The Austrian Consul was found to have a large store of corn, which he

concealed in magazines painted and decorated to pass as part of his

dwelling-house. It was all destroyed. Amid the necessary destruction,

private plunderers found facility for their work. The scene presented by

the town could only be likened to that presented by Palmyra, fresh from

the hands of the destroyer, or some other type of desolation. Along the

quay there was a long line of walls, which once were the fronts of

storehouses, magazines, mansions, and palaces. They were empty shells,

hollow and roofless, with fire burning luridly within them by night, and

streaks and clouds of parti-coloured smoke arising from them by day. The

white walls were barred with black bands where the fire had rushed out

of the window-frames. These storehouses belonged to Russians, and were

full of corn--these magazines were the enemy's--these mansions belonged

to their nobles and governors--and these palaces were the residences of

their princes and rulers; and so far we carried on war with all the

privileges of war, and used all the consequences of conquest. In the

whole lengthened front facing the sea, and the wide quay which bordered

it, there was not an edifice untouched but one. This was a fine mansion,

with a grand semicircular front, ornamented with rich entablatures and a

few Grecian pillars. The windows permitted one to see massive mirrors

and the framework of pictures and the glitter of brasswork. Inside the

open door an old man in an arm-chair received everybody. How deferential

he was! how he bowed! how graceful, deprecatory, and soothing the

modulation of his trunk and arms! But these were nothing to his smile.

His face seemed a kind of laughing-clock, wound up to act for so many

hours. When the machinery was feeble, towards evening, the laugh

degenerated into a grin, but he had managed with nods, and cheeks

wreathed in smiles, and a little bad German and French, to inform all

comers that this house was specially under English and French

protection, and thus to save it from plunder and pillage. The house

belonged, _on dit_, to Prince Woronzoff, and the guardian angel was an

aged servitor of the Prince, who, being paralytic, was left behind, and

had done good service in his arm-chair.

The silence of places which a few days before were full of people was

exceedingly painful and distressing. It reigned in every street, almost

in every house, except when the noise of gentlemen playing on pianos

with their boot-heels, or breaking up furniture, was heard within the

houses, or the flames crackled within the walls. In some instances the

people had hoisted the French or Sardinian flag to protect their houses.

That poor device was soon detected and frustrated. It was astonishing to

find that the humblest dwellings had not escaped. They must have been

invaded for the mere purpose of outrage and from the love of mischief,

for the most miserable of men could have but little hope of discovering

within them booty worthy of his notice.

[Sidenote: SPIT OF ARABAT.]

It was decided to occupy Pavlovskaia, because it was in a fine position

to command the entrance to Kertch and Yenikale, at a place where the

channel is narrowed by one of the sandbanks from Taman to the breadth of

a mile and a half. Defensive lines were thrown up around Yenikale of the

most massive and durable character. They enclosed the ramparts of the

old town, and presented on every side towards the land a broad ditch, a

steep parapet defended by redoubts, and broken into batteries, which

were aided by the fire of the pieces on the walls.

The point or bank of Tcherhka, opposite Yenikale, is one of the many

extraordinary spits of land which abound in this part of the world, and

which are, as far as I know, without example in any other country. Of

all these the Spit of Arabat, which is a bank but a few feet above the

water, and is in some places only a furlong in breadth, is the most

remarkable. It is nearly 70 miles in length, and its average width less

than half a mile from sea to sea. The bank of Tcherhka (or Savernaia

Rosa), which runs for nearly eight miles in a south-westerly direction

from Cape Kammenoi past Yenikale, closes up the Bay of Kertch on the

west, and the Gulf of Taman on the east, is a type of these formations,

and is sufficiently interesting to deserve a visit. It only differs from

Arabat in size, and in the absence of the fresh-water wells which are

found at long intervals on the great road from Arabat to Genitchi. It is

so low that it is barely six feet above the level of the sea. A bank of

sand on both sides of the spit, piled up three or four feet in height,

marks the boundary of the beach. The latter, which is a bank of shingle,

shells, and fine sand, is only a few yards broad, and is terminated by

the sand and rank grass and rushes of the spit, which rises up a foot or

two above the beach.

In the interior, or on the body of the bank, there are numerous

lagunes--narrow strips of water much more salt than that of the adjacent

sea. Some of these are only a few yards in length and a few feet in

breadth, others extend for a quarter of a mile, and are about 100 yards

broad. They are all bounded alike by thick high grass and rushes. The

bottom, at the depth of a few feet--often at two or three

inches--consists of hard sand covered with slimy green vegetable matter.

The water abounds in small flounders and dabs, and in shrimps, which

jump about in wild commotion at an approaching footstep. Every lagune is

covered with mallards and ducks in pairs, and the fringes of the spit

are the resort of pelicans and cormorants innumerable. The silence, the

dreary solitude of the scene is beyond description. Even the birds, mute

as they are at the season of my visit, appeared to be preternaturally

quiet and voiceless. Multitudes of old, crustaceous-looking polypous

plants sprang up through the reeds; and bright-coloured flycatchers,

with orange breasts and black wings, poised over their nests below them.

[Sidenote: PILLAGE OF KERTCH.]

The first day I went over, we landed upon the beach close to the battery

which the Russians placed on the spit at the Ferry station. It consisted

of a quadrangular work of sandbags, constructed in a very durable

manner, and evidently not long made. In the centre of the square there

was a whitewashed house, which served as a barrack for the garrison. The

walls only were left, and the smoke rose from the ashes of the roof and

rafters inside the shell. Our men had fired it when they landed. A pool

of brackish water was enclosed by the battery, which must have been the

head-quarters of ague and misery. The sailors said the house swarmed

with vermin, and had a horrible odour. Nothing was found in it but the

universal black bread and some salt fish. The garrison, some 30 or 40

men probably, had employed themselves in a rude kind of agriculture, and

farming or pasturage. Patches of ground were cleared here and there, and

gave feeble indications that young potatoes were struggling for life

beneath. Large ricks of reeds and coarse grass had been gathered round

the battery, but were reduced to ashes. At the distance of a hundred

yards from the battery there was another whitewashed house, or the shell

of it, with similar signs of rural life about it, and an unhappy-looking

cat trod gingerly among the hot embers, and mewed piteously in the

course of her fruitless search for her old corner. The traces of herds

of cattle, which were probably driven down from the mainland to feed on

the grass round the salt marshes, were abundant. There was a track

beaten into the semblance of a road over the sand from the battery to

Taman, and it was covered with proofs of the precipitate flight of the

garrison. Pieces of uniform, bags containing pieces of the universal

black bread, strings of onions, old rags, empty sacks and bottles, were

found along the track, and some of our party came upon a large chest,

which was full of Government papers, stamps, custom-house and quarantine

dockets, stamped paper for Imperial petitions and postage, books of

tariff and customs in Russian, French, German, and English, and tables

of port dues, which we took away to any amount. The heat of the sun, the

vapours from the salt lakes, the mosquitoes, the vermin, and the odour,

must have formed a terrible combination of misery in close barracks in

the dog-days, and have rendered going out, staying in, lying down, and

standing up, equally desperate and uncomfortable. The enemy relied

considerably on the shallow water to save him from attack, but he was

also prepared with heavy metal for gunboats, such as they were in the

old war, and he was no doubt astonished when the large shot from the

Lancaster guns began to fall upon his works from the small hulls of our

despatch gunboats. One of the gunboats which lay off the fort--a mere

hulk, without masts or cordage, of 150 tons burden, with embrasures

through her sides on the deck for nine small guns--was found to be

filled below with the most complete series of galvanic apparatus,

attached to vessels full of powder, intended to explode on contact with

the keel of a vessel. The submarine machines with their strange cups and

exploding apparatus were recognized by Mr. Deane, the diver, as portions

of the same kinds of instruments as those he employed in submarine

operations. All were regularly numbered, and, as there was a break in

the series, it afforded reason for believing that some of them were

actually sunk; but the wires connecting them with the battery on board

the ship were cut the night we forced the Straits, and the vessel

itself was scuttled subsequently. There were many miles of wire, and the

number of cells indicated a very powerful battery.

The pillage of Kertch still went on; the inhabitants fled. Even the

Tartars were in terror. For two or three days the beach was crowded by

women and children, who sat out under the rays of the scorching sun to

find safety in numbers. They were starving, and miserably clad, and in

charity were taken on board the _Ripon_, which sailed with them for some

Russian port. They were about two hundred in number. Mothers had lost

their children, and children were without their mothers. In the

confusion which prevailed they were separated, and the _Caton_ carried

some off to the Sea of Azoff, and the _Ripon_ took others off to Odessa

or Yalta. Our attempts to prevent outrage and destruction were of the

feeblest and most contemptible character. If a sailor was found carrying

any articles--books, or pictures, or furniture--they were taken from him

at the beach and cast into the sea. The result was that the men, when

they got loose in the town, where there was no control over them, broke

to pieces everything that they could lay their hands on. We did not

interfere with French or Turks, and our measures against our own men

were harsh, ridiculous, and impotent.

Prince Woronzoff's house was said to be under the protection of the

English and French. Was he protected because he was a Prince, or merely

because he was supposed to be friendly to the Englishmen, and connected

with some English families? Sir George Brown assuredly had no natural

sympathy with pure aristocracy or with anything but pure democratic

soldiery and military good fortune. It might have been--nay, it

was--right to save Prince Woronzoff's house, but would it not have been

equally proper to protect the stock-in-trade of some miserable Russian

mechanic who remained in the town trusting to our clemency, and who was

ruined by a few brutal sailors? Prince Woronzoff had many palaces. His

friendly feelings towards England were at best known to but few, and

were certainly of no weight with Frenchmen, because those sentiments, if

they existed at all, dated from a period antecedent to the true _entente

cordiale_, and were suggestive of anything but good liking towards

Frenchmen. However, the house was so far safe, and if we were sorry that

the museum was sacked, we might be proud that the palace was spared. The

marks of useless destruction and of wanton violence and outrage were too

numerous and too distressing to let us rest long on the spectacle of

this virgin palace.

The following extract from a "General After Order," which came out

subsequently, gives a summary of the operations effected by our

expeditionary force:--

"Berdiansk has been destroyed, with four war steamers.

"Arabat, a fortress mounting thirty guns, after resisting an hour

and a half, had its magazine blown up by the fire of our ships.

"Genitchi refused to capitulate, and was set fire to by shells.

Ninety ships in its harbour were destroyed, with corn and stores to

the amount of £100,000.

"In these operations the loss to the enemy during four days has

amounted to four war steamers, 246 merchant vessels, and corn and

magazines to the amount of £150,000. Upwards of 100 guns have been

taken. It is estimated that four months' rations for 100,000 men of

the Russian army have been destroyed.

"On the Circassian coast the enemy evacuated Soudjak Kaleh on the

28th of May, after destroying all the principal buildings and sixty

guns and six mortars.

"The fort on the road between Soudjak Kaleh and Anapa is also

evacuated."

[Sidenote: THE FIRST "MONITOR."]

Subsequently an attack was made on Taganrog, but the depth of water off

the port did not permit the larger vessels to approach near enough to

cover the landing of armed parties, to destroy the immense stores of

corn effectually; nevertheless a good deal of harm was done to the

Russians, and public and private property largely injured. It was on the

occasion of the demonstration against this important town, apparently,

that the germ of the great idea of the _Monitor_, which has

revolutionized the navies of the world, was developed by Lt. Cowper

Coles, R.N. He mounted a gun on a raft and defended it with gabions, and

he was enabled to bring this floating battery, which he called the _Lady

Nancy_, into action with great effect against Taganrog. In the

development of that idea called the _Captain_ he lost his life in 1870.

These operations along the coasts of the Sea of Azoff certainly caused

losses to the enemy, and may have done something to create temporary

inconvenience; they were effected in a legitimate if rather barbarous

exercise of the rights of war, but when a few months subsequently the

British Army before Sebastopol was in such need of corn that contractors

were sent out to buy it in the United States, it must have occurred to

the authorities that they had countenanced senseless waste, and

authorized wanton destruction, to their great eventual detriment. As the

naval forces were obliged to retire after each bombardment, and the

landing of armed parties was only temporary, the enemy generally claimed

the credit of having repulsed them, and Russia was inundated with

accounts of the disasters caused by the bravery of priests and peasants,

and divine interposition, to the audacious invaders who had ventured to

pollute her holy soil. Cheap prints of the defence of Taganrog, &c.,

were published and sold by the thousand, and the people were excited by

accounts of the death of innocent people, of the sacking of undefended

cities, and of arson and pillage and wreck. Kertch and Yenikale were

placed in a state of defence and garrisoned, and eventually the Turkish

Contingent was stationed on the coast and in the town, and a small force

of infantry and cavalry was detached from the British to aid them. The

Contingent, composed of Turks under British officers, became a highly

disciplined body, fit for any duty, but its value and conduct were not

exhibited in the field, and it was employed as a corps of defence and

observation on the Bay of Kertch till the war was over, when it and the

other corps raised abroad under British officers, such as the Swiss

Legion, the German Legion, &c., were disbanded. The Russians soon sent a

corps to observe the movements of the force stationed at Kertch and

Yenikale, and hemmed them in with Cossacks, and some slight affairs of

outposts and reconnoitring parties occurred during the autumn and

winter, in one of which a party of the 10th Hussars had difficulty in

extricating itself, and suffered some loss from a larger body of the

enemy. The work of the expedition to Kertch having been accomplished by

the occupation of the town and straits, and by obtaining complete

command of the entrance of the Sea of Azoff, the Allied fleets returned

to Kamiesh and to the anchorage off Sebastopol, to participate as far as

they could in the task of the siege.

