+42.+ Sicily, then, lies towards Southern Italy very much in the same

relative position as the Peloponnese does to the rest of Greece. The

only difference is that the one is an island, the other a peninsula;

and consequently in the former case there is no communication except

by sea, in the latter there is a land communication also. The shape

of Sicily is a triangle, of which the several angles are represented

by promontories: that to the south jutting out into the Sicilian Sea

is called Pachynus; that which looks to the north forms the western

extremity of the Straits of Messene and is about twelve stades from

Italy, its name is Pelorus; while the third projects in the direction

of Libya itself, and is conveniently situated opposite the promontories

which cover Carthage, at a distance of about a thousand stades:

it looks somewhat south of due west, dividing the Libyan from the

Sardinian Sea, and is called Lilybaeum. On this last there is a city

of the same name. It was this city that the Romans were now besieging.

It was exceedingly strongly fortified: for besides its walls there was

a deep ditch running all round it, and on the side of the sea it was

protected by lagoons, to steer through which into the harbour was a

task requiring much skill and practice.

[Sidenote: Siege of Lilybaeum, B.C. 250.]

The Romans made two camps, one on each side of the town, and connected

them with a ditch, stockade, and wall. Having done this, they began

the assault by advancing their siege-works in the direction of the

tower nearest the sea, which commands a view of the Libyan main.

They did this gradually, always adding something to what they had

already constructed; and thus bit by bit pushed their works forward

and extended them laterally, till at last they had brought down not

only this tower, but the six next to it also; and at the same time

began battering all the others with battering-rams. The siege was

carried on with vigour and terrific energy: every day some of the

towers were shaken and others reduced to ruins; every day too the

siege-works advanced farther and farther, and more and more towards

the heart of the city. And though there were in the town, besides the

ordinary inhabitants, as many as ten thousand hired soldiers, the

consternation and despondency became overwhelming. Yet their commander

Himilco omitted no measure within his power. As fast as the enemy

demolished a fortification he threw up a new one; he also countermined

them, and reduced the assailants to straits of no ordinary difficulty.

Moreover, he made daily sallies, attempted to carry or throw fire

into the siege-works, and with this end in view fought many desperate

engagements by night as well as by day: so determined was the fighting

in these struggles, that sometimes the number of the dead was greater

than it ordinarily is in a pitched battle.

[Sidenote: Attempted treason in Lilybaeum.]

+43.+ But about this time some of the officers of highest rank in the

mercenary army discussed among themselves a project for surrendering

the town to the Romans, being fully persuaded that the men under their

command would obey their orders. They got out of the city at night,

went to the enemy’s camp, and held a parley with the Roman commander on

the subject. But Alexon the Achaean, who on a former occasion had saved

Agrigentum from destruction when the mercenary troops of Syracuse made

a plot to betray it, was on this occasion once more the first to detect

this treason, and to report it to the general of the Carthaginians.

The latter no sooner heard it than he at once summoned a meeting of

those officers who were still in their quarters; and exhorted them to

loyalty with prayers and promises of liberal bounties and favours, if

they would only remain faithful to him, and not join in the treason

of the officers who had left the town. They received his speech with

enthusiasm, and were there and then commissioned by him, some to go

to the Celts accompanied by Hannibal, who was the son of the Hannibal

killed in Sardinia, and who had a previous acquaintance with that

people gained in the expedition against them; others to fetch the rest

of the mercenary troops, accompanied by Alexon, because he was liked

and trusted by them. These officers then proceeded to summon a meeting

of their men and address them. They pledged their own credit for the

bounties promised them severally by the General, and without difficulty

persuaded the men to remain staunch. The result was that when the

officers, who had joined in the secret mission, returned to the walls

and tried to address their men, and communicate the terms offered by

the Romans, so far from finding any adherents, they could not even

obtain a hearing, but were driven from the wall with volleys of stones

and darts. But this treason among their mercenaries constituted a

serious danger: the Carthaginians had a narrow escape from absolute

ruin, and they owed their preservation from it to that same Alexon

whose fidelity had on a former occasion preserved for Agrigentum her

territory, constitution, and freedom.

[Sidenote: Hannibal relieves Lilybaeum.]

+44.+ Meanwhile the Carthaginians at home knew nothing of what was

going on. But they could calculate the requirements of a besieged

garrison; and they accordingly filled fifty vessels with soldiers,

furnished their commander Hannibal, a son of Hamilcar, and an officer

and prime favourite of Adherbal’s, with instructions suitable to the

business in hand, and despatched him with all speed: charging him to

be guilty of no delay, to omit no opportunity, and to shrink from no

attempt however venturesome to relieve the besieged. He put to sea with

his ten thousand men, and dropped anchor at the islands called Aegusae,

which lie in the course between Lilybaeum and Carthage, and there

looked out for an opportunity of making Lilybaeum. At last a strong

breeze sprang up in exactly the right quarter: he crowded all sail and

bore down before the wind right upon the entrance of the harbour, with

his men upon the decks fully armed and ready for battle. Partly from

astonishment at this sudden appearance, partly from dread of being

carried along with the enemy by the violence of the gale into the

harbour of their opponents, the Romans did not venture to obstruct the

entrance of the reinforcement; but stood out at sea overpowered with

amazement at the audacity of the enemy.

The town population crowded to the walls, in an agony of anxiety as to

what would happen, no less than in an excess of joy at the unlooked-for

appearance of hope, and cheered on the crews as they sailed into the

harbour, with clapping hands and cries of gladness. To sail into the

harbour was an achievement of great danger; but Hannibal accomplished

it gallantly, and, dropping anchor there, safely disembarked his

soldiers. The exultation of all who were in the city was not caused

so much by the presence of the reinforcement, though they had thereby

gained a strong revival of hope, and a large addition to their

strength, as by the fact that the Romans had not dared to intercept the

course of the Carthaginians.

[Sidenote: A sally from Lilybaeum.]

[Sidenote: It fails.]

+45.+ Himilco, the general in command at Lilybaeum, now saw that both

divisions of his troops were in high spirits and eager for service,—the

original garrison owing to the presence of the reinforcement, the newly

arrived because they had as yet had no experience of the hardships of

the situation. He wished to take advantage of the excited feelings

of both parties, before they cooled, in order to organise an attempt

to set fire to the works of the besiegers. He therefore summoned

the whole army to a meeting, and dwelt upon the themes suitable to

the occasion at somewhat greater length than usual. He raised their

zeal to an enthusiastic height by the magnitude of his promises for

individual acts of courage, and by declaring the favours and rewards

which awaited them as an army at the hands of the Carthaginians. His

speech was received with lively marks of satisfaction; and the men

with loud shouts bade him delay no more, but lead them into the field.

