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With the British Army in the Holy Land
BY
MAJOR H. O. LOCK
THE DORSETSHIRE REGIMENT
WITH MAPS
LONDON: ROBERT SCOTT
ROXBURGHE HOUSE
PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C.
1919
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
PAGE
EGYPT AND THE SUEZ CANAL 1
Modern Egypt--Military Geography of Egypt--The Eastern Boundary--Outbreak
of War, 1914--Invasion of Egypt by the Turks--The Dardanelles--Defence
Problem at the Opening of 1916.
CHAPTER II
THE DESERT OF SINAI 10
Across the Canal--The Military Railway--The Pipe-line--Kantara--Oghratina,
Katia and Dueidar--Romani--Bir-el-Abd--El Arish--Maghdaba--Magruntein and
Rafa--Sea-borne Supplies--Khan Yunus--The Land of Promise--Personnel.
CHAPTER III
MESOPOTAMIA, THE CAUCASUS, AND THE HEJAZ 21
Landing in Mesopotamia--1915
Operations--Kut--Baghdad--Consolidation--Interdependence of Mesopotamia and
Palestine--Caucasus--Collapse of Russia--The Yemen--Revolt of the
Hejaz--Mecca--Medina--Maan--Arab Co-operation in Eastern Palestine.
CHAPTER IV
PALESTINE 28
General Idea--A Comprehensive View--The Sea--Sand Dunes--Coastal
Plain--Judæan Hills--Jordan Valley--Eastern
Palestine--Armageddon--Climate--Railways--Population.
CHAPTER V
GAZA 37
History--Importance of Situation--Topography--First Battle of Gaza--Second
Battle of Gaza--Reorganization of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
CHAPTER VI
TRENCH WARFARE 43
Fresh Arrivals--Journey to Railhead--Acclimatization--The Turkish Line--The
British Line--Campaigning Conditions--Flies and Dust--Morale--Humorous
Incidents--Spies--Raiding and Shelling--Defences at the Apex--Preparations
for the Offensive.
CHAPTER VII
GAZA AND BEERSHEBA 51
General Plan of the Battle--Reasons--Water--Transport--Bombardment of
Gaza--Capture of Beersheba--Infantry Attack on Gaza--Counter-attack at
Khuweilfeh--Attack on Sheria--Evacuation of Gaza--Retreat of the Enemy--The
Apex--Shelling and Raids.
CHAPTER VIII
FULL CRY 62
Flight of the Enemy--Cavalry Pursuit--Crossing No Man's Land--Infantry
Pursuit--Water--Arak-el-Menshiyeh Demonstration--Mesmiyeh
Engagement--Junction Station Captured--Naaneh--Gezer--Jaffa--Summary of the
Situation.
CHAPTER IX
NEBY SAMWIL 71
Routes into the Hills--Bireh--Scheme of Operations--The Saris
Pass--Contrast with Hill Fighting in India--Enab--Neby Samwil--The Key to
Jerusalem--Consolidation and Reliefs.
CHAPTER X
JERUSALEM 79
The 20th Corps Movements--The New Line--Counter-attacks--Final
Advance--Fighting round Jerusalem--The Enemy Outmanoeuvred--Surrender of
the City--General Allenby's Entry and Proclamation.
CHAPTER XI
THE HOLY CITY 86
Sacred to the Jew, the Christian and the Moslem--The
Kings--Nebuchadnezzar--Nehemiah--Alexander--Ptolemy I--Antiochus--The
Maccabees--Pompey--Herod--Christ--Titus--Hadrian--Constantine--Chosroes--
Islam--The Crusaders--Saladin--Richard--The Kharezmians--Expulsion of the
Crusaders--Tamerlane--The Ottomans--Napoleon--Mohammed Ali--Routes taken by
the several Invaders.
CHAPTER XII
JUNCTION STATION AND LUDD 101
Chaos--Looting--Turkish Hospital--Prisoners of War--Vale of Sorek--Town
Planning--Movements of Troops--Railway Development--Bridges--Armoured
Train--Junction Station Superseded by Ludd--Development of Ludd--St.