BOOK VI.

COMBINED ATTACKS ON THE ENEMY'S COUNTER APPROACHES--CAPTURE OF THE

QUARRIES AND MAMELON--THE ASSAULT OF THE 18TH OF JUNE--LORD

RAGLAN'S DEATH.

CHAPTER I.

Preparations for the Attack--Important News--The Assault--The

Quarries and the Mamelon--A Desperate Attempt--Plan of another

Attack--Assault of the Malakoff and the Great Redan--Failure--Naval

Brigade--An Armistice--Inside the Mamelon--Sad Scenes.

Whilst I was away with the Kertch expedition, the siege was pressed on

by the French with great vigour, and our army was actively employed in

preparing for the bombardment which was to precede the fall of the

place, as all fondly hoped and believed. There were intervals in the day

when you might suppose that "villanous saltpetre" had no more to do with

a modern siege than an ancient one, and that all this demonstration of a

state of conflict was merely an amicable suit upon an extensive scale.

There were times at night when angry and sudden explosions sprang up as

if by some unaccountable impulse or conjuration, and continued with an

impetuosity which seemed as if it intended to finish the whole business

in a moment. There were times when the red fusees turned and tumbled in

the air like hot coals belched out of a volcano, and danced successive

hornpipes upon nothing; then the clatter of small arms broke upon the

ear in distant imitation of the heavy artillery, like a little dog

yelping in gratuitous rivalry of a big one. The fighting was done by

jerks and starts, and the combatants, like Homer's heroes, stood at ease

the best part of the time, and took it coolly, meaning deadly mischief

all the while. The sharpest onset was generally on the side of our

allies, about the Flagstaff or the Quarantine Battery, where they were

sedulously advancing their endless mileage of trench and parallel, and

promising themselves a result before long.

For the third time our fire was opened along the whole range of

positions on the 6th of June. At half-past two o'clock on that day 157

guns and mortars on our side, and above 300 on that of the French, awoke

from silence to tumult.

[Sidenote: ATTACK ON THE QUARRIES.]

The two armies--one might say the four armies, but that the Turks and

Sardinians were not expected to take a very prominent part in the

trench-work and assault--were in strength equal to any achievement, and

in spirits ever chiding the delay, and urging that one touch of the

bayonet which made all the world scamper. If the strategic necessity

pointed to some more decisive action this time, so, on the other hand,

the intention of going beyond a vain cannonade was tolerably plain. Our

fire was kept up for the first three hours with excessive rapidity, the

Russians answering by no means on an equal scale, though with

considerable warmth. On our side the predominance of shells was very

manifest, and distinguished the present cannonade in some degree even

from the last. The superiority of our fire over the enemy became

apparent at various points before nightfall, especially in the Redan,

which was under the especial attention of the Naval Brigade. The

Russians displayed, however, plenty of determination and bravado. They

fired frequent salvos at intervals of four or six guns, and also, by way

of reprisals, threw heavy shot up to our Light Division and on to the

Picquet-house-hill. After dark the animosity on both sides gave signs of

relaxing, but the same relative advantage was maintained by our

artillery. It was a sultry day, with the dull mist of extreme heat

closing down upon the valleys, and with no air to rend away the curtain

of smoke which swayed between the town and our batteries; and at night

flashes of lightning in the north-east made a counter-illumination on

the rear of our position.

A still and sluggish atmosphere, half mist, half gunpowder, hung about

the town in the early morning of June the 7th, and the sun enfilading

the points of view from the horizon, telescopes were put out of joint.

The Redan, however, which rose up boldly in front of the hills that

sloped from Cathcart's Mound, gave some evidence of having yielded to

rough treatment, the jaws of its embrasures gaping, and its fire being

irregular and interrupted.

At nine a cool, strong breeze sprang up, and continued throughout the

day. The whole range of fire from right to left became visible in a

bright sun, that for once was not scorching. The enemy either could not

or would not keep up a very vigorous reply. All the early part of the

day we had the work very much to ourselves.

About eleven o'clock a shell from the Russians exploded a magazine in

our eight-gun battery, and a yell of delight followed. Very slight harm

resulted--one man was killed, one wounded, and a few scorched a little.

As the day wore on, it leaked out that the double attack would probably

commence at five or six P.M. An immense concourse of officers and men

was gathered on Cathcart's Hill, and along the spines of the heights

which wind towards Sebastopol. The fire on our side assumed a sudden

fury about three o'clock.

Between five and six o'clock Lord Raglan and his staff took up a

position on the edge of the hill below the Limekiln, where it commanded

our four-gun battery, and looked straight into the teeth of the Redan.

About half-past six the head of the French column came into view, as it

climbed to the Mamelon. A rocket was thrown up, and instantly our men

made a rush at the Quarries. After one slight check they drove out the

Russians, and, turning round the gabions, commenced making themselves

snug; but the interest was so entirely concentrated upon the more

exciting scene, full in view upon the right, that they had to wait a

good while before attention was directed to their conflict.

[Sidenote: BRILLIANT FIRING.]

The French went up the steep to the Mamelon in loose order, and in most

beautiful style. Every straining eye was upon their movements, which the

declining daylight did not throw out into bold relief. Still their

figures, like light shadows flitting across the dun barrier of

earthworks, were seen to mount up unfailingly--running, climbing,

scrambling up the slopes on to the body of the work, amid a plunging

fire from the guns, which did them as yet little damage. As an officer,

who saw Bosquet wave them on, said, "They went in like a clever pack of

hounds." In a moment some of these dim wraiths shone out clear against

the sky. The Zouaves were upon the parapet, the next moment a flag was

hoisted up as a rallying-point and defiance, and was seen to sway hither

and thither, now up, now down, as the tide of battle raged. It was seven

minutes and a half from the commencement. Then there came a rush of the

French through the angle, where they had entered, and momentary

confusion outside. Groups were collected on the hither side in shelter.

But hardly had the need of support become manifest, and a gun or two

again flashed from the embrasure, than there was another run in, another

sharp fight, and this time the Russians went out spiking their guns.

Twice the Russians made head against the current, for they had a large

mass of troops in reserve, covered by the guns of the Round Tower; twice

they were forced back by the onsweeping flood of French. For ten minutes

or so the quick flash and roll of small arms declared how the uncertain

fight waxed and waned inside the enclosure. Then the back door, if one

may use an humble metaphor, was burst open. The noise of the conflict

went away down the descent on the side towards the town, and the arena

grew larger. It was apparent by the space over which the battle spread,

that the Russians had been reinforced. When the higher ground again

became the seat of action,--when there came the second rush of the

French back upon their supports, for the former one was a mere reflux or

eddy of the stream,--when rocket after rocket went up ominously from the

French General's position, and seemed to emphasize by their repetition

some very plain command, we began to get nervous. It was growing darker

and darker, too, so that with our glasses we could with difficulty

distinguish the actual state of affairs. There was even a dispute for

some time as to whether our allies were going in or out of the work, and

the staff themselves were by no means clear as to what was going on. At

last, through the twilight, we discerned that the French were pouring

in. After the interval of doubt, our ears could gather that the swell

and babble of the fight was once more rolling down the inner face of the

hill, and that the Russians were conclusively beaten. "They are well

into it this time," says one to another, handing over the glass. The

musket flashes were no more to be seen within it. There was no more

lightning of the heavy guns from the embrasures. A shapeless hump upon a

hull, the Mamelon was an extinct volcano, until such time as it should

please our allies to call it again into action. Then, at last, the more

hidden struggle of our own men in the hollow on the left came uppermost.

"How are our fellows getting on?" says one. "Oh! take my word for it,

they're all right," says another. And they were, so far as taking the

Quarries was concerned, but they had nevertheless to fight all night.

As it grew dark our advanced battery under the Green-hill made very

pretty practice by flipping shells over our men's heads at the Russians.

From the misshapen outline of the Quarries a fringe of fire kept blazing

and sparkling in a waving sort of curve, just like a ring of gas

illuminating on a windy night; the attempt to retake them out of hand

was desperately pushed, the Russians pouring in musketry, which caused

us no small loss, and as it came up the gorge, contending with the fresh

wind, sounded in the distance like water gulped simultaneously from a

thousand bottles.

Meanwhile the fall of the Mamelon did not by any means bring the combat

to an end on the side of our allies. The Zouaves, emboldened by their

success, carried their prowess too far, and dreamt of getting into the

Round Tower by a _coup de main_. A new crop of battle grew up over all

the intervening hollow between it and the Mamelon, and the ripple of

musket shots plashed and leaped over the broad hill-side. The combatants

were not enough for victory there too, but they were enough for a

sanguinary and prolonged contest, a contest to the eye far more violent

than that which preceded it. The tower itself, or rather the inglorious

stump of what was once the Round Tower, took and gave shot and shell and

musketry with the most savage ardour and rapidity. The fire of its

musketry was like one sheet of flame, rolling backwards and forwards

with a dancing movement, and, dwarfed as it was by the distance, and

seen by us in profile, could scarcely be compared to anything, small or

large, except the notes of a piano flashed into fire throughout some

rapid tune. Our gunners, observing the duration and aim of the skirmish,

redoubled their exertions, and pitched their shells into the Round Tower

with admirable precision, doing immense mischief to the defenders. It

was dark, and every one of them came out against the heavens as it rose

or swooped. From Gordon's Battery and the Second parallel they streamed

and plunged one after another into the enceinte up to which the Zouaves

had won their way unsupported, heralded every now and then by the prompt

and decisive ring of a round shot. The Russian defence, rather than

their defences, crumbled away before this tremendous fire, but, on the

other hand, the attack not being fed, as it was not designed, began to

languish, and died gradually away.

During the night repeated attacks, six in all, were made upon our men in

the Quarries, who defended their new acquisition with the utmost courage

and pertinacity, and at a great sacrifice of life, against superior

numbers, continually replenished. The strength of the party told off for

the attack was in all only 1,000, of whom 600 were in support. At the

commencement 200 only went in, and another 200 followed. More than once

there was a fierce hand-to-hand fight in the position itself, and our

fellows had frequently to dash out in front and take their assailants in

flank. The most murderous sortie of the enemy took place about three in

the morning; then the whole ravine was lighted up with a blaze of fire,

and a storm of shot was thrown in from the Strand Battery, and every

other spot within range. With a larger body in reserve, it was not

doubtful that our men could have been into the Redan. This was asserted

freely both by officers and privates, and the latter expressed their

opinion in no complimentary manner. They were near enough up to it to

see that it was scarcely defended, and one officer lost his life almost

within its limits. On our side 365 rank and file, and 35 officers, had

been killed and wounded. Our loss in officers killed was great. The 88th

were the severest sufferers, having three officers killed, one missing

and conjectured to be killed, and four wounded--all indeed who were

engaged. The four senior officers of the 62nd were put _hors de combat_.

On the French side nearly double the number of officers, and a total of

not less than 1,500 men, probably more. It was stated as high as 3,700.

When morning dawned, with the wind blowing even stronger than the day

before, the position held by both parties was one of expectation. The

French were in great force within and on the outer slopes of the

Mamelon, and also in possession of two out of the three offsets attached

to the Mamelon on the Sapoune-hill. Their dead were seen lying mixed

with Russians upon the broken ground outside the Malakoff Tower, and

were being carried up to camp in no slack succession. In the rear of the

Mamelon their efforts to intrench themselves were occasionally

interrupted by shells from the ships in the harbour, and from a battery

not previously known to exist further down the hill, while, on their

left front, the Round Tower, showing still its formidable platforms of

defence and its ragged embrasures above, fired upon their working

parties, in the western face, and upon their reserves in the background.