For the present, however, he contented himself with thanking them and

expressing his delight at their excellent spirit, and bidding them go

early to rest and obey their officers, dismissed them. But shortly

afterwards he summoned the officers; assigned to them severally the

posts best calculated for the success of the undertaking; communicated

to them the watchword and the exact moment the movement was to be made;

and issued orders to the commanders to be at the posts assigned with

their men at the morning watch. His orders were punctually obeyed:

and at daybreak he led out his forces and made attempts upon the

siege-works at several points. But the Romans had not been blind to

what was coming, and were neither idle nor unprepared. Wherever help

was required it was promptly rendered; and at every point they made a

stout resistance to the enemy. Before long there was fighting all along

the line, and an obstinate struggle round the entire circuit of the

wall; for the sallying party were not less than twenty thousand strong,

and their opponents more numerous still. The contest was all the

hotter from the fact that the men were not fighting in their regular

ranks, but indiscriminately, and as their own judgment directed; the

result of which was that a spirit of personal emulation arose among

the combatants, because, though the numbers engaged were so great,

there was a series of single combats between man and man, or company

and company. However, it was at the siege-works themselves that the

shouting was loudest and the throng of combatants the densest. At

these troops had been massed deliberately for attack and defence. The

assailants strove their utmost to dislodge the defenders, the defenders

exerted all their courage to hold their ground and not yield an inch

to the assailants,—and with such emulation and fury on both sides,

that they ended by falling at their posts rather than yield. But

there were others mingled with these, carrying torchwood and tow and

fire, who made a simultaneous attack upon the battering-rams at every

point: hurling these fiery missiles against them with such audacity,

that the Romans were reduced to the last extremity of danger, being

quite unable to overpower the attack of the enemy. But the general

of the Carthaginians, seeing that he was losing large numbers in the

engagement, without being able to gain the object of the sortie,

which was to take the siege-works, ordered his trumpeters to sound a

recall. So the Romans, after coming within an ace of losing all their

siege-gear, finally kept possession of the works, and were able to

maintain them all without dispute.

+46.+ After this affair Hannibal eluded the enemy’s watch, and sailed

out of the harbour by night with his ships to Drepana, to join the

Carthaginian Commander-in-Chief, Adherbal. Drepana is about one hundred

and twenty stades from Lilybaeum, and was always an object of special

care to the Carthaginians from the convenience of its position and the

excellence of its harbour.

[Sidenote: Hannibal the Rhodian offers to run the blockade.]

Now the Carthaginian government were anxious to learn the state of

affairs at Lilybaeum, but could not do so because the garrison was

strictly blockaded, and the Romans were exceedingly vigilant. In this

difficulty a nobleman, called Hannibal the Rhodian, came to them, and

offered to run the blockade, to see what was going on in Lilybaeum with

his own eyes, and to report. The offer delighted them, but they did

not believe in the possibility of its fulfilment with the Roman fleet

lying at the very entrance of the channel. However, the man fitted out

his own private vessel and put to sea. He first crossed to one of the

islands lying off Lilybaeum. Next day he obtained a wind in the right

quarter, and about ten o’clock in the morning actually sailed into the

harbour in the full view of the enemy, who looked on with amazement

at his audacity. Next day he lost no time in setting about a return

voyage. The Roman Consul had determined on taking extra precautions

for watching the sea near the channel: with this view he had during

the night got ready his ten fastest-sailing vessels, and taking up a

position on shore close to the harbour mouth, was watching with his own

eyes what would happen. The whole army was watching also; while the

ships on both sides of the mouth of the channel got as close to the

shallows as it was possible to approach, and there rested with their

oars out, and ready to run down and capture the ship that was about to

sail out. The Rhodian, on his side, attempted no concealment. He put

boldly to sea, and so confounded the enemy by his audacity, and the

speed of his vessel, that he not only sailed out without receiving any

damage to ship or crew, scudding along the bows of the enemy as though

they were fixed in their places, but even brought his ship to, after

running a short way ahead, and, with his oars out and ready, seemed

to challenge the foe to a contest. When none of them ventured to put

out to attack him, because of the speed of his rowing, he sailed away:

having thus with his one ship successfully defied the entire fleet of

the enemy. From this time he frequently performed the same feat, and

proved exceedingly serviceable both to the government at Carthage and

the besieged garrison. To the former by informing them from time to

time of what was pressingly necessary; and to the latter by inspiring

them with confidence, and dismaying the Romans by his audacity.

[Sidenote: His example is followed by others.]

[Sidenote: The Rhodian is at length captured.]

+47.+ What contributed most to encourage him to a repetition of the

feat was the fact that by frequent experience he had marked out the

course for himself by clear land marks. As soon as he had crossed

the open sea, and was coming into sight, he used to steer as though

he were coming from Italy, keeping the seaward tower exactly on his

bows, in such a way as to be in a line with the city towers which

faced towards Libya; and this is the only possible course to hit the

mouth of the channel with the wind astern. The successful boldness of

the Rhodian inspired several of those who were acquainted with these

waters to make similar attempts. The Romans felt themselves to be

in a great difficulty; and what was taking place determined them to

attempt blocking up the mouth of the harbour. The greater part of the

attempted work was a failure: the sea was too deep, and none of the

material which they threw into it would hold, or in fact keep in the

least compact. The breakers and the force of the current dislodged and

scattered everything that was thrown in, before it could even reach the

bottom. But there was one point where the water was shallow, at which

a mole was with infinite labour made to hold together; and upon it a

vessel with four banks of oars and of unusually fine build stuck fast

as it was making the outward passage at night, and thus fell into the

hands of the enemy. The Romans took possession of it, manned it with a

picked crew, and used it for keeping a look out for all who should try

to enter the harbour, and especially for the Rhodian. He had sailed in,

as it happened, that very night, and was afterwards putting out to sea

again in his usual open manner. He was, however, startled to see the

four-banked vessel put out to sea again simultaneously with himself.

He recognised what ship it was, and his first impulse was to escape

her by his superior speed. But finding himself getting overhauled by

the excellence of her rowers, he was finally compelled to bring to and

engage at close quarters. But in a struggle of marines he was at a

complete disadvantage: the enemy were superior in numbers, and their

soldiers were picked men; and he was made prisoner. The possession of

this ship of superior build enabled the Romans, by equipping her with

whatever was wanted for the service she had to perform, to intercept

all who were adventurous enough to try running the blockade of

Lilybaeum.

[Sidenote: A storm having damaged the siege-works, the Lilybaeans

succeed in burning them.]

+48.+ Meanwhile, the besieged were energetically carrying on

counterworks, having abandoned the hope of damaging or destroying the

constructions of the enemy. But in the midst of these proceedings a

storm of wind, of such tremendous violence and fury, blew upon the

machinery of the engines, that it wrecked the pent-houses, and carried

away by its force the towers erected to cover them. Some of the Greek

mercenaries perceived the advantage such a state of things offered

for the destruction of the siege-works, and communicated their idea

to the commander. He caught at the suggestion, and lost no time in

making every preparation suitable to the undertaking. Then the young

men mustered at three several points, and threw lighted brands into the

enemy’s works. The length of time during which these works had been

standing made them exactly in the proper state to catch fire easily;

and when to this was added a violent wind, blowing right upon the

engines and towers, the natural result was that the spreading of the

fire became rapid and destructive; while all attempts on the Roman side

to master it, and rescue their works, had to be abandoned as difficult

or wholly impracticable. Those who tried to come to the rescue were

so appalled at the scene, that they could neither fully grasp nor

clearly see what was going on. Flames, sparks, and volumes of smoke

blew right in their faces and blinded them; and not a few dropped down

and perished without ever getting near enough to attempt to combat

the fire. The same circumstances, which caused these overwhelming

difficulties to the besiegers, favoured those who were throwing the

fire-brands in exactly the same proportion. Everything that could

obscure their vision or hurt them was blown clean away and carried into

the faces of the enemy; while their being able to see the intervening

space enabled the shooters to take a good aim at those of the enemy who

came to the rescue, and the throwers of the fire-brands to lodge them

at the proper places for the destruction of the works. The violence

of the wind, too, contributed to the deadly effect of the missiles by

increasing the force of their blows. Eventually the destruction was

so complete, that the foundations of the siege-towers and the blocks

of the battering-rams were rendered unusable by the fire. In spite of

this disaster, though they gave up the idea of assaulting the place

any longer by means of their works, the Romans still persisted. They

surrounded the town with a ditch and stockade, threw up an additional

wall to secure their own encampment, and left the completion of their

purpose to time. Nor were the besieged less determined. They repaired

the part of their walls which had been thrown down, and prepared to

endure the siege with good courage.

