BASILIDES’ IDEA OF MARTYRDOM REFUTED.
Basilides, in the twenty-third book of the _Exegetics_, respecting
those that are punished by martyrdom, expresses himself in the
following language: “For I say this, Whosoever fall under the
afflictions mentioned, in consequence of unconsciously transgressing
in other matters, are brought to this good end by the kindness of Him
who brings them, but accused on other grounds; so that they may not
suffer as condemned for what are owned to be iniquities, nor reproached
as the adulterer or the murderer, but because they are Christians;
which will console them, so that they do not appear to suffer. And if
one who has not sinned at all incur suffering--a rare case--yet even
he will not suffer aught through the machinations of power, but will
suffer as the child which seems not to have sinned would suffer.” Then
further on he adds: “As, then, the child which has not sinned before,
or committed actual sin in itself, but has that which committed sin,
when subjected to suffering, gets good, reaping the advantage of many
difficulties; so also, although a perfect man may not have sinned
in act, while he endures afflictions, he suffers similarly with the
child. Having within him the sinful principle, but not embracing the
opportunity of committing sin, he does not sin; so that he is not to be
reckoned as not having sinned. For as he who wishes to commit adultery
is an adulterer, although he do not succeed in committing adultery;
and he that wishes to commit murder is a murderer, although he is
unable to kill; so also, if I see the man without sin, whom I specify,
suffering, though he have done nothing bad, I should call him bad,
on account of his wishing to sin. For I will affirm anything rather
than call Providence evil.” Then, in continuation, he says expressly
concerning the Lord, as concerning man: “If then, passing from all
these observations, you were to proceed to put me to shame by saying,
perchance impersonating certain parties, This man has then sinned; for
this man has suffered;--if you permit, I will say, He has not sinned;
but was like a child suffering. If you were to insist more urgently,
I would say, That the man you name is man, but that God is righteous:
‘For no one is pure,’ as one said, ‘from pollution.’”[569] But the
hypothesis of Basilides says that the soul, having sinned before in
another life, endures punishment in this--the elect soul with honour
by martyrdom, the other purged by appropriate punishment. How can this
be true, when the confessing and suffering punishment or not depends
on ourselves? For in the case of the man who shall deny, Providence,
as held by Basilides, is done away with. I will ask him, then, in the
case of a confessor who has been arrested, whether he will confess
and be punished in virtue of Providence or not? For in the case of
denying he will not be punished. But if, for the sake of escaping and
evading the necessity of punishing such an one, he shall say that the
destruction of those who shall deny is of Providence, he will be a
martyr against his will. And how any more is it the case, that there
is laid up in heaven the very glorious recompense to him who has
witnessed, for his witnessing? If Providence did not permit the sinner
to get the length of sinning, it is unjust in both cases; both in not
rescuing the man who is dragged to punishment for righteousness’ sake,
and in having rescued him who wished to do wrong, he having done it as
far as volition was concerned, but [Providence] having prevented the
deed, and unjustly favoured the sinner. And how impious, in deifying
the devil, and in daring to call the Lord a sinful man! For the devil
tempting us, knowing what we are, but not knowing if we will hold out,
but wishing to dislodge us from the faith, attempts also to bring us
into subjection to himself. Which is all that is allowed to him, partly
from the necessity of saving us, who have taken occasion from the
commandment, from ourselves; partly for the confusion of him who has
tempted and failed; for the confirmation of the members of the church,
and the conscience of those who admire the constancy [displayed]. But
if martyrdom be retribution by way of punishment, then also faith and
doctrine, on account of which martyrdom comes, are co-operators in
punishment--than which, what other absurdity could be greater? But
with reference to these dogmas, whether the soul is changed to another
body, also of the devil at the proper time mention will be made. But at
present, to what has been already said, let us add the following: Where
any more is faith in the retribution of sins committed before martyrdom
takes place? And where is love to God, which is persecuted and endures
for the truth? And where is the praise of him who has confessed, or
the censure of him who has denied? And for what use is right conduct,
the mortification of the lusts, and the hating of no creature? But
if, as Basilides himself says, we suppose one part of the declared
will of God to be the loving of all things because all things bear a
relation to the Whole, and another “not to lust after anything,” and
a third “not to hate anything,” by the will of God these also will be
punishments, which it were impious to think. For neither did the Lord
suffer by the will of the Father, nor are those who are persecuted
persecuted by the will of God, since either of two things is the case:
either persecution in consequence of the will of God is a good thing,
or those who decree and afflict are guiltless. But nothing is without
the will of the Lord of the universe. It remains to say that such
things happen without the prevention of God; for this alone saves both
the providence and the goodness of God. We must not therefore think
that He actively produces afflictions (far be it that we should think
this!); but we must be persuaded that He does not prevent those that
cause them, but overrules for good the crimes of His enemies: “I will
therefore,” He says, “destroy the wall, and it shall be for treading
under foot.”[570] Providence being a disciplinary art;[571] in the
case of others for each individual’s sins, and in the case of the Lord
and His apostles for ours. To this point says the divine apostle: “For
this is the will of God, even your sanctification, that ye abstain from
fornication: that each one of you should know how to possess his vessel
in sanctification and honour; not in the lust of concupiscence, as
the Gentiles who know not the Lord: that none of you should overreach
or take advantage of his brother in any matter; because the Lord
is the avenger in respect of all such, as we also told you before,
and testified. For God hath not called us unto uncleanness, but to
holiness. Wherefore he that despiseth, despiseth not man, but God, who
hath also given His Holy Spirit to you.”[572] Wherefore the Lord was
not prohibited from this sanctification of ours. If, then, one of them
were to say, in reply, that the martyr is punished for sins committed
before this embodying, and that he will again reap the fruit of his
conduct in this life, for that such are the arrangements of the [divine
administration], we shall ask him if the retribution takes place by
Providence. For if it be not of the divine administration, the economy
of expiations is gone, and their hypothesis falls to the ground; but
if expiations are by Providence, punishments are by Providence too.
But Providence, although it begins, so to speak, to move with the
Ruler, yet is implanted in substances along with their origin by the
God of the universe. Such being the case, they must confess either
that punishment is not just, and those who condemn and persecute the
martyrs do right, or that persecutions even are wrought by the will of
God. Labour and fear are not, then, as they say, incident to affairs
as rust to iron, but come upon the soul through its own will. And on
these points there is much to say, which will be reserved for future
consideration, taking them up in due course.