The ammunition waggons, the ambulance carts, the French mules, with

their panniers full freighted, thronged the ravine below our Light

Division, which is the straight or rather the crooked road down to the

attack on the right. Troops of wounded men came slowly up, some English,

the greater portion French, begrimed with the soil of battle. On the

left a party of Zouaves had stopped a while to rest their burden, it

being the dead bodies of three of their officers. A little lower an

English soldier was down on the grass exhausted and well nigh

unconscious from some sudden seizure. A party of French were gathered

round him, supporting him on the bank, and offering water from their

canteens, which he wildly motioned aside. On the right, lining a deep

bay in the gorge, was dotted over half a mile of ground a French

reserve, with their muskets piled, attending the signal to move forward.

They were partially within view of the Malakoff, and the round shot and

shell came plumping down in the hollow, producing every minute or so

little commotions of the _sauve qui peut_ order, replaced the next

moment by the accustomed nonchalance, and the crack of stale charges,

fired off by way of precaution.

[Sidenote: AN UNEXPECTED PETITION.]

A lively and even pretty vivandière came striding up the ascent, without

a symptom of acknowledgment to the racing masses of iron, and smiling as

if the honour of her corps had been properly maintained. At ten o'clock

the little incidents of the halting war perceptible through the

telescope from the crown of the hill below the Picket-house were

these:--At the head of the harbour the Russians were busily engaged

burying their dead; outside the abattis of the Round Tower several

corpses of Zouaves were to be distinguished; about the Mamelon the

French troops were hard at work, some of them stripped for coolness to

their drawers, and were seen creeping down the declivity on the side

towards the Malakoff, and making themselves a deep shelter from its

fire. Our people, meanwhile, on the right attack were calmly shelling

the Malakoff in a cool matter-of-business sort of way, but the eternal

gun on its right, which has been endowed with nine months of strange

vitality, launched an indirect response into the Mamelon. From and after

eleven o'clock the Russians, as usual, slackened fire, nor was there any

duel of artillery on a great scale until after dark.

On the 9th a white flag from the Round Tower and another on the left

announced that the Russians had a petition to make. It was a grave one

to make in the middle of a fierce bombardment with events hanging in the

balance, and success, perhaps, depending upon the passing moments; but

made it was, and granted. From one o'clock until six in the evening no

shot was fired on either side, while the dead bodies which strewed the

hill between the Mamelon and the Round Tower, or remained in front of

the Quarries, were removed from the field. Both of the French and of the

Russians large numbers were scattered over the ground of the chief

conflict; among the former a large proportion were swarthy _indigenes_

of Arab blood, or, as they were popularly termed by the French soldiers,

Turcos, and to their contingent of the killed some were added from the

very inside of the Malakoff, showing how near the impromptu attack was

delivering the place into our hands. Of the Russians there lay still

upon the spot some 200, a sufficient testimony to the severity of their

losses in the struggle. The third battery on the Sapoune-hill was

abandoned the night before, and its guns either withdrawn or tumbled

down the hill.

In the early part of the day there had been a popular impulse to believe

that an end of the affair would be made at night by a combined assault

upon the Malakoff and the Redan. That both were within scope of capture

was considered in camp as proved to demonstration. But the news of the

suspension of arms dissipated the hope, and when the divisions got their

orders for the night, it was no longer thought that aggression was

likely, though defence might be. The enemy, with their wonted

perseverance, had been making very comfortable use of their time, and

when the firing recommenced, which it did instantly on the flags being

lowered, a few minutes before six o'clock, it was plain that the

Malakoff and Redan had both received a reinforcement of guns. Six and

eleven were the numbers of remounted _bouches de feu_--exactness in such

a calculation was not easy, for the Russians were laboriously artful in

disguising the strength of their artillery, and frequently by moving

guns from one embrasure to another make a single one play dummy for two

or three. From six until nine o'clock the duel continued without special

incidents; then there came a sudden splash of musketry, which lasted

some few minutes and died away as unexpectedly. Another trifling

musketry diversion took place about three in the morning, to relieve the

monotony of the great artillery, which kept up its savagery throughout

the night--ten guns for one of the enemy's--but slacked a little towards

morning. We had a great number of casualties during the night in our new

position on the left, into which the Russians kept firing grape and

canister from the batteries which protect the rear of the Redan. They

also occupied the dismantled houses above the ravine, and leisurely took

shot at our people from the windows. Not unnaturally, it was a subject

of the bitterest anger and complaint among the soldiers that they had to

stand still and be riddled, losing day by day a number which was swollen

in a week to the dimensions of a battle-roll of killed and wounded.

Through the occupation and arming of the White Batteries, situated on

the edge of the ridge of Mount Sapoune, the head of the harbour was more

or less in our power. The Russians themselves seemed to acknowledge this

by taking outside the boom the vessels which had before been lying in

that direction, and would have been commanded from the works which the

French were then constructing on the site of the White Batteries of the

Russians. But this was not all. These new works were to act against the

two Strand batteries which the Russians had behind the Mamelon, and

which, not being much commanded by any of our works, could do a good

deal of harm without being exposed to much danger. The construction of

French works on the Mamelon brought us to about 500 yards from the

Malakoff works; it gave us a footing on the plateau on which these works

lie; it furnished us with the means of approaching the rear of them, and

at the same time of operating successfully on the annoying batteries in

the rear of the Mamelon, which, taken thus in a cross fire, could not

long resist. The Quarry was scarcely more than 200 yards from the Redan.

The battery which it contained worked successfully on the six-gun

battery in the rear between the Redan and the Malakoff Tower works; and

from the advanced posts our riflemen were able to prevent a good number

of the guns in the Redan from working.

But, for all this, the keeping of the Quarry was, especially in the

beginning, not at all an easy thing; not so much, perhaps, from the

attempts of the Russians to retake a point of such vital importance to

them, but rather on account of the fire to which it was exposed from

other Russian batteries besides the Redan. The Garden Battery on our

flank, the six-gun battery in the rear, and the Malakoff works could

touch it on nearly all sides. Moreover, the work, when it was taken

being directed against us, offered very little protection against the

riflemen of the Redan, until its face could be converted.

[Sidenote: CHANGE OF PLAN OF OPERATIONS.]

The French in the Mamelon had to maintain themselves under a not less

heavy fire than the English in the Quarries. Some parts of the Malakoff

works, the shipping, the Strand batteries behind, and even some of the

Inkerman batteries, could bear upon them, and they suffered considerable

loss in the first days after their instalment there. Night attacks were

commenced by the fleets; on the 16th the _Tribune_, _Highflier_,

_Terrible_, _Miranda_, _Niger_, _Arrow_, _Viper_, _Snake_, and _Weser_,

stood in at night, and opened a heavy fire upon the town, in company

with some French steamers, whilst the _Danube_ and the launches of the

_Royal Albert_ fired rockets into the place. On the 17th, the _Sidon_,

_Highflier_, _Miranda_, _Viper_, _Snake_, and _Princess Royal_ ran in

again, but the enemy had got their range, and hulled some of the ships

repeatedly; and we had to mourn the loss of Captain Lyons of the

_Miranda_, who was wounded by a piece of shell, of which he died soon

afterwards, at the Hospital of Therapia.

On the 16th of June it was decided at a council of war that, after three

hours' cannonade from the whole of the allied batteries, the assault

should take place on the morning of the 18th of June. Our armament

consisted of thirty 13-inch mortars, twenty-four 10-inch mortars, seven

8-inch mortars, forty-nine 32-pounders, forty-six 8-inch guns, eight

10-inch guns, eight 68-pounders: total, one hundred and sixty-six guns.

The French had about two hundred and eighty _bouches-à-feu_. The

despatch of Lord Raglan, dated 19th June, states that it was decided

that the fire should be kept up for two hours after dawn; but, on the

evening of the 17th, Marshal Pelissier sent over a despatch to our

head-quarters, to the effect that, as the French infantry could not be

placed in the trenches in the morning without the enemy seeing them, he

had decided on attacking the place at daybreak, without any preliminary

cannonade in the morning. Lord Raglan accepted this change of the plan

of attack, although it was opposed to his private judgment, and sent

orders to the divisional generals to carry it out. Sir George Brown, who

was understood to be of opinion that an assault against the Redan was

very doubtful, was ordered to make the arrangements.

The assaulting force, which consisted of detachments of the Light,

Second, and Third Divisions, was divided into three columns. Sir John

Campbell had charge of the left, Colonel Shadforth, of the 57th

Regiment, of the right, and Colonel Lacy Yea, of the 7th Fusileers, of

the centre column. Brigadier (afterwards Sir Henry) Barnard was directed

to take his brigade of the Third Division down the Woronzoff Ravine,

whilst Major-General Eyre moved down his brigade of the same Division

still further to the left, with orders to threaten the works on the

proper right of the Redan and in front of the Dockyard Creek, and, in

case of the assault being successful, to convert the demonstration of

his brigade into a serious attack on the place. The right column was

destined to attack the left face of the Redan between the flanks of the

batteries; the centre column was to assault the salient of the Redan;

and the left column was to assault the re-entering angle formed by the

right face and flank of the work; the centre column was not to advance

till the other columns had well developed their attack. On the French

left, assaults under General de Salles were to be directed against the

Quarantine Bastion, the Central Bastion, and the Bastion du Mât, each by

a division 6,000 strong. On the French right, General d'Autemarre, with

a column of 6,000 men, was to assault the Gervais Battery and the right

flank of the Malakoff; General Brunet, with a similar force, from the

Mamelon, was to attack the left flank of the Malakoff and the little

Redan; General Mayran, from the extreme of the French right, was to fall

upon the Russian batteries near Careening Creek, and the works

connecting No. 1 Bastion with the Little Redan. In order to give greater

completeness to the arrangements, it was decided that the French should

make a demonstration against the Mackenzie Heights; and General Bosquet,

who commanded the Second Corps d'Armée, because it was known that he was

unfavourable to an assault, and preferred operations in the field, was

displaced from his command by General Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely. It

will thus be seen that the French were to assault in six columns,

constituting a force of not less than 36,000 men, with reserves of

25,000. Our assaulting columns were only 1,200 men, although there was a

force in reserve of nearly 10,000 men.

The fire which opened on Sunday morning (the 17th) was marked by great

energy and destructiveness. In the first relief the Quarry Battery,

commanded by Major Strange, threw no less than 300 8-inch shells into

the Redan, which was only 400 yards distant. Throughout Sunday 12,000

rounds, and on the following day 11,946 rounds of shot and shell were

fired against Sebastopol from the British lines.

[Sidenote: A FATAL ADVANCE.]

Early on Monday morning (18th of June), the troops, who had been under

arms soon after midnight, moved down to the trenches. Lord Raglan and

his staff were stationed in the trench in rear of the Quarries Battery.

Marshal Pelissier took up his post in a battery to the rear of the

Mamelon and on our right front, a considerable way from Lord Raglan.

Just as some faint tinge of light in the east announced the approach of

dawn, we heard a very irregular but sharp fire of musketry on our right,

close to the Malakoff. In an instant all the Russian works on the right

woke up into life, and the roar of artillery, mingled with musketry,

became incessant. The column under General Mayran had made a premature

attack! A rocket fired unintentionally misled the French general, who

fell mortally wounded. In a few minutes the column was driven back with

great loss. The musketry ceased. Then three rockets flew up into the

gloomy sky. This was the signal for the assault, which Mayran had

anticipated with such unfortunate results. General d'Autemarre's column,

at the double, made a dash up the ravine which separated the Redan from

the Malakoff. General Brunet led his men to attack the left of the work.

The Russians received them with a tremendous fire, for the grey dawn

just gave light sufficient to indicate the advance of these large

masses. General Brunet fell dead, and his column was obliged to retreat,

with great loss. The other column on the right of the Malakoff was

somewhat more fortunate. They dashed across the ditch and over the

parapet of the Gervais Battery, and drove the enemy before them. Some

few get into the Malakoff itself; certainly, unless my eyes deceived me,

I saw a tricolor flag waving in the centre of the work, and a few French

actually reached the dockyard wall. Although it was understood that the

English were not to attack until the French had carried the Malakoff,

Lord Raglan resolved to assist the French at this stage of the assault,

and the two rockets which was the signal for the advance were sent up.

At the moment, the French were fighting outside the Malakoff, but were

in possession of the Gervais battery on the right flank. Brunet's column

had been driven back. A second attack on the extreme right by Mayran's

column, though aided by 4,000 of the Imperial Guard under General

Mellinet, had completely failed. The Russians, warned by the assault on

their left, were prepared; in the Redan, they held a great force in

reserve. Their guns, loaded with grape, were manned, and the parapets

were thickly lined with infantry.