George.
CHAPTER XIII
THE JORDAN 109
Attempt to Retake Jerusalem--Winter in Palestine--Jericho--Advancing the
Line--Crossing the Jordan--Raid on Amman--Raid on Shunat Nimrin.
CHAPTER XIV
THE WADI DEIR BALLUT 116
Crossing the Auja--Front Line Life in
March--Musketry--Aircraft--Flowers--Wadi Deir Ballut--Capture of Deir
Ballut Ridge.
CHAPTER XV
THE MOUNTAINS OF EPHRAIM 124
The New Line--Turkish Reinforcements--Method of Holding the Line--A Patrol
Incident--Capture of Ikba.
CHAPTER XVI
RAFAT 130
Arara--Rafat--Three Bushes Hill--Collapse in France--Reorganization.
CHAPTER XVII
THE CROWNING VICTORY 135
Situation in September, 1918--The Terrain--Preparations--Mugheir--The Sweep
from Rafat to the Sea--Cavalry--Deraa--The Turkish Rout--Eastern
Palestine--Sea of Galilee--Damascus--Summary of Results.
CHAPTER XVIII
CONCLUSION 143
Pursuit--Beyrout--Aleppo--Armistices--Close of the War--Cross and
Crescent--Résumé.
SKETCH MAPS PAGE
I RAILWAYS IN 1914 1
II GAZA AND BEERSHEBA 51
III COUNTRY ROUND JERUSALEM 79
IV RAILWAYS IN 1918 101
V COUNTRY ROUND RAFAT 117
NOTE
My aim in compiling this little book has been to provide a short account
of the Palestine campaign, illustrated from the experiences of one who
was present.
The manuscript was written on active service, soon after the occurrence
of the events recorded. It may, on this account, be sketchy, but, it is
hoped, not the less interesting.
My acknowledgments are due to the Official Despatches and publications,
and also to the writings of Mr. W.T. Massey, Official Correspondent with
the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
H. O. L.
IN THE FIELD, 1918.
[Illustration]
WITH THE BRITISH ARMY IN THE HOLY LAND
CHAPTER I
EGYPT AND THE SUEZ CANAL
The Holy Land has been the scene of war since the dawn of History. Long
before Belgium became the cock-pit of Europe, Palestine was the cock-pit
of the known world. Here, on the high road between Asia and Africa, were
fought the great wars of Egyptians and Assyrians, Israelites and
Canaanites, Greeks and Romans, Saracens and Crusaders. With these few
square miles are associated the names of the world's greatest soldiers
no less than that of the Prince of Peace. None can fail to be interested
in the latest campaign in this Land of Armageddon.
To understand the causes and events that led up to the campaign in
Palestine of 1917-1918, we must first summarize, as shortly as possible,
the modern history of Egypt. That country had for many centuries formed
an integral part of the Turkish Empire. But she had been rapidly
slipping from the grasp of the Turk. Early in the nineteenth century
Mohamed Ali had effectually thrown off the Turkish yoke. True, the
Turkish suzerainty remained; but that authority was little more than
nominal and was represented by an annual money tribute paid to the Porte
by the Khedive out of the revenues of Egypt.
Both France and England had large financial interests in Egypt,
especially after the construction of the Suez Canal, which was opened
for traffic in 1869.
The Suez Canal, in fact, became of vital importance to Great Britain. By
a stroke of policy the British Government acquired the shares of the
almost bankrupt Khedive, Ismail Pasha, and thus had a holding in the
company worth several million pounds. But far more important to Britain
was the position of the Canal as the great artery of the British Empire,
the most vulnerable point on the short sea route to India. Thus Britain
became directly concerned in the affairs of Egypt, in its internal
administration to secure peace within, and in its military defence to
secure the country in general, and the Canal zone in particular, from
invasion by a foreign enemy.
