THE JORDAN
Jerusalem having surrendered on the 9th December, the enemy lay round
about in an encircling line on the north and east. The first thing to be
done was to make good our hold upon the city. Accordingly, a series of
minor operations took place, with the object of clearing the enemy from
any points of vantage that he held and driving him further from the
city.
On the night of the 26/27th December, determined counter-attacks were
delivered by the Turks. They attacked the 53rd Division at points east
of Jerusalem, and the 60th to the north, their principal objective being
Tel el Ful, a conspicuous hill 3 miles east of Neby Samwil, from which
Jerusalem and the intervening ground could be overlooked. On the morning
of the 28th, a lull occurred in the fighting, followed by an attack of
unexpected strength against the whole front. The successes gained by
this attack were short-lived. A counter-attack by the 74th and 10th
Divisions, further to the left, now made itself felt. This was launched
against the enemy's reserves, and thus deprived the enemy of the
initiative. The Turkish attack being spent, a general advance northward,
took place, not, however, without further heavy fighting. Pursuing our
advantage, we further advanced our line on the 30th, and occupied a line
from Beitior (Bethel), 2 miles north-east of Bireh, to Janieh and Ras
Kerker, 7 miles west, north-west of Bireh. Bireh, which had been our
objective in November, was, at last, securely in our possession. The
Turkish attempt to recapture Jerusalem had ended in crushing defeat.
Throughout the winter months the weather was miserably wet, and the
troops in Palestine, whether engaged in active operations or merely
holding the line, suffered intense discomfort. The mails brought us
letters from our friends at home, saying how much they envied us who
were spending Christmas in the Holy Land. But those who were up the line
spent Christmas Day soaked to the skin in a gale of wind and rain, while
their Christmas dinner consisted of half-rations of bully beef and
biscuit. They were wishing themselves anywhere else upon this earth. The
appalling weather conditions made it impossible to get more than the
bare necessities of life forward from railhead, and tons of Christmas
luxuries sent from England through Egypt lay soaked and rotting in dumps
at Deir Sineid.
January was much too wet for operations in this country. In February,
however, General Allenby determined on the capture of Jericho. The
country from round Jerusalem slopes down, as we have seen, very abruptly
to Jericho and the Jordan Valley. Precipitous slopes, rocky ridges and
narrow ledges, confined the advance to definite lines on which the enemy
could concentrate fire. The advance began on the 19th, and, by the
evening of the 20th, the 60th Division had reached a line 4 miles west
of the cliffs overlooking Jericho. In the meantime, the mounted troops
were working on the right or south of the infantry, towards the
commanding position of Neby Musa, near the north-west corner of the Dead
Sea. This advance was held up at the last wadi which was directly
overlooked by, and subjected to, a heavy fire from Neby Musa. Other
mounted troops, further to the right, discovered a way down to the
Jordan Plain, where they were firmly established by dusk. That night the
Turks withdrew, and our mounted troops, moving up the Plain, entered
Jericho on the morning of the 21st.
There are two or three routes between Jericho and the summit of the
Judæan plateau. That by which the British had now come down was not the
route followed by Joshua and the Israelites. They, on the other hand,
ascended by a route farther north, through Mukhmas (Michmash) and Beitin
(Bethel), thus reaching the summit near Bireh. The route followed by the
pilgrims was that of the main road, which hereafter became the main line
of supply of the forces operating in this direction.
Having secured Jericho and the low country beyond as far as the Jordan,
operations were now commenced with the object of pushing the enemy
northwards, and clearing him from another substantial portion of
Palestine. This would, at the same time, broaden the base for future
operations which were contemplated across the River Jordan.
Operations on a large scale were commenced on March 9th. Both the 20th
and 21st Corps were engaged. We will, however, consider here only the
operations of the 20th Corps, leaving those of the 21st until a
subsequent chapter. The reader is already familiar with the type of
country, which resembled that between Jerusalem and Jericho. The
downward slopes were exceptionally steep, in places precipitous. The
slopes were swept by machine-gun and rifle fire, and the beds of the
wadis were enfiladed. The ascent on the far side was steeply terraced.
Men had alternately to hoist and pull each other up under fire, and
finally to expel the enemy from the summits in hand-to-hand fighting.
Under these conditions no rapid advance could be looked for.
The 60th Division, by night, crossed the Wadi el Auja, north of Jericho
(not to be confused with the wadi of the same name to the north of
Jaffa). This Division seized a position astride the Beisan-Jericho road.
The 53rd Division captured Tel-Asur, a conspicuous landmark among a mass
of high hills, which mountain the enemy tried repeatedly, but in vain,
to recover. Farther to the left, a counter-attack was repulsed by the
10th Division. At the conclusion of the operations, the high ground
covering the approaches to the Jordan by the Jericho-Beisan Road had
been secured, and also, farther west, linking up with the 21st Corps,
the high ground stretching across the hills of Mount Ephraim.