The party to assault the left face of the Redan consisted of 11 officers

and 400 men of the 34th Regiment, under Major Gwilt, preceded by a

covering party of the Rifle Brigade and a ladder party from the Sailors'

Brigade. When the signal was given, the men carrying the ladders and

wool-bags rushed out of the trench; they were swept down at once by the

tremendous fire. Major Gwilt ordered the 34th to lie down; but on the

extreme right the men who did not receive the order advanced in sections

at the double, and the whole of the storming party made a run at the

re-entering angle of the left face of the Redan. On crossing the trench,

our men, instead of coming upon the open in a firm body, were broken

into twos and threes. This arose from the want of a temporary step above

the berm, which would have enabled the troops to cross the parapet with

regularity; instead of which they had to scramble over it as well as

they could; and, as the top of the trench was of unequal height and

form, their line was quite broken. The moment they came out from the

trench the enemy began to direct on their whole front a deliberate and

well-aimed _mitraille_, which increased the want of order and

unsteadiness caused by the mode of their advance. Yea saw the

consequences. Having in vain tried to obviate the evil caused by the

broken formation and confusion of his men, who were falling fast around

him, he exclaimed, "This will never do! Where's the bugler to call them

back?" But, at that critical moment, no bugler was to be found. The

gallant officer, by voice and gesture, tried to form and compose his

men, but the thunder of the enemy's guns close at hand and the gloom

frustrated his efforts; and as he rushed along the troubled mass of

troops, endeavouring to get them into order for a rush at the batteries,

a charge of their deadly missiles passed, and the noble soldier fell

dead in advance of his men, struck at once in head and stomach by grape

shot. A fine young officer, Hobson, the adjutant of the 7th, fell along

with his chief, mortally wounded. They were thrown into confusion on

getting up to the abattis, by finding a formidable barrier before them.

When the 34th came up, there was only _one_ ladder at the abattis.[20]

Major Gwilt, who was about sixty yards from the abattis, was soon

severely wounded and obliged to retire. Colonel Lysons, who now took the

command, ordered the men to retire. But ere the 34th regained the

trenches, Captain Shiffner, Captain Robinson, and Lieutenant Hurt, were

killed; Captain Jordan, Major Gwilt, Lieutenant Harman, Lieutenant

Clayton, and Lieutenant Alt, were severely wounded, the last two dying

of their injuries.

The column on the left told off for the attack of the re-entering angle

and flank of the right of the Redan, was exposed to the same fire. There

were no scaling ladders at the abattis, much less at the ditch of the

Redan, nor could the Rifles keep down the enemy's artillery. Colonel

Shadforth was killed whilst leading on his men most gallantly. Sir John

Campbell fell dead close to the abattis. In a few moments the assaulting

columns had disappeared.

On our extreme left, the brigade under Major-General Eyre, consisting of

the 18th on the left of the line, of the 9th Regiment and 28th Regiment

in reserve, the 38th Regiment and 44th Regiment on the right, advanced

to threaten the Dockyard Creek and the Barrack Batteries. Four

volunteers from each company, under Major Fielden, of the 44th Regiment,

covered the advance. The brigade was turned out before dawn, and marched

down the road on the left of the Greenhill Battery to the Cemetery,

while the necessary dispositions were being made for the attack. General

Eyre, addressing the 18th, said, "I hope, my men, that this morning you

will do something that will make every cabin in Ireland ring again!" The

reply was a loud cheer, which instantly drew a shower of grape. Just as

the general attack began, they rushed at the Cemetery, which was very

feebly defended; but the moment the enemy retreated their batteries

opened a heavy fire upon it from the left of the Redan and from the

Barrack Battery. They also kept up a heavy fire of musketry from a

suburb close to the Dockyard Creek, by the side of the Woronzoff Road,

and from a number of houses at the other side of the Creek, below the

Barrack Battery. The 18th charged and carried the houses. The Russians

could not depress their guns sufficiently to fire down upon our men;

they directed a severe flanking fire upon them from an angle of the

Redan. The 44th made a dash at the houses under the Barrack Battery, and

the 38th seized hold of the suburb over the Creek Battery, so that the

Russians were obliged to abandon it.

While portions of the 9th, 18th, 28th and 44th were in the houses, the

38th kept up a hot fire from the Cemetery on the Russians in the

battery. One part of the brigade was exposed to a destructive fire in

houses, the upper portion of which crumbled into pieces or fell in, and

it was only by keeping in the lower stories, which were vaulted, that

they were enabled to hold their own. The rest of the brigade, far

advanced from our batteries, were almost unprotected, and were under a

constant _mitraille_ and bombardment from guns which our batteries

failed to touch.

[Sidenote: DEFECTIVE PREPARATIONS FOR THE ASSAULT.]

A sergeant and a handful of men actually got possession of a small work,

in which there were twelve or fourteen artillerymen; but the Russians,

seeing that they were alone, came down upon them and drove them out. An

officer and half-a-dozen men got up close to the Flagstaff Battery, and

were advancing into it when they saw that they were by themselves, and

retreated. About fifteen French soldiers on their left aided them, but

they were unsupported and they all had to retire. Another officer with

twelve men took one of the Russian rifle-pits, and held possession of it

throughout the day.

This partial success, however, did not change the fortunes of the day.

The French were driven out of the Gervais' Battery because they received

no reinforcements, though not till they had held it for upwards of forty

minutes. Marshal Pelissier made proposals to Lord Raglan to renew the

assault. Lord Raglan, though agreeing with the French General in the

practicability of a renewed assault, was of opinion that it ought not to

be attempted till a heavy bombardment had been continued for some hours.

As there was a considerable distance between them, Lord Raglan had to

ride over to Marshal Pelissier, to confer with him on the arrangements

for the proposed assault. During the interval, the French, who were

suffering heavily from the enemy's fire, became dispirited by their

losses and by the inaction which followed the check they had sustained.

The Russians were evidently in great force at the Malakoff; and General

d'Autemarre was so convinced that the assault would not succeed, that he

sent a pressing message to Marshal Pelissier to beg that he would not

expose the men in a fruitless assault. Marshal Pelissier was obliged to

yield to such an expression of opinion, and, Lord Raglan coinciding with

him, the renewal of the assault did not take place. Although the attack

upon the Redan had been discussed at a council of war, and the Engineer

officers of both our attacks (Colonel Chapman and Colonel Gordon) had

been called upon to assist the Generals with their advice, the result

proved that the arrangements were defective and inadequate. Our officers

were outwitted by the subtlety of the Russians, who had for some time

masked their guns, or withdrawn them from the embrasures, as if they

were overpowered and silenced by our fire. No more decisive proof of the

inefficiency of our force could be afforded than this fact--that in no

case did the troops destined to assault and carry the Redan reach the

outer part of the work; that no ladders were placed in the ditch; and

that a very small portion indeed of the storming party reached the

abattis, which was placed many yards in front of the ditch of the Redan.

It cannot be said that on this occasion our men exhibited any want of

courage; but so abortive and so weak was the attack, that the Russians

actually got outside the parapet of the Redan, jeered and laughed at our

soldiers as they fired upon them at the abattis, and mockingly invited

the "Inglisky" to come nearer. A few dilettanti have since started a

theory, which has not even ingenuity to recommend it, and which, if well

founded, would convey the weightiest accusation ever yet made against

our commanders--and that is, that our assault against the Redan was

never meant to be successful, and that it was, in fact, a mere

diversion, to assist the French in getting into the Malakoff. To any one

acquainted with the facts, or to those who were present, this theory

must appear, not only _not ingenious_, but ludicrous and contemptible.

Indeed, the truth is, that an assault was not merely intended to be

successful, but that it was looked upon as certain to succeed. No one

hinted a doubt of the carrying of the Redan, though there was a general

expression of opinion, among those who knew the case, that the force

detailed for the storm was perilously small, and some few, as I heard,

also found fault with the position of the reserves, and thought they

were placed too far in the rear to be of service in case of a check.

Our losses were severe, and they were not alleviated by the consolations

of victory. No less than 22 officers and 247 men were killed, 78

officers and 1,207 men were wounded. The French lost 39 officers killed

and 93 wounded; 1,600 rank and file killed or taken prisoners, and about

the same number wounded--so that the loss of the Allies, on the 18th of

June, amounted to nearly 5,000 officers and men. The Russians admitted a

loss of 5,800; but it is remarkable in their return that the proportion

of their officers killed is very much less than ours. In our army one

officer was killed to every eleven men--one was wounded to every

fifteen. In the French army one officer was killed to thirty men, and

one was wounded to every sixteen men. In the Russian army the proportion

of killed was about one officer to forty-nine men--of wounded, one

officer to thirty-one men. General Jones was wounded over the trench.

General Eyre was disabled by a severe cut on the head, but kept with his

men till they were established in the Cemetery.

[Sidenote: HARROWING SCENES.]

The detachments from the Naval Brigade consisted of four parties of

sixty men each, one for each column, but only two of them went out, the

other two being kept in reserve; they were told off to carry

scaling-ladders and wool-bags, and to place them for our storming

parties. Captain Peel, who commanded, was wounded. His aide-de-camp,

Lieutenant Wood, midshipman of H.M.S. _Queen_, though badly wounded, got

up to the abattis, and rendered himself so conspicuous for a gallantry

of which he had given several proofs on previous occasions, that Lord

Hardinge presented him with a commission of the 13th Light Dragoons on

his expressing a desire to exchange into the army. In No. 1 party,

Lieutenants Urmston, Dalyell, and Parsons, were wounded. In No. 3,

Lieutenant Cave was wounded, and Lieutenant Kidd killed. No. 2 and No. 4

party did not advance, and lost no officer. When the men retreated,

overwhelmed by the storm from the enemy's battery, several officers and

men were left behind wounded. Lieutenant Kidd got into the trench all

safe, and was receiving the congratulations of a brother officer, when

he saw a wounded soldier lying out in the open. He at once

exclaimed--"We must go and save him!" and leaped over the parapet in

order to do so. He had scarcely gone a yard when he was shot through the

breast, and died an hour after. A private soldier of the 33rd, a native

of Cork, named Richard Worrell, displayed the most touching devotion on

the same occasion. When the regiment returned to the trenches it was

discovered that a young officer named Heyland was missing. The enemy's

guns were sweeping the front of the trenches. Worrell did not hesitate

for a moment. "I'll go out," said he, "and bring him in if he's

wounded, or die beside him." He kept his word. His body was found

pierced with balls, close to that of his officer.

All the advantage we gained was the capture of the Cemetery, and the

small Mamelon near it. The French sent over an engineer to examine the

ground, and as that officer expressed an opinion that it was desirable

to hold the place with a view to ulterior defensive works being erected

upon it, General Eyre was assured that a strong body of men would be

marched into it at night. As these troops never arrived, Colonel Adams

retired from the Cemetery at night, leaving only a picket, which was

also withdrawn in compliance with the instructions General Eyre received

from head-quarters, which were to the effect that if the French did not

occupy the work our troops were to withdraw. On the following morning,

Lieutenant Donnelly of the Engineers heard that the position for which

we had paid so dearly was not in our possession. He appreciated its

value--he saw that the Russians had not yet advanced to reoccupy it,

begged and borrowed some thirty men, with whom he crept into the

Cemetery. As soon as the armistice began, the Russians flocked down to

the Cemetery, which they supposed to be undefended, but to their great

surprise they found our men posted there, and in the evening the party

was strengthened, and the Allies constructed most valuable works and

batteries there.

The natural consequence, in civilized warfare, of such a contest as that

recorded above, is an armistice to bury the dead. It was our sad duty to

demand it next day, for our dead lay outside our lines, and there were

no Russian corpses in front of the Redan or Malakoff. We hoisted a white

flag in the forenoon, but there was no such emblem of a temporary peace

displayed by the Russians. Officers and soldiers eager to find the

bodies of their comrades, waited patiently and sadly for the moment when

friendship's last melancholy office could be performed. At last it

became known that the armistice was to take place at four o'clock in the

afternoon.

It was agonizing to see the wounded men lying under a broiling sun,

parched with excruciating thirst, racked with fever, and agonized with

pain--to behold them waving their caps faintly, or making signals

towards our lines, over which they could see the white flag waving. They

lay where they fell, or had scrambled into the holes formed by shells;

and there they had been for thirty hours! how long and how dreadful in

their weariness! A soldier who was close to the abattis saw a few men

come out of an embrasure, and fearing he should be unnoticed, raised his

cap on a stick and waved it till he fell back exhausted. Again he rose,

and managed to tear off his shirt, which he agitated in the air till his

strength failed him. His face could be seen through a glass; and my

friend, who watched him, said he could never forget the expression of

despair with which the poor fellow folded his shirt under his head to

await the mercy of Heaven.