[Sidenote: The Roman army is reinforced.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 249. Coss. P. Claudius Pulcher, L. Junius Pullus.]

[Sidenote: Claudius sails to attack Drepana.]

+49.+ When the announcement of these events at Rome was followed by

reiterated tidings that the larger part of the crews of the fleet had

been destroyed, either at the works, or in the general conduct of the

siege, the Roman government set zealously to work to enlist sailors;

and, having collected as many as ten thousand, sent them to Sicily.

They crossed the straits, and reached the camp on foot; and when they

had joined, Publius Claudius, the Consul, assembled his tribunes,

and said that it was just the time to sail to the attack of Drepana

with the whole squadron: for that Adherbal,[139] who was in command

there, was quite unprepared for such an event, because he as yet knew

nothing of the new crews having arrived; and was fully persuaded

that their fleet could not sail, owing to their loss of men in the

siege. His proposition met with a ready assent from the council of

officers, and he immediately set about getting his men on board, the

old crews as well as those who had recently joined. As for marines, he

selected the best men from the whole army, who were ready enough to

join an expedition which involved so short a voyage and so immediate

and certain an advantage. Having completed these preparations, he set

sail about midnight, without being detected by the enemy; and for the

first part of the day he sailed in close order, keeping the land on

his right. By daybreak the leading ships could be seen coming towards

Drepana; and at the first sight of them Adherbal was overwhelmed with

surprise. He quickly recovered his self-possession however: and, fully

appreciating the significance of the enemy’s attack, he determined to

try every manœuvre, and hazard every danger, rather than allow himself

and his men to be shut up in the blockade which threatened them.

He lost no time in collecting his rowing-crews upon the beach, and

summoning the mercenary soldiers who were in the town by proclamation.

When the muster had taken place, he endeavoured to impress upon them

in a few words what good hopes of victory they had, if they were bold

enough to fight at sea; and what hardships they would have to endure

in a blockade, if they hesitated from any fear of danger and played

the coward. The men showed a ready enthusiasm for the sea-fight, and

demanded with shouts that he would lead them to it without delay. He

thanked them, praised their zeal, and gave the order to embark with all

speed, to keep their eyes upon his ship, and follow in its wake. Having

made these instructions clear as quickly as he could, he got under

weigh himself first, and guided his fleet close under the rocks, on the

opposite side of the harbour to that by which the enemy were entering.

[Sidenote: Unexpected resistance of Adherbal. The Roman fleet checked.]

+50.+ When the Consul Publius saw, to his surprise, that the enemy, so

far from giving in or being dismayed at his approach, were determined

upon fighting him at sea: while of his own ships some were already

within the harbour, others just in the very entrance channel, and

others still on their way towards it; he at once issued orders to all

the ships to turn round and make the best of their way out again. The

result of this was that, as some of the ships were in the harbour,

and others at the entrance, they fouled each other when they began

reversing their course; and not only did a great confusion arise among

the men, but the ships got their oars broken also in the collisions

which occurred. However, the captains exerted themselves to get the

ships into line close under the shore, as they successively cleared

the harbour, and with their prows directed towards the enemy. Publius

himself was originally bringing up the rear of the entire squadron; but

he now, while the movement was actually in execution, turned towards

the open sea and transferred himself to a position on the left wing of

the fleet. At the same moment Adherbal succeeded in outflanking the

left of his opponents with five vessels furnished with charging beaks.

He turned his own ship with its prow towards the enemy, and brought to.

As each of the others came up, and fell into line with him, he sent

orders to them by his staff officers to do the same as he had done.

Thus they all fell in and formed a complete line. The signal which had

been agreed upon before was given, and an advance was begun, which was

made at first without disarranging the line. The Romans were still

close in-shore, waiting for the coming out of their ships from the

harbour; and this proximity to the land proved of infinite disadvantage

to them in the engagement.

[Sidenote: The battle.]

[Sidenote: The Romans beaten.]

+51.+ And now the fleets were within a short distance of each other:

the signals were raised from the ships of the respective commanders;

the charge was made; and ship grappled with ship. At first the

engagement was evenly balanced, because each fleet had the pick of

their land forces serving as marines on board. But as it went on

the many advantages which, taking it as a whole, the Carthaginians

possessed, gave them a continually increasing superiority. Owing to the

better construction of their ships they had much the advantage in point

of speed, while their position with the open sea behind them materially

contributed to their success, by giving them freer space for their

manœuvres. Were any of them hard pressed by the enemy? Their speed

secured them a sure escape, and a wide expanse of water was open to

their flight. There they would swing round and attack the leading ships

which were pursuing them: sometimes rowing round them and charging

their broadsides, at other times running alongside them as they lurched

awkwardly round, from the weight of the vessels and the unskilfulness

of the crews. In this way they were charging perpetually, and managed

to sink a large number of the ships. Or was one of their number in

danger? They were ready to come to the rescue, being out of danger

themselves, and being able to effect a movement to right or left, by

steering along the sterns of their own ships and through the open sea

unmolested. The case of the Romans was exactly the reverse. If any of

them were hard pressed, there was nowhere for them to retreat, for they

were fighting close to the shore; and any ship of theirs that was hard

driven by the enemy either backed into shallow water and stuck fast,

or ran ashore and was stranded. Moreover, that most effective of all

manœuvres in sea fights,—sailing through the enemy’s line and appearing

on their stern while they are engaged with others,—was rendered

impossible for them, owing to the bulk of their vessels; and still more

so by the unskilfulness of their crews. Nor, again, were they able

to bring help from behind to those who wanted it, because they were

hemmed in so close to the shore that there was not the smallest space

left in which those who wished to render such help might move. When

the Consul saw how ill things were going for him all along the line;

when he saw some of his ships sticking fast in the shallows, and others

cast ashore; he took to flight. Thirty other ships which happened to be

near him followed him as he sailed from the left, and coasted along the

shore. But the remaining vessels, which amounted to ninety-three, the

Carthaginians captured with their crews, except in the case of those

who ran their ships ashore and got away.

[Sidenote: The Romans not discouraged send the Consul L. Junius with a

large supply of provisions in 800 transports, convoyed by 60 ships of

war to Lilybaeum.]

+52.+ The result of this sea fight gave Adherbal a high reputation at

Carthage; for his success was looked upon as wholly due to himself,

and his own foresight and courage: while at Rome Publius fell into

great disrepute, and was loudly censured as having acted without due

caution or calculation, and as having during his administration, as

far as a single man could, involved Rome in serious disasters. He was

accordingly some time afterwards brought to trial, was heavily fined,

and exposed to considerable danger. Not that the Romans gave way in

consequence of these events. On the contrary, they omitted nothing

that was within their power to do, and continued resolute to prosecute

the campaign. It was now the time for the Consular elections: as soon

as they were over and two Consuls appointed; one of them, Lucius

Junius,[140] was immediately sent to convey corn to the besiegers of

Lilybaeum, and other provisions and supplies necessary for the army,

sixty ships being also manned to convoy them. Upon his arrival at

Messene, Junius took over such ships as he found there to meet him,

whether from the army or from the other parts of Sicily, and coasted

along with all speed to Syracuse, with a hundred and twenty ships, and

his supplies on board about eight hundred transports. Arrived there,

he handed over to the Quaestors half his transports and some of his

war-ships, and sent them off, being very anxious that what the army

needed should reach them promptly. He remained at Syracuse himself,

waiting for such of his ships as had not yet arrived from Messene, and

collecting additional supplies of corn from the allies in the central

districts of the island.