But the affairs of Egypt were in a most unsatisfactory condition. The
army was wholly unreliable, and extravagance in high places had brought
the exchequer to the verge of bankruptcy. In 1882 matters reached a
crisis. A revolution broke out, headed by Arabi Pasha, and the situation
looked desperate. Joint naval and military action by Britain and France
was proposed, but the French ships sailed away and left Britain with a
free hand. The British fleet bombarded the Forts at Alexandria and a
military force, based on the Suez Canal, was landed at Ismailia. This
force completely defeated the army of Arabi Pasha at Tel-el-Kebir, put
down the rebellion, and restored the government of the then Khedive,
Tewfik Pasha. But the Khedivial government had been unable to cope with
the rebellion single-handed; it had only been restored to power by
British arms; it could not hope to retain that power unless continuously
backed by the power of Britain.
From this time forward, whether she liked it or not, Britain found
herself effectually saddled with the direction of the government of
Egypt. In this position she became more fully confirmed by the
Anglo-Egyptian military operations against the Soudan in 1885, under
Gordon, and in 1898, under Kitchener. Outstanding differences with
France were dispelled on the conclusion of the Anglo-French Entente
Cordiale, and Britain was left virtually mistress of Egypt.
Let us look for a minute at the military geography of Egypt,
particularly with regard to the security of her frontiers from invasion.
Egypt consists, or prior to the seventies consisted, of the Nile, its
valley and delta, and the country rendered fertile by that river. On
either side of this fertile belt is dry, barren desert. On the north is
the Mediterranean Sea, and on the south the tropical Soudan. Thus, in
the hands of a power that holds the command of the sea, Egypt is well
adapted for defence. The tropical Soudan makes a well-nigh impossible
line of advance for a large hostile force from the south, and the routes
of approach from the east and from the west, across the waterless
deserts, present obstacles scarcely less formidable. Since the
seventies, however, another important factor has entered the problem,
namely, the Suez Canal and the area of cultivation and civilization
which has sprung up along its banks. The large amount of fresh water
required for the maintenance of the Canal, for the use of the towns that
have sprung up along its banks, and for the existence of the large
population which the Canal has attracted, is brought by a Canal known as
the Sweet Water Canal, from the river Nile. This Sweet Water Canal, and
the piped services which it supplied, were, in 1914, wholly upon the
western or Egyptian side of the Suez Canal. This western side was also
well provided with communications. Trunk railways connected Ismailia, at
the centre of the Canal, with Cairo and Alexandria, and lateral
railways, running along the whole length of the Canal, connected it with
Port Said and Suez.
Although, as was subsequently discovered, the problem of defending the
Suez Canal was by no means the same as that of defending Egypt, the
problems may, at first sight, appear identical. An enemy force moving
from Palestine against the Suez Canal and Egypt, would have to cross a
comparatively waterless desert for a distance of over a hundred miles.
On coming into collision with the defenders of the Canal, such an enemy
would be operating far from his base, with a long and vulnerable line of
communications, and with little or no available fresh water. The
defenders, operating along the line of the Suez Canal, would be close to
their base, with admirable communications, both lateral and to the rear,
and with the rich cultivated lands of Egypt on which to draw for
supplies, whilst their supply of fresh water would be unlimited.
The boundary line between Egypt and Palestine in 1914 ran from Rafa, on
the Mediterranean, to the head of the Gulf of Akaba, the north-eastern
arm of the Red Sea. This line runs right across the desert and is
distant about 120 miles from the Suez Canal. At first sight the boundary
seems ideal, and in so far as the defence of Egypt alone was concerned,
it left little or nothing to be desired. But, as subsequent events
proved, this line was not good enough to safeguard the defences of the
Canal.
On the outbreak of war, in August, 1914, between Germany and
Austria-Hungary on the one hand, and Great Britain, France, Russia and
Belgium on the other, the garrison of Egypt was augmented by troops sent
out from England and India and from Australia. The Suez Canal, through
which vast numbers of troops were passing, was of vital importance to
the communications of the allies, and was strongly guarded accordingly.
