ATTEMPT TO CUT OFF THE ENEMY'S SHIPS--DISOBEDIENCE TO ORDERS--LETTER TO
THE PRIME MINISTER--WORTHLESSNESS OF THE MEN--THEIR TREACHERY--BLOCKADE
ESTABLISHED--EQUIPMENT OF FIRESHIPS--ENEMY'S SUPPLIES CUT
OFF--PORTUGUESE UNTRUSTWORTHY--DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE ENEMY--HIS
PRETENDED CONTEMPT FOR US--THE ENEMY RETURNS TO PORT--THEIR
CONSTERNATION AT THE FIRESHIPS--PORTUGUESE CONTEMPLATE ATTACKING
US--FLAGSHIP RECONNOITRES ENEMY AT ANCHOR--EXCESSIVE ALARM AT MY
NOCTURNAL VISIT--PROCLAMATION OF THE COMMANDANT--CONSTERNATION IN THE
CITY--THE AUTHORITIES DECIDE ON EVACUATING BAHIA--INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
BRAZILIAN CAPTAINS--WARNINGS ADDRESSED TO THE AUTHORITIES--ENEMY QUITS
BAHIA--READINESS FOR CHASE--NUMBERS OF THE ENEMY--CAPTURE OF THE
CONVOY--PRIZES DISABLED--ATTEMPT OF TROOPS TO ESCAPE--PRIZES SENT TO
PERNAMBUCO--PURSUIT DISCONTINUED--REASONS FOR GOING TO MARANHAM--REASONS
FOR NOT TAKING MORE PRIZES--ADVANTAGES TO THE EMPIRE.
On the 3rd of April, we put to sea with a squadron of four ships only,
viz. the _Pedro Primiero_, Captain Crosbie, _Piranga_, Captain Jowett,
_Maria de Gloria_, Captain Beaurepaire, and _Liberal_, Captain
Garcaõ--two others which accompanied us, viz. the _Guarani_, Captain de
Coito, and _Real_, Captain de Castro, were intended as fireships. Two
vessels of war, the _Paraguassu_ and the _Nitherohy_, being incomplete
in their equipment, were of necessity left behind.
The _Nitherohy_, Captain Taylor, joined on the 29th of April, and on the
1st of May we made the coast of Bahia. On the 4th, we made the
unexpected discovery of thirteen sail to leeward, which proved to be the
enemy's fleet leaving port with a view of preventing or raising the
blockade. Shortly afterwards the Portuguese Admiral formed line of
battle to receive us, his force consisting of one ship of the line, five
frigates, five corvettes, a brig, and schooner.
Regularly to attack a more numerous and better trained squadron with our
small force, manned by undisciplined and--as had been ascertained on the
Voyage--disaffected crews, was out of the question. On board the
flagship there were only a hundred and sixty English and American
seamen, the remainder consisting of the vagabondage of the capital, with
a hundred and thirty black marines, just emancipated from slavery.
Nevertheless, observing an opening in the enemy's line, which would
enable us to cut off their four rearmost ships, I made signals
accordingly, and with the flagship alone gave the practical example of
breaking the line, firing into their frigates as we passed. The
Portuguese Admiral promptly sent vessels to the aid of the four cut off,
when, hauling our wind on the larboard tack, we avoided singly a
collision with the whole squadron, but endeavoured to draw the enemy's
ships assisting into a position where they might be separately attacked
to advantage.
Had the rest of the Brazilian squadron come down in obedience to
signals, the ships cut off might have been taken or dismantled, as, with
the flagship I could have kept the others at bay, and no doubt have
crippled all in a position to render them assistance. To my astonishment
the signals were disregarded, and--for reasons which will presently be
adduced--no efforts were made to second my operations.
For some time the action was continued by the _Pedro Primiero_ alone,
but to my mortification the fire of the flagship was exceedingly
ill-directed. A still more untoward circumstance occurred in the
discovery that two Portuguese seamen who had been stationed to hand up
powder, were not only withholding it, but had made prisoners of the
powder boys who came to obtain it! This would have been serious but for
the promptitude of Captain Grenfell, who, rushing upon the men, dragged
them on deck; but to continue the action under such circumstances was
not to be thought of; and as the enemy had more than double our
numerical force, I did not consider myself warranted in further
attempting, with greater hazard, what on a future opportunity might be
accomplished with less. Quitting the enemy's ships cut off, we therefore
hauled our wind, to join the vessels which had kept aloof, and to
proceed to the station previously appointed as the rendezvous of the
squadron, whither the fireships were to follow. In this affair no lives
were lost.
Extremely annoyed at this failure, arising from non-fulfilment of
orders, and finding, from experience on the voyage, that we had been
hurried to sea, without consideration as to the materials of which the
squadron was composed, a rigid inquiry was instituted, which gave me
such cogent reasons for losing all confidence in it, that on the day
following I considered it expedient to address the following letter to
the Prime Minister, Andrada, pointing out that if prompt steps were not
taken to add to our strength, by providing more efficient crews, the
result might be to compromise the interests of the empire, no less than
the character of the officers commanding.
(Secret) H.I.M.S. _Pedro Primiero_, at Sea,
May 5, 1823.
MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,
Availing myself of your permission to address you
upon points of a particular nature, and referring you to my public
despatches to the Minister of Marine, I beg leave to add that it
was not only unfavourable winds which retarded our progress, but
the extreme bad sailing of the _Piranga_ and _Liberal_. Neither these
ships nor the _Nitherohy_, which sails equally ill, are adapted to the
purposes to be effected, as from their slowness, the enemy has an
opportunity to force an action under any circumstances, however
disadvantageous to this undisciplined squadron. The _Real_ is no
better, and her total uselessness as a ship of war, has determined
me to prepare her as a fireship, there appearing no probability of the
others joining.
From the defective sailing and manning of the squadron it
seems, indeed, to me, that the _Pedro Primiero_ is the only one
that can assail an enemy's ship of war, or act in the face of a
superior force, so as not to compromise the interests of the empire
and the character of the officers commanding. Even this ship--in
common-with the rest--is so ill-equipped as to be much less
efficient than she otherwise would be.
This letter, you will observe, is not intended to meet the public
eye, but merely to put the Government in possession of facts
necessary for its information.