The red-coats lay thick over the broken ground in front of the abattis

of the Redan. Blue and grey coats lay in piles in the raincourses before

the Malakoff. I rode down with some companions past the old 13-inch

mortar battery in advance of our Picket-house into the Middle Picket

Ravine, at the end of which began the French approaches to their old

parallel, which was extended up to their recent conquest, the Mamelon. A

body of light cavalry moved down the Woronzoff road a little later, and

began extending their files right and left in a complete line across the

whole of our front, with the object of preventing any, except those who

were on duty, getting down to the neutral ground. However, my companions

and myself got down into the ravine before the cavalry halted just

behind the Picket-house. This ravine was paved with shot and shell. The

earth gleamed here and there with bullets and fragments of lead. In one

place there was a French picket posted in a bend of the ravine, sleeping

under their greatcoats, raised on twigs, to protect them from the sun,

smoking or talking gravely. Yes, for a wonder, the men were grave and

looked almost sullen; but they were thinking of the comrades whose

bodies they would have to inter. By the side of this ravine--your horse

must needs tread upon them, if you were not careful in guiding him--was

many a mound, some marking the resting-place of individual soldiers,

others piled over one of those deep pits where rank and file reposed in

their common glory.

In the ravine were mules with litters, ambulances, and Land Transport

Corps. English and French were mixed together. I saw in one place two of

our men, apart from the rest, with melancholy faces. "What are you

waiting here for?" said I.

"To go out for the Colonel, sir," was the reply.

"What Colonel?"

"Why, Colonel Yea, to be sure, sir," said the good fellow, who was

evidently surprised at my thinking there could be any other colonel in

the world. And indeed the Light Division felt his loss. Under

brusqueness of manner he concealed a kind heart. A more thorough

soldier, one more devoted to his men, to the service, and to his

country, never fell in battle than Lacy Yea. Throughout the winter his

attention to his regiment was exemplary. His men were the first who had

hospital huts. When other regiments were in need of every comfort, and

almost of every necessary, the Fusileers, by the care of their colonel,

had everything that could be procured by exertion and foresight. Writing

of him, and of similar cases, I said, "At Inkerman his gallantry was

conspicuous. He and Colonel Egerton are now gone, and there remains in

the Light Division but one other officer of the same rank who stands in

the same case as they did. Is there nothing to be done? No recognition

of their services? No decorations? No order of merit?"[21] Two French

soldiers approached, with an English naval officer, whom they were

taking off as a spy. He told us he was an officer of the _Viper_, that

he walked up to see some friends in the Naval Brigade, got into the

Mamelon, and was taken prisoner. The Frenchmen pointed out that the

Naval Brigade was not employed on the Mamelon, that spies were abundant

and clever; but they were at last satisfied, and let their captive go

with the best grace in the world. We were close to the Mamelon, and the

frequent reports of rifles and the pinging of the balls proved that the

flag of truce had not been hoisted by the enemy. We were in the zigzag,

a ditch about six feet broad and six feet deep, with the earth knocked

about by shot at the sides, and we met Frenchmen laden with water

canteens or carrying large tin cans full of coffee, and tins of meat and

soup, cooked in the ravine close at hand, up to the Mamelon.

[Sidenote: INTERIOR OF THE MAMELON.]

I entered along with them. The parapets were high inside the work, and

were of a prodigious thickness. It was evident the Mamelon was overdone.

It was filled with traverses and excavations, so that it was impossible

to put a large body of men into it, or to get them in order in case of

an assault. The stench from the dead, who had been buried as they fell,

was fearful; and bones, and arms, and legs stuck out from the piles of

rubbish on which you were treading. Many guns were also buried, but they

did not decompose. Outside were plenty of those fougasses, which the

Russians planted thickly. A strong case containing powder was sunk in

the ground, and to it was attached a thin tube of tin or lead, several

feet in length; in the upper end of the tube was enclosed a thin glass

tube containing sulphuric or nitric acid. This portion of the tube was

just laid above the earth, where it could be readily hid by a few blades

of grass or a stone. If a person stepped upon it he bent the tin tube

and broke the glass tube inside. The acid immediately escaped down the

tin tube till it met a few grains of chlorate of potash. The mine

exploded, and not only destroyed everything near it, but threw out a

quantity of bitumen, with which it was coated, in a state of ignition. I

very nearly had a practical experience of the working of these mines,

for an English sentry, who kindly warned me off, did not indicate the

exact direction till he found he was in danger of my firing it, when he

became very communicative upon the subject. They made it disagreeable

walking in the space between the works.

I turned into the second English parallel on my left, where it joined

the left of the French right. What a network of zigzags, and parallels,

and traverses! You could see how easy it was for men to be confused at

night--how easy to mistake.

I walked out of the trench of the Quarries under the Redan, in which we

had then established a heavy battery, at the distance of 400 yards from

the enemy's embrasures. The ground sloped down for some few hundred

yards, and then rose again to the Redan. It was covered with long rank

grass and weeds, large stones, tumuli, and holes ranging in depth from

three feet and a half or four feet, to a foot, and in diameter from five

feet to seven or eight feet, where shells had exploded. It is impossible

to give a notion of the manner in which the earth was scarred by

explosions, and shot. The grass was seamed in all directions, as if

ploughs, large and small, had been constantly drawn over it.

The litter-bearers were busy. Most of our dead were close to the abaths

of the Redan, and many, no doubt, had been dragged up to it at night for

plunder's sake. Colonel Yea's body was found near the abattis on the

right of the Redan. His head was greatly swollen, and his features, and

a fine manly face it had been, were nearly undistinguishable. Colonel

Shadforth's remains were discovered in a similar state. Sir John

Campbell lay close up to the abattis. It was but the very evening before

his death that I saw him standing within a few feet of his own grave. He

had come to the ground in order to attend the funeral of Captain

Vaughan, an officer of his own regiment (the 38th), who died of wounds

received two days previously in the trenches, and he laughingly invited

me to come and lunch with him next day at the Clubhouse of Sebastopol.

His sword and boots were taken, but the former was subsequently restored

by a Russian officer. The body was interred on Cathcart's Hill--his

favourite resort, where every one was sure of a kind word and a cheerful

saying from the gallant Brigadier.

The bodies of many a brave officer whom I had known in old times--old

times of the war, for men's lives were short in the Crimea, and the

events of a life were compressed into a few hours--were borne past us in

silence, and now and then men with severe wounds were found still

living. The spirit of some of these noble fellows triumphed over all

their bodily agonies. "General!" exclaimed a sergeant of the 18th Royal

Irish to Brigadier Eyre, as he came near the place in the Cemetery where

the poor fellow lay with both his legs broken by a round shot, "thank

God, _we_ did _our_ work, any way. Had I another pair of legs, the

country and you would be welcome to them!" Many men in hospital, after

losing leg or arm, said they "would not have cared if they had only

beaten the Russians." The wounded lay in holes made by shells, and were

fired at by the Russian riflemen when they rolled about. Our men report

that the enemy treated them kindly, and even brought them water out of

the embrasures. They pulled all the bodies of officers within reach up

to the abattis, and took off their epaulettes and boots, but did not

strip them.

A line of sentries was formed by the Russians so far in front of the

abattis, that General Airey was obliged to remonstrate with an

aide-de-camp of General Osten-Sacken, who ordered them to retire. These

men were remarkably fine, tall, muscular fellows, and one could not but

contrast them with the poor weakly-looking boys in our regiments, or

with the undergrown men of the French line. They were in clean new

uniforms. Many of them wore medals. Their officers turned out with white

kid gloves and patent leather boots.

One stout elderly Russian of rank asked one of our officers, "How are

you off for food?"

"Oh! we get everything we want; our fleet secures that."

"Yes," remarked the Russian, with a knowing wink, "yes; but there's one

thing you're not so well off for, and that your fleet can't supply you

with, and that's sleep."

[Sidenote: OPPOSITE OPINIONS.]

"We're at least as well off for that as you are," was the rejoinder.

Another officer asked if we really thought, after our experience of the

defence they could make, that we could take Sebastopol.

"We must; France and England are determined to take it."

"Ah! well," said the other, "Russia is determined France and England

shall not have it; and we'll see who has the strongest will, and can

lose most men."

In the midst of these brief interviews, beginning and ending with bows

and salutes, and inaugurated by the concession of favours relating to

cigars and lights, the soldiers bore dead bodies by, consigning the

privates to the burial-grounds near the trenches, and carrying off the

wounded and the bodies of the officers to the camp.

The armistice lasted for upwards of two hours.

CHAPTER II.

Effects of Failure of Assault on Health--General order of Lord

Raglan--Death of Lord Raglan--His Character--Orders of General

Simpson, successor to Lord Raglan--Personal Qualifications of

General Simpson to command the Army--Confirmation as

Commander-in-chief by the Queen--Other Appointments.

Immediately after the failure of the assault, Sir George Brown, Generals

Pennefather, Codrington, Buller, and Estcourt, were obliged to take to

their beds, to seek change of air, or to sail for England. Lord Raglan

was affected. It was observed by his staff that the failure had

"affected his health;" and an officer, writing home to his friends, on

the 23rd of June, remarked, "he (Lord Raglan) looks far from well, and

has grown very much aged latterly."

General Estcourt, Adjutant-General of the Army, died on the morning of

the 24th of June, after three days' illness.

On the 28th Lord Raglan published the following order:--

"The Field-Marshal has the satisfaction of publishing to the army

the following extract from a telegraphic despatch from Lord

Panmure, dated the 22nd of June.

"'I have Her Majesty's commands to express her grief that so much

bravery should not have been rewarded with merited success, and to

assure her brave troops that Her Majesty's confidence in them is

entire.'"

Within a very few hours after the appearance of this order, the electric

telegraph brought the startling intelligence to the head-quarters of the

various divisions that the Field-Marshal was dead.

On Tuesday evening, after his usual devotion to the desk, he was seized

with symptoms of a choleraic character, and took to his bed, where he

died on the night of the following Thursday. Lord Raglan possessed

qualities which, if not those of a great general, were calculated to

obtain for the English army more consideration than that to which it was

entitled by its numerical strength. Although he was frequently obliged

to give way to their councils, in opposition to his declared

convictions, his calmness in the field--his dignity of manner--his

imperturbable equanimity--exercised their legitimate influence over the

generals of the French army.

That Lord Raglan was an accomplished gentleman, as brave a soldier as

ever drew a sword, an amiable, honourable man, zealous for the public

service, of the most unswerving truth, devoted to his duty and to his

profession, cannot be denied; but he appears to me to have been a man of

strong prejudices and of weak resolution, cold to those whom, like Omar

Pasha, he considered "vulgar," coerced without difficulty by the

influence of a stronger will, and apt to depend upon those around him

where he should have used his own eyes. There was something of the old

heroic type in his character, which would have compensated for even

graver defects, if their results had not been, in many instances, so

unfortunate for our arms; his death on a foreign soil whilst in command

of an English army touched the hearts of his countrymen.

The following General Orders were issued next day:--

"HEAD-QUARTERS BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, _June 29_.

"No. 1. It becomes my most painful duty to announce to the army the

death of its beloved commander, Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, G.C.B.,

which melancholy event took place last night about nine o'clock.

"No. 2. In the absence of Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown, the

command of the troops devolves on me, as the next senior officer

present, until further orders are received from England.

"No. 3. Generals of Divisions and heads of departments will be

pleased to conduct their respective duties as heretofore.

"J. SIMPSON, Lieutenant-General."

[Sidenote: QUEEN APPOINTS GENERAL SIMPSON COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.]

General Simpson was destitute of those acquirements and personal

characteristics which in Lord Raglan compensated for a certain apathy

and marble calmness. He was a veteran who had seen a year's service in

the Peninsula in 1812-13, and in the campaign of 1815, and who thirty

years afterwards held the post of Quartermaster-General to Sir C.

Napier, in his Indian war of 1845. Lord Raglan had, at all events, by

the dignity of his personal character, secured a position for the troops

he commanded to which they were not numerically entitled; but no one can

say by what sacrifices that position was maintained till the battle of

Inkerman forced us to abandon it. It was believed at the time, and it is

now notorious, that General Simpson opposed his own appointment, and

bore testimony to his own incapacity; but the Government--or Lord

Hardinge and Lord Panmure--insisted, and General Simpson became

Commander-in-Chief of the British Army. Writing at the time respecting

our future General I said:--

"Rumours prevail that a new Commander-in-Chief is to come out from

England. Whether this be true I have not yet learnt, but it is to

be hoped that the Peninsula and Waterloo, at twenty-three or

twenty-four years of age, will not be the only qualification. It

seems to all here that the best school for Sebastopol is Sebastopol

itself, and that a man who has been six months in the Crimea is

more likely to be an efficient general than any one who may be sent

out in reliance upon vague reminiscences of campaigns in the field

forty years ago. It takes some little time to gain an acquaintance

even with the ground, and as autumn is drawing on there is no need

for delay. The only reason that can be conceived for sending out a

general from England is that some man of European reputation may be

appointed, who may give a _status_ to the British army beyond what

its present numbers are calculated to obtain for it in the eyes of

the world. There is no doubt that Lord Raglan did this. His rank,

his high character, his manners, his superiority to petty

jealousies, and his abstinence from petty intrigues, commanded the

respect of even those who were disposed to question his capacity

and energy. If this war be prosecuted for any length of time, and

England is not prepared to embark more fully in the struggle with

men as well as money, there is some danger that the British Army

will be looked upon as a mere contingent. A general of established

reputation may add a lustre to the British name, but, after all,

the best reliance is upon skill and energy, and there are many men

at present before Sebastopol upon whom the command might devolve

with satisfaction to the army, and with a reasonable hope of a

creditable performance of the duties of the post."

