REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT PROCLAIMED AT PERNAMBUCO--ITS CONCORDAT----THE
PRESIDENT CARVALHO--THREAT OF BOMBARDMENT--A BRIBE OFFERED TO ME AND
REFUSED--THE REVOLT ADMITTED OF PALLIATION--IT WAS FAST BECOMING
GENERAL--INTIMIDATION INEFFECTUAL--THE REVOLUTIONISTS EXPECT FOREIGN
AID--PERNAMBUCO TAKEN POSSESSION OF--PAYMENT OF PRIZE MONEY--THE
ACCOUNTS RENDERED IN DUE COURSE--ORDERS TO PUT DOWN REVOLT AT
PARA--CHARACTER OF THE REVOLUTION--DIFFICULTY IN FINDING PROPER
GOVERNORS--REVOLT AT CEARA--STEPS TAKEN TO SUPPRESS IT--THEY PROVE
SUCCESSFUL--THE INSURGENT LEADER KILLED--MEASURES FOR PRESERVING
TRANQUILLITY.
On the 2nd of August, 1824, the Imperial squadron again quitted Rio de
Janeiro, the rendezvous being appointed at Jurugua, where we arrived on
the 13th, and on the 16th landed a body of twelve hundred troops under
General Lima, at Alagoas, seventy or eighty miles from the seat of
revolt! this notable step being taken in pursuance of strict orders from
the Administration at Rio de Janeiro.
On the 18th, the squadron reached Pernambuco, falling in, near the
entrance of the port, with a number of Portuguese vessels quitting the
city with passengers; but in consequence of the prize tribunal having
_decreed damages_ for the seizure of enemy's ships within a certain
distance of the coast, they were permitted to pass unmolested.
We did not reach Pernambuco too soon, for proclamations had been
issued by Manuel Carvalho Paes de Andrade, the revolutionary
President--denouncing Don Pedro as a traitor, whose aim it was to
abandon Brazil to the Portuguese; which denunciation, though right in
one sense, was wrong as regarded the Emperor, whose views were
thoroughly national--though the object of his ministers was as
thoroughly Portuguese. Had the Pernambucans been aware of the want of
concord between the Emperor's intentions and those of his ministers, who
had forced themselves upon him--the probability is that they would have
supported, instead of denouncing his government.
The revolution had, however, now taken vigorous root, and the democratic
spirit of the Pernambucans was not to be trifled with. A republican form
of Government had been proclaimed, the views of which were on a more
extensive scale than was commensurate with the abilities of those
propounding them; it being their vain hope to constitute all the
equatorial provinces into a federation, on the model of the United
States, a project fostered--if not originated--by Americans resident in
the city. To further this object, an appeal was made to the other
Northern provinces to repudiate the Imperial authority, and to form with
Pernambuco an alliance, under the title of "Confederation of the
Equator;" the consequence being, that a large proportion of the
inhabitants of Parahyba, Piahuy, Rio Grande do Norte, and Cearà,
declared in favour of the measure.
The annexed is the Concordat of the revolutionary provinces:--
In the year of Our Lord 1824, third year of the Independence of
Brazil, and the 3rd of August in that year, in the Hall of Session of
the Government of the Province of Pernambuco, there being present,
the Brazilian citizen, Quaresma Torreaõ, on behalf of His Excellency
the President, Carvalho Paes de Andrade, and the Illustrious and
Reverend Francisco da Costa Leixas; José Joaquim Fernandez Barros,
and the Citizen José Joaquim Germiniano de Moraes Navarro, on behalf
of the province of Rio Grande del Norte, by diploma dated August 16,
1824, and also the Illustrious deputies commissioned by His
Excellency the Governor of the Province of Pernambuco to treat on
behalf of his Government, with a view to extinguish dissension in
political opinions, which has so greatly retarded the progress of
Brazil, and of independence and liberty; and, at the same time, to do
their endeavour to banish a servile spirit which tends to enthral
Brazil by a pretended Constitution, domineering over the Brazilian
nation like that of the Grand Seignior of the Ottoman Porte.
