean while
Holland had been drawn into the war, and her stations, Negapatam on
the Coromandel coast, and the very important harbor of Trincomalee in
Ceylon, were both captured, the latter in January, 1782, by the joint
forces of the army and navy. The successful accomplishment of these
two enterprises completed the military situation in Hindostan at the
time when the arrival of Suffren, just one month later, turned the
nominal war into a desperate and bloody contest. Suffren found himself
with a decidedly stronger squadron, but without a port, either French
or allied, on which to base his operations against the English.
Of these four chief theatres of the war, two, North America and the
West Indies, as might be expected from their nearness, blend and
directly affect each other. This is not so obviously the case with the
struggles in Europe and India. The narrative therefore naturally falls
into three principal divisions, which may to some extent be treated
separately. After such separate consideration their mutual influence
will be pointed out, together with any useful lessons to be gathered
from the goodness or badness, the success or failure, of the grand
combinations, and from the part played by sea power.
On the 13th of March, 1778, the French ambassador at London notified
the English government that France had acknowledged the independence
of the United States, and made with them a treaty of commerce and
defensive alliance. England at once recalled her ambassador; but
though war was imminent and England at disadvantage, the Spanish king
offered mediation, and France wrongly delayed to strike. In June,
Admiral Keppel sailed from Portsmouth, with twenty ships, on a cruise.
Falling in with two French frigates, his guns, to bring them to,
opened the war. Finding from their papers that thirty-two French ships
lay in Brest, he at once returned for reinforcements. Sailing again
with thirty ships, he fell in with the French fleet under D'Orvilliers
to the westward of Ushant, and to windward, with a westerly wind. On
the 27th of July was fought the first fleet action of the war,
generally known as the battle of Ushant.
This battle, in which thirty ships-of-the-line fought on either side,
was wholly indecisive in its results. No ship was taken or sunk; both
fleets, after separating, returned to their respective ports. The
action nevertheless obtained great celebrity in England from the
public indignation at its lack of result, and from the storm of naval
and political controversy which followed. The admiral and the officer
third in command belonged to different political parties; they made
charges, one against the other, and in the following courts-martial
all England divided, chiefly on party lines. Public and naval
sentiment generally favored the commander-in-chief, Keppel.
[Illustration: Pl. IX. KEPPEL OFF USHANT JULY 27, 1778.]
Tactically, the battle presents some interesting features, and
involves one issue which is still living to-day. Keppel was to leeward
and wished to force an action; in order to do this he signalled a
general chase to windward, so that his fastest ships might overtake
the slower ones of the enemy. Granting equal original fleet-speed,
this was quite correct. D'Orvilliers, to windward, had no intention of
fighting except on his own terms. As will generally be the case, the
fleet acting on the offensive obtained its wish. At daybreak of the
27th both fleets were on the port tack, heading west-northwest, with
a steady breeze at southwest (Plate IX., A, A, A).[121] The English
rear (R) had fallen to leeward,[122] and Keppel consequently made
signal to six of its ships to chase to windward, so as to place them
in a better position to support the main body if it could get into
action. D'Orvilliers observed this movement, and construed it to show
an intention to attack his rear with a superior force. The two fleets
being then from six to eight miles apart, he wore his fleet in
succession (French A to B), by which he lost ground to leeward, but
approached the enemy, and was able to see them better (Positions B, B,
B). At the completion of this evolution the wind hauled to the
southward, favoring the English; so Keppel, instead of going about,
stood on for half an hour more (English B to C), and then tacked
together in wake of the French. This confirmed D'Orvilliers'
suspicions, and as the wind, which certainly favored the English that
morning, now hauled back again to the westward, permitting them to lay
up for the French rear, he wore his fleet together (B to C), thus
bringing the rest to aid the rear, now become the van, and preventing
Keppel from concentrating on or penetrating it. The two fleets thus
passed on opposite tacks (C),[123] exchanging ineffective broadsides,
the French running free to windward and having the power to attack,
but not using it. D'Orvilliers then made the signal for his van,
formerly the rear, to wear to leeward of the English rear, which was
to leeward of its own main body, intending himself to remain to
windward and so attack it on both sides; but the commander of that
division, a prince of the blood royal, did not obey, and the possible
advantage was lost. On the English side the same manoeuvre was
attempted. The admiral of the van and some of his ships tacked, as
soon as out of fire (D),[124] and stood after the French rear; but for
the most part the damage to rigging prevented tacking, and wearing was
impossible on account of the ships coming up behind. The French now
stood to leeward and formed line again, but the English were not in
condition to attack. This was the end of the battle.