[Sidenote: Carthalo tries to intercept the transports.]

+53.+ Meanwhile Adherbal sent the prisoners he had taken in the sea

fight, and the captured vessels, to Carthage; and giving Carthalo his

colleague thirty vessels, in addition to the seventy in command of

which he had come, despatched him with instructions to make a sudden

attack upon the enemy’s ships that were at anchor off Lilybaeum,

capture all he could, and set fire to the rest. In obedience to

these instructions Carthalo accomplished his passage just before

daybreak, fired some of the vessels, and towed off others. Great was

the commotion at the quarters of the Romans. For as they hurried to

the rescue of the ships, the attention of Himilco, the commander of

the garrison, was aroused by their shouts; and as the day was now

beginning to break, he could see what was happening, and despatched

the mercenary troops who were in the town. Thus the Romans found

themselves surrounded by danger on every side, and fell into a state of

consternation more than usually profound and serious. The Carthaginian

admiral contented himself with either towing off or breaking up some

few of their vessels, and shortly afterwards coasted along under the

pretence of making for Heracleia: though he was really lying in wait,

with the view of intercepting those who were coming by sea to the

Roman army. When his look-out men brought him word that a considerable

number of vessels of all sorts were bearing down upon him, and were

now getting close, he stood out to sea and started to meet them: for

the success just obtained over the Romans inspired him with such

contempt for them, that he was eager to come to an engagement. The

vessels in question were those which had been despatched in advance

under the charge of the Quaestors from Syracuse. And they too had

warning of their danger. Light boats were accustomed to sail in advance

of a squadron, and these announced the approach of the enemy to the

Quaestors; who being convinced that they were not strong enough to

stand a battle at sea, dropped anchor under a small fortified town

which was subject to Rome, and which, though it had no regular harbour,

yet possessed roadsteads, and headlands projecting from the mainland,

and surrounding the roadsteads, so as to form a convenient refuge.

There they disembarked; and having set up some catapults and ballistae,

which they got from the town, awaited the approach of the enemy. When

the Carthaginians arrived, their first idea was to blockade them:

for they supposed that the men would be terrified and retreat to the

fortified town, leaving them to take possession of the vessels without

resistance. Their expectations, however, were not fulfilled; and

finding that the men on the contrary resisted with spirit, and that the

situation of the spot presented many difficulties of every description,

they sailed away again after towing off some few of the transports

laden with provisions, and retired to a certain river, in which they

anchored and kept a look out for the enemy to renew their voyage.

+54.+ In complete ignorance of what had happened to his advanced

squadron, the Consul, who had remained behind at Syracuse, after

completing all he meant to do there, put to sea; and, after rounding

Pachynus, was proceeding on his voyage to Lilybaeum. The appearance of

the enemy was once more signalled to the Carthaginian admiral by his

look-out men, and he at once put out to sea, with the view of engaging

them as far as possible away from their comrades. Junius saw the

Carthaginian fleet from a considerable distance, and observing their

great numbers did not dare to engage them, and yet found it impossible

to avoid them by flight because they were now too close. He therefore

steered towards land, and anchored under a rocky and altogether

dangerous part of the shore; for he judged it better to run all risks

rather than allow his squadron, with all its men, to fall into the

hands of the enemy. The Carthaginian admiral saw what he had done;

and determined that it was unadvisable for him to engage the enemy,

or bring his ships near such a dangerous place. He therefore made for

a certain headland between the two squadrons of the enemy, and there

kept a look out upon both with equal vigilance. Presently, however,

the weather became rough, and there was an appearance of an unusually

dangerous disturbance setting in from the sea. The Carthaginian pilots,

from their knowledge of the particular localities, and of seamanship

generally, foresaw what was coming; and persuaded Carthalo to avoid

the storm and round the promontory of Pachynus.[141] He had the good

sense to take their advice: [Sidenote: The Roman fleet is wrecked.] and

accordingly these men, with great exertions and extreme difficulty,

did get round the promontory and anchored in safety; while the Romans,

being exposed to the storm in places entirely destitute of harbours,

suffered such complete destruction, that not one of the wrecks even was

left in a state available for use. Both of their squadrons in fact were

completely disabled to a degree past belief.

[Sidenote: The Romans abandon the sea.]

+55.+ This occurrence caused the Carthaginian interests to look up

again and their hopes to revive. But the Romans, though they had met

with partial misfortunes before, had never suffered a naval disaster

so complete and final. They, in fact, abandoned the sea, and confined

themselves to holding the country; while the Carthaginians remained

masters of the sea, without wholly despairing of the land.

[Sidenote: Lucius Junius perseveres in the siege. B.C. 248.]

[Sidenote: Eryx.]

Great and general was the dismay both at Rome and in the camp at

Lilybaeum. Yet they did not abandon their determination of starving

out that town. The Roman government did not allow their disasters

to prevent their sending provisions into the camp overland; and the

besiegers kept up the investment as strictly as they possibly could.

Lucius Junius joined the camp after the shipwreck, and, being in a

state of great distress at what had happened, was all eagerness to

strike some new and effective blow, and thus repair the disaster which

had befallen him. Accordingly he took the first slight opening that

offered to surprise and seize Eryx; and became master both of the

temple of Aphrodite and of the city. This is a mountain close to the

sea-coast on that side of Sicily which looks towards Italy, between

Drepana and Panormus, but nearer to Drepana of the two. It is by far

the greatest mountain in Sicily next to Aetna; and on its summit, which

is flat, stands the temple of Erycinian Aphrodite, confessedly the

most splendid of all the temples in Sicily for its wealth and general

magnificence. The town stands immediately below the summit, and is

approached by a very long and steep ascent. Lucius seized both town and

temple; and established a garrison both upon the summit and at the foot

of the road to it from Drepana. He kept a strict guard at both points,

but more especially at the foot of the ascent, believing that by so

doing he should secure possession of the whole mountain as well as the

town.

[Sidenote: B.C. 247.]

[Sidenote: Occupation of Hercte by Hamilcar.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 247-244.]

+56.+ Next year, the eighteenth of the war, the Carthaginians

appointed Hamilcar Barcas general, and put the management of the

fleet in his hands. He took over the command, and started to ravage

the Italian coast. After devastating the districts of Locri, and the

rest of Bruttium, he sailed away with his whole fleet to the coast of

Panormus and seized on a place called Hercte, which lies between Eryx

and Panormus on the coast, and is reputed the best situation in the

district for a safe and permanent camp. For it is a mountain rising

sheer on every side, standing out above the surrounding country to a

considerable height. The table-land on its summit has a circumference

of not less than a hundred stades, within which the soil is rich

in pasture and suitable for agriculture; the sea-breezes render it

healthy; and it is entirely free from all dangerous animals. On the

side which looks towards the sea, as well as that which faces the

central part of the island, it is enclosed by inaccessible precipices;

while the spaces between them require only slight fortifications,

and of no great extent, to make them secure. There is in it also an

eminence, which serves at once as an acropolis and as a convenient

tower of observation, commanding the surrounding district. It also

commands a harbour conveniently situated for the passage from Drepana

and Lilybaeum to Italy, in which there is always abundant depth of

water; finally, it can only be reached by three ways—two from the land

side, one from the sea, all of them difficult. Here Hamilcar entrenched

himself. It was a bold measure: but he had no city which he could

count upon as friendly, and no other hope on which he could rely; and

though by so doing he placed himself in the very midst of the enemy,

he nevertheless managed to involve the Romans in many struggles and

dangers. To begin with, he would start from this place and ravage the

seaboard of Italy as far as Cumae; and again on shore, when the Romans

had pitched a camp to overawe him, in front of the city of Panormus,

within about five stades of him, he harassed them in every sort of

way, and forced them to engage in numerous skirmishes, for the space

of nearly three years. Of these combats it is impossible to give a

detailed account in writing.