The Commission of the Government of this province, and the
illustrious deputations before-mentioned, having maturely considered
these subjects, agree--
First,--That these provinces of Pernambuco and Rio Grande
unite in a fraternal league, offensive and defensive, to assemble
all their forces against any aggression of the Portuguese Government,
or that of the Government of Rio de Janeiro, to reduce these
provinces to a state of thraldom.
Secondly,--That the said league shall extend to the establishing
constitutional liberty throughout the said provinces, and to supplant
the servile spirit with which they are infected, and thus avert civil
war, engendered by the intrigues at Rio de Janeiro, the influence of
which now pervades the whole of Brazil.
Thirdly,--That to insure the effect of this compact, the Government
of Rio Grande must form a body of troops, and place them on
the borders of the province of Parahyba, to be employed as necessity
requires.
Fourthly,--That this body of troops shall be supported by the
province of Pernambuco, but shall be afterwards supported by the
"Confederation of the Equador." And that the same may be
carried into immediate effect, this Concordat shall have full force,
after being signed and ratified by their Excellencies the Presidents
of the said provinces of Pernambuco and Rio del Norte.
(Signed)
P. FRANCISCO DA COSTA LEIXAS.
JOSÉ JOAQUIM FERNANDEZ BARROS.
JOSÉ JOAQUIM GERMINIANO DE MORAES NAVARRO.
BASILIO QUARESMA TORREAÓ.
MANOEL DE CARVALHO PAES D'ANDRADE, President.
_Printed at the National Press._
Carvalho, however, was not the man to carry out such a scheme, his
enthusiasm being without prudence or daring; hence, on our arrival--in
place of union, the contending factions were engaged in destroying each
other's sugar-mills and plantations, whilst Carvalho himself had taken
the precaution to station a vessel at the island of Tamarica, for the
purpose of escaping, if necessary, from the turbulence which he had
raised, but could not control. On learning this, I felt it my duty to
despatch a corvette to seize her, _though at the risk of four-fold
damages, according to the regulations of the Admiralty Court!_
Knowing that it would take some time for the troops to come up, I
determined to try the effect of a threat of bombardment, and issued a
proclamation remonstrating with the inhabitants on the folly of
permitting themselves to be deceived by men who lacked the ability to
execute their schemes; pointing out, moreover, that persistence in
revolt would involve both the town and its rulers in one common ruin;
for, if forced to the necessity of bombardment,--I would reduce the
port and city to insignificance. On the other hand, I assured them that
if they retraced their steps, and rallied round the Imperial throne,
thus aiding to protect it from foreign influence--it would be more
gratifying to me to act the part of a mediator, and to restore
Pernambuco to peace, prosperity and happiness--than to carry out the
work of destruction which would be my only remaining alternative.
In another proclamation I called the attention of the inhabitants to the
distracted state of the Spanish republics on the other side of the
Continent, asking whether it would be wise to risk the benefits of
orderly government for social and political confusion; entreating them
not to compel me to proceed to extremities, as it would become my duty
to destroy their shipping and block up their port, unless within eight
days the integrity of the empire were acknowledged.
These threats were held out in the hope that by intimidation a struggle
might be prevented, but they failed to produce the desired effect. One
result was, however, not a little curious, as originating an offer to
myself from the revolutionary President, of a bribe of 400,000 milreis,
to be shipped immediately on board the English packet anchored off the
port, if I would abandon the Imperial cause, and come over to the
Republicans; this offer alluding, in strong terms, to the "infamous
treatment with which my services had been met by the administration at
Rio de Janeiro, and warning me that, by adhering to it, I should meet
with nothing but continued ill-treatment and ingratitude."
The subjoined is the revolutionary President's letter:
MY LORD,
Frankness is the distinguishing character of free men, but
Your Excellency has not found it in your connection with the
Imperial Government. _Your not having been rewarded for the
first expedition affords a justifiable inference that you will get
nothing for the second._ I therefore use the freedom to assure Your
Excellency the amount of 400 contos of Reis, as an indemnification
for your losses.
The services required from Your Excellency are to take up the
cause of the "Confederation of the Equator," as adopted by the
majority of the Northern provinces, whose limits will be the river of
Francisco da Norte.
I have the honour to be
Your Excellency's most humble servant,
MANUEL DE CARVALHO PAES D'ANDEADE.