Our cartridges are all unfit for service, and I have been obliged
to cut up every flag and ensign that could be spared, to render them
serviceable, so as to prevent the men's arms being blown off whilst
working the guns, and also to prevent the constant necessity of
sponging, &c. which, from the time it consumes, diminishes the
effective force of the ships fully one half.
The guns are without locks--which they ought to have had in
order to their being efficient.
The sails of this ship are all rotten--the light and baffling airs on
our way hither, having beaten one set to pieces, and the others
are hourly giving way to the slightest breeze of wind.
The bed of the mortar which I received on board this ship was
crushed on the first fire--being entirety rotten; the fuzes for the
shells are formed of such wretched composition that it will not take
fire with the discharge of the mortar, and are consequently unfit
for use on board a ship where it is extremely dangerous to kindle
the fuze otherwise than by the explosion; even the powder with
which this ship is supplied is so bad, that six pounds will not
throw our shells more than a thousand yards, instead of double that
distance.
The marines neither understand gun exercise, the use of
small arms, nor the sword, and yet have so high an opinion of
themselves that they will not assist to wash the decks, or even to
clean out their own berths, but sit and look on whilst these
operations are being performed by seamen; being thus useless as
marines, they are a hinderance to the seamen, who ought to be
learning their duty in the tops, instead of being converted into
sweepers and scavengers. I have not yet interfered in this injurious
practice, because I think that reforms of the ancient practice of the
service, ought to form the subject of instruction from the Government
--and also, because at this moment, any alterations of mine
might create dissatisfactions and dissensions even more prejudicial
to the service in which we are engaged, than the evils in question.
With respect to the seamen, I would observe, that, in order to
create an effective marine, young active lads of from fourteen to
twenty should be selected. Almost the whole of those who
constitute the crews of these vessels--with the exception of the
foreign seamen, are not only totally unpractised in naval profession,
but are too old to learn.
I warned the Minister of Marine, that every native of Portugal
put on board the squadron--with the exception of officers of known
character--would prove prejudicial to the expedition, and yesterday
we had a clear proof of the fact. The Portuguese stationed in the
magazine, actually withheld the powder whilst this ship was in the
midst of the enemy, and I have since learned that they did so from
feelings of attachment to their own countrymen. I now inclose
you two letters on this subject--one just received from the officer
commanding the _Real_, whose crew were on the point of _carrying
that vessel into the enemy's squadron for the purpose of delivering her
up!_ I have also reason to believe, that the conduct of the _Liberal_
yesterday in not bearing down upon the enemy and not complying
with the signal which I had made to break the line--was owing to
her being manned with Portuguese. The _Maria de Gloria_ has also
a great number of Portuguese, which is the more to be regretted,
as otherwise her superior sailing, with the zeal and activity of her
captain, would render her an effective vessel. To disclose to you
the truth, it appears to me that one half of the squadron is
necessary to watch over the other half: and, assuredly, this is a
system which ought to be put an end to without delay.
A greater evil is, that this ship is one hundred and twenty seamen
short of her complement and three hundred short of what I should
consider an efficient crew, whilst the bad quality and ignorance of
the landsmen, makes the task of managing her in action no easy
matter, the incessant bawling going on rendering the voices of the
officers inaudible. Had this ship yesterday been manned and equipped
as she ought to have been, and free from the disadvantages stated,
there is no doubt whatever in my mind, but, that singly, we could
have dismantled half the ships of the enemy.
On the whole, Sir, you must perceive that I have not been supplied
with any of those facilities which I requested to be placed in my
hands. I am, however, aware of the difficulties under which a new
Government labours, and am ready to do all in my power under
any circumstances. What I have to request of you is, that you will
do me the justice to feel that the predicament in which I am now
placed, is somewhat analogous to your own, and that if I cannot
accomplish all I wish, the deficiency arises from causes beyond my
control; but I entreat you to let me have--at least this ship--
_well manned_, and I will answer for her rendering more efficient
service than the whole squadron besides--constituted as it now is.
You will perceive by my public despatch addressed to the Minister
of Marine, that although we passed through the enemy's line, and,
I may add, actually brushed the nearest vessel, which we cut off--yet
nothing really useful was effected, notwithstanding that the
vessel we touched ought to have been sunk, and those separated to
have been dismantled or destroyed. I am quite vexed at the result--which
was such, however, as might have been expected from the bad
manning of the squadron.
I have determined to proceed forthwith to the Moro San Paulo,
and to leave there the ill-sailing vessels. I intend to remove all the
effective officers and seamen from the _Piranga_ and _Nitherohy_, into
this ship, and with her alone, or attended only by the _Maria de
Gloria_, to proceed to Bahia, to reconnoitre the situation of the
enemy at their anchorage, and obtain the information requisite to
enable me to enter on more effectual operations.
I have the honour, &c.
COCHRANE.
Ill. Exmo. Senor JOSÉ BONIFACIO D'ANDRADE Y SILVA,
Ministro e Secretario d'Estado.
A rigorous blockade was nevertheless established, in spite of our
deficiencies or the efforts made to raise or evade it--though the enemy
were bold in reliance upon their numbers, and none the less so, perhaps,
from considering our recent failure a defeat. They did not, however,
venture to attack us, nor were we yet in a condition to meddle further
with them.
The blockade of the port was not calculated to effect anything decisive,
beyond paralysing the naval operations of the enemy's squadron. Even
this would not prevent the Portuguese from strengthening themselves in
positions on shore, and thus, by intimidating all other districts within
reach,--enable them to bar the progress of independence. I therefore
determined, as a force in our condition was not safe to hazard in any
combination requiring prompt and implicit obedience, to adopt the step
of which I had apprised the Prime Minister, and took the squadron to
Moro San Paulo, where, transferring from the bad sailing frigates to the
flagship, the captains, officers, and best petty officers and seamen,
the _Pedro Primiero_ was rendered more efficient than the whole
together; and with her and the _Maria de Gloria_, I resolved to conduct
further operations against the enemy--leaving the _Piranga_, and
_Nitherohy_, together with all the other vessels, in charge of Captain
Pio--the two senior captains having been transferred to the flagship, in
charge of their officers and men.
