THE CHAIN-PLATING OF THE KEARSARGE.

Great stress has been laid upon the chain-plating of the Kearsarge, and it

is assumed by interested parties that, but for this armour, the contest

would have resulted differently. A pamphlet lately published in this city,

entitled "The Career of the Alabama,"[2] makes the following statements:

"The Federal Government had fitted out the Kearsarge, a new vessel of

great speed, _iron-coated_," &c. (p. 23).

"She," the Kearsarge, "appeared to be _temporarily_ plated with iron

chains." (p. 38.) (In the previous quotation, it would appear she had so

been plated by the Federal Government: both statements are absolutely

incorrect, as will shortly be seen.)

"It was frequently observed that shot and shell struck against the

Kearsarge's side, and harmlessly rebounded, bursting outside, and doing no

damage to the Federal crew."

"Another advantage accruing from this was that it sank her very low in the

water, so low in fact, that the heads of the men who were in the boats

were on the level of the Kearsarge's deck." (p. 39.)

"As before observed, the sides of the Kearsarge _were trailed all over

with chain cables_." (p. 41).

The author of the pamphlet in question has judiciously refrained from

giving his name. A greater number of more unblushing misrepresentations

never were contained in an equal space.

In his official report to the Confederate Envoy, Mr. Mason, Captain Semmes

makes the following statements:

"At the end of the engagement, it was discovered by those of our officers

who went alongside the enemy's ship with the wounded, that her midship

section on both sides was thoroughly iron-coated; _this having been done

with chain constructed for the purpose_, (_!_) placed perpendicularly from

the rail to the water's edge, the whole covered over by a thin outer

planking, which gave no indication of the armour beneath. This planking

had been ripped off in every direction (!) by our shot and shell, the

chain broken and indented in many places, and forced partly into the

ship's side. She was most effectually guarded, however, in this section

from penetration."

"The enemy was heavier than myself, both in ship, battery, and crew, (!)

_but I did not know until the action was over that she was also

iron-clad_."

"Those of our officers who went alongside the enemy's ship with our

wounded." As soon as Captain Semmes reached the Deerhound, the yacht

steamed off at full speed towards Southampton, and Semmes wrote his report

of the fight either in England, or on board the English vessel. Probably

the former, for he dates his communication to Mr. Mason--"Southampton,

June 21, 1864." How did he obtain intelligence from those of his officers

"who went alongside the enemy's ship," and who would naturally be detained

as prisoners of war? It was impossible for anybody to reach Southampton in

the time specified; nevertheless he did obtain such information. One of

his officers--George T. Fullam, an Englishman unfortunately--came to the

Kearsarge in a boat at the close of the action, representing the Alabama

to be sinking, and that if the Kearsarge did not hasten to get out boats

to save life, the crew must go down with her. Not a moment was to be lost,

and he offered to go back to his own vessel to bring off prisoners,

pledging his honour to return when the object was accomplished. After

picking up several men struggling in the water, he steered directly for

the Deerhound, and on reaching her actually cast his boat adrift. It was

subsequently picked up by the Kearsarge. Fullam's name appears amongst the

list of "saved" by the Deerhound; and he, with others of the Alabama's

officers who had received a similar permission from their captors, and had

similarly broken their troth, of course gave the above information to

their veracious Captain.

The chain-plating of the Kearsarge was decided upon in this wise. The

vessel lay off Fayal towards the latter part of April, 1863, on the look

out for a notorious blockade-runner, named the "Juno." The Kearsarge being

short of coal, and, fearing some attempts at opposition on the part of her

prey, the first officer of the sloop, Lieutenant-commander James S.

Thornton, suggested to Captain Winslow the advisability of hanging her two

sheet-anchor cables over her sides, so as to protect her midship section.

Mr. Thornton had served on board the flag-ship of Admiral Farragut, the

"Hartford" when she and the rest of the Federal fleet ran the forts of the

Mississippi to reach New Orleans; and he made the suggestion at Fayal

through having seen the advantage gained by it on that occasion. I now

copy the following extract from the log-book of the Kearsarge:

"HORTA BAY, FAYAL (_May 1st, 1863._)

"_From 8 to Merid._ Wind E.N.E. (F 2). Weather b. c. Strapped, loaded,

and fused (5 sec. fuse) 13 XI-inch shell. Commenced armour plating

ship, using sheet chain. Weighed kedge anchor.

"(Signed) E. M. STODDARD, _Acting Master_."

This operation of chain-armouring took three days, and was effected

without assistance from the shore and at an expense of material of

seventy-five dollars (£15). In order to make the addition less unsightly,

the chains were boxed over with 3/4-inch deal boards, forming a case, or

box, which stood out at right angles from the vessel's sides. This box

would naturally excite curiosity in every port where the Kearsarge

touched, and no mystery was made as to what the boarding covered. Captain

Semmes was perfectly cognizant of the entire affair, notwithstanding his

shameless assertion of ignorance; for he spoke about it to his officers

and crew several days prior to the 19th of June, declaring that the chains

were only attached together with rope-yarns, and would drop into the water

when struck with the first shot. I was so informed by his own wounded men

lying in the naval hospital at Cherbourg. Whatever might be the value for

defence of this chain-plating, it was only struck once during the

engagement, so far as I could discover by a long and close inspection.