It has been said that there are some interesting points about this
resultless engagement. One is, that Keppel's conduct was approved
throughout, on oath before the court-martial, by one of the most
distinguished admirals England has brought forth, Sir John Jervis, who
commanded a ship in the fleet. It does not indeed appear what he could
have done more; but his lack of tactical understanding is shown by a
curious remark in his defence. "If the French admiral really meant to
come to action," says he, "I apprehend he would never have put his
fleet on the contrary tack to that on which the British fleet was
approaching." This remark can only proceed from ignorance or
thoughtlessness of the danger to which the rear of the French fleet
would have been exposed, and is the more curious as he himself had
said the English were lying up for it. Keppel's idea seems to have
been that the French should have waited for him to come up abreast,
and then go at it, ship for ship, in what was to him the good old
style; D'Orvilliers was too highly trained to be capable of such
action.
The failure of the Duc de Chartres,[125] commanding the French van
during the firing, to wear in obedience to orders, whether due to
misunderstanding or misconduct, raises the question, which is still
debated, as to the proper position for a naval commander-in-chief in
action. Had D'Orvilliers been in the van, he could have insured the
evolution he wished. From the centre the admiral has the extremities
of his fleet equally visible, or invisible, as it may be. At the head
he enforces his orders by his example. The French toward the end of
this war solved the question by taking him out of the line altogether
and putting him on board a frigate, for the avowed reasons that he
could thus better see the movements of his fleet and of the enemy
without being blinded by smoke or distracted by the occurrences on
board his own ship, and that his signals could be better seen.[126]
This position, resembling somewhat that of a general on shore, being
remote from personal risk, was also assumed by Lord Howe in 1778; but
both that officer and the French abandoned the practice later. Nelson
at Trafalgar, the end of his career, led his column; but it may be
doubted whether he had any other motive than his ardor for battle. The
two other great attacks in which he commanded in chief were directed
against ships at anchor, and in neither did he take the head of the
column; for the good reason that, his knowledge of the ground being
imperfect, the leading ship was in most danger of grounding. The
common practice in the days of broadside sailing-ships, except when a
general chase was ordered, was for the admiral to be in the line, and
in the centre of it. The departure from this custom on the part of
both Nelson and Collingwood, each of whom led his own columns at
Trafalgar, may have had some reason, and an ordinary man rather
shrinks from criticising the action of officers of their eminence. The
danger to which were exposed the two senior officers of the fleet,
upon whom so much depended, is obvious; and had any serious injury
befallen their persons, or the head of their columns, the lack of
their influence would have been seriously felt. As it was, they were
speedily obliterated, as admirals, in the smoke of the battle, leaving
to those who came after them no guidance or control except the
brilliancy of their courage and example. A French admiral has pointed
out that the practical effect of the mode of attack at Trafalgar, two
columns bearing down upon a line at right angles to them, was to
sacrifice the head of the columns in making two breaches in the
enemy's line. So far, very well; the sacrifice was well worth while;
and into these breaches came up the rear ships of each column, nearly
fresh, forming in fact a _reserve_ which fell upon the shattered ships
of the enemy on either side of the breaks. Now this idea of a reserve
prompts a thought as to the commander-in-chief. The size of his ship
was such as precluded its being out of the order; but would it not
have been well had the admiral of each column been with this reserve,
keeping in his hands the power of directing it according to the
chances of the action, making him a reality as well as a name for some
time longer, and to a very useful purpose? The difficulty of arranging
any system of signals or light despatch-boats which could take the
place of the aids or messengers of a general, coupled with the fact
that ships cannot stand still, as divisions of men do, waiting orders,
but that they must have steerage-way, precludes the idea of putting an
admiral of a fleet under way in a light vessel. By so doing he becomes
simply a spectator; whereas by being in the most powerful ship of the
fleet he retains the utmost weight possible after action is once
engaged, and, if this ship be in the reserve, the admiral keeps to the
latest possible moment the power of commander-in-chief in his own
hands. "Half a loaf is better than no bread;" if the admiral cannot,
from the conditions of sea warfare, occupy the calmly watchful
position of his brother on shore, let there be secured for him as much
as may be. The practice of Farragut after New Orleans and Vicksburg,
that is to say, in the latter part of his career, when it may be
believed experience had determined his views, was to lead in person.