We come now to the passage of the River Jordan and the operations in
Eastern Palestine. It will be remembered, from what has already been
written,[9] that active operations were in progress about this time
between the Turks south-east of the Dead Sea and our Arab allies, the
troops of the King of the Hejaz. The Turkish line of communications ran
down the Hejaz Railway through eastern Palestine, temptingly near our
forces at Jericho. It will also be remembered,[10] that the Jordan
Valley, and ascent therefrom into the hills of Eastern Palestine are
unique. It would therefore have been difficult or impossible to cut the
Turks' Hejaz communications by maintaining a permanent garrison astride
the railway, such garrison being based on Jericho with an extremely
vulnerable line of communications across the valley. It was thought,
however, that much useful service might be rendered to the Arabs if a
raiding force were to cross the Jordan and destroy the railway in the
neighbourhood of Amman.
The country between the Jordan and Amman offered many obstacles to our
advance. There were the marshes of the Jordan Valley to be crossed,
ridges of clay to be surmounted, scrub to be negotiated, followed by an
ascent of 3,500 feet. The metalled road to Amman crosses the Jordan at
the Ghoraniyeh Bridge, and reaches the hills at Shunet Nimrin. It then
winds up a wadi to Es Salt, whence it strikes due eastward to Amman.
The operations commenced in the latter part of March. No serious
obstacle was encountered until the crossings of the Jordan were reached.
A small party was sent in motor-boats across the Dead Sea to dispose of
any enemy who might be in the district to the north-east of the Dead
Sea, but they met with few traces of the enemy. The enemy had destroyed
the bridge at Ghoraniyeh early in the month. Other means had therefore
to be devised for effecting a crossing. "Jordan overfloweth all his
banks all the time of harvest." On the 28th March, owing to heavy rain,
the river rose 9 feet. Floods had, therefore, to be contended with. The
current is at all times rapid, and the banks, on account of the floods,
are boggy and difficult for the approach of transport. On the night of
the 21st/22nd March, the main crossings of the river were attempted,
both at Ghoraniyeh, and a few miles further south at Hajlah, where the
Pilgrim Road from Jerusalem reaches the Jordan. At the former point
three attempts to swim the river were made, under fire, by men with
ropes attached to their bodies, but in each case the swimmers were
carried away by the strong current and found it impossible to reach the
opposite bank. Then a punt was launched, but this was no sooner launched
than it was swept away. The attempt was commenced in the bright
moonlight, but was much hampered by enemy fire. It was renewed after the
moon had gone down, but then it was impossible to find the easiest route
or to negotiate the current in the dark. Farther down stream, however,
the efforts met with better fortune. A small party succeeded in swimming
across in the dark and landing on the left bank. These towed a rope
behind them, by which, after landing, they hauled across light rafts.
The crossing by the raft-loads of men had to be carried out in the face
of some hostile fire. Portions of the scrub had been set on fire by the
enemy, and these fires to some extent lit up the rafts as they were
being pulled across. By daylight, 300 men had been got across, and a
small bridge-head established. A barrel bridge was without delay
constructed by the Engineers. Very little progress could be made that
day as the scrub was infested with enemy machine guns. On the following
night, however, a rush was made, and the bridge-head enlarged to a width
of 1,500 yards. That night the Engineers constructed a steel pontoon
bridge, and an entire cavalry regiment was passed over by dawn. The
cavalry soon cleared away the enemy, not only from Hajlah, but also from
in front of Ghoraniyeh. Bridges were built now at Ghoraniyeh and the
passage of the river assured.
Having successfully crossed the Jordan, the force pushed on eastwards
across the low country, meeting with some opposition. Eventually we
reached Shunat Nimrin. The enemy retreating up the Es Salt road were
bombed and machine-gunned by our aircraft. Part of our force, following
on their heels, entered Es Salt on the 25th, while, on the 26th, our
mounted troops occupied Amman. The railway to the south of the station
was successfully cut, but north of Amman the cutting was not complete.
Consequently, the enemy were able to receive considerable
reinforcements. Before Amman could be attacked in strength some 4,000
Turks were in position covering the viaduct and tunnel, while 2,000 more
were moving on Es Salt from the north. Five miles of railway line were
however, destroyed, while much other damage was done to the railway
line. But, in view of the strength of the enemy and the difficulties of
our communications (we had only been able to bring forward
mountain-artillery), our force withdrew.
The raid had not entirely fulfilled its object, but much good work had
been done, and it had materially assisted Sherif Faisal with his Hejaz
troops in his operations further south against Maan.
Our force returning from Eastern Palestine did not abandon the
hardly-won eastern bank of the Jordan. Bridge-heads were retained. The
Turks, however, became aggressive, and, on the 11th April, attacked our
bridge-head at Ghoraniyeh. They were repulsed from here and driven back
to Shunet Nimrin, which they strongly garrisoned.
On the 30th April another raid was made across the Jordan. This time our
infantry attacked the Shunet Nimrin position, while the cavalry,
intending to cut off the garrison, moved round the flank and reached Es
Salt. But a strong Turkish force, crossing the Jordan from the Nablus
area at Jisr ed Damieh, drove back the cavalry, who lost nine guns in
their retirement. This raid had been planned to co-operate with the Beni
Sakr Arabs. Their promised assistance did not materialize, and the whole
force was brought back to the crossings of the Jordan.
Thenceforth, until the sweep of the following September the Jordan river
and bridge-heads remained our front line.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 9: See before Chapter III.]
[Footnote 10: See before Chapter IV.]