+57.+ It is like the case of two boxers, eminent alike for their

courage and their physical condition, engaged in a formal contest

for the prize. As the match goes on, blow after blow is interchanged

without intermission; but to anticipate, or keep account of every feint

or every blow delivered is impossible for combatants and spectators

alike. Still one may conceive a sufficiently distinct idea of the

affair by taking into account the general activity of the men, the

ambition actuating each side, and the amount of their experience,

strength, and courage. The same may be said of these two generals. No

writer could set down, and no reader would endure the wearisome and

profitless task of reading, a detailed statement of the transactions

of every day; why they were undertaken, and how they were carried out.

For every day had its ambuscade on one side or the other, its attack,

or assault. A general assertion in regard to the men, combined with the

actual result of their mutual determination to conquer, will give a far

better idea of the facts. It may be said then, generally, that nothing

was left untried,—whether it be stratagems which could be learnt from

history, or plans suggested by the necessities of the hour and the

immediate circumstances of the case, or undertakings depending upon

an adventurous spirit and a reckless daring. The matter, however, for

several reasons, could not be brought to a decisive issue. In the first

place, the forces on either side were evenly matched: and in the second

place, while the camps were in the case of both equally impregnable,

the space which separated the two was very small. The result of this

was that skirmishes between detached parties on both sides were always

going on during the day, and yet nothing decisive occurred. For though

the men actually engaged in such skirmishes from time to time were cut

to pieces, it did not affect the main body. They had only to wheel

round to find themselves out of the reach of danger behind their own

defences. Once there, they could face about and again engage the enemy.

[Sidenote: Siege of Eryx, B.C. 244.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 243-242.]

+58.+ Presently however Fortune, acting like a good umpire in the

games, transferred them by a bold stroke from the locality just

described, and the contest in which they were engaged, to a struggle

of greater danger and a locality of narrower dimensions. The Romans,

as we have said, were in occupation of the summit of Eryx, and had a

guard stationed at its foot. But Hamilcar managed to seize the town

which lay between these two spots. There ensued a siege of the Romans

who were on the summit, supported by them with extraordinary hardihood

and adventurous daring: while the Carthaginians, finding themselves

between two hostile armies, and their supplies brought to them with

difficulty, because they were in communication with the sea at only one

point and by one road, yet held out with a determination that passes

belief. Every contrivance which skill or force could sustain did they

put in use against each other, as before; every imaginable privation

was submitted to; surprises and pitched battles were alike tried: and

finally they left the combat a drawn one, not, as Fabius says, from

utter weakness and misery, but like men still unbroken and unconquered.

The fact is that before either party had got completely the better of

the other, though they had maintained the conflict for another two

years, the war happened to be decided in quite a different manner.

[Sidenote: The obstinate persistence of the Romans and Carthaginians.]

Such was the state of affairs at Eryx and with the forces employed

there. The two nations engaged were like well-bred game-cocks that

fight to their last gasp. You may see them often, when too weak to

use their wings, yet full of pluck to the end, and striking again

and again. Finally, chance brings them the opportunity of once more

grappling, and they hold on until one or other of them drops down dead.

[Sidenote: The Romans once more fit out a fleet.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 242. Coss. C. Lutatius Catulus, A. Postumius Albinus.]

+59.+ So it was with the Romans and Carthaginians. They were worn out

by the labours of the war; the perpetual succession of hard fought

struggles was at last driving them to despair; their strength had

become paralysed, and their resources reduced almost to extinction by

war-taxes and expenses extending over so many years. And yet the Romans

did not give in. For the last five years indeed they had entirely

abandoned the sea, partly because of the disasters they had sustained

there, and partly because they felt confident of deciding the war by

means of their land forces; but they now determined for the third time

to make trial of their fortune in naval warfare. They saw that their

operations were not succeeding according to their calculations, mainly

owing to the obstinate gallantry of the Carthaginian general. They

therefore adopted this resolution from a conviction that by this means

alone, if their design were but well directed, would they be able to

bring the war to a successful conclusion. In their first attempt they

had been compelled to abandon the sea by disasters arising from sheer

bad luck; in their second by the loss of the naval battle off Drepana.

This third attempt was successful: they shut off the Carthaginian

forces at Eryx from getting their supplies by sea, and eventually put

a period to the whole war. Nevertheless it was essentially an effort

of despair. The treasury was empty, and would not supply the funds

necessary for the undertaking, which were, however, obtained by the

patriotism and generosity of the leading citizens. They undertook

singly, or by two or three combining, according to their means, to

supply a quinquereme fully fitted out, on the understanding that they

were to be repaid if the expedition was successful. By these means a

fleet of two hundred quinqueremes were quickly prepared, built on the

model of the ship of the Rhodian. Gaius Lutatius was then appointed

to the command, and despatched at the beginning of the summer. His

appearance on the coasts of Sicily was a surprise: the whole of the

Carthaginian fleet had gone home; and he took possession both of the

harbour near Drepana, and the roadsteads near Lilybaeum. He then

threw up works round the city on Drepana, and made other preparations

for besieging it. And while he pushed on these operations with all

his might, he did not at the same time lose sight of the approach of

the Carthaginian fleet. He kept in mind the original idea of this

expedition, that it was by a victory at sea alone that the result of

the whole war could be decided. He did not, therefore, allow the time

to be wasted or unemployed. He practised and drilled his crews every

day in the manœuvres which they would be called upon to perform; and

by his attention to discipline generally brought his sailors in a very

short time to the condition of trained athletes for the contest before

them.

[Sidenote: The Carthaginians send Hanno with a fleet.]

[Sidenote: 10th March B.C. 241. A strong breeze is blowing.]

[Sidenote: Lutatius however decides to fight.]

+60.+ That the Romans should have a fleet afloat once more, and

be again bidding for the mastery at sea, was a contingency wholly

unexpected by the Carthaginians. They at once set about fitting out

their ships, loaded them with corn and other provisions, and despatched

their fleet: determined that their troops round Eryx should not run

short of necessary provisions. Hanno, who was appointed to command the

fleet, put to sea and arrived at the island called Holy Isle. He was

eager as soon as possible, if he could escape the observation of the

enemy, to get across to Eryx; disembark his stores; and having thus

lightened his ships, take on board as marines those of the mercenary

troops who were suitable to the service, and Barcas with them; and

not to engage the enemy until he had thus reinforced himself. But

Lutatius was informed of the arrival of Hanno’s squadron, and correctly

interpreted their design. He at once took on board the best soldiers

of his army, and crossed to the Island of Aegusa, which lies directly

opposite Lilybaeum. There he addressed his forces some words suitable

to the occasion, and gave full instructions to the pilots, with the

understanding that a battle was to be fought on the morrow. At daybreak

the next morning Lutatius found that a strong breeze had sprung up on

the stern of the enemy, and that an advance towards them in the teeth

of it would be difficult for his ships. The sea too was rough and

boisterous: and for a while he could not make up his mind what he had

better do in the circumstances. Finally, however, he was decided by the

following considerations. If he boarded the enemy’s fleet during the

continuance of the storm, he would only have to contend with Hanno,

and the levies of sailors which he had on board, before they could be

reinforced by the troops, and with ships which were still heavily laden

with stores: but if he waited for calm weather, and allowed the enemy

to get across and unite with their land forces, he would then have to

contend with ships lightened of their burden, and therefore in a more

navigable condition, and against the picked men of the land forces; and

what was more formidable than anything else, against the determined

bravery of Hamilcar. He made up his mind, therefore, not to let the

present opportunity slip; and when he saw the enemy’s ships crowding

sail, he put to sea with all speed. The rowers, from their excellent

physical condition, found no difficulty in overcoming the heavy sea,

and Lutatius soon got his fleet into single line with prows directed to

the foe.