It is known that he very reluctantly, at the solicitation of various
officers, yielded his convictions in this matter at Mobile so far as
to take the second place, and afterward freely expressed his regrets
for having done so. It may, however, be argued that the character of
all the actions in which Farragut commanded had a peculiarity,
differentiating them from battles in the strict sense of the word. At
New Orleans, at Vicksburg, at Port Hudson, and at Mobile, the task was
not to engage, but to pass fortifications which the fleet confessedly
could not stand up to; and the passage was to be made under conditions
mainly of pilotage upon ground as to which, unlike Nelson, he had good
knowledge. There was thus imposed upon the commander-in-chief the duty
of leadership in the literal, as well as the military, sense of the
term. So leading, he not only pointed out to the fleet the safe road,
but, drawing continually ahead of the smoke, was better able to see
and judge the path ahead, and to assume the responsibility of a course
which he may have prescribed and intended throughout, but from which a
subordinate might shrink. It has not perhaps been commonly noted, that
at Mobile the leaders, not only of one but of both columns, at the
critical point of the road hesitated and doubted as to the admiral's
purpose; not that they had not received it clearly, but because
circumstances seemed to them to be different from what he had
supposed. Not only Alden in the "Brooklyn," but Craven also in the
"Tecumseh," departed from the admiral's orders and left the course
dictated to them, with disastrous results. There is no necessity to
condemn either captain; but the irresistible inference is that
Farragut was unqualifiedly right in his opinion that the man who alone
has the highest responsibility should, under the conditions of his
battles, be in the front. And here it must be remarked that at such
critical moments of doubt any but the highest order of mind tends to
throw off the responsibility of decision upon the superior, though
from the instancy of the case hesitation or delay may be fatal. A man
who as the commissioned chief would act intelligently, as the mere
subordinate will balk. Nelson's action at St. Vincent will rarely be
emulated, a truth which is strongly shown by the fact that
Collingwood was immediately in his rear that day, and did not imitate
his action till signalled by the commander-in-chief; yet after
receiving the authority of the signal, he particularly distinguished
himself by his judgment and daring.[127] It will be recalled, also, in
connection with this question of pilot-ground battles, that a central
position nearly lost the flag-ship at New Orleans, owing to the
darkness and to the smoke from the preceding ships; the United States
fleet came near finding itself without its leader after the passage of
the forts. Now as the mention of a reserve prompted one set of
considerations, so the name of pilotage suggests certain ideas,
broader than itself, which modify what has been said of keeping the
admiral with the reserve. The ease and quickness with which a steam
fleet can change its formation make it very probable that a fleet
bearing down to attack may find itself, almost at the very moment of
collision, threatened with some unlooked-for combination; then where
would be the happiest position for an admiral? Doubtless in that part
of his own order where he could most readily pilot his ships into the
new disposition, or direction, by which he would meet the changed
conditions; that is, in the position of leading. It would seem that
there are always two moments of greatest importance in a sea-fight;
one which determines the method of the main attack, the other the
bringing up and directing the effort of the reserve. If the first is
more important, the second perhaps requires the higher order of
ability; for the former may and should proceed on a before-determined
plan, while the latter may, and often must, be shaped to meet
unforeseen exigencies. The conditions of sea-battles of the future
contain one element that land battles cannot have,--the extreme
rapidity with which encounters and changes of order can take place.
However troops may be moved by steam to the field of battle, they will
there fight on foot or on horseback, and with a gradual development of
their plan, which will allow the commander-in-chief time to make his
wishes known (as a rule, of course), in case of a change in the
enemy's attack. On the other hand, a fleet, comparatively small in
numbers and with its component units clearly defined, may be
meditating an important change of which no sign can appear until it
begins, and which will occupy but a few minutes. So far as these
remarks are sound, they show the need of a second in command
thoroughly conversant with not only the plans, but with the leading
principles of action of his chief,--a need plain enough from the fact
that the two extremities of the order-of-battle may be necessarily
remote, and that you want the spirit of the leader at both
extremities. As he cannot be there in person, the best thing is to
have an efficient second at one end. As regards Nelson's position at
Trafalgar, mentioned at the beginning of this discussion, it is to be
noted that the "Victory" did nothing that another ship could not have
done as well, and that the lightness of the wind forbade the
expectation of any sudden change in the enemy's order. The enormous
risk run by the person of the admiral, on whose ship was concentrated
the fire of the enemy's line, and which led several captains to
implore a change, was condemned long before by Nelson himself in one
of his letters after the battle of the Nile:--
"I think, if it had pleased God I had not been wounded, not a
boat would have escaped to have told the tale; but do not
believe that any individual in the fleet is to blame.... I only
mean to say that if my experience could in person have directed
those individuals, there was every appearance that Almighty God
would have continued to bless my endeavors," etc.[128]
Yet, notwithstanding such an expression of opinion based upon
experience, he took the most exposed position at Trafalgar, and upon
the loss of the leader there followed a curious exemplification of its
effects. Collingwood at once, rightly or wrongly, avoidably or
unavoidably, reversed Nelson's plans, urged with his last breath.