The letter contained, in addition, an argumentative justification of the
revolt, but as it abounds in abuse of the Emperor, couched in the most
indecorous language, I will not sully these pages by printing it entire.
The result predicted by Carvalho--as I had learned by experience--was
not improbable, but it did not follow that, because the Brazilian
ministers were unjust and hostile to me, I should accept a bribe from a
traitor to follow his example. I therefore transmitted the following
reply to his impudent proposal:--
_Pedro Primiero,_ Off Pernambuco, Aug. 26, 1824.
SIR,
If I shall have an opportunity of becoming personally known to Your
Excellency, I can afford you proof to conviction, that the opinion
you have formed of me has had its origin in the misrepresentations
of those in power, whose purposes I was incapable, on principle, to
serve.
I have, &c. &c. COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.
His Excellency M. DE C. PAES D'ANDEADE.
On the 19th, the Junta requested the interposition of the English and
French consuls to induce me to give further time for consideration. This
I refused, from the dangerous nature of the anchorage, by which the
safety of the ships was imperilled.
Unwilling, however, to injure this fine city, I sent in proposals for
capitulation, giving permission to the revolutionary leaders to depart
unpunished, together with their property, provided they quitted the
Brazilian territory--demanding in return the surrender of the forts,
ships of war, gunboats, &c. as well as of all public property. In order
to prevent waste of time in correspondence, I proposed to Carvalho to
meet me on board any neutral ship of war, pledging my honour as to his
being permitted to return in safety; he nevertheless declined the
interview, proposing in return to meet me on shore on an island near the
town but--as after his insulting proposal, I could have no confidence in
his honour, this was of course declined.
Still anxious to avoid extremities--from which, after the threats made,
I could not consistently refrain--I again wrote to Carvalho, that, had
he possessed the means of distinguishing between the intentions of the
Emperor, and the proceedings of a foreign faction, he would not have
been in arms against His Imperial Majesty, by adherence to whom Brazil
could alone be saved from that anarchy and confusion into which Mexico
and other South American States had fallen through individual rivalry
and the ignorance of their popular assemblies. I further pointed out to
him, that if, by procrastination I was compelled to bombard the city,
the popular clamour against the insurgent authorities might be followed
by melancholy proof to himself how quickly political adventurers may be
abandoned or betrayed in the hour of danger, and that he had better
yield to reason, what he could not prevent my effecting by force.
By writers who could not have known anything of the circumstances--which
exist only in my own documents--I have been blamed for this tone of
moderation towards the revolutionary President. There were two valid
reasons for this course; first, that the conduct of the Pernambucans
admitted of great palliation, seeing that the distractions resulting
from the Portuguese faction in the administration at Rio de Janeiro had
been ignorantly construed into acts of His Imperial Majesty--so that the
injured people argued that it would have been better for them to have
remained a colony of Portugal, than a colony of the Government at Rio de
Janeiro--this mode of reasoning not being very far wrong. Secondly--and
this fully accounts for the moderation complained of--I knew, from the
most authentic sources that, in case of attack on the city, Carvalho had
determined to retire into the interior, there to carry on civil war by
enlisting the negro population under his standard; to avert which, I
considered that moderation was the best course to induce him and his
partisans to quit the empire, which would thus have been well rid of
them.
It was folly, therefore, to consider the rebellion local, as had been
represented to the Imperial Government, or that its actors and
instigators were few and insignificant, for, in truth, as has been said,
it had already extended far and wide into the adjacent provinces, I
therefore wrote to the Minister of Marine, that "although it might not
be difficult to put down the revolution in the city, which, even the
land forces could have already accomplished, had they not been landed at
a distance--yet that without great circumspection, the prevention of
further revolution in the interior would be a work of time, trouble, and
expense; and that even all these would be thrown away, unless the causes
which had led to the rebellion, were removed or explained."
The time given having expired without acceptance of the terms, it became
necessary to make at least a shew of enforcing them, though the water
was too shallow to admit vessels of large burden to approach with
safety, and the small vessels were ill adapted to the purpose; still I
determined to make a demonstration, and as a preparatory step ordered
Captain Welsh, of the _Paraguassu_, to shift into the flagship all the
English petty officers and seamen; but a heavy swell set in, and as the
anchorage was bad, I considered the risk imprudent.
