Success in war depends in some degree on adaptation of tactics to local
conditions, and it is therefore clear that, to attain rapid success
against the inhabitants of the North Western Frontier, a knowledge
of their tactics is required, and that, whilst the British aims are
pursued with unswerving determination, their probable movements must be
met and defeated.
The tribesmen, like most savages, are only really formidable when
one is running away from them. They fight well in positions strongly
fortified, and with flanks secure, but, being without the discipline
or cohesion to meet envelopment, are much influenced by pressure
against their flanks.
Pathans are fearful of artillery, and do not, as a rule, seriously
resist a determined advance, preferring the easier and less dangerous
enterprise of harassing the retirements which they believe are an
inevitable corollary to forward movements; or of attacking isolated
detachments, whose operations they have observed from their hill-tops.
They are suspicious of ambuscades, except when excited in pursuit, and
are not prone to accept battle unless surprised.
Like other people, they shoot well when not themselves under effective
fire, and, when shooting into a valley, where the strike of the bullet
can be observed, their fire is accurate. On the other hand, owing to
their relatively defective armament, and to lack of ammunition, tribal
fire as a rule lacks volume.
The tribesmen skirmish well, and move quickly over their hills, but
rarely, except when engaging a small force, or by night, attack in
mass. On the other hand, they often crowd their defensive positions
with men.
They are said to dislike being overlooked by their opponents, and
therefore do not care to attack up hill, but will, at times, try to
rush a detachment, with the object of capturing rifles and ammunition.
The fact that a proportion of the men possess only inferior fire-arms,
renders possible resort to shock tactics, especially when roused to a
pitch of fanaticism.
Pathans are partial to night operations, probably because they believe
that there is little fear of interference after dark. Their enterprises
are usually on a small scale, but night attacks in force, are possible.
Their inadequate clothing, and the cold of the early morning, however,
usually forces them to seek shelter as the night wears on.
From the above description it will be seen that British troops, so long
as they observe the ordinary principles of war, have nothing to fear
from the tribesmen. But it is to be remembered that, unless stratagem
is intended, the offensive is the general rule in tribal warfare, for
the enemy construes a defensive attitude as a sign of fear, and becomes
correspondingly elated.
The composition of forces despatched on reconnaissance and minor
punitive expeditions requires careful consideration. Columns composed
of men drawn from many different infantry units are inherently weak, so
that, in all operations, complete units, so far as they are required,
should be employed, cavalry being added when local conditions are
favourable. Artillery will generally be necessary, as well as a
proportion of technical troops, but the strength of columns should,
within limits of safety, be low, in order to insure mobility, and
to encourage resistance. The military value of the enemy must not,
however, be underestimated.
The main object of all operations is to quickly attain a decisive
success. To this end the tribesmen must be induced to stand and fight
with the purpose of inflicting casualties on them.
It is to be remembered that the enemy can, less easily than the
British, afford losses, especially of arms. Commanders, without being
prodigal of their men's lives, need not, therefore, be afraid of
incurring casualties, especially when there is likelihood that the
enemy will suffer loss to at least an equal extent. If the tribesmen's
losses are heavy, those of the British troops will probably be
considerably less. Close fighting is all to the advantage of trained
soldiers.
As has been stated, the clansmen will rarely commit themselves to
battle in conditions favourable to the British, unless they can be
outwitted or surprised. Night operations may, therefore, frequently
be necessary, having special regard to the fact that, from their hill
tops, the enemy will overlook all manoeuvres. As the natives are not
often abroad in the early morning, surprise, at dawn, will not present
unusual difficulties.
The enveloping form of tactics, when the enemy is attacked both in
front and flank, is as effective in tribal as in other warfare. But,
owing to the topographical advantages enjoyed by the tribesmen, it will
be necessary to hold them closely in frontal attack, and so distract
their attention from outflanking movements. This may be possible, for
they fight with confidence when behind cover. Mere frontal attack
is likely to be at once costly and ineffective; hence, if neither
envelopment, nor night operations, are practicable, resort may be
had to such stratagems as a feigned retirement, or bait of transport
animals, to tempt the Pathans from their hills.
Though the possibility of tribal counter-attack, by shock, must not be
lost sight of, the British advantage in training and armament should
enable a central general reserve to be dispensed with, the object being
to so dispose the troops as to insure envelopment.
Good information and staff work, and a sound system of
inter-communication, will, moreover, if all ranks are imbued with the
spirit of mutual support, go far to insure success.
Commanders, especially of small forces, should remember that hesitation
will be quickly observed by the enemy, but a bold front, and ready
stratagem, will soon cause him to lose heart.