[Sidenote: The battle of Aegusa.]

[Sidenote: Victory of the Romans.]

+61.+ When the Carthaginians saw that the Romans were intercepting

their passage across, they lowered their masts, and after some words of

mutual exhortation had been uttered in the several ships, closed with

their opponents. But the respective state of equipment of the two sides

was exactly the converse of what it had been in the battle off Drepana;

and the result of the battle was, therefore, naturally reversed also.

The Romans had reformed their mode of shipbuilding, and had eased

their vessels of all freight, except the provisions necessary for the

battle: while their rowers having been thoroughly trained and got well

together, performed their office in an altogether superior manner, and

were backed up by marines who, being picked men from the legions, were

all but invincible. The case with the Carthaginians was exactly the

reverse. Their ships were heavily laden and therefore unmanageable in

the engagement; while their rowers were entirely untrained, and merely

put on board for the emergency; and such marines as they had were raw

recruits, who had never had any previous experience of any difficult or

dangerous service. The fact is that the Carthaginian government never

expected that the Romans would again attempt to dispute the supremacy

at sea: they had, therefore, in contempt for them, neglected their

navy. The result was that, as soon as they closed, their manifold

disadvantages quickly decided the battle against them. They had fifty

ships sunk, and seventy taken with their crews. The rest set their

sails, and running before the wind, which luckily for them suddenly

veered round at the nick of time to help them, got away again to Holy

Isle. The Roman Consul sailed back to Lilybaeum to join the army, and

there occupied himself in making arrangements for the ships and men

which he had captured; which was a business of considerable magnitude,

for the prisoners made in the battle amounted to little short of ten

thousand.

[Sidenote: Barcas makes terms.]

[Sidenote: The treaty, B.C. 242.]

+62.+ As far as strength of feeling and desire for victory were

concerned, this unexpected reverse did not diminish the readiness of

the Carthaginians to carry on the war; but when they came to reckon up

their resources they were at a complete standstill. On the one hand,

they could not any longer send supplies to their forces in Sicily,

because the enemy commanded the sea: on the other, to abandon and, as

it were, to betray these, left them without men and without leaders

to carry on the war. They therefore sent a despatch to Barcas with

all speed, leaving the decision of the whole matter in his hands.

Nor was their confidence misplaced. He acted the part of a gallant

general and a sensible man. As long as there was any reasonable hope

of success in the business he had in hand, nothing was too adventurous

or too dangerous for him to attempt; and if any general ever did so,

he put every chance of victory to the fullest proof. But when all his

endeavours miscarried, and no reasonable expectation was left of saving

his troops, he yielded to the inevitable, and sent ambassadors to

treat of peace and terms of accommodation. And in this he showed great

good sense and practical ability; for it is quite as much the duty of

a leader to be able to see when it is time to give in, as when it is

the time to win a victory. Lutatius was ready enough to listen to the

proposal, because he was fully aware that the resources of Rome were at

the lowest ebb from the strain of the war; and eventually it was his

fortune to put an end to the contest by a treaty of which I here give

the terms. “_Friendship is established between the Carthaginians and

Romans on the following terms, provided always that they are ratified

by the Roman people. The Carthaginians shall evacuate the whole of

Sicily: they shall not make war upon Hiero, nor bear arms against the

Syracusans or their allies. The Carthaginians shall give up to the

Romans all prisoners without ransom. The Carthaginians shall pay to the

Romans in twenty years 2200 Euboic talents of silver._”[142]

+63.+ When this treaty was sent to Rome the people refused to accept

it, but sent ten commissioners to examine into the business. Upon their

arrival they made no change in the general terms of the treaty, but

they introduced some slight alterations in the direction of increased

severity towards Carthage. Thus they reduced the time allowed for the

payment of the indemnity by one half; they added a thousand talents to

the sum demanded; and extended the evacuation of Sicily to all islands

lying between Sicily and Italy.

[Sidenote: Greatness of the war.]

Such were the conditions on which the war was ended, after lasting

twenty-four years continuously. It was at once the longest, most

continuous, and most severely contested war known to us in history.

Apart from the other battles fought and the preparations made, which

I have described in my previous chapters, there were two sea fights,

in one of which the combined numbers of the two fleets exceeded five

hundred quinqueremes, in the other nearly approached seven hundred.

In the course of the war, counting what were destroyed by shipwreck,

the Romans lost seven hundred quinqueremes, the Carthaginians five

hundred. Those therefore who have spoken with wonder of the sea-battles

of an Antigonus, a Ptolemy, or a Demetrius, and the greatness of

their fleets, would we may well believe have been overwhelmed with

astonishment at the hugeness of these proportions if they had had

to tell the story of this war.[143] If, further, we take into

consideration the superior size of the quinqueremes, compared with the

triremes employed by the Persians against the Greeks, and again by the

Athenians and Lacedaemonians in their wars with each other, we shall

find that never in the whole history of the world have such enormous

forces contended for mastery at sea.

These considerations will establish my original observation, and show

the falseness of the opinion entertained by certain Greeks. It was

_not_ by mere chance or without knowing what they were doing that the

Romans struck their bold stroke for universal supremacy and dominion,

and justified their boldness by its success. No: it was the natural

result of discipline gained in the stern school of difficulty and

danger.

+64.+ And no doubt the question does naturally arise here as to why

they find it impossible in our days to man so many ships, or take

the sea with such large fleets, though masters of the world, and

possessing a superiority over others many times as great as before.

The explanation of this difficulty will be clearly understood when

we come to the description of their civil constitution. I look

upon this description as a most important part of my work, and one

demanding close attention on the part of my readers. For the subject

is calculated to afford pleasure in the contemplation, and is up to

this time so to speak absolutely unknown, thanks to historians, some

of whom have been ignorant, while others have given so confused an

account of it as to be practically useless. For the present it suffices

to say that, as far as the late war was concerned, the two nations

were closely matched in the character of the designs they entertained,

as well as in the lofty courage they showed in prosecuting them: and

this is especially true of the eager ambition displayed on either side

to secure the supremacy. But in the individual gallantry of their

men the Romans had decidedly the advantage; while we must credit the

Carthaginians with the best general of the day both for genius and

daring. I mean Hamilcar Barcas, own father of Rome’s future enemy

Hannibal.

[Sidenote: War between Rome and Falerii.]

[Sidenote: The mercenary war, B.C. 241.]

+65.+ The confirmation of this peace was followed by events which

involved both nations in a struggle of an identical or similar nature.

At Rome the late war was succeeded by a social war against the

Faliscans, which, however, they brought to a speedy and successful

termination by the capture of Falerii after only a few days’ siege.