The schooner _Leopoldina_ was therefore ordered to try the effect of a
few experimental shells; but the mortar so shook the vessel, that she
had to be withdrawn, it being evident that nothing further could be done
till the weather would permit the approach of ships, or that rafts could
be constructed--for which purpose timber had been ordered from Bahia.
Little damage was effected by this experiment, for the wealthiest
inhabitants had fled into the interior, taking with them all their
valuable property.
Heavy weather having now set in compelled the flagship to run to Bahia
for safety, the outer road of Pernambuco being at this season
exceedingly dangerous from the coralline nature of the bottom, as was
practically proved by the fact that the _Pedro Primiero_ lost every
anchor but one, so that to remain was certain destruction, and there was
no alternative but to make for Bahia to procure anchors.
Nothing had been heard of General Lima's force since its debarkation, I
was therefore anxious to know what had become of it, and how far it was
in a condition to cooperate, the speedy possession of the place being
nautically an important point--for, whilst blockading we had intercepted
a Portuguese vessel, only forty-three days from the Tagus, and learned
from her letters that a large force was preparing at Lisbon, consisting
of sixteen ships of war and numerous transports, their destination
being Pernambuco; this forming sufficient proof that the Portuguese
Government counted on the recovery of those disorganised provinces which
had alike revolted against the mother country and the Emperor of Brazil.
On the 4th of September, the flagship left for Bahia, first visiting the
island of Alexo, where the _Cacique_ and _Maranhaõ_ were at anchor. From
them we learned that General Lima's head-quarters were at Leimham, his
advance guard having joined the troops at Mogado, on the banks of a
river near Cape St. Augustine, the revolutionary forces occupying the
other bank.
On reaching Bahia, we received information that the rebel Government at
Pernambuco was in immediate expectation of several fast sailing vessels,
ordered by the revolutionary President from North America, and also of
two steamers from England. I therefore wrote to the Minister of Marine
to send me some superior sailing vessels, as, if the anticipated
expedition from Lisbon, or those expected from England and America, made
their appearance, four at least of our force would, from their bad
sailing, run the risk of being captured on the first appearance of the
enemy.
On learning the panic which had been created in Pernambuco, by the show
of bombardment, and its anticipated repetition in earnest on my return,
General Lima pushed forward towards the capital with no more formidable
opposition than a few desultory skirmishes; and on the 11th of
September, with the co-operation of the naval officers and seamen there
left, took possession of the city, Carvalho retreating into the
suburbs, where, breaking down the bridge which united them, he
entrenched himself. On the following day, it was said that General Lima
found in the treasury 400,000 dollars; perhaps the same which Carvalho
had offered to me as a bribe to join the republican party.
The _Piranga_ arriving at this juncture with a convoy bringing eight
hundred additional troops, preparations were made to attack Carvalho;
but the insurgent president, making his escape on a fishing raft, took
refuge on board the British corvette _Tweed_, and afterwards got to sea.
During the interval which elapsed between my departure for Bahia and my
return to Pernambuco, the distribution of prize money amongst those
entitled to it took place, the flagship and the _Maria de Gloria_ being
paid at Bahia, and the rest at Pernambuco. As His Imperial Majesty had
left me altogether unfettered by orders or instructions, and as he had
given the 200,000 dollars to be used in furthering the Imperial objects,
I determined not to regard the advances which had been made at Rio de
Janeiro, as forming any portion of the reward, especially to the
flagship, which had, unaided, achieved the more important results of the
late campaign, and was therefore entitled to a share commensurate with
the arduous exertions of the officers and crew, now again under my flag.
The subjoined extracts from the log of my secretary will shew the
periods at which the distribution took place:--
_Sept.10th._ Made distribution of prize money in silver.
_Sept.15th to 16th._ Went on board the _Maria de Gloria_, and paid
prize money.
_Sept. 17th._ Paid Capt. Crosbie, 10,400 dollars in specie. Paid
other officers 5750 dollars.
_Sept. 18th._ Paid Admiral 4750 dollars.