Two months later (November 5), Turkey threw in her hand with the Central
Powers. One of the baits held out by Germany to induce the Turks to
enter the struggle, was a promise that they should be restored to
complete supremacy in Egypt. With the entering of Turkey into the war,
and her open threats to invade Egypt, the protection of that country and
of the Canal became a matter of extreme urgency.
The policy of defence adopted was that of making the line of the Canal
the line of resistance. A large portion of the low-lying desert to the
north-east of the Canal was flooded, so as to render approach by that
direction impossible. Warships took up stations in the Canal itself,
while naval patrol launches took over the duty of guarding the Bitter
Lakes. The troops detailed for the defence of the Canal itself were
entrenched upon the western side, with reserves concentrated at points
of tactical importance. In this way full advantage was taken of the
lateral communications on the western side of the Canal, while it was
thought that the difficulties of crossing the desert on the eastern side
would make approach by the Turks well-nigh impossible.
Meanwhile, the Turk was not letting the grass grow under his feet.
Whether the Germans ever intended to pay the price for Turkish adhesion
by sending a strong enough force to make the invasion of Egypt
practicable is open to doubt. The Turkish rank and file were certainly
led to believe that a serious invasion of Egypt was intended. But it is
much more likely that the object of the Germans was to detain as large a
British force as possible in Egypt and thus prevent their taking part in
the fighting in France. A secondary object may have been to render the
Suez Canal temporarily impassable. Whatever may have been the chestnuts
that Germany hoped to get out of the fire, it was clear that Turkey was
willing to act as catspaw, and attempt a foolhardy invasion of Egypt.
Consequently, the construction of a new military railway in Syria was
put in hand, and by January, 1915, the Turks had formed advanced posts
at Auja, on the frontier, and also at Kosseima, El Arish, and Khan
Epenus in the desert. The problem of water supply has always presented a
difficulty to armies crossing this waterless desert. There are a certain
number of reservoirs and cisterns which hold up water during the rains.
In the winter time these would be full. The Turk is less particular
about the water which he drinks than the white man, and doubtless he
could, to some extent, be supplied from some of the brackish pools in
the desert, with water that no one would think of offering to a British
soldier.
The light pontoons that the Turks dragged across the desert for crossing
the Canal are said to have been used for carrying water during certain
stages of the advance. Suffice it to say that the Turks did succeed in
solving the water problem, and in crossing the desert with a force of
some considerable strength.
On the 3rd February, 1915, the threatened attack materialized. Before
dawn, some of the light pontoons which the Turks had brought with them,
were launched on the Canal. These were manned, while other Turks
deployed along the eastern bank and opened fire to cover the crossing.
The troops defending this portion of the Canal, mostly Indians, opened
fire upon the pontoons, with the result that many of them were sunk. Two
of the pontoons, however, reached the western bank, and their crews,
numbering about twenty, surrendered. There was fighting throughout the
day, but no further crossing of the Canal. On the next day the east bank
was swept, with the result that a considerable party of the enemy were
captured. After this, the Turks withdrew, and marched back to Palestine.
This was the only time that a formed body of the enemy succeeded in
reaching the Canal. But they had shown that it was possible for them to
achieve the almost impossible, and thus they gave the authorities
responsible for the defence of Egypt much food for thought.
The menace to Egypt was for a time delayed, though not wholly removed,
by the expedition against the Dardanelles.
To co-operate with our Russian allies, the British Government decided,
early in 1915, to attempt to force the passage of the Dardanelles. The
strategic gains promised were highly attractive, and included--the
passage of arms and munitions from the allies to Russia in exchange for
wheat, the neutrality and possible adherence of the outstanding Balkan
States, the severing of communications between European and Asiatic
Turkey, the drawing off of Turkish troops from the theatres of the war,
and the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople, and ultimately from
Europe. Incidentally, it was considered, on the principle that the best
defensive is an offensive, that a thrust at the very heart of Turkey, a
threat against Constantinople itself, would afford the best means of
defending Egypt.