On the 21st of July, General Simpson published the following order:--

"General Simpson announces to the army that he has had the honour

to receive from her Majesty the Queen the appointment of

Commander-in-Chief of the Army in the Crimea.

"The Lieutenant-General, though deeply impressed with the

responsibility of the position in which he is placed, is most proud

of the high and distinguished honour, and of the confidence thus

reposed in him by his Sovereign.

"It will be the Lieutenant-General's duty to endeavour to follow in

the steps of his great predecessor, and he feels confident of the

support of the generals, and of the officers and soldiers, in

maintaining unimpaired the honour and discipline of this noble

army.

(Signed) "JAMES SIMPSON,

"Lieutenant-General Commanding."

The personal Staff of his Excellency consisted of Captain Colville,

Rifle Brigade; Captain Lindsay, Scots Fusileer Guards; Major Dowbiggen,

4th Foot (appointed by electric telegraph). Lieut.-Colonel Stephenson

was appointed Military Secretary, although Colonel Steele remained at

head-quarters; and Colonel Pakenham was confirmed as Adjutant-General,

at the request of Lord Raglan, in the last despatch he ever penned.

On the 21st, Captain Lushington, who had been promoted to the rank of

Admiral, was relieved in the command of the Naval Brigade by Captain the

Hon. H. Keppel. Commissary-General Filder, at the same date, returned

home on the recommendation of a Medical Board.

[Sidenote: RELINQUISHMENT OF A FAVOURABLE POSITION.]

BOOK VII.

EFFORTS TO RAISE THE SIEGE--BATTLE OF THE TCHERNAYA--THE SECOND

ASSAULT--CAPTURE OF THE MALAKOFF--RETREAT OF THE RUSSIANS TO THE

NORTH SIDE.

CHAPTER I.

Survey of the Position of the Allied Armies--Renewed preparations

of the Russians--Operations of the Allied Armies--Their

Defectiveness--Renewed defence of the Malakoff--Strength of our

Armament--Inactivity of the Allies, especially the Turks--Public

feeling respecting the non-participation of the latter in the Siege

Operations--Gloomy view of the Position of the Allies--Anticipated

renewal of Hostilities--Curious Russian Letter on the

Situation--Violent Storm of Wind and Rain--Continuous Supply of

Russian Soldiers--Military discipline and composition of

Piedmontese Army--Medical board and system of Invaliding--Desultory

Russian firing--Eager anticipations by our Army of a general

Attack--Arrival of British reinforcements--Turkish demand for Black

Mail--French Malpractices.

The time is not yet come for the disclosure of all the truth; but it may

even now be asked, how it was that on the 6th of February, 1855, we

abandoned our ground opposite the Malakoff to the French, if we really

knew it to be the key of the Russian position? A change was indeed

necessary, and it was evident that the English army was much too weak to

occupy the space from the Dockyard Creek ravine on the left, to the

valley of the Tchernaya on the right. But why, instead of allowing the

French (I use that word "allowing," inasmuch as we are given to

understand that Sir John Burgoyne objected to the change)--why, instead

of allowing the French to take from us the favourable ground upon our

right attack, did we not move to our right, and leave the French to

occupy the spot held by our left, which we maintained to the end of the

siege? It seems but natural that as we had defended the right of the

Allied Army at Inkerman, with so much loss, and so much courage, we

should have continued to occupy a position we had rendered glorious for

ever. A cession of it to the French appears to be a tacit reproach. By

concentrating our left on our right attack, we could have readily

carried on the siege works, and have preserved to ourselves the attack

against the Malakoff, which was originally opened by us on the 17th of

October, 1854. It was said that the French objected to take Chapman's

attack, on the plea that they could not serve our artillery. Sir John

Burgoyne then offered that our artillerymen should be left to work the

English guns; but the objection, if ever it was made, was futile,

inasmuch as at a subsequent period of the siege the French demanded and

received the loan of more than twenty-four 32-pounders, which they used

with great vigour at the final bombardment. The compliance of Sir John

Burgoyne upon this point is the more to be wondered at, inasmuch as it

was he who discovered the great importance of the position we so readily

yielded, and it was he who announced that the Malakoff, of which he

relinquished the attack to our Allies, was the veritable key of the

whole of the defences of Sebastopol.

Between the death of Lord Raglan and the middle of July, no decided

progress was made in the siege approaches, and the Russians contented

themselves with strenuous preparations to meet another assault. But as

sickness diminished, and reinforcements and fresh supplies of material

were poured into the Crimea later in the month, the Allies set to work

with renewed energy, and not only gained ground before Sebastopol, but

began to feel their way towards the left of the enemy's position on the

Belbek. At the same time they extended their operations in the direction

of Mangoup-Kale, and Kutchuk Sevren, first by way of reconnaissance, and

finally by the establishment of standing camps of sufficient strength to

defy a sudden attack by any force short of an army. In these operations

the French performed the active work. They were aided to some extent by

the Sardinians encamped at Komara, and by the Turks, who completed the

friendly investment of Balaklava from the Sardinian right to the cliffs

over the sea near Cape Aiya.

[Sidenote: SEIZURE OF MALAKOFF BY THE RUSSIANS.]

After the 18th of June, 1855, it became quite evident that our left

attack was utterly useless for the purposes of an assault, and

accordingly one would have thought that the whole energy of the chiefs

of the British Army and of the Engineers would have been directed to

push on our saps in the direction of the only point of attack the

British Army had to deal with; but in effect the Redan was not

approached much more closely by our Engineers subsequently to the 18th

than it had been previously, and most of our efforts were directed to

the augmentation of the weight and vigour of our fire from batteries

already established, or to the strengthening of the Quarries Battery,

which we took on the 7th of June. In fact, we seemed determined to take

the place by the fire of artillery alone; and yet, when the time came we

combined with it an assault, which was of course an interference with,

and an abandonment of, that determination. Although our officers had the

Mamelon before their eyes, they overlooked the fact that the Russians

could screen a very large body of men inside their casemates and

bomb-proofs, and that the garrison would suffer very little from our

fire so long as it failed to search out and destroy those retreats. When

the garrison of these casemates was warned, by the cessation of our

fire, of the coming assault, they swarmed out in masses more numerous

than the assailants, who were besides broken, and almost breathless,

owing to their run from the trenches, and repulsed them ere they reached

the abattis. Whenever the Russians felt our energy was overpowering them

at any one particular point they withdrew their guns behind the

traverse or parapet, and trusted to the strength of their earthworks, so

that it was difficult to say what was the exact effect of our cannonade

upon their guns. Thus, on the 18th of June, our soldiers were raked with

grape and canister from points where we had imagined the guns were

dismounted and silenced, and it was evident that our artillery had not

gained that mastery over the enemies' pieces which was requisite to

ensure success. We subsequently endeavoured to secure a better chance

for our troops, at the next assault, by establishing batteries to crush

the flanking fire of the angles of the Redan, and of the curtains in the

direction of the salient; but the tackles broke in raising the guns, and

these batteries were never armed.

From the attack of the 18th of June to the 10th of July, the enemy were

employed in strengthening their works; they made such progress at the

Redan, that it was judged expedient to open a heavy fire upon them. This

commenced at five o'clock on the morning of the 10th of July, and lasted

for four hours. Several embrasures were destroyed, and the enemy's reply

was feeble; but they did not cease from their labours, and we were

obliged to reserve our ammunition for general bombardment. The English

cavalry, long inactive, began to look forward to service in the field,

as hopes were held out that a movement would be made against the Russian

corps on the Upper Belbek. On the 12th July, General Barnard was

appointed Chief of the Staff.

Major-General Markham arrived on the 19th of July, and assumed the

command of the Second Division; but he had materially injured his health

by the exertions he made in travelling through India to get to the

Crimea, and he did not add to the high reputation he had gained in the

East.

The arrival of Sir Harry Jones to replace Sir John Burgoyne was regarded

with hope, but no change in the plan of attack was originated by that

officer, nor did the French engineers at any time appear to appreciate

the importance of the ground between them and the Malakoff, till the

Russians significantly demonstrated the value of the Mamelon by seizing

upon and fortifying it in the spring of the year. Sir Harry Jones,

although younger than Sir John Burgoyne, was not blest with the health

of that veteran soldier, and for some time the works were carried on

without the benefit of his personal supervision. If the ground in front

of our trenches and saps towards the Redan was difficult, that through

which the French drove their approaches close to the Bastion du Mât, and

notably to the Bastion Centrale, was literally a mass of oolite and hard

rock.

Our armament, on the 17th of June, consisted of thirty 13-inch mortars,

seventeen 10-inch mortars, and eight 8-inch mortars; of forty-nine

32-pounders, of forty-six 8-inch guns, of eight 10-inch, and eight

68-pounder guns--an increase of thirty guns and mortars on the armament

with which we opened fire on the 7th June; and 2,286 13-inch bombs, 884

10-inch bombs, 9,746 32-lb. shot, 6,712 8-inch shot, 1,706 10-inch shot,

1,350 68-pounder shot, were fired into the town, in the bombardment,

previous to the assault. Still, this weight of metal did not crush the

fire of the place, and the enemy were enabled to continue to reply, and

to mount fresh guns, owing to the constant command of men from the

armies outside the town. The capture of Kertch and Yenikale, the command

of the Sea of Azoff, the partial possession of the Spit of Arabat, had

not produced the results we expected on the resources of the garrison;

they received supplies of men and food by Perekop and Tchongar--no

matter by what exertions or at what sacrifices the communications might

be effected. The Allies advanced from Eupatoria, towards Simpheropol,

but invariably found the enemy in superior force, in strong positions,

except on the single occasion of General d'Allonville's brilliant affair

with the Russian cavalry, under General Korte, near Sak, which ended in

the utter rout of the latter and the loss of a battery of field

artillery. The nature of the country, the difficulty of transport, and

the distance of the base of operations, have all been pleaded as reasons

for the failure of the attempts to advance from Eupatoria; but it seems

rather strange that no effort was made to march, by either the Buljanak

or the Alma, to the capital of the Crimea: the troops of Omar Pasha,

instead of being kept idle at Komara or Eupatoria, could have been

employed with the French and English in making a serious diversion,

which would have paralyzed the energies of the enemy, and which might

have led to the fall of Sebastopol. It was not till the 11th July that

Omar Pasha, dispirited at the inactivity to which himself and army had

been doomed, proposed to General Simpson to embark the Turks from the

Crimea, and to land near Kutais, in order to relieve Kars by menacing a

march upon Tiflis. On the 15th of July a conference of the Allied

Generals was held at General Pelissier's to consider the position of the

Turks in Asia Minor, and it was with much difficulty the Turkish

Generalissimo succeeded in persuading them that 25,000 Turks operating

in Asia were much better employed than if they were doing nothing at

Komara. However, it was long ere he could obtain the means of carrying

out his plans; and there is no doubt but that his assistance in

operating from Eupatoria would have been of the utmost importance during

the time he was compelled to maintain an attitude of hopeless

inactivity.

[Sidenote: GLOOMY FOREBODINGS OF SIR GEORGE BROWN.]

It will be observed that all this while the Turks never took part in the

siege. The justice of the following remarks, which was apparent enough

in July, 1855, seems still more evident at the present moment:--"It is a

singular thing, that while the French and British troops consider their

most harassing work to be the duty in the trenches, the Turks, who are

equally interested in the event of the war, and will be the most

benefited by its success, do not take any share in actual siege

operations, and amuse themselves with the mere pastime of foraging, or

actually sitting in indolence for hours together, following the shadows

of their tents as they move from west to east, smoking stolidly, or

grinning at the antics of some mountebank comrade. Omar Pasha goes

hither and thither without object, merely that his army may seem to be

employed; its actual services are of little importance. It is said that

an agreement was made between the allied Generals and the Porte that the

Turks were not to assist in the siege. But why not? and can such an

arrangement be binding when the public good demands a different course?