_Sept. 27th._ Paying prize money to the _Paraguassu_ and others.
_Sept. 28th._ Similarly employed.
_Sept. 30th._ Paying prize money.
_Oct. 1st to 5th._ Paying prize money.
The following were the amounts disbursed on these occasions, as far as
they appear in my private memoranda--some doubtless having been lost:--
Dollars.
Disbursements at Rio de Janeiro 70,750
_(Paid Squadron as per account, made up Sept. 23, 1824.)_
To petty officers and seamen of flagship, in classes
numbered A to Y, as per pay books transmitted
by _Piranha_ 18,289
Paid Captain Crosbie 10,400
" Captain-Lieutenants Carvalho, Grenfell, and
Shepherd, 2250 dollars each 6,750
" Capt. Grenfell, on account of captures at Parà 2,750
" Seven Lieutenants, at 1500 dollars each 10,500
" Two Lieutenants at 1000 dollars each 2,000
" Six Lieutenants at 750 dollars each 4,500
" Lieutenant Ross as prize master 500
" _Maria de Gloria_ 2,483
" _Nitherohy, Carolina,_ and _Paraguassu_, no
account, say the same 7,500
" Brig _Bahia_ 274
" Officers and men of the _Piranga_ 7,053
" Mr. Dean, purser 600
" Lieutenant Ayre 480
" Florencia José da Costa 140
" Gratifications to artisans 419
" To Admiral 4,750
" Secretary, for distribution 5,000
" May and Lukin, prize agents, as per balance
of account, July 15, 1824 5,324
------
160,462
Original amount 200,000
------
Balance to be accounted for 39,538
======
The above were not the whole amounts paid, but they are all that a
search amongst my numerous papers at present furnish; and as the
original accounts, as has been previously stated, were sent to Rio de
Janeiro, a more precise balance cannot here be drawn; but even this is
sufficient to carry conviction to any reasonable mind, that the sums
above stated were disbursed in ordinary routine, and should make the
Brazilian administration ashamed to say, that "the First Admiral never
sent in his accounts of the 200,000 dollars entrusted to him," thus
inducing an unworthy inference that they were not disbursed; though any
man possessed of common understanding could never believe that a
squadron, constituted as the Brazilian Marine was, would obey orders and
cheerfully act in unison with me, knowing that their prize money was on
board--of which I unwarrantably held possession!
These explanations are more humiliating to the Brazilian administration
than to myself--though for so many years the subject of unmerited
obloquy from their denial of accounts which must unquestionably have
been in the possession of the Administration of 1825. But I must carry
these explanations yet farther. With the exception of 4750 dollars for
my own necessities, I took none as my share, though entitled to an
eighth in all cases, and to a fourth in the absence of other ships
whenever important services were performed by the flagship alone.
Neither had I received from the Imperial Government a single dollar of
the customary emoluments due to me, though, had these been honestly paid
according to the usages of nations and the stipulations of the Emperor's
decree of December 11, 1822, my share ought to have been more than
double the whole amount entrusted to me to man the ships and satisfy the
officers and men. Still I did not appropriate the 39,000 dollars which
remained, after paying the men, but determined to withhold it till I saw
what course the prize tribunal at Rio de Janeiro intended to pursue;
and, if that course were not satisfactory, then to appropriate it as a
right, although it was wholly inadequate to the services rendered, for
which I had been loaded with Imperial honours and national thanks,
without a shilling of emolument, notwithstanding the capture of a
hundred and twenty _bona fide_ enemy's ships--the expulsion of their
fleet and army--and the annexation of more than one half the empire. But
more of this in another place.
On my return to Pernambuco, I found General Lima in quiet possession of
the city, and as the _Piranga_ had brought me instructions from His
Imperial Majesty, that, as soon as order was restored, a force should
proceed to Parà, and depose the, General-at-Arms there nominated, I
applied to General Lima for a small military detachment to effect that
object; but he declined--on the ground, that in the present state of
affairs in Pernambuco, it was not practicable to diminish his force.