There was, however, another reason for leaving the remainder of the
squadron at Moro San Paulo. Before quitting Rio de Janeiro, I had urged
on the Government the necessity of immediately forwarding fireships, as
the most reliable means for destroying a superior force. These had not
been supplied; but in their place a quantity of inflammable and
explosive materials had been sent. As several prizes had been taken, I
determined to convert them into fireships, as well as the _Real_
schooner--a useless vessel, the crew of which had shewn that they were
not to be depended upon; so that the remaining ships of the squadron,
though unreliable in other respects, were well employed in carrying
these objects into execution.
In order to protect the ships and men thus engaged, I directed a body of
marines to be landed, for the purpose of making a show by forming and
manning batteries to repel any attack, though, had such been made,
neither the batteries nor their defenders would have been of much
service.
The flagship, together with the _Maria de Gloria_, now proceeded to
cruize off Bahia, with such success that all supplies were cut off by
sea, notwithstanding repeated attempts to introduce vessels from San
Mattheos with farinha--a dozen of which fell into our hands, in spite of
the enemy's superiority.
As the _Carolina_ had now joined us, I directed her to take under convoy
the captured transports with provisions, whilst the _Guarani_ was sent
to scour the coast, with orders to avoid approaching the enemy's fleet,
and to bring me information as to the progress of the fireships, upon
which I now saw that I must mainly rely.
On the 21st, I considered it expedient to address the following private
letter to the Minister of Marine:--
Off Bahia, N.W. 12 miles,
May 21, 1833.
Most Illustrious Sir,
In addition to my official letters of the 3rd and
4th inst. I beg to acquaint you that, being convinced--not only
from the conduct of the crew of this ship during the attack on the
4th, but from what I observed in regard to the other vessels--that
nothing beneficial to His Imperial Majesty's service could be
effected by any attempts to combine the whole squadron in an
attack against the enemy--but, on the contrary, from the imperfect
and incongruous manner in which the vessels are manned--
consequences of the most serious nature would ensue from any
further attempt of the kind. I have therefore determined to take
the squadron to Moro San Paulo, for the adoption of other measures
essential under such circumstances, viz. to take on board such officers
and men from the bad sailing vessels as will render the _Pedro
Primiero_ more effective than the whole squadron as now constituted.
In the first conversation I had with you, I gave you my opinion
as to the superior benefit of equipping one or two vessels _well_--
rather than many imperfectly, and I again beg to press on your
consideration the necessity of such efficient equipment of all
vessels, whether many or few. I must also remind you of the great
danger that arises from the employment of Portuguese of the
inferior class in active operations against their own countrymen,
because they neither do nor can consider that the dispute between
Brazil and the Portuguese Government, bears any similarity to warfare
as ordinarily understood. I have had sufficient proof since
leaving Rio de Janeiro, that there is no more trust to be placed in
Portuguese, when employed to fight against their countrymen, than
there was in the Spaniards, who, on the opposite side of this continent,
betrayed the patriot Governments, by whom they were employed.
I shall press this point no further than to say, that so long as His
Imperial Majesty's ships are so manned, I shall consider them
as not only wholly inefficient, but requiring to be vigilantly watched
in order to prevent the most dangerous consequences.
Since making my arrangements at the Moro, where I left all
the squadron except this ship and the _Maria de Gloria_, I have been
constantly off the port of Bahia, but could see nothing of the
enemy's squadron, till the 20th, when I learned from an English
vessel that they had been as far down as the Abrolhos shoals, for
what purpose I know not. They consist of thirteen vessels, being
the number which we encountered on the 4th. I am watching an
opportunity to attack them in the night, in the hope not only of
being able to damage them materially by the fire of this ship, but
also in the expectation that, if they are not better disciplined than
the crews of this squadron, they will occasion as much damage
amongst themselves, as they would sustain if they had an equal
force to contend with. In the meantime we are as effectually
blockading Bahia, as if the enemy did not dare to remove from his
anchorage--for both this ship and the _Maria de Gloria_ outsail them
all. We have captured three Portuguese vessels, and from the
letters found therein, many more are expected from Maranham and
other ports to leeward, as well as from San Mattheos.
Should the enemy's squadron return to port before I can obtain
a favourable opportunity of assailing them at sea, I shall endeavour
to attack them at their anchorage, and the Government may be
assured that no exertion shall be wanting on my part, or on that of
the officers now in this ship, to effect their destruction.
I may fairly ascribe the prepared state of the enemy, and the
great force in which they appeared on the 4th, and still exhibit--to
the information carried by the British ship of war Tartar, which
was permitted to sail from Rio so early after our departure for
Bahia, and thus served them as effectually as though she had been
expressly hired for the purpose.
I have the honour, &c.
COCHRANE.
To the Minister of Marine.
On the 22nd we captured another vessel, and reconnoitred the port of
Bahia, the Portuguese squadron being there at anchor. Finding this to be
the case, I returned to the Moro to expedite the fireships--leaving the
_Maria de Gloria_ to watch the enemy's movements.
On the 26th the Portuguese Admiral again appeared in full force, and
approached towards us at the Moro San Paulo, when we prepared for
action, but the hostile squadron withdrew. The same demonstration was
made for several days, the enemy not venturing on an attack, whilst,
from the causes previously alleged, we were in no condition to take the
initiative.
On the 26th I apprised the Minister of Marine that, when the enemy
returned to port, I should make an attempt on them on the first dark
night with the flagship alone, pending the equipment of the fireships.
At the same time I addressed the following letter to the Prime Minister,
De Andrada:--
Moro San Paulo, 26th May, 1823.
MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,
With regard to the transactions of the squadron, I beg to refer you
to my despatches to the Minister of Marine, but solicit your
attention to a few particulars which appear to me of importance.
In the first place, you will observe from the enclosed Bahia
newspaper, that the maritime force of the enemy is contrasted with
that of the squadron under my command. I should be well content were
the real disparity of the respective forces no greater than the
statement has set forth, but unfortunately, the Brazilians, who have
never before been at sea, are of little or no use, from their total
want of discipline, and of any kind of nautical knowledge; whilst
the Portuguese seamen in the squadron, are not only useless--but a
great deal worse, for the reasons stated in my former letters.
The enemy in Bahia are in want of all kinds of fresh provisions
--though they have been using every means to procure them. Some
supplies they have lately had from Buenos Ayres, and even from the
Cape de Verds; but the most surprising fact is that the Brazilian
Governor of San Mattheos, near the Abrolhos, and the chiefs of other
small Brazilian ports in that quarter have been loading vessels for
the enemy's use--under the simulated destination of Rio de Janeiro.