When a post or isolated detachment requires assistance, aid can often
be most rapidly and effectively given by application of such indirect
pressure as will tend to divert the enemy's attention.
In minor tactics, whilst taking every advantage of the cover afforded
by features of ground, troops must beware of seeking shelter in
hollows or nullahs, places which will, assuredly, have been marked
by the enemy's riflemen, so that their occupation will rarely escape
punishment.
In attack, infantry units, whilst securing their flanks, should advance
up salients, taking care to afford one another mutual fire assistance.
Supports and local reserves should be pushed as near to the firing line
as the shape of the ground will permit; but, at times, reserves may be
able to effectively support the troops in front by covering fire, from
suitable positions, behind, or on the flanks of, the line of advance.
Fire should be reserved until units have closed on the enemy, the
object being to prevent the early evacuation of a position, after
having caused a few casualties at long range.
As the enemy's fire, though likely to be accurate, will probably lack
volume, resort need not be had to widely extended formations.
To gain ground, and when assaulting, the procedure outlined in the
training manuals requires no modification.
Artillery should be handled with discretion, and should be on its guard
against the tendency to open fire whenever a target is seen. Its aim
should be not to evict, but to hold the enemy to his sangars, and to
inflict loss when he retreats.
The steep forward slopes of hills will enable fire to be continued
until the infantry has closed on the tribesmen, but oblique, rather
than frontal fire should be employed.
It is, of course, important to insure close inter-communication between
infantry and artillery.
In tribal, as in other warfare, unless the enemy is completely
enveloped, efficient pursuit is necessary to set the seal on victory.
Pursuit can, at first, probably be best undertaken by the enveloping
wings, artillery co-operating to head the enemy off in the required
direction, whilst the cavalry press forward.
A portion of the artillery should, therefore, move with the outflanking
wings, keeping as near as possible to the firing line.
Pathans, familiar with the country, and confident that they have
everything to gain, and but little to lose by such tactics, favour the
harassing of troops as they withdraw from heights, or along valleys.
Though it may be taken as a maxim that there will be no pursuit if
the enemy has, in any recent fighting, been adequately punished, the
conditions may have been such that casualties could not be inflicted.
In these circumstances, the clansmen must surely not be permitted to
embarrass the British movements, and must be convinced that pursuit is
both dangerous and unprofitable.
Mere counter-attack, when the enemy is not surprised, is likely to lead
to no advantage, but a few skilfully laid ambushes will soon discourage
his zeal for pursuit. Should he, however, persist in following up the
troops, counter-attack should at once be made, and the retirement
discontinued. The enemy, it is to be remembered, will, as a rule,
offer the greatest opportunity of inflicting loss when he follows up a
retirement, and, in such operations, the aim must be rather to cause
than to avoid casualties.
All withdrawals should be pre-arranged and systematic, flanks being
securely held, and the principle of mutual support observed. But
formalism must be avoided, and procedure must never be permitted to
become so stereotyped that the enemy will be able to confidently
anticipate the movements of the troops.
Men must beware of entering nullahs, or depressions of any kind,
until the further edge has been secured; and, when on a hill top, the
provision of such cover as will conceal the head-dress is of importance.
Transport animals should be clear of the fighting troops before
retirement is begun.
If the object is to slip away from the enemy, the retirement should be
made at a time when movement is not expected.
When a valley is to be swept in course of punitive operations, an
adequate force should be left to secure the entrance, if the column is
to leave by this route.
Troops, as has already been suggested, should, in respect of
ammunition, food, and warm coats, be independent of transport animals,
and it should be understood that units are always to be prepared to
remain for the night away from camp. The men should be trained to
economise water, which is often scarce across the border.
Ammunition and rifles being the main objects of tribal ambition,
special care should be taken to prevent them from falling into the
enemy's hands.
Against the North West Frontier clans, the offensive, as usual, is
normally the best defensive, but it may sometimes happen that small
British forces are temporarily obliged to act on the defensive.
In such circumstances, it is to be expected that the enemy will adopt
the tactics, common amongst savages, of seeking the flanks of the
troops, both to avoid fire, and to obtain the advantages of enfilade.
It follows, then, that defensive measures should include all round
protection, whilst a relatively large reserve should be kept ready to
attack the hostile levies, as soon as any portion comes within charging
distance.
Experience tends to prove that a compact body of even a section, if
well entrenched and supplied with ammunition, has nothing to fear from
Pathans, especially when the British leader is animated by the proper
spirit of timely offensive.