Some of the officers of the Kearsarge asserted to me that it was struck

twice, whilst others deny that declaration: in one spot, however, a

32-pounder shot broke in the deal covering and smashed a single link,

two-thirds of which fell into the water. The remainder is in my

possession, and proves to be of the ordinary 5-1/4-inch chain. Had the

cable been struck by the rifled 120-pounder instead of by a 32, the result

might have been different; but in any case the damage would have amounted

to nothing serious, for the vessel's side was hit five feet above the

water-line and nowhere in the vicinity of the boilers or machinery.

Captain Semmes evidently regarded this protection of the chains as little

worth, for he might have adopted the same plan before engaging the

Kearsarge; but he confined himself to taking on board 150 tons of coal _as

a protection to his boilers_, which, in addition to the 200 tons already

in his bunkers, would bring him pretty low in the water. The Kearsarge, on

the contrary, was deficient in her coal, and she took what was necessary

on board during my stay at Cherbourg.

The quantity of chain used on each side of the vessel in this

much-talked-of armouring is only 120 fathoms, and it covers a space

amidships of 49 ft. 6 in. in length, by 6 ft. 2 in. in depth.[3] The

chain, which is single, not double, was and is stopped to eye-bolts with

rope-yarn and by iron dogs.[4] Is it reasonable to suppose that this

plating of 1-7/10-inch iron (the thickness of the links of the chain)

could offer any serious resistance to the heavy 68-pounder and the 7 in.

Blakely rifle of the Alabama--at the comparatively close range of 700

yards? What then becomes of the mistaken remark of the _Times_ that the

Kearsarge was "provided, as it turned out, with some special contrivances

for protection," or Semmes' declaration that she was "iron-clad?" "The

Career of the Alabama," in referring to this chain-plating, says--"Another

advantage accruing from this was that it sank her very low in the water,

so low in fact, that the heads of the men who were in the boats were on

the level of the Kearsarge's deck." It is simply ridiculous to suppose

that the weight of 240 fathoms of chain could have any such effect upon a

vessel of one thousand tons burden; whilst, in addition, the cable itself

was part of the ordinary equipment of the ship. Further, the supply of

coal on board the Kearsarge at the time of action was only 120 tons, while

the Alabama had 350 tons on board.

The objection that the Alabama was short-handed does not appear to be

borne out by the facts of the case; while, on the other hand, a greater

number of men than were necessary to work the guns and ship would be more

of a detriment than a benefit to the Kearsarge. The latter vessel had 22

officers on board, and 140 men: the Alabama is represented to have had

only 120 in her crew, (Mr. Mason's statement,) but if her officers be

included in this number, the assertion is obviously incorrect, for the

Kearsarge saved 67,[5] the Deerhound 41, and the French pilot-boats 12,

and this, without mentioning the 13 accounted for as killed and

wounded,[6] and others who went down with the ship. When the Alabama

arrived at Cherbourg, her officers and crew numbered 149. This information

was given by captains of American vessels who were held as prisoners on

board the privateer after the destruction of their ships; and their

information is indorsed by the captured officers of the Alabama now on

board the Kearsarge. It is known also that many persons tried to get on

board the Alabama while she lay in Cherbourg; but this the police

prevented as far as lay in their power. If Captain Semmes' representation

were correct in regard to his being short-handed, he certainly ought not

to be trusted with the command of a vessel again, however much he may be

esteemed by some parties for his Quixotism in challenging an

antagonist--to use his own words--"heavier than myself both in ship,

battery, and crew."

The asserted unpreparedness of the Alabama is about as truthful as the

other representations, if we may take Captain Semmes' report, and certain

facts, in rebutting evidence. The Captain writes to Mr. Mason, "I cannot

deny myself the pleasure of saying that Mr. Kell, my First Lieutenant,

deserves great credit for the fine condition the ship was in when she went

into action;" but if Captain Semmes were right in the alleged want of

preparation, he himself is alone to blame. He had ample time for

protecting his vessel and crew in all possible manners; he, not the

Kearsarge was the aggressor; and but for his forcing the fight, the

Alabama might still be riding inside Cherbourg breakwater. Notwithstanding

the horrible cause for which he is struggling, and the atrocious

depredations he has committed upon helpless merchantmen, we can still

admire the daring he evinced in sallying forth from a secure haven and

gallantly attacking his opponent; but when he professes ignorance of the

character of his antagonist, and unworthily attempts to disparage the

victory of his foe, we forget all our first sympathies, and condemn the

moral nature of the man, as he has forced us to do his judgment.

Nor must it be forgotten that the Kearsarge has had fewer opportunities

for repairs than the Alabama, and that she has been cruising around in all

seas _for a much longer period than her antagonist_.[7] The Alabama, on

the contrary, had lain for many days in Cherbourg, and she only steamed

forth when her Captain supposed her to be in, at all events, as good a

condition as the enemy.

An Englishman's View of the Battle between the Alabama and the Kearsarge An Account of the Naval Engagement in the British Channel, on Sunday June 19th, 1864 · 第 11 / 30 题