Permit me to suggest that an investigation into this matter is
highly essential.
From all the information which I can collect, the enemy at Bahia are
considerably distracted in their councils, which dissensions cannot
fail to be increased by seeing their vessels taken in the very mouth
of the harbour, and their look-out ships driven under the guns of
the batteries by those of His Imperial Majesty, I may, indeed, say
by two ships alone, because in the state of the other vessels and
crews I have not deemed it prudent to trust them in the
neighbourhood of a port occupied by the enemy.
I have no doubt of succeeding--by some means or other--in effecting
our object, and that in as short a time as can reasonably be
expected--for it is not to be supposed that I should all at once
accomplish objects of such magnitude with a force so inferior, and
in great part so inexperienced and heterogeneously composed. On
this subject I beg to call your attention to the low opinion
entertained of our squadron by the enemy, as expressed in the
enclosed Bahia Gazette (No 65), which, on that point, is in
conformity with my own opinion as previously expressed.
I have the honour, &c. COCHRANE.
To the Prime Minister.
The following proclamation from the _Bahia Gazette_ will shew the
nature of these vapourings deliberately inserted by the Bahia
authorities:--
Last week the wind was Southerly, with rain, which has rendered
it impossible for our squadron to get at the Rio squadron, to decide
whether Brazil shall remain in the fetters of the usurper of Rio--
or enjoy constitutional liberty. Had they credited me more, we
should not have seen on our bar, an enterprising man who ruined
the commerce of the Pacific, and now thinks to regain the glory he
lost. The conduct of Lord Cochrane verberates in our ears--
examine his conduct in the Pacific, and observe that he lost all, and
was obliged to abandon everything to the Spaniards in Peru, afterwards
losing his little force in attacks and tempests. The Ministry
of Rio sent for him, giving him the pompous title of "Admiral of
the Brazils," and great promises--thinking that he would bring
with him a squadron to help the Imperial fraudulence. This is
the great wonder, who has come to carry fire and blood to the
trusty Bahia, bringing with him vessels manned, for the most part,
with Portuguese sailors--and not leaving in Rio a single vessel,
from which he did not take even the negro sailors.
It is only the _Pedro Primiero_ that is manned with the adventurous
foreigners, so that we shall fall upon the 74, and by beating
her, decide the business of Brazil. Our squadron is superior in
physical force, having at their head brave officers, with plenty of
troops. It is commanded in chief by an Admiral who has success
before him, and who wishes to regain the opinion of the public, so
that we may all wait a happy result.
Commerce--the strong pillar which upholds the Constitutional
edifice--has promised great recompense to the victorious fleet and
their chief, and has precious gifts for those who will shew their
gratitude to Bahia, and defend their liberty. Officers who distinguish
themselves, will have a medal representing their victory,
which will make them known to the citizens of Bahia, who will not
be ungrateful.
Citizens of all classes are ready at a moment's warning to decide
the great cause of our liberty, and will measure the greatness of our
triumph by the sacrifices made. Constance, courage, and union,
and we shall see the despotic monster raging and tearing himself to
pieces.
All we look to, at this moment, is to destroy the Rio squadron.
The usurper who rules in that Capital thinks that, reaching the bar
with the squadron of his imaginary Empire, we should be attacked
on all sides, and compelled to make a shameful capitulation. How
much you are mistaken--new-born monster! We have abundant
force at our disposal; but in the meantime we must overthrow the
plans of the enterprising Cochrane, and wait the result of maritime
prowess.
Notwithstanding that the Portuguese opinion of the Brazilian squadron,
as expressed in the official gazette, is couched in terms of contempt,
as compared with the efficiency of their own squadron--yet most
inconsistently, they did not venture to attack us. The fact was,
however, most painful to me, being aware of its truthfulness, and I
wrote to the Minister of Marine, begging him to enable us to intercept
the numerous vessels expected at Bahia, by procuring three fast-sailing
American clippers, armed with 18 or 24-pounders, in lieu of the useless
schooners with which we were encumbered. In addition to the professed
contempt of the Portuguese authorities for the ships blockading
Bahia--the proclamation in which these expressions were contained,
termed His Imperial Majesty a "Turkish despot,"--his Prime Minister a
"tyrannical vizier," and myself "a coward;" so that I had at least the
satisfaction of being maligned in good company.
On the 2nd of June, to my great satisfaction, the Portuguese returned to
port, and I felt certain that so soon as the fireships in preparation at
the Moro San Paulo were ready, the destruction of the whole was
inevitable--the Portuguese naval officers being of the same opinion,
whatever might be the official boasts of the military Commandant.
According to the secret correspondence which I had established with
Brazilian patriots resident within the city, the Admiral's consternation
on learning that fireships were nearly equipped was excessive--and being
in nightly expectation of a repetition of the scene in Basque Roads; or
at least of that which little more than a year previous had been enacted
before Callao--every precaution was taken against surprise. He was
quite right in the conjecture as to what was intended; but did not
calculate--as I was obliged to do--on the general want of experience of
such matters in the Brazilian service.
Our preparations being, on the 8th of June, reported to be favourably
progressing, I determined to put the attack in execution so soon as the
tide flowed late enough in the evening to prevent the enemy from
perceiving us in time to disturb or defeat our operations. The
difficulty was to find competent persons to take charge of the
fireships, so as to kindle them at the proper moment--the want of which
had rendered most of the fireships ineffective--as such--in the affair
of Basque Roads in 1809, and had formed one of the principal obstacles
when attacking Callao in 1821. Of the explosion vessel I intended myself
to take charge, as I had formerly done in Basque Roads.
On the 9th of June information arrived that the enemy had resolved on an
attempt to destroy the fireships in the Moro San Paulo, and that the
second division of their army was being embarked in transports for that
purpose. Preparations were at once made to receive them by ordering in
the vessels scouring the coast, and by such other precautionary measures
as were necessary for the defence of that important station.