If the Ottoman troops be so excellent behind fortifications, there can

be no objection to their relieving their hard-worked allies in some of

the less important positions; or they might at least be employed in some

more active manner than merely moving to and fro occasionally, as if for

the purpose of impressing the mind of Europe with a false idea of

activity.

"The rumour has spread within the last few days that Omar Pasha is to go

to Kars, in order to relieve the place and oppose the advance of the

Russians in Asia. But this, if seriously contemplated, can be intended

only as a measure of preparation for next year's campaign, and the

object will be rather to save Erzeroum than Kars. Should the

transportation of the Turkish army to Trebizonde be determined upon, it

will not take less than two months, even with the help of the British

Navy, to convey it across, a longer term having been required for the

transport from Varna to Eupatoria, which places are not so far apart.

Allowing a month for the march from Trebizonde to Kars, it would be

November before the army could reach its new position; and at that

season the lofty table-land of Armenia is deep in snow, and all military

operations will be suspended until the ensuing spring. But it is more

than probable that the report of the movement has no foundation. It

arises from a belief that the affairs of Asia have been grievously

neglected, that the present year has not bettered the position of the

Turks, and that there is danger lest the Russians should actually

succeed in wresting away an important province as well as consolidating

their reputation among the inhabitants of Central Asia."

The first great phase in the siege had been passed--we found that the

Russians could resist the Allied forces with vigour, and that they were

capable of acting upon the defensive with greater energy than we gave

them credit for, from their conduct at the Alma. The constant passage up

the Bosphorus of vessels with troops on board from France, and artillery

and material from England, evinced the preparations made by the Allies

for the renewal of the struggle; but there were many who thought that

the siege would not be over till the following year, and that the Allies

would have to undergo the miseries of another winter in the open

trenches. Sir George Brown, who had ever entertained a most gloomy view

of our position--the falseness and danger of which, in a military sense,

he rather exaggerated than undervalued--left the army on sick

certificate two days after Lord Raglan's death, and the Generals in

command were new and untried men, in comparison with those who first led

our army to the Crimean campaign.

On the 12th of July, the Turks and French went out foraging and

reconnoitring towards Baidar. According to the officers who accompanied

this reconnaissance, there was no weak point towards the Belbek, and an

attack on the Russian position from Inkerman to Simpheropol was

considered hopeless. Nature seems as if she had constructed the plateau

they occupied as a vast defensible position which 50,000 men might hold

against four times their number. Writing on the 12th of July, I

said,--"Of the reduction of Sebastopol proper before the winter I have

no kind of doubt. The Russian generals, though brave and determined on

an obstinate defence, deserve credit for prudence and forethought. As

long as a place can be held with a chance of success, or even of

damaging the enemy, they will hold it; but all their proceedings induce

the belief that they will not allow their troops to be cut to pieces

merely for the credit of having made a desperate resistance, and of

having maintained, without advantage, for a short time longer, a

position which, in a military sense, is untenable. When they perceive

that their retreat is seriously endangered, it is not improbable that

they will altogether abandon the southern side, which they can hardly

hope to hold should the Allies be able to command the harbour. They, no

doubt, count at least on being able to prolong their resistance until

the winter sets in; if that be impossible, they will most likely

withdraw to the northern side, to which it may be impracticable to lay

siege before the spring of 1856."

On the night of the 22nd, the Russians, who were either under the

impression that the Allies were about to make an assault, or wished to

stop our working parties, opened a heavy fire of musketry along their

line, and after a great expenditure of ammunition, they retired from the

parapets. The casualties in the trenches became so heavy, that the

Commander-in-Chief, in several despatches, expressed his regret at the

loss, which he attributed to the proximity of the works, the lightness

of the nights, and the rocky nature of the ground. From the 27th to the

29th July, thirteen men were killed, and five officers and 108 men were

wounded, in addition to casualties in the Naval Brigade. However, some

little progress was made--our advanced parallels were strengthened, and

our unlucky fifth parallel was deepened. The French engineers were

pressing on with indefatigable energy on the right and left of our

position, and were close to the Malakoff on the right, and the Central

and Flagstaff Bastion on the left; and it was evident that, at the next

bombardment, it would scarcely be possible to preserve the town from

destruction. The Russians prepared to strike a blow, the influence of

which would be felt in the councils of Vienna, and in the Cabinets of

every State in Europe.

The French had now pushed their works almost to the abattis of the

Malakoff, and were so near that a man might throw a stone into the

Russian position. It began to be understood by all engaged that the real

point of attack would be the Malakoff works, the capture of which would

render the Redan untenable, and make the surrender of the south side of

the place merely a question of time.

[Sidenote: RUSSIAN LETTER TO A SISTER]

The following letter, which was found in Laspi, near Baidar, affords a

curious insight into the feeling of Russian civilians. It was written

from a village close to the north Fort of Sebastopol, and ran thus:--

_May 26_ (_June 7_).

"You are not, my dear sister, in a very safe position; according to

my judgment, the enemy is only a few steps from you at Foross. The

Baidar road is broken up. We have already sent pioneers to the

coast to break up the roads in case of the arrival of the enemy;

they have taken a sufficient quantity of powder. In your letter of

the 12th of May (24th) you said all was quiet about you, but it

cannot be so now. Kertch is taken; at Arabat there was a battle, in

which we were victorious. They even say that a Russian army is

marching upon Paris. Up to to-day all was quiet in Sebastopol.

To-day the enemy bombarded heavily, but did nothing but bombard,

and will do nothing; they can do nothing at all against us. Mother,

who has just come from there, says it is impossible to recognize

the town, it is so much changed by the fortification continually

added to it. At the Severnaya, you enter as through a gate, with

enormous batteries on each side. Mother was there a day when it was

quite quiet; she even slept in the town that night. At ten o'clock

a shell fell into the gallery near the window; happily it did not

fall into the room, or she might have been hurt. * * * They say

that the seat of war will soon be transferred to the Danube. It is

time that these gentlemen should leave us, and let us have a little

rest. As soon as they go, the town of Sebastopol will be built

where the Chersonese was, and what is now Sebastopol will be

entirely a fortress. How curious it will be, till one gets

accustomed to it," &c.

The writer goes on to speak of her yellow dress being ready, and of her

intention of going in it to Sebastopol in order to have her portrait

taken. The Severnaya alluded to in the letter was what we called the

Star Fort, or is more probably the name for the whole northern faubourg.

After the sortie of the 23rd of July, nothing of importance, or even of

interest, occurred. The desultory fire, to which we were accustomed,

continued by day, usually swelling into a roar of artillery for a

portion of every night. The casualties continued much as before, not

very heavy, although some days were unlucky, and on the night of the

28th the Guards had twenty-five or thirty men killed and wounded.

Soon after five o'clock on the morning of the 31st of July a most

violent storm of wind and rain commenced. It caused much discomfort and

actual damage in the camp, over which it raged with combined fury and

obstinacy which I do not remember to have seen surpassed. The extensive

portion of the camp, of which I commanded a view from my hut, was

converted into a lake, the rain descending much faster than it could

sink into the earth. Over the surface of this lake the rain was borne in

clouds by the driving wind, and formed a sort of watery curtain through

which the soaked tents looked dreary and dismal enough. The shelter

which they offered, imperfect as it was, was sought, and only here and

there a drenched figure was to be seen struggling through the blast. In

the pens the mules and horses hung their heads mournfully, enduring,

with melancholy philosophy, the inevitable and unwelcome _douche_. In

sundry nooks and corners to the leeward of tents, and under the eaves of

huts, the camp fowls took refuge, with drooping plumes, and that look of

profound discomfort peculiar to poultry under difficulties. Even the

furious war of the elements did not arrest the strife between man and

man, and from time to time, above the roar of the wind and the plash of

the rain, the boom of a gun reached us.

I was told by a French officer of Artillery, that General Pelissier, on

being asked when offensive siege operations would be again resumed,

said, "Well, I don't know: the Russians are losing every day 300 or 400

men by sickness. If we wait a week, they will have lost a brigade; if we

wait a month, they will have lost a _corps d'armée_." But if the

Russians lost many men by sickness, they managed to replace them.

Numbers of stories were in circulation about the formidable forces which

had come, and kept coming, and apprehensions of an attack upon the

Tchernaya line gained ground daily.

On the night of August 2nd, between ten and eleven o'clock, P.M., the

Russians sallied out of the town by the Woronzoff Road, and advanced to

the heavy iron frieze placed across the Woronzoff Road, between the left

and right attacks. The advanced picket at the _chevaux de frise_ was

commanded by Lieutenant R. E. Carr, of the 39th Regiment, who behaved

with coolness and gallantry. He fell back slowly, keeping up a fire on

the Russians, to the advanced trench guard, under Captain Lackie, 39th

Regiment. The trench guard on the right of the fourth parallel, under

Captain Boyle, 89th, and Captain Turner, 1st Royals, checked the enemy,

and they retired after ten minutes' firing, leaving a few men killed

behind them, and carrying off a part of the barrier.

[Sidenote: COMPOSITION OF PIEDMONTESE ARMY.]

Piedmont, placed as it is between two great military Powers--France and

Austria--has evidently watched with attention the progress and

improvements which have been introduced into the military systems of

these two neighbouring empires, and adapted their experiments in these

matters to her own advantage. In the autumn of every year a

concentration of troops takes place in Lombardy, and before the war of

1848 numbers of Piedmontese officers used to assemble there. The same

was, and I think is still, the case whenever a camp is collected in the

south of France. Thus they had the opportunity of studying two, in many

respects, very different systems. The result is a blending of the two in

arms, accoutrements, administration, and movements. For instance, the

infantry is dressed in French fashion, with leather gaiters under the

trousers, the long coat reaching to the knees; the only exception being

the shako, which more resembles the Austrian shako than the French kepi.

The cavalry and the artillery, on the contrary, wear the short tunic of

the Austrian cavalry and artillery. For the movements of infantry as

well as of cavalry the French manual has been exclusively adopted, and

at some distance one could scarcely distinguish French cavalry

manoeuvring from Piedmontese, were it not for the difference in the

seat of the riders. The _manège_ is decidedly Austrian.

The spirit of the Piedmontese army--I mean, the relations existing

between soldiers and officers, and of the intercourse of the latter with

one another--is, however, more analagous to that of the English than to

that of either the French or Austrian armies. It is neither the easy

familiarity which exists between the French officer and soldier, nor

that "beggar-on-horseback"-like tyranny of the officer and the unwilling

slavishness of the soldier which characterize the Austrian army. The

officers in the Piedmontese, like those in the English Army, belong

almost exclusively to the higher classes, and only rarely does an

officer rise from the ranks, so that the distance between officer and

soldier is not one of mere discipline, but social; and, however the

spirit of Republicanism and the longing for equality may be developed in

other states of Italy, Piedmont does not seem to be impregnated with it,

and the system adopted of choosing for officers men from the higher

classes answers very well. On the other hand, the officers themselves

associate much in the same manner as in the English Army. When official

business is over and social intercourse begins, the difference between

the higher and lower officer entirely ceases, and they associate as

gentlemen are wont to do.

On the 30th of July a medical board was ordered on Lieutenant-General

Sir R. England, G.C.B., commanding Third Division, and he was

recommended to return to England. He was the last of the generals who

left England in command of a division. Major-General Eyre succeeded him

in the Third Division.

On the 5th, Brigadier Lockyer was in orders for Ceylon, and Colonel

Windham, C.B., was nominated to succeed him in the command of the Second

Brigade, 2nd Division. On the 3rd of August General Canrobert was

recalled.

At an early hour on the 7th, General Simpson went round the lines,

examining the works. A council of war was held on Wednesday evening,

8th, at the British head-quarters. The principal medical officers of

Divisions received orders to clear the hospitals, to send to Balaklava

such patients as could safely be moved, and to complete the preparations

for the reception of wounded men.

Leave of absence continued to be granted to a very large extent. Taking

five of the then latest general orders, those of the 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th,

and 8th of August, we find the names of no less than seventy officers

who had received permission to absent themselves. Of these, twenty-nine

proceeded to England--twenty-six of them in virtue of medical

certificates, and three upon "urgent private affairs," or in

consideration of peculiar circumstances: twenty-seven went to Scutari

and Therapia for periods varying from two to five weeks; twelve on board

ship, and two to the Monastery of St. George, where there were ten rooms

fitted up for ailing or convalescent officers. I heard a colonel declare

that he had but one captain and three subalterns on duty in his

battalion, and that he, consequently, had to send one hundred men into

the trenches under charge of a youth of eighteen. If this state of

things could not have been helped, it, at least, was very unfortunate.

