MESOPOTAMIA, THE CAUCASUS, AND THE HEJAZ
Having taken a hurried glance at the campaign in Sinai, which directly
led up to that in Palestine, we will take a yet more hurried glance at
three other campaigns in Asiatic Turkey which had their bearing, direct
or indirect, upon the Palestine operations.
Most important among these was the expedition to Mesopotamia. In 1914,
when Turkey came into the war against us, a British Indian Brigade was
landed at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, the common estuary by which
the Tigris and the Euphrates reach the Persian Gulf. The objects of this
expedition were to secure the oil-fields of Persia in which Britain was
largely interested; to neutralize German ascendancy, which was rapidly
developing in this part of the world through her interests in the
Baghdad Railway; and to embarrass Turkey by attacking her at a point
where facilities of manoeuvre and supply seemed to hold out a
reasonable promise of success.
Throughout 1915 this expedition met with uninterrupted success. The
British Indian forces engaged were increased in number and strength,
and, in spite of appalling conditions of climate, and notwithstanding
more than one narrow escape from disaster, the British flag was pushed
further and further forward into this flat alluvial country. In the
autumn of 1915, we held all the country up to Nasiriyeh on the Euphrates
and to Kut el Amara on the Tigris. Then that ill-fated decision was
arrived at which sent General Townshend, with the inadequate force at
his command, up the Tigris to capture Baghdad. This force went
heroically forward, and, just short of that city, defeated the Turks at
the battle of Ctesiphon. But General Townshend's casualties were heavy,
and his available reinforcements were neither sufficiently numerous nor
at hand. The pick of the Turkish army released by our withdrawal from
Gallipoli, had poured down to reinforce the enemy, and General Townshend
had no alternative but to beat a hasty retreat. Accordingly, he fell
back to Kut el Amara. Partly from inability to get his war-worn forces
further away, and partly from a disinclination to abandon this important
tactical point to the enemy, he consolidated here and prepared to
withstand a siege. The history of that siege will live as one of the
noblest in the annals of the British army. But the stars in their
courses fought against us. Strong enemy positions, inadequate supplies
and transport arrangements, floods, and appalling conditions of country
and weather, proved overwhelming. In spite of the unremitting efforts of
the relieving army, which fought battle after battle without stint of
labour or loss, the garrison of Kut found themselves, at the beginning
of May, 1916, left with no alternative but to capitulate. Almost the
whole of the garrison were removed into Asia Minor, to a captivity which
few were destined to survive. Naturally the Turks were much elated by
this success, following upon their successes in Gallipoli, and were
persuaded that the might of the British arm was nothing which they need
fear.
Leaving a sufficient force to check any further British advance into
Mesopotamia, the Turk withdrew the bulk of his forces to operate against
the Russians and, perhaps wisely, made no great effort to dislodge us
from the territory which we already occupied. The opposing forces sat
down and watched each other for many months in the entrenched positions
below Kut. In March of the following year, 1917, General Maude, on whom
had fallen the command of the British army in Mesopotamia, won a
decisive victory at Kut; and, pursuing the remnants of the routed enemy,
entered Baghdad. The Turks withdrew to the higher country north and
north-east of the city, whither they were pursued. After these
operations, the British were in occupation of the completed section of
the Baghdad railway, which was then open from Baghdad as far north as
Samarra. They also effected a junction with the Russian troops operating
in Persia. In the following September, engagements were fought at Ramadi
and elsewhere on the Euphrates, with the result that the Turkish
garrisons were rounded up, and but few Turkish troops were left to
oppose the British forces in Mesopotamia. Nevertheless, an immediate
advance was not made up to Mosul and the upper territories of
Mesopotamia. Owing to the collapse of Russia, it became necessary for us
to take over some of the country in Persia, which had previously been
occupied by Russian troops, and an expedition was also sent to assist
the Armenians at Baku on the Caspian Sea. Other troops which could be
spared from Mesopotamia were sent round, in the spring of 1918, to take
part in the operations in Palestine, and the forces that remained were
devoted to the garrisoning and consolidation of the territory already
occupied.
A glance at the map of Turkey in Asia will show that the provinces of
Mesopotamia and Syria consist of long narrow strips of fertile country
bordered by desert, and resemble two legs which fork at Aleppo.
As far as Aleppo, troops and supplies from Europe passed over one common
route. From the Turkish point of view, therefore, the campaigns in these
two countries were to some extent interdependent. This enabled the Turks
to concentrate a reserve at Aleppo, ready to be moved down into either
theatre of war as the exigencies of the situation might demand.
Conversely, therefore, a British offensive in Mesopotamia might draw off
troops destined for Palestine, or an offensive in Palestine might
attract troops otherwise intended for operations in Mesopotamia. There
is strong evidence that a Turco-German offensive was contemplated in
Mesopotamia for 1918. In the spring of that year, however, a British
offensive was undertaken in Palestine, which had the immediate effect of
drawing to that country strong Turkish and German reinforcements from
Aleppo. Nothing more was heard of the offensive in Mesopotamia, and, by
the autumn of 1918, there was scarcely a fighting Turk to be found in
that country. Just as our expedition against the Dardanelles, by
engaging the enemy at a vital spot near home, had materially assisted
the defence of Egypt, so did our offensives in Palestine materially
assist the defence of Mesopotamia.