It was, however, difficult to make a proper defence, for, with the
exception of Portuguese--who could not be trusted--there were no
Artillerymen in the Brazilian squadron who had any practical knowledge
of their duty, even if the guns on the Moro could be made to contribute
to its defence, for the place was open, and commanded by heights, of
which, as we had no troops, the enemy could possess themselves by night
or by day. In case they did so, before adequate preparations could be
made, I directed the guns to be spiked, that they might not be turned
against the ships. No attack was, however, made, the enemy being
doubtless deterred by the apparent promptitude in anticipating their
movements.
On the 11th of June further information was received that the
contemplated attack on the Moro had been abandoned, and that the enemy
were seriously deliberating on evacuating the port before the fireships
were completed, I therefore ordered the _Maria de Gloria_ to water and
re-victual for three months, so as to be in readiness for anything which
might occur, as, in case the rumour proved correct, our operations might
take a different turn to those previously intended. The _Piranga_ was
also directed to have everything in readiness for weighing immediately,
on the flagship appearing off the Moro and making signals to that
effect. The whole squadron was at the same time ordered to re-victual,
and to place its surplus articles in a large shed constructed of trees
and branches felled in the neighbourhood of the Moro.
Whilst the other ships were thus engaged, I determined to increase the
panic of the enemy with the flagship alone. The position of their fleet
was about nine miles up the bay, under shelter of fortifications, so
that an attack by day would have been more perilous than prudent.
Nevertheless, it appeared practicable to pay them a hostile visit on the
first dark night, when, if unable to effect any serious mischief, it
would at least be possible to ascertain their exact position, and to
judge what could be accomplished when the fireships were brought to bear
upon them.
Accordingly, having during the day carefully taken bearings of the high
lands at the mouth of the river--on the night of the 12th June, I
decided on making the attempt, which might possibly result in the
destruction of part of the enemy's fleet, in consequence of the
confused manner in which the ships were anchored, and from information
received that the chief officers were invited ashore to a public ball.
As soon as it became dark, we proceeded up the river, but unfortunately,
when within hail of the outermost ship, the wind failed, and the tide
soon after turning, our plan of attack was rendered abortive;
determined, however, to complete the reconnaissance, we threaded our way
amongst the outermost vessels, but dark as was the night--the presence
of a strange ship under sail was discovered--and some beat to quarters,
hailing to know what ship that was? The reply being "an English vessel,"
satisfied them, so that our investigation was made unmolested. The chief
object thus accomplished, we succeeded in dropping out with the ebb
tide, now rapidly running, and were enabled to steady our course
stern-foremost with the stream anchor adrag, whereby we reached our
former position off the mouth of the river.
Finding from the reconnaissance, that it would not be difficult to
destroy the enemy's vessels, huddled together as they were amongst a
crowd of merchantmen, I hastened to Moro San Paulo, to expedite the
completion of the fireships. Returning immediately to Bahia, and again
anchoring off the entrance of the harbour, I now learned that the alarm
created by our nocturnal visit was excessive; indeed, my informants
stated that the exploit had the effect of determining the Portuguese
admiral to remove as quickly as possible from a locality in which he
could no longer consider himself safe.
On the 29th of June, information was again forwarded to me, by persons
favourable to the Imperial cause, that a council of war had been held,
at which it had been resolved to withdraw the fleet to St. Catherine's
or Maranham, and not the fleet alone but the troops also--thus
abandoning the city and province of Bahia to the Imperial squadron; the
council judging that I should be well content to permit them to pass to
another part of the coast, as their departure would result in the
Imperial occupation of Bahia.
The subjoined proclamation issued by General Madeira will shew the
straits to which the blockading squadron had reduced the city and
garrison:--
INHABITANTS OF BAHIA,
The crisis in which we find ourselves is perilous,
because the means of subsistence fail us, and we cannot secure the
entrance of any provisions. My duty as a soldier, and as Governor,
is to make any sacrifice in order to save the city; but it is equally
my duty to prevent, in an extreme case, the sacrifice of the troops I
command--of the squadron--and of yourselves. I shall employ
every means to fulfil both duties. Do not suffer yourselves to be
persuaded that measures of foresight are always followed by disasters.
You have already seen me take such once before. They alarmed
you, but you were afterwards convinced that they portended nothing
extraordinary. Even in the midst of formidable armies measures
of precaution are daily used, because victory is not constant, and
reverses should be provided against. You may assure yourselves,
that the measures I am now taking, are purely precautionary, but it
is necessary to communicate them to you, because if it happens that
_we must abandon the, city_, many of you will leave it also; and I
should be responsible to the nation and to the King if I had not
forewarned you.
(Signed) IGNACIO LUIZ MADEIRA DE MELLA.
Were it dignified to allude to the cowardice imputed to me by the same
authority, it would be easy to refer to the above enumeration of
distresses caused by our two ships having captured all their provisions
in the face of thirteen, in every way better manned and equipped.
The consternation caused by my nocturnal visit, which decided the
evacuation of the city, was described as almost ludicrous. As I had been
correctly informed, the Portuguese admiral and his officers _were_ at a
ball, and information of our appearance amongst the fleet was conveyed
to him in the midst of the festivities. "What"--exclaimed he--"Lord
Cochrane's line-of-battleship in the very midst of our fleet! Impossible
--no large ship can have come up in the dark." We, however, did find our
way in the dark--and did not retire till our _reconnaissance_ was as
complete as darkness would permit.
The lamentations caused by General Madeira's proclamation were no doubt
faithfully chronicled in the Bahia newspapers, one of these declaring
"in the last few days we have witnessed in this city a most doleful
spectacle that must touch the heart even of the most insensible. A panic
terror has seized on all men's minds--the city will be left without
protectors--and families, whose fathers are obliged to fly, will be left
orphans--a prey to the invaders," &c. &c. A prognostication not at all
in accordance with my mode of carrying on warfare, which, as Portuguese
families afterwards found, both at Bahia and elsewhere, was to protect
the defenceless and unoffending.
The before-mentioned resolution of the council was precisely what I
wished, as the evacuation of the port and province by the troops as well
as the fleet, must prove more favourable to the Imperial cause than if
the fleet alone had been destroyed and the military force remained. As I
had, however, every reason to believe that it was General Madeira's
intention to remove the troops to the Northern provinces, which would
only have shifted the scene of war to another locality, I was determined
at all hazards to prevent such movement.