The Carthaginians were not so fortunate. Just about the same time

they found themselves confronted by three enemies at once, their own

mercenaries, the Numidians, and such Libyans as joined the former

in their revolt. And this war proved to be neither insignificant

nor contemptible. It exposed them to frequent and terrible alarms;

and, finally, it became a question to them not merely of a loss of

territory, but of their own bare existence, and of the safety of the

very walls and buildings of their city. There are many reasons that

make it worth while to dwell upon the history of this war: yet I must

give only a summary account of it, in accordance with the original plan

of this work. The nature and peculiar ferocity of the struggle, which

has been generally called the “truceless war,” may be best learnt from

its incidents. It conveys two important lessons: it most conspicuously

shows those who employ mercenaries what dangers they should foresee

and provide against; and secondly, it teaches how wide the distinction

is between the character of troops composed of a confused mass of

uncivilised tribes, and of those which have had the benefit of

education, the habits of social life, and the restraints of law. But

what is of most importance to us is, that we may trace from the actual

events of this period the causes which led to the war between Rome and

Carthage in the time of Hannibal. These causes have not only been a

subject of dispute among historians, but still continue to be so among

those who were actually engaged; it is therefore a matter of importance

to enable students to form an opinion on this matter as nearly as

possible in accordance with the truth.

[Sidenote: Evacuation of Sicily.]

[Sidenote: The mercenaries sent to Sicca.]

+66.+ The course of events at Carthage subsequent to the peace was

as follows: As soon as possible after it was finally ratified Barcas

withdrew the troops at Eryx to Lilybaeum, and then immediately laid

down his command. Gesco, who was commandant of the town, proceeded

to transport the soldiers into Libya. But foreseeing what was likely

to happen, he very prudently embarked them in detachments, and did

not send them all in one voyage. His object was to gain time for the

Carthaginian government; so that one detachment should come to shore,

receive the pay due to them, and depart from Carthage to their own

country, before the next detachment was brought across and joined

them. In accordance with this idea Gesco began the transportation of

the troops. But the Government—partly because the recent expenses

had reduced their finances to a low ebb, partly because they felt

certain that, if they collected the whole force and entertained them

in Carthage, they would be able to persuade the mercenaries to accept

something less than the whole pay due to them—did not dismiss the

detachments as they landed, but kept them massed in the city. But

when this resulted in the commission of many acts of lawlessness by

night and day, they began to feel uneasy at their numbers and their

growing licentiousness; and required the officers, until such time as

arrangements for discharging their pay should have been made, and the

rest of the army should have arrived, to withdraw with all their men

to a certain town called Sicca, receiving each a piece of gold for

their immediate necessities. As far as quitting the city was concerned

they were ready enough to obey; but they desired to leave their heavy

baggage there as before, on the ground that they would soon have to

return to the city for their wages. But the Carthaginian government

were in terror lest, considering the length of their absence and their

natural desire for the society of wives or children, they would either

not quit the city at all; or, if they did, would be sure to be enticed

by these feelings to return, and that thus there would be no decrease

of outrages in the city. Accordingly they forced them to take their

baggage with them: but it was sorely against the will of the men, and

roused strong feelings of animosity among them. These mercenaries

being forced to retire to Sicca, lived there as they chose without any

restraint upon their lawlessness. For they had obtained two things

the most demoralising for hired forces, and which in a word are in

themselves the all-sufficient source and origin of mutinies,—relaxation

of discipline and want of employment.[144] For lack of something better

to do, some of them began calculating, always to their own advantage,

the amount of pay owing to them; and thus making out the total to be

many times more than was really due, they gave out that this was the

amount which they ought to demand from the Carthaginians. Moreover they

all began to call to mind the promises made to them by the generals

in their harangues, delivered on various occasions of special danger,

and to entertain high hopes and great expectations of the amount of

compensation which awaited them. The natural result followed.

[Sidenote: The beginning of the outbreak, B.C. 241.]

+67.+ When the whole army had mustered at Sicca, and Hanno, now

appointed general in Libya, far from satisfying these hopes and the

promises they had received, talked on the contrary of the burden of

the taxes and the embarrassment of the public finances; and actually

endeavoured to obtain from them an abatement even from the amount of

pay acknowledged to be due to them; excited and mutinous feelings at

once began to manifest themselves. There were constant conferences

hastily got together, sometimes in separate nationalities, sometimes

of the whole army; and there being no unity of race or language

among them, the whole camp became a babel of confusion, a scene

of inarticulate tumult, and a veritable revel of misrule. For the

Carthaginians being always accustomed to employ mercenary troops of

miscellaneous nationalities, in securing that an army should consist

of several different races, act wisely as far as the prevention of

any rapid combinations for mutiny, or difficulty on the part of the

commanders in overawing insubordination, are concerned: but the

policy utterly breaks down when an outburst of anger, or popular

delusion, or internal dissension, has actually occurred; for it makes

it impossible for the commander to soothe excited feelings, to remove

misapprehensions, or to show the ignorant their error. Armies in such a

state are not usually content with mere human wickedness; they end by

assuming the ferocity of wild beasts and the vindictiveness of insanity.

This is just what happened in this case. There were in the army

Iberians and Celts, men from Liguria and the Balearic Islands, and

a considerable number of half-bred Greeks, mostly deserters and

slaves; while the main body consisted of Libyans. Consequently it was

impossible to collect and address them _en masse_, or to approach

them with this view by any means whatever. There was no help for it:

the general could not possibly know their several languages; and to

make a speech four or five times on the same subject, by the mouths

of several interpreters, was almost more impossible, if I may say so,

than that. The only alternative was for him to address his entreaties

and exhortations to the soldiers through their officers. And this Hanno

continually endeavoured to do. But there was the same difficulty with

them. Sometimes they failed to understand what he said: at others they

received his words with expressions of approval to his face, and yet

from error or malice reported them in a contrary sense to the common

soldiers. The result was a general scene of uncertainty, mistrust,

and misunderstanding. And to crown all, they took it into their heads

that the Carthaginian government had a design in thus sending Hanno to

them: that they purposely did not send the generals who were acquainted

with the services they had rendered in Sicily, and who had been the

authors of the promises made to them; but had sent the one man who had

not been present at any of these transactions. Whether that were so or

not, they finally broke off all negotiations with Hanno; conceived a

violent mistrust of their several commanders; and in a furious outburst

of anger with the Carthaginians started towards the city, and pitched

their camp about a hundred and twenty stades from Carthage, at the town

of Tunes, to the number of over twenty thousand.

[Sidenote: The mercenaries at Tunes.]

[Sidenote: Attempts to pacify them.]

[Sidenote: The demands of the mercenaries.]

[Sidenote: The dispute referred to the arbitration of Gesco.]

+68.+ The Carthaginians saw their folly when it was too late. It was a

grave mistake to have collected so large a number of mercenaries into

one place without any warlike force of their own citizens to fall back

upon: but it was a still graver mistake to have delivered up to them

their children and wives, with their heavy baggage to boot; which they

might have retained as hostages, and thus have had greater security for

concerting their own measures, and more power of ensuring obedience to

their orders. However, being thoroughly alarmed at the action of the

men in regard to their encampment, they went to every length in their

eagerness to pacify their anger. They sent them supplies of provisions

in rich abundance, to be purchased exactly on their own terms, and

at their own price. Members of the Senate were despatched, one after

the other, to treat with them; and they were promised that whatever

they demanded should be conceded if it were within the bounds of

possibility. Day by day the ideas of the mercenaries rose higher. For

their contempt became supreme when they saw the dismay and excitement

in Carthage; their confidence in themselves was profound; and their

engagements with the Roman legions in Sicily had convinced them, that

not only was it impossible for the Carthaginians to face them in the

field, but that it would be difficult to find any nation in the world

who could. Therefore, when the Carthaginians conceded the point of

their pay, they made a further claim for the value of the horses they

had lost. When this too was conceded, they said that they ought to

receive the value of the rations of corn due to them from a long time

previous, reckoned at the highest price reached during the war. And

in short, the ill-disposed and mutinous among them being numerous,

they always found out some new demand which made it impossible to

come to terms. Upon the Carthaginian government, however, pledging

themselves to the full extent of their powers, they eventually agreed

to refer the matter to the arbitration of some one of the generals who

had been actually engaged in Sicily. Now they were displeased with

Hamilcar Barcas, who was one of those under whom they had fought in

Sicily, because they thought that their present unfavourable position

was attributable chiefly to him. They thought this from the fact that

he never came to them as an ambassador, and had, as was believed,

voluntarily resigned his command. But towards Gesco their feelings were

altogether friendly. He had, as they thought, taken every possible

precaution for their interests, and especially in the arrangements for

their conveyance to Libya. Accordingly they referred the dispute to the

arbitration of the latter.