Turning to another corner of the map of Turkey, where Europe and Asia
meet in the mountains of the Caucasus, we see that the Turkish frontier
here marches with that of Russia. In the earlier days of the war, the
Russians carried out an important and successful advance in this
neighbourhood, and, early in 1916, occupied the cities of Trebizond and
Erzerum. Thus, at the time when the campaign in Palestine was embarked
upon, the armies of the allies were closing in upon Eastern Turkey
simultaneously from three directions, the Russian Caucasus army from the
north-east, the British Mesopotamian army from the south-east, and the
Egyptian Expeditionary Force from the south. Strategically, the
situation seemed full of promise. But, in the winter of 1917-18,
followed the disastrous collapse of Russia, and the setting free of many
Turkish soldiers of good quality from all the Russian fronts for service
elsewhere. We had hoped that our offensive in Syria might have been
supported by the co-operation of the Russians. Instead, we felt the
pinch of their defection in the stiffening of enemy resistance on our
front by the transfer of good troops from the Caucasus to Palestine.
There is yet another theatre of warfare in Asiatic Turkey, the
operations in which exerted considerable influence on those in
Palestine. The whole of the eastern shores of the Red Sea formed part
of the Ottoman Empire. The southernmost sector, known as the Yemen, was
the farthest outpost of that Empire. Here a few Turks and Arabs
conducted a sporadic warfare against our garrison at Aden, more
calculated to cause annoyance and to detain a British force of some
strength than to exercise much influence upon the war as a whole.
Farther to the north, on this Red Sea littoral, is a province of much
more importance, the Hejaz, in which are situate the most holy of cities
in the Moslem world, Mecca and Medina. To Christians, the Hejaz is
forbidden ground. To Mahomedans, it is the focus of pilgrimage from all
parts of the world. The Sultan of Turkey, as the ruler of Mecca, is
looked up to by the Sunni or orthodox Mahomedans in all lands as the
spiritual head of their Church. Though rulers of the Hejaz, the Turks
were not at one with the local population. These are Arabs, and to them
the Turkish rule was as unpopular as to most other non-Turkish subjects
of that decaying Empire. Profiting by Turkey's embarrassments in other
parts, the Arabs rose in the summer of 1916, resolved on ridding
themselves of the hated Turkish yoke. Sheikh Hussein of Mecca was
proclaimed King of the Hejaz.
At this time there were garrisons of Turkish troops stationed at Mecca,
Medina and at the port of Jiddah. Their communication with Turkey was by
the recently opened railway to Damascus and Aleppo. This railway, south
of Damascus, ran along the high plateau on the eastern side of the Dead
Sea, through Maan, and along the desert to Medina. The intention was to
carry the line ultimately through to Mecca, but at this time it was only
open for traffic as far as Medina. The revolt broke out on the 5th June,
1916, at which date a cordon was spread round Medina. Jiddah was
attacked on the 9th, and capitulated after holding out for only a week.
The bulk of the Mecca garrison were at this time at Taif. Accordingly,
the town of Mecca passed into the hands of the Emir, with the exception
of the ports. These put up a small fight, but had all surrendered by the
middle of July. The force at Taif were blockaded, and, on the 23rd
September, this force also surrendered. By this time, all the outlying
garrisons had been disposed of, and the Hejaz generally cleared of
Turks.
Meanwhile, Medina had not only held out, but had been reinforced, and
the fighting strength brought up to some 14,000. Late in September, the
Turks sallied out and established a cordon of posts at a distance of
some 30 to 40 miles from the city. They also pushed further afield; but,
Arab armies moving up from the south, the Turks withdrew, at the end of
the year, behind the cordon of posts which they had established. For the
next six months, the railway to the north of Medina was frequently
raided by the Arabs, but the town was effectually cut off from its
communications with Turkey.
In July, 1917, Akaba, at the head of the gulf of that name, the
north-eastern arm of the Red Sea, was captured. This is at no great
distance from Maan, an important depot on the Hejaz Railway, the last
outpost of Syria at the edge of the desert of North Arabia. From Akaba,
the railway was now attacked at Maan, with serious results to Medina;
nevertheless, that city continued to hold out, and was probably never
very closely invested.
In October and November, 1917, about the time of the third battle of
Gaza, the Turks were still in Maan, and tried to assume the offensive
against the Arabs, but proved too weak to succeed. After the fall of
Jerusalem, the Turks withdrew to some extent, and the Arabs advanced
towards the lands east of the Dead Sea.
From this period forward, the history of the Hejaz revolt merges in that
of the Palestine campaign. The Arab forces east of the Dead Sea afforded
a safeguard against any possible Turkish attempt to move round our right
flank and raid our line of communications. In February and in March,
1918, Turkish expeditions moving against the Arab forces of the King of
the Hejaz southward from Kerak, near the south-eastern corner of the
Dead Sea, met with failure. The former expedition ended in disaster, and
the latter was forced to withdraw, owing to the imminence of a British
crossing of the Jordan in its rear. Arab activity on the railway now
definitely isolated Medina. Although the Arabs were never strong enough
to push a powerful force up through Eastern Palestine, yet the presence
of a friendly force operating in that country exercised considerable
influence upon the later stages of the Palestine campaign. The
assistance which the Arabs gave in the ultimate destruction of the
Turkish army was invaluable.