It was not at Parà only that irregularities prevailed: even at Maranham
serious disturbances had broken out, with the avowed intention, on the
part of the insurgents, of deposing the Governor acting under the
authority of His Imperial Majesty--to whom this new attempt at
revolution was as yet unknown. In short, the order to depose the
General-at-Arms at Parà had unexpectedly resolved itself into the
necessity of tranquillizing the whole of the Northern provinces, which
were only waiting the result of Carvalho's measures at Pernambuco,
openly to declare against the Imperial authority.
The dissatisfaction in the Northern provinces originated solely in the
anti-Brazilian system of Government pursued at Rio de Janeiro, which in
the estimation of all at a distance was Portuguese rather than
Brazilian. As they were either ignorant, or did not believe, that the
patriotic intentions of the Emperor were overruled or thwarted by the
Portuguese faction in the administration, which, holding in reality the
reins of power, left to His Majesty little more than nominal authority.
It was not, then, to be wondered at, that the inhabitants of these
distant provinces, who, only a year before, had welcomed me as their
liberator from Portuguese oppression, and as the representative of
constitutional authority, should now be dissatisfied with what they
rightly considered an unnational system of government--preferring to
submit to a bad government of their own choosing rather than to one thus
arbitrarily imposed upon them.
To avert revolution required able presidents, well skilled in the
management of public affairs; but, in place of these, men of an opposite
character had, for the most part, been chosen by the administration.
It was no less essential that the Generals-at-Arms, or military
commandants, should be temperate and unprejudiced; but those placed in
this responsible position used their authority in the most obnoxious and
arbitrary manner. It was, no doubt, difficult to find proper men; or, if
they existed amongst the Brazilians, the jealousy of the Portuguese
party in the administration prevented their elevation to power; the aim
of that faction being disorder, as auxiliary to their anti-imperial
views. This had been strikingly evinced by the instructions given to
disembark General Lima's force at Alagoas, instead of near the seat of
disturbance; thus entailing loss of time and a difficult and tedious
march, which might have ended in failure, had it not been for the
distraction caused by the threatened bombardment of Pernambuco by water,
and the demonstration made to shew how easily it would be effected, when
means for a destructive attack were complete; the result was,
that--knowing my return from Bahia, with everything in readiness for an
attack in earnest, could not be delayed beyond a few days, no serious
opposition was offered to the occupation of the city by the force under
General Lima.
The reports of increased disaffection in the Northern provinces becoming
daily more precise, it was necessary to take advantage of the panic
which the recovery of Pernambuco had occasioned; the more so, as serious
commotions had arisen, whilst a strong disposition to revolt was almost
universally manifested. As General Lima had refused me a military
detachment--and as the _Pedro Primeiro_ and _Piranga_ could render him
no further assistance, I considered it more in conformity with His
Majesty's interests to visit the Northern ports with these ships; taking
also the _Cacique_ and _Atalanta_, for the performance of services to
which the larger vessels were not adapted. The mere presence of these
off the disaffected ports would, I knew, suffice to restore order, by
affording inferential demonstration that, if force were required, it was
ready to be applied.
Accordingly, leaving at Pernambuco the remainder of the squadron, we
sailed on the 10th of October for Rio Grande do Norte, where great
confusion prevailed amongst the inhabitants, threatened by the
insurgents in the adjacent province of Cearà, on account of their
abandonment of revolutionary designs in consequence of events at
Pernambuco.
Arriving off the Rio Grande on the 12th, I requested information from
the President, relative to the state of the maritime towns and provinces
between Rio Grande and Parà, especially with regard to Cearà. The
nature of the reply determined me at once to proceed to the latter
place, though regretting the necessity of going farther to leeward, on
account of the time which would be occupied in getting back to Rio de
Janeiro; yet feeling assured that it would not be satisfactory to His
Majesty, were we to return without ascertaining more particularly the
condition of the North, and without contributing to the restoration of
tranquillity.
Arriving off Cearà on the 18th, I sent a communication to the President,
requiring him to make known my arrival for the purpose of restoring
order, and promising that all disaffected persons who, within fourteen
days, should return to their allegiance, would be permitted to retire
quietly to their homes, and would not in any way be molested on account
of their previous acts or opinions.