Enough officers did not come out to replace those who went home. The

protracted siege--if siege it could be called, which in reality was a

tedious struggle between two rows of detached forts--was certainly not

popular with the officers of the army, few of whom cared to remain if

they had a respectable pretext for returning home, while fewer still

desired to return hither when they once got away. I am persuaded that if

there had been more movement in the campaign--if, instead of monotonous

trench duty we had been engaged in ordinary warfare, manoeuvring,

marching, fighting, there would have been both less sickness and fewer

seeking leave. I do not attempt to decide the question whether leave was

sometimes too easily granted, and more to interest than to necessity.

The French were thought to fall into the other extreme, and instances

were cited to me in which the lives of valuable officers would have been

saved had they been allowed to exchange severe duty (one night out of

three in the trenches, independently of ordinary guards and parades,

cannot be considered light labour) for a period of relaxation in a more

salutary climate.

On the 9th the Russians amused themselves by throwing a few round shot

into the camp of the Fourth Division. Two of these buried themselves in

the ground, close to a hospital hut of the 17th Regiment, shaking the

edifice and astonishing the wounded, but doing no other damage; another

killed a man of the field-train as he lay in his tent. It was said the

missiles were intended for General Bentinck's tents, which were near the

Fourth Division flagstaff on Cathcart's Hill. The Duke of Newcastle was

staying there. A new kitchen, building for the General, was thought to

have attracted the attention of the Muscovite gunners.

[Sidenote: DEMAND FOR BLACK MAIL BY TURKS.]

Late in the evening of the 13th of August orders were given for the

troops to be under arms by three in the morning. Of course, Malakoff was

immediately the word, and most persons supposed that the long-talked-of

assault was to be made. This, however, was soon found not to be the

case. Without tap of drum or sound of bugle, the camp was afoot at the

prescribed hour, the troops forming up in profound silence. The entire

army was out, including the cavalry and artillery from Balaklava. The

first grey of morning found a number of officers and amateurs assembled

on Cathcart's Hill, the best point of observation. There was unusually

little firing the day before and during the night, and all expected that

this tranquillity was quickly to be broken by the din of an engagement.

The interest of the situation grew stronger as the morning advanced, and

as the scarlet columns became visible, massed along the lines,

motionless and expectant. Superior officers, with their staff, moved to

and fro; aides-de-camp traversed the heights with orders; here and

there, through the still imperfect light, which began to be tinged with

the first red flush of sunrise, waved the pennons of a Lancer escort.

With broad day, the brief excitement ended. Before the upper edge of the

sun's disc rose above the hills, the troops were marching briskly back

to their tents. The morning was beautifully clear, and the spectacle was

striking. In fine order, in serried columns, looking hardy, active, and

cheerful, and up to any work, the Crimean army regained its canvas

quarters. For the day, the danger was over--to commence again, it was

believed, at night. From certain orders that were given with respect to

ammunition, mules, &c., I inferred that the army would again be under

arms early the next morning. The officers were warned to be ready at a

moment's notice. It was believed that reinforcements had reached

Sebastopol. They had been expected for some time previously. Four

divisions were talked of, two of them Imperial Guards. Word was sent up

from the fleet to head-quarters that large bodies of troops had been

seen collecting behind the Redan, and others behind the Tchernaya, and

there were grounds for expecting a general attack along our lines. The

Generals of Division assembled in the afternoon at the quarters of the

Commander-in-Chief. General Simpson was indisposed, and it was reported

that he intended going on board ship for a few days. It is not

impossible that this turn-out of the Army was a mere rehearsal, intended

to ascertain whether all the actors were perfect in their parts, and in

case of need would be promptly at their posts. The report in camp was,

that the Archduke Michael was in Sebastopol. We learned from deserters

that he had been expected. General Pelissier held 40,000 men in

readiness to operate on the line of the Tchernaya, which, from its

extent, was perhaps the most attackable part of our position; but it was

vigilantly guarded.

The _Orinoco_ arrived at Balaklava with Dragoons and horses. Mr. Doyne,

Superintendent-in-Chief of the Army Working Corps, also arrived. He came

as far as Constantinople in the _Simoom_, with 450 of his men, who were

to follow him to the Crimea. The casualties from the 10th to the 12th

were 19 killed; one officer, and 112 wounded. On the afternoon of the

13th, a distinguished young officer, Major Hugh Drummond, Scots Fusileer

Guards, was killed as he was posting his sentries in front of the

trenches. Drafts arrived to the Light Division; the 71st Regiment, and

one squadron of 1st Dragoon Guards, landed at Balaklava.

The troops turned out every morning before dawn, and the Sardinians and

French made reconnaissances. The Russian villas in the lovely valley of

Baidar suffered, in which the Turks discovered, in a little

country-house on the sea-shore, called Laspi, an old French doctor, who

had been established many years in Russia. One fine morning a complaint

was made to the French General by his countryman, that five Turkish

soldiers had come to pay a visit to Laspi. They were received and fed,

but before going away they asked for "_madjar_" (Hungarian ducats, the

best known foreign money among the Turks). The old doctor, who of course

understood nothing of their language, thought it was a polite inquiry

about his nationality; and, wishing to rectify the mistake of his

guests, pointed to the French cockade which he had fixed on his cap,

saying at the same time, "_Je suis Français, Français._" But when one of

the soldiers took hold of his watch and chain, and the others began to

search the persons of the ladies of the family, he was aware that it was

he, and not the Turks, who had made the mistake, and the soldiers

departed with objects to the value of about £200. General Pelissier

addressed a complaint to the Turkish head-quarters. The answer was, that

the Turks had the strictest orders not to plunder; that the marauders

could not have been Turkish soldiers; and that the dress and flint

muskets must have been borrowed or taken in order to make people believe

that they were Turks.

After the French and English cavalry occupied the valley, the visits to

the country-houses became much more systematic. The Russians having

entirely withdrawn from the coast up to Yalta, the whole of the

country-houses on the shore were opened to enterprising individuals, and

every morning arabas and pack-horses came into camp, loaded with the

most heterogeneous objects; chairs, beds, crockery, carpets, pictures,

albums, ladies' work-baskets, embroidered cushions, cooking utensils,

wine, and hundreds of other things, were brought back and sold all along

the road. In order to put a stop to these excursions, an English cavalry

picket was stationed at the Phoros Pass, which is erected on the highest

point of the Woronzoff Road, just before it begins to descend towards

the sea, and nobody was allowed to enter except with a pass. But this

mended things only half--that is to say, no English soldier was

permitted to indulge in a roaming disposition; but French marauders, as

before, came duly provided with a pass, and returned with as much

plunder as they could possibly carry.

CHAPTER II.

Defeat of the Russians--Renewal of hostilities--Bravery of the

Allied Armies--Tenacity of Russian Attack--Usual prognostication of

Retreat--Letter of Emperor read to Russian troops--Enumeration of

troops engaged on the side of the Allies--Despatch of Marshal

Pelissier.

On the 16th of August the long-threatened attack of the Russians took

place, and ended in their complete defeat. Movements of large numbers of

troops in the neighbourhood of Sebastopol, the unanimous reports of the

deserters, of whom several came in every day, and information gained

from Tartars, had given intimation that the Russians intended to try

their luck once more in an offensive operation. Although, at first, the

line of the Tchernaya suggested itself as the point which the Russians

would most probably attack, a supposition which was moreover confirmed

by all the deserters, yet, as large numbers of newly-arrived troops were

seen concentrated in and about the Russian works, apprehensions were

entertained that they might attempt the positions before Sebastopol.

[Sidenote: POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES.]

Several deserters came in on the 15th, and spoke with the utmost

certainty of an intended attack on the Tchernaya; but no particular

attention was paid to their reports, and no special orders were given to

the troops, except "to be prepared;" and this had been so often repeated

that it made no impression. In Baidar, whence the English cavalry had

been withdrawn, two regiments of heavy French cavalry, and detachments

of Chasseurs and Zouaves, were stationed. On the 15th, General

d'Allonville sent word by semaphore, that large numbers of Russian

troops were concentrated on the heights, and that he expected to be

attacked. Late in the evening, notice of this message was sent to

General Della Marmora and Osman Pasha. No additional precautions were

taken on the Tchernaya line, and the advance was scarcely less a

surprise than that of Inkerman. The first news of the attack was brought

about daybreak by some Chasseurs forming part of a patrol who fell into

an ambuscade and escaped, while their comrades were taken prisoners.

Soon afterwards the outposts across the Tchernaya were driven in, and at

daybreak the cannonade began.

The Tchernaya, issuing from the narrow gorge in which it runs after

leaving the Valley of Baidar, at the Tower of Karlovka, flows between a

succession of hillocks, which formed the basis of the position of the

allied armies. On the extreme right, the Turks were stationed. They

occupied two hillocks, between which are two roads leading from Higher

Tchorgoun and the Tower of Karlovka into the Woronzoff Road. The

Sardinians leant on the little mountain stream which limited the Turkish

position to the left, and on the large hillock above the road from

Balaklava to Tchorgoun, and occupied a position of the utmost importance

in the defence of the line of the Tchernaya. In front, and divided from

it by the aqueduct, was another hillock, smaller but equally steep,

accessible from the first by a stone bridge on which the Sardinians had

a small _épaulement_. They had outposts at the other side of the

Tchernaya, on the hillock near the Mackenzie Road. The French occupied

three hillocks to the left of the Sardinians, and guarded the road

leading to Balaklava over the Traktir Bridge from Mackenzie's Farm. The

first of these, to the right, was separated from the others by the road

to the bridge; and the third, on the left, was protected by the basin of

the aqueduct. In front of the bridge there was an _épaulement_, beyond

which were the outposts.

[Illustration

PLAN OF THE

BATTLE OF

THE TCHERNAYA

AUGUST 16th 1855.

Reduced from the Q.M. General's Plan.

]

The first attack of the Russians was against the outposts of the

Sardinians. Corresponding to the hillocks on the south side of the

Tchernaya were three plateaux from which their guns could command not

only the ground opposite occupied by the Sardinians and Turks, but the

plain which opens towards the French position. A company of infantry,

and a company of bersaglieri, formed the Sardinian outposts. They were

attacked at dawn. As the troops were not under arms, it was necessary to

hold this position for a while, and General Della Marmora sent Major

Govone, of the Etat-Major, with a company of bersaglieri, to reinforce

the companies. They crossed the aqueduct and the river, and went up the

plateau; but, when they arrived on the crest, the two companies had

just left the _épaulement_, which had become untenable, as it was swept

by the guns which the Russians had brought up on the plateaux, and was

exposed to be taken in the rear. The Sardinians retired in good order

across the river, and went to reinforce the post which occupied the

second hillock on the aqueduct.

The cannonade on both sides commenced. Scarcely had the cannonade opened

when three compact columns of infantry advanced towards the French

position, and attacked the bridge and the hillock to the right.

The French outpost beyond the bridge consisted of a company of the 2nd

regiment of Zouaves. The other _avant postes_, to the right of the

Zouaves up to the Sardinian outposts, were furnished by the 20th _léger_

and the 22nd of the line. The _réveillée_ had not yet gone in camp, when

the sentinels were alarmed by hearing the tramp of men, whose forms were

yet invisible in the darkness. The posts had not time to stand to their

arms ere they were driven across the river; but the desultory firing had

given timely warning to the main guards and to the camps, and the men

turned out just as a storm of round shot began to rush over the ground.

The Russian columns, protected by the fire of their artillery, moved in

excellent order down to the river side, notwithstanding the heavy fire

of artillery which greeted them in front from the French, and in flank

from the Sardinians. At the river the first column detached itself from

the rest, and dividing into two parts crossed the river, which is easily

fordable in summer.

Before the troops were properly under arms the Russians were at the

bridge and at the foot of the hillock. The 20th _léger_ and the 2nd

battalion of Zouaves had to stand the first shock, and they certainly

stood it gallantly. The Russians, without losing time in firing,

advanced with an _élan_ scarcely ever seen in Russian troops. They were

new troops, belonging, according to the prisoners and wounded, to the

5th division of the 2nd _corps d'armée_, lately arrived from Poland.

The aqueduct which ran close to the foot of the hillock, formed the

chief defence of the French. About nine or ten feet wide and several

feet deep, it skirts the steep hills so close, that it is nearly in all

places supported by a high embankment, offering considerable

difficulties for an advancing force, and exposing them as soon as they

reach the top of the embankment, to commanding musketry fire.

Notwithstanding this, the Russians crossed it on the right, and were

beginning to scale the heights, when, taken in flank by the Sardinian

batteries, which fired with admirable precision, they were swept down

wholesale and rolled into the aqueduct.

[Sidenote: ORDINARY SIGNAL OF RUSSIAN RETREAT.]