[Sidenote: Spendius.]

[Sidenote: Mathōs.]

[Sidenote: Spendius and Mathōs cause an outbreak.]

+69.+ Gesco came to Tunes by sea, bringing the money with him. There he

held a meeting first of the officers, and then of the men, according

to their nationalities; rebuked them for their past behaviour, and

endeavoured to convince them as to their duty in the present: but

most of all he dwelt upon their obligation in the future to show

themselves well-disposed towards the people whose pay they had been

so long enjoying. Finally, he proceeded to discharge the arrears of

pay, taking each nationality separately. But there was a certain

Campanian in the army, a runaway Roman slave named Spendius, a man of

extraordinary physical strength and reckless courage in the field.

Alarmed lest his master should recover possession of him, and he should

be put to death with torture, in accordance with the laws of Rome,

this man exerted himself to the utmost in word and deed to break off

the arrangement with the Carthaginians. He was seconded by a Libyan

called Mathōs, who was not a slave but free, and had actually served

in the campaign. But he had been one of the most active agitators in

the late disturbances: and being in terror of punishment for the past,

he now gave in his adhesion to the party of Spendius; and taking the

Libyans aside, suggested to them that, when the men of other races

had received their pay, and taken their departure to their several

countries, the Carthaginians would wreak upon them the full weight of

the resentment which they had, in common with themselves, incurred;

and would look upon their punishment as a means of striking terror

into all the inhabitants of Libya. It did not take long to rouse the

men by such arguments, nor were they at a loss for a pretext, however

insignificant. In discharging the pay, Gesco postponed the payment

of the valuations of rations and horses. This was enough: the men at

once hurried to make a meeting; Spendius and Mathōs delivered violent

invectives against Gesco and the Carthaginians; their words were

received with every sign of approval; no one else could get a hearing;

whoever did attempt to speak was promptly stoned to death, without the

assembly so much as waiting to ascertain whether he intended to support

the party of Spendius or no.

[Sidenote: βάλλε.]

A considerable number of privates as well as officers were killed in

this manner in the various _émeutes_ which took place; and from the

constant repetition of this act of violence the whole army learnt the

meaning of the word “throw,” although there was not another word which

was intelligible to them all in common. The most usual occasion for

this to happen was when they collected in crowds flushed with wine

after their midday meal. On such occasions, if only some one started

the cry “throw,” such volleys were poured in from every side, and with

such rapidity, that it was impossible for any one to escape who once

ventured to stand forward to address them. The result was that soon

no one had the courage to offer them any counsel at all; and they

accordingly appointed Mathōs and Spendius as their commanders.

[Sidenote: Gesco and his staff seized and thrown into chains.]

+70.+ This complete disorganisation and disorder did not escape

the observation of Gesco. But his chief anxiety was to secure the

safety of his country; and seeing clearly that, if these men were

driven to exasperation, the Carthaginians would be in danger of total

destruction, he exerted himself with desperate courage and persistence:

sometimes summoning their officers, sometimes calling a meeting of

the men according to their nationalities and remonstrating with them.

But on one occasion the Libyans, not having received their wages as

soon as they considered that they ought to have been paid to them,

approached Gesco himself with some insolence. With the idea of rebuking

their precipitancy he refused to produce the pay, and bade them “go

and ask their general Mathōs for it.” This so enraged them, that

without a moment’s delay they first made a raid upon the money that

was kept in readiness, and then arrested Gesco and the Carthaginians

with him. Mathōs and Spendius thought that the speediest way to secure

an outbreak of war was for the men to commit some outrage upon the

sanctity of law and in violation of their engagements. They therefore

co-operated with the mass of the men in their reckless outrages;

plundered the baggage of the Carthaginians along with their money;

manacled Gesco and his staff with every mark of insolent violence,

and committed them into custody. Thenceforth they were at open war

with Carthage, having bound themselves together by oaths which were at

once impious and contrary to the principles universally received among

mankind.

[Sidenote: B.C. 240.]

This was the origin and beginning of the mercenary, or, as it is

also called, the Libyan war. Mathōs lost no time after this outrage

in sending emissaries to the various cities in Libya, urging them to

assert their freedom, and begging them to come to their aid and join

them in their undertaking. The appeal was successful: nearly all the

cities in Libya readily listened to the proposal that they should

revolt against Carthage, and were soon zealously engaged in sending

them supplies and reinforcements. They therefore divided themselves

into two parties; one of which laid siege to Utica, the other to Hippo

Zarytus, because these two cities refused to participate in the revolt.

[Sidenote: Despair at Carthage.]

+71.+ Three things must be noticed in regard to the Carthaginians.

First, among them the means of life of private persons are supplied by

the produce of the land; secondly, all public expenses for war material

and stores are discharged from the tribute paid by the people of Libya;

and thirdly, it is their regular custom to carry on war by means

of mercenary troops. At this moment they not only found themselves

unexpectedly deprived of all these resources at once, but saw each one

of them actually employed against themselves. Such an unlooked-for

event naturally reduced them to a state of great discouragement and

despair. After the long agony of the Sicilian war they were in hopes,

when the peace was ratified, that they might obtain some breathing

space and some period of settled content. The very reverse was now

befalling them. They were confronted by an outbreak of war still more

difficult and formidable. In the former they were disputing with Rome

for the possession of Sicily: but this was a domestic war, and the

issue at stake was the bare existence of themselves and their country.

Besides, the many battles in which they had been engaged at sea had

naturally left them ill supplied with arms, sailors, and vessels.

They had no store of provisions ready, and no expectation whatever

of external assistance from friends or allies. They were indeed now

thoroughly taught the difference between a foreign war, carried on

beyond the seas, and a domestic insurrection and disturbance.

+72.+ And for these overpowering miseries they had themselves to thank

more than any one else. During the late war they had availed themselves

of what they regarded as a reasonable pretext for exercising their

supremacy over the inhabitants of Libya with excessive harshness. They

had exacted half of all agricultural produce; had doubled the tribute

of the towns; and, in levying these contributions, had refused to show

any grace or indulgence whatever to those who were in embarrassed

circumstances. Their admiration and rewards were reserved, not for

those generals who treated the people with mildness and humanity, but

exclusively for those who like Hanno secured them the most abundant

supplies and war material, though at the cost of the harshest treatment

of the provincials.

[Sidenote: Revolt of the country people.]

These people therefore needed no urging to revolt: a single messenger

sufficed. The women, who up to this time had passively looked on

while their husbands and fathers were being led off to prison for the

non-payment of the taxes, now bound themselves by an oath in their

several towns that they would conceal nothing that they possessed;

and, stripping off their ornaments, unreservedly contributed them to

furnish pay for the soldiers. They thus put such large means into the

hands of Mathōs and Spendius, that they not only discharged the arrears

due to the mercenaries, which they had promised them as an inducement

to mutiny, but remained well supplied for future needs. A striking

illustration of the fact that true policy does not regard only the

immediate necessities of the hour, but must ever