A deputation of the inhabitants came off to the flagship, asking me to
land as large a force as I could spare, but as General Lima had declined
to supply a military detachment, it was out of my power to comply; for
the roadstead being unsafe, and the flagship nearly aground, I could not
dispense with the English seamen, whilst the Portuguese portion of the
crews was not to be trusted. Besides which, the foreign seamen were not
adapted to garrisoning a town.
The application was, therefore, evaded; but with an assurance to the
President that, should the insurgents advance, we would render effectual
assistance; reminding him, however, that the inhabitants ought to be
induced to adopt amongst themselves, measures for their own protection
and preservation of tranquillity, which results were perfectly within
their power; and would render unnecessary the presence of military.
I however landed a small detachment for the purpose of ascertaining the
means of defence, as well as in the hope of exciting the authorities on
shore to some degree of activity in their own cause. In case of attack,
I promised to disembark for their assistance the whole of the men who
could be spared; at the same time giving permission to withdraw to the
ships in case of sudden emergency, which might not admit of
communication with me in time.
This offer produced the best effect in the city, giving confidence to
the well-affected, whilst, as the discontented were ignorant of the
extent of aid that could be afforded, they deemed it wisest to keep
quiet. On the following day, the inhabitants returned to their
allegiance, the officiating President hoisting the Imperial flag on the
ramparts with his own hands, amidst every demonstration of general
satisfaction.
I next caused despatches to be sent to all quarters of the province,
announcing the return of the city to its allegiance, promising oblivion
of the past to all who followed the example, and this was succeeded by a
general acknowledgment of the Imperial authority. Confidential agents,
entrusted with similar despatches, were likewise sent to the
revolutionary forces headed by Bizarra, the rebel General-at-Arms, the
whole of whose troops abandoned him; whilst, by similar agency, the
_corps_, under the immediate command of the revolutionary president,
Araripe, was reduced to a hundred men--even the Indians, without
exception, abandoning his standard.
As one of the first steps towards the pacification of the province, I
had published not only a general amnesty, but also a particular amnesty,
offering to the insurgent leaders themselves especial pardon, from
which, in ordinary general amnesty, they might otherwise imagine
themselves excluded, I had, in my own mind, determined upon this as a
general course to be pursued, as I could not but see that, in the outset
of the revolt, both insurgents and leaders had good cause to be
dissatisfied with the central Government at Rio de Janeiro. I had even
addressed a letter personally to the revolutionary president, Araripe,
remonstrating upon the folly of the course he was pursuing, and
promising my protection to _himself_, as well as to the other
revolutionary leaders, if they would return to their allegiance. He
chose rather to withdraw into the interior, with the discontented who
adhered to him, intending, no doubt, to wait till the naval force had
retired. Foreseeing the danger of this, I issued a proclamation,
offering a reward for his capture, sufficient to induce the Indians who
had previously been his supporters to proceed in quest of him, the
result being that he himself was killed, and the whole of his followers
captured. The Indian chiefs, as well as their dependants, were of great
service in the restoration of order, combining superior bodily strength
and activity, with energy, docility, and unfailing power of endurance
--forming, indeed, the best specimens of the native race I had seen in
South America.
Previous to this I had succeeded, without much trouble, in restoring
tranquillity to the province of Parahyba, which had also been disturbed
by the mandates of Araripe; the inhabitants complying with his orders,
from the immediate danger to which they were exposed by his violence,
and being under the impression that Rio de Janeiro was too far distant
to afford them succour. Their delight at finding a squadron at hand was,
therefore, immediately followed by a repudiation of the insurgent chief,
and a return to unqualified allegiance.
My next endeavour was to organise an effective force at Cearà, and this
was accomplished by the embodiment of more than a thousand men, though
we had not a soldier in the squadron. Various _corps_ were also raised
in the towns and villages of the province, and were active in pursuit of
the scattered remains of the republican army.
Having thus assured myself of the complete restoration of order in the
capital and province of Cearà, and addressed a proclamation to the
inhabitants, pointing out to them the folly of being misled by designing
persons, who could have no accurate knowledge of matters which formed
the ground of complaint against the Imperial Government, we sailed on
the 4th of November for Maranham, which province was found in a state of
even greater anarchy than had prevailed at Cearà.