On the 1st of July, information was brought, that, as the fireships were
now known to be in readiness for the attack, the Portuguese admiral had
hastily embarked the whole of the troops in transports, and that a
number of merchantmen were also filled with persons who wished to leave
Bahia under his protection. As it was clear that the total evacuation of
the province by the enemy was preferable to an attack which might only
end in destroying the ships and driving both naval and military forces
on shore to renew their operations--I determined not to interfere with
their retreat, till they were clear out of the harbour, when a vigilant
pursuit would prevent them from again taking shelter in Brazil.
The following order was therefore issued to Captain Beaurepaire, of the
_Maria de Gloria_, Captain Taylor, of the _Nitherohy_, and Captain.
Thompson, of the _Carolina_, these being the only vessels on which I
could in any degree depend:--
Having received information that the enemies of the independence
of Brazil are about to evacuate the city, and quit the
port of Bahia--taking under the protection of their ships of war
numerous transports in which the military force and stores are
embarked, together with all the moveable property, public and
private--not excepting even the sacred vases appropriated to
religious uses--and as it is highly expedient that the progress of
the enemy should be interrupted and impeded as far as is
practicable--you are required to be particularly vigilant in watching
their escape, and are to endeavour to cut off such of their vessels as
you can assail with safety, and are to continue in the execution of
this duty so long as you can keep sight of the enemy.
COCHRANE.
Given on board the _Pedro Primiero_ this 1st of July, 1823.
To Captain Taylor, of the _Nitherohy_, I gave further instructions to
continue the chase as long as he considered it practicable to capture or
destroy the enemy's vessels, using his utmost endeavours to disable all
having troops on board; and as it was necessary to occupy Bahia after
its evacuation, I directed Captains Beaurepaire and Thompson, after
having captured or disabled all they could, to return forthwith to
Bahia, and take possession; for which purpose the following order was
issued to Captain Beaurepaire:--
After having executed the previous order, you are to return to
the port of Bahia, taking upon yourself the command of the naval
department afloat in my absence, and it will be your duty to
ascertain the nature of the cargoes of the neutral ships now in the
port of Bahia, or which may afterwards enter, as there are many
neutral ships said to have embarked property to a large amount,
which has been illegally transferred to such neutrals since the
blockade, for the purpose of fraudulent concealment. All such
vessels and all such property ought to be detained and subjected to
legal investigation in the prize tribunals of His Imperial Majesty.
You will have a perfect right to require this investigation, and
though the neutrals may clamour, they cannot lawfully oppose your
proceedings therein--advisedly taken.
A Portuguese frigate being daily expected at Bahia, as well as
other vessels from Portugal and the Portuguese colonies, it will be
advisable, for the better opportunity of capturing the same, to
arrange with the General and Commander-in-Chief, that the
Portuguese flag shall be displayed at least on the outer fort or
battery on the appearance of such Portuguese vessels, or of others
whose nationality is doubtful.
You are to continue on the service above pointed out until further
orders from me, or from the Minister of Marine, with whom you are
to communicate, and convey to him a copy of the present order.
COCHRANE.
Having learned that a great number of the more influential inhabitants
were about to quit Bahia with the fleet--and not wishing to involve them
in the consequences of war--I addressed the following caution to the
Junta of Bahia:--
GENTLEMEN,
Understanding that it is in contemplation to abandon the town of
Bahia, without any security being given not again to resume
hostilities against the subjects and territories of His Imperial
Majesty, and as you may not be aware of the difficulty of
retiring--whilst hopes may have been held out to you that this is
practicable--I must, for the sake of humanity, caution you against
any attempt to remove yourselves by sea, unless I have a perfect
understanding as to the future intentions of the naval forces which
may accompany you, but to whom I have nothing to suggest.
I tell you however, that it is in my power to take advantages which
may be fatal to your escape, and if, after this notice, you shall
sail, you must not lay anything to my charge in the destruction of
passengers, for in the obscurity of night it is impossible to
discriminate ships in which they may be embarked. If, after this
notice, you embark, or continue embarked, it will be to me a subject
of great regret, because I have ever desired that the dangers of war
should be confined to the military and naval profession.
COCHRANE.
To the Junta, Bahia,
To General Madeira, commanding the Portuguese troops, I wrote as
follows:--
Understanding that you are about to embark the military forces
under your command, with a view to proceed to some of the Northern
provinces, humanity compels me to declare to you my duty, however
painful, to take all measures within my power to dismantle whatever
transports may attempt to sail from Bahia under convoy of the
ships of war. That I have the means of performing this duty, in
defiance of the ships of war which may endeavour to obstruct
my operations, is a fact which no naval officer will doubt--but
which to you as a military man may not be so apparent. If,
after this warning, I am compelled to have recourse to the measures
alluded to, and if numerous lives should be sacrificed thereby, I
shall stand acquitted of those consequences which would otherwise
press heavily on my mind.
(Signed) COCHRANE.
Gen. MADEIRA.
To the Portuguese Admiral I addressed the following note:--
Sir,
I have written to the Junta and the General commanding
the military force, relative to particulars which I have felt it my
duty to submit to their consideration. To you, as a professional
man, I have nothing to suggest or request--but merely to express
my conviction that, for the sake of humanity, you will give that
professional opinion on the subject of my letters--should they be
referred to you--which may be expected from a naval officer of your
experience.
(Signed) COCHRANE.
The Admiral of the Portuguese Squadron.
On the 2nd of July, the whole Portuguese force, naval and military, got
under weigh, and steered out--the troops being embarked in the armed
transports and large merchantmen, whilst other vessels were filled with
Portuguese families and their property--everything moveable being put on
board--with the utmost confidence in the protection of their fleet. As
only the flagship and _Maria de Gloria_ were present, we made no attempt
to attack them whilst issuing from the mouth of the river, they no doubt
ridiculing my warnings as communicated to the Junta and the commanding
officers.
In this, however, they were mistaken; as every thing was in readiness,
both on board the flagship and the _Maria de Gloria_, for immediate
chase, so soon as the whole were clear of the port; though I had no
intention--as they no doubt interpreted my letters--of attacking
thirteen ships of war and numerous armed transports, with two ships
alone, so long as they remained within the harbour; but when once out,
the superior sailing qualities of these two ships would safely enable us
to harass them with impunity.