"Anchor! Hardy, do you anchor!" said the dying chief. "Anchor!" said
Collingwood. "It is the last thing I should have thought of."
FOOTNOTES:
[113] Troude: Batailles Navales.
[114] Mahon: History of England.
[115] Lapeyrouse-Bonfils, vol. iii. p. 5.
[116] Troude, vol. ii. pp. 3-5. For other quotations from French
authors to the same effect, see _ante_, pages 77, 80, 81.
[117] Mahon: History of England; Gentleman's Magazine, 1777, p. 553.
[118] Keppel's Defence.
[119] "A candid view of our affairs, which I am going to exhibit, will
make you a judge of the difficulties under which we labor. Almost all
our supplies of flour and no inconsiderable part of our meat are drawn
from the States westward of Hudson's River. This renders a secure
communication across that river indispensably necessary, both to the
support of your squadron and the army. The enemy, being masters of
that navigation, would interrupt this essential intercourse between
the States. They have been sensible of these advantages.... If they
could by any demonstration in another part draw our attention and
strength from this important point, and by anticipating our return
possess themselves of it, the consequences would be fatal. Our
dispositions must therefore have equal regard to co-operating with you
[at Boston] in a defensive plan, and securing the North River, which
the remoteness of the two objects from each other renders peculiarly
difficult."--WASHINGTON to D'ESTAING, Sept. 11, 1778.
[120] Annual Register, 1778, p. 201.
[121] In this plate the plan followed in every other instance, of
showing only the characteristic phases of a battle, in succession, but
disconnected, has been abandoned, and the attempt is to indicate
_continuously_ the series of manoeuvres and the tracks by which the
fleets at last came into contact (from A to C). As the _battle_
consisted merely in the passage by each other of two fleets, moving in
opposite parallel directions, an encounter always indecisive and
futile, the previous manoeuvres constitute the chief interest in an
affair whose historical importance is due to other than tactical
reasons.
[122] The line drawn through the centre of the English fleet at A
shows the close-hauled line (south-southeast) on which, by strict
tactical requirement, the English ships should have borne from each
other.
[123] The leading ships of the two fleets diverged from each other
(C), which is, by the French, attributed to the English van keeping
away; by the English it is said that the French van luffed. The latter
account is followed in the diagrams.
[124] The position D, separated from the rest of the plan, shows the
end of the passage by, which began at C. It could not be shown in
connection with the other tracks without producing confusion.
[125] Afterward Duc d'Orleans; the Philippe Égalité of the French
Revolution, and father of Louis Philippe.
[126] The capture of the French commander-in-chief on board his
flag-ship, in the battle of April 12, 1782, was also a motive for this
new order.
[127] The following incident, occurring during Rodney's chase of De
Grasse, in April, 1782, shows how far subordination may be carried.
Hood was one of the finest of the British officers; nor does the
author undertake to criticise his action. He was some miles from
Rodney at the time. "The separated French ship in the N.W., having got
the breeze at the same time as our van division, boldly stood for and
endeavored to weather the British advanced ships; that being the only
way to regain her own fleet, then to windward. To such a length did
she carry her audacity that she compelled the Alfred, the headmost
ship of Sir Samuel Hood's division, to bear up in order to allow her
to pass. Every eye was fixed upon the bold Frenchman, excepting those
who were anxiously looking out on the commander-in-chief to make the
signal to engage, but who, most likely from not supposing it could be
an enemy, did not throw out the ardently looked-for signal, and
therefore not a gun was fired. This is mentioned to show the state of
discipline on board the ships composing Sir Samuel Hood's division,
and that he, though second in command, would not fire a single shot
until directed to do so by his commander-in-chief. 'It is more than
probable that Sir S. Hood's reason for having waited for the signal to
engage from his commander-in-chief, ere he would fire, arose from the
supposition that had he been the occasion of prematurely bringing on
an action under the above circumstances, he would have been
responsible for the results.'" (White's Naval Researches, p. 97.)
Hood may have been influenced by Rodney's bearing toward inferiors
whose initiative displeased him. The relations of the two seem to have
been strained.
[128] Sir N.H. Nicholas: Despatches and Letters of Lord Nelson.