The story of the Dardanelles expedition has been often told, and
scarcely forms a part of this history, so a few words must suffice. In
February, 1915, we started by bombarding the forts with a few old
warships. The forts at the outer entrance were soon silenced, and early
in March, the warships moved up to the Narrows. On the 18th, a great
effort was made to reduce the forts about the Narrows; but it failed,
with the loss of three battleships and more than 2,000 men. This
demonstrated the fact that the Dardanelles could never be opened by sea
power alone, and, accordingly, amphibious operations became necessary.
An expeditionary force was assembled in Egypt, and Mudros was selected
as the advanced base. On April 25, landings were effected on the extreme
point of the Gallipoli Peninsula. In spite of heroic attempts, we did
little more than effect a precarious lodgment. Further operations were
necessary; additional divisions were brought out from home; and on the
night of the 6th/7th August, another landing was effected at Suvla Bay.
But the new plan was no more successful than the old. Within a couple of
days this force also had settled down to a war of positions. Winter was
approaching; our positions on the peninsula would then become no longer
tenable. No progress could be made, and at length it was decided to
evacuate. The Suvla Bay force was withdrawn first; and the evacuation of
the main body of troops was completed on the 20th December. The
withdrawal was carried out with the same brilliance that had
characterized the various landings, and with so small a number of
casualties that it was described as "an achievement without parallel in
the annals of war."
Many of the regiments that fought against the Turks at Gallipoli were
withdrawn, directly or indirectly to Egypt, and subsequently met the
Turk again during the advance into Palestine. Included among these were
the 10th, 52nd, 53rd and 54th Divisions, besides regiments of Anzacs and
Yeomanry. In so far as the Dardanelles operations aimed at protecting
Egypt, they were a success; for, while they were in progress, no
organized invasion of Egypt was attempted. But the evacuation had the
effect of liberating a large force of Turkey's best troops for
operations against Mesopotamia and Egypt.
It would be convenient to pause here and take stock of the military
situation in Egypt, in the light of over a year's experience of actual
war.
In the first place, the Turks had disillusioned us as to the
impossibility of crossing the waterless desert, and had actually crossed
it with a considerable armed and organized force. They announced that
what they had effected had been nothing more than a reconnaissance. In
any case, they had shown us what they could do, and that, backed by the
resources of the Central Powers, there would be no insuperable obstacle
to their bringing a large and fully equipped army across the desert.
In the second place, we had discovered that the problems of defending
the Suez Canal and of defending Egypt were not identical. While the
Canal formed an admirable moat, an obstacle difficult to negotiate when
stoutly defended, and so a capital defensive line for the protection of
the Nile; yet this line was inadequate for the protection of the Canal
itself or for securing the immunity of the passing shipping.
And so, thirdly, we realized that some other line must be found for the
protection of the Canal. While we were sitting on the west bank, small
parties of Turks approached the eastern bank. On more than one occasion,
in the summer of 1915, they succeeded in placing mines in the fairway of
the Canal. It would, therefore, have been quite possible for them to
have seriously interfered with the working of the Canal and the passage
of shipping. Granted that a new line must be found, the question arises
where such new line should be drawn. A line across the actual desert may
be all very well in war time, though none too easy to hold, for the
reasons that we have already discussed. But to keep a garrison on such a
line for ever would be well-nigh intolerable. Thus, by a process of
elimination, we find that the most suitable line for the permanent
defence of the Suez Canal is the fertile country beyond the eastern
desert--in other words, Palestine.
Fourthly, it had been brought home to us that the worst form of defence
is a passive defence. As, therefore, the Turk would not leave well
alone, but insisted on attacking us in Egypt, so it became necessary for
us to meet him on his own ground, to push a vigorous offensive, and
eventually to carry the war into Palestine.