As the merchant brig, _Colonel Allen_, which had conveyed us from Chili,
was still with us, and as she might be made useful in looking after the
prizes, I adopted her into the Brazilian navy under the name of the
_Bahia_, appointing her master, Captain Haydon, to the rank of
captain-lieutenant.
Whilst the Portuguese were passing out, I wrote and despatched by the
_Liberal_ schooner, the following letter to the Minister of Marine at
Rio de Janeiro:--
_Pedro Primiero_, off Bahia,
July 2nd, 1833.
MOST EXCELLENT SIR,
I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Excellency
that the enemy's squadron have this day evacuated Bahia, their
resources by sea being no longer available. Their ships of war,
consisting of thirteen sail of different sizes, and many large
merchantmen filled with troops, are now standing out of the bay.
It is my intention to pursue them as long as it shall appear
beneficial so to do. This ship and the _Maria de Gloria_ are the only
two in sight of the enemy, the _Carolina_ having been obliged to
return to the Moro, in consequence of having lost a topmast, and
the _Nitherohy_ not having joined. I hope in my next to be able to
give you some account of the ulterior objects the enemy have in
view, which, whatever they may be, I shall endeavour to frustrate.
(Signed) COCHRANE.
To the commanders of the other ships, I sent the following order on
their joining the pursuit:--
It being improper to weaken the squadron, and impossible to
officer and man the vessels which may fall into our hands, you are to
adopt the following plan to secure them, viz. to send with the boats
crews which board the enemy's vessels a sufficient number of
crowbars, for the purpose of breaking up their water casks, leaving
only water enough to carry them, on short allowance, into Bahia, to
which port you are to order them immediately to return.
Their papers being essential to the justification of this or any
other hostile act, the boarding officer will take especial care to
secure them.
COCHRANE.
In addition to this, the masts of all troopships which might be
boarded, were directed to be so far cut away as to prevent their
escape--a written order instructing them to return forthwith to Bahia,
on pain of being treated with great severity if found on any other
course. Singular as the order may appear, it was in most cases obeyed,
and thus the captured vessels navigated themselves into our hands.
The Portuguese squadron consisted of _Don Joaõ_, 74; _Constitucaõ_,50;
_Perola_, 44; _Princeza Real_,28; _Calypso_, 22; _Regeneracaõ_, 26;
_Activa_, 22; _Dez de Fevereiro_, 26; _Audaz_, 20; _S. Gaulter_, 26;
_Principe do Brazil_, 26; _Restauracaõ_, 26; _Canceicaõ_, 8; with
between sixty and seventy merchant vessels and transports filled with
troops.
As soon as they were clear of the port, we fell upon the rearmost ships,
disabling their main and mizen masts, so as to render it difficult for
them to sail otherwise than before the wind, which would carry them to
the Brazilian coast, and ordering them back to Bahia. The flagship and
the _Maria de Gloria_ then resumed the pursuit, but the latter being
employed in looking after the prizes, on the following morning we were
alone amongst the enemy's convoy.
The next day, July 3rd, the _Carolina_ and _Nitherohy_ came up, as did
also the _Colonel Allen_. The frigates captured a number of merchantmen
mostly filled with Portuguese families--these unfortunate people finding
to their cost that my warnings were not empty threats, though they had
no doubt been led to ridicule the remonstrance by a misplaced
confidence in the protection of their national squadron. Many prizes
were taken, and as evening closed the frigates dropped out of sight with
the captured vessels.
It would have been easy for the flagship also to have taken prizes, but
about this I cared nothing,--my great object being to prevent the enemy
from landing troops elsewhere, and with this view I determined on
closely following the ships of war and transports--leaving the Brazilian
frigates to exercise their own discretion in disabling the convoy. It
may be considered an act of temerity for one ship of war thus to chase
thirteen; but, encumbered as they were, and, as I knew, short of
provisions, I felt assured of accomplishing my object.
The enemy--being greatly annoyed at our perseverance in following, and
still more so at the loss of so many of the convoy--on the morning of
the 4th, gave chase to the flagship with the whole squadron,
endeavouring to hem her in, and at one time we were pursued so closely
inshore, that there was some danger of getting embayed, but the handling
and superior sailing qualities of the _Pedro Primiero_ enabled her to
out-manoeuvre them and get clear. On seeing this, the Portuguese
squadron, finding further chase unavailing, gave us a broadside which
did no damage, and resumed its position in the van of the convoy, to
which we immediately gave chase as before, and as soon as night set in,
dashed in amongst them, firing right and left till the nearest ships
brought to, when they were boarded--the topmasts cut away--the rigging
disabled--the arms thrown overboard--and the officers compelled to give
their _parole_ not to serve against Brazil until regularly exchanged--an
event not likely to happen.
Keeping well up with them on the 5th--as soon as night set in, this mode
of attack was repeated, when we took a Russian vessel filled with
Portuguese troops, and disabled her in like manner. Of the merchantmen
within reach we took no notice, as it was impolitic to weaken the crew
of the flagship by manning prizes, whilst, as we saw nothing of the
remainder of the Brazilian squadron, there was no other means of
preventing their escape.
The prudence of preserving the crew of the flagship entire, was now well
exemplified. After taking possession of the Russian transport, at dusk,
I observed half-a-dozen large ships detach themselves from the main body
of the convoy, and suspecting some valid reason for the movement,
immediately gave chase. Though they crowded all sail, we came up with
them on the following morning, and singling out a large frigate-built
ship, filled with troops, we fired upon her till she brought to. On
boarding, we found her to be the _Gran Para_, containing--with the
others--a division of several thousand troops, destined to maintain
Portuguese authority in the province of Maranham--as, indeed, I had been
informed at Bahia. The private signals and instructions of the
Portuguese admiral--obtained by Flag-Lieutenant Grenfell from her
captain--put me in possession of the whole arrangement, which was thus
luckily frustrated.
As it was of importance not to let any of these troopships escape,
Captain Grenfell was ordered to disable the _Gran Para_, cutting away
her main and mizen masts, throwing the arms and ammunition overboard,
taking possession of the regimental flags, and compelling the officers,
as before, to give their _parole_ not to serve against Brazil. This
done, the other transports were successively boarded and disabled, so
far as was consistent with not leaving them positive wrecks on the
water; for with my single ship, to have made prisoners of so numerous a
body of troops was manifestly impossible.
The brig _Bahia_ having opportunely hove in sight, I seized four of the
vessels carrying troops, and ordered Captain Haydon to convoy them to
Pernambuco, to the President of which province I addressed the following
letter:--
Pedro Primiero, July 7th, 1823.
ILLUSTRIOUS AND EXCELLENT SIR,
The abandonment of Bahia by the enemy, in
consequence of the rigours of blockade--and the capture of half of
his army, ensigns, artillery, and stores, are events which you will
be gratified to learn. Part of the captured officers and troops I
send in for your disposal, having engaged that they shall be treated
after the manner which may justly be expected from the high
character of the Government of His Imperial Majesty, and the
customary practice of all European states. I have to request that
you will be pleased to order their disembarkation without delay.
We require seamen to finish the war. If you will be pleased to
grant the bounty of 24 dollars per man, as at Rio--charging the
same to the Government--you will render an essential service to
your country. I do not mean Portuguese seamen--who are enemies;
but able seamen of any other nation, and I need scarcely say, that
from my knowledge of the character of the men, I should prefer
British seamen to all others.
I shall probably have the honour of shortly making myself known
to you, but that depends on circumstances over which I have no
control. If we can come in, permit me to observe, that it would be
conducive to the health of my crew to have ready a supply of fresh
provisions and fruits, especially lemons and oranges. I hope you
will excuse my freedom in mentioning these things, as the health
of the men is as conducive to the interests of the empire as are
the ships of war themselves.
I have the honour, &c.
COCHRANE.
Sent by the _Balia_, Captain Haydon.
By the same opportunity I despatched the following to the Minister of
Marine:--
ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,
I have the honour to inform you that half the
enemy's army, their colours, cannon, ammunition, stores, and
baggage, have been taken. We are still in pursuit, and shall
endeavour to intercept the remainder of the troops, and shall then
look after the ships of war, which would have been my first object,
but that, in pursuing this course, the military would have escaped
to occasion further hostilities against the Brazilian Empire.
Such of the enemy's colours as we have had time to take away
I have the honour to transmit, and to lay them at the feet of His
Imperial Majesty, and shall shortly forward the remainder.
The vessels taken are large and beautiful ships, fast sailers, and
resemble, in their appearance, ships of war.
The Portuguese squadron, and other vessels armed for war, I
have every reason to believe are on their route for Lisbon. I have
also fully ascertained that the troopships which separated from their
squadron during the night were destined for Maranham.
I have the honour, &c.
COCHRANE.
The Minister of Marine.
The pursuit was now resumed, but the weather becoming hazy, we saw
nothing of the enemy till the 11th, when they appeared to have recovered
the _Gran Para_. As it became calm, nothing could be done till the 14th,
when we crossed the Equator in Long. 33-30, making straight for the
ships of war, but finding them well together, considered it prudent to
defer an attack till they should become separated.
On the 15th they continued united, giving us no opportunity for
mischief, yet not venturing to attack us, though only one ship to
thirteen. At 3 A.M. on the 16th, we crowded sail and went in amongst
them, firing a broadside within half musket shot at one of the frigates
with evident effect, as, from the damage caused, they did not return our
fire. Whilst tacking to give them the other broadside, our mainsail
split in two, and night setting in, we relinquished the pursuit in 5
degrees North latitude.
My object in so doing was--that as we had only taken part of the
troopships destined for Maranham, it was quite possible--as that port
lay to leeward--that the remainder might even yet reach their
destination; and as the Portuguese authority still existed in that--as
throughout all the Northern provinces--they might again be armed and
equipped. The instructions of the Portuguese admiral were, moreover,
that, in case of separation, they were to rendezvous at the island of
Fernando de Noronha, near which they were fallen in with some days
afterwards; so that there were good grounds for anticipating the
possibility of their yet reaching their original destination. Instead,
therefore, of following the enemy's squadron farther, I thought we
should better serve the interests of Brazil by proceeding direct to
Maranham, with the double purpose of being beforehand with the enemy's
troops, should the attempt be made--and, if practicable, reducing the
province to the authority of the Emperor; a proceeding which, though not
within my orders, was, as I conceived, nevertheless of great importance.
Accordingly, quitting the Portuguese fleet and convoy, during the
obscurity of night, we made straight for Maranham.
Thus were the Northern provinces entirely rescued from the designs of
this armament, which--luckily for the consolidation of the empire--I had
been enabled to frustrate; so that the cause of independence became free
to develop itself throughout its whole extent. It is satisfactory to
record the fact, that the whole military force was captured or
dispersed, and its objects averted--by a single ship--without the loss
of a man on our part--or the additional cost of a dollar to the Imperial
Government; though, when we left Rio de Janeiro, it was believed that
such objects could only be effected by costly naval and military
expeditions combined.
During this chase, as I have said, it did not appear a national object
to make captures, though many were secured--as officers and seamen must
have been detached for the purpose, thereby diminishing our efficiency
for the annexation of those provinces where the Portuguese authority was
still intact; to accomplish which--though such result was not expected
by the Government--I had formed plans during the pursuit. Considering
that zeal for Brazilian interests would be better shewn by expelling the
enemy which remained, I therefore refrained from taking possession of
many valuable ships, otherwise completely at our mercy, _though not
having done so--then (previous to my experience of the Court of
Admiralty) seemed_ a heavy pecuniary loss to myself, the officers, and
crew. Such sacrifice should have secured us better treatment than we
subsequently endured from the Administration of a country whose entire
independence was thus obtained by our personal sacrifices.
The means of intimidation employed for the expulsion of the Portuguese
from Bahia--the pursuit of the enemy's fleet--and the disabling of the
troopships destined for Maranham--acts altogether in excess of the
Imperial instructions--not only freed the Northern provinces from the
enemy, but, as before stated, saved the Brazilian Government the delay,
expense, and uncertainty of powerful expeditions.
These services--undertaken solely on my own responsibility--were
productive of the most beneficial consequences to the future career of
the Brazilian Empire, the integrity of which they secured at a blow, or
it may rather be said, without a blow, for none of any magnitude was
struck; the dread of the fireships and the certainty arising--from the
nocturnal visit of the flagship on the 12th of June, that my plans for
making use of them were completed--having determined the Portuguese
Admiral to save his fleet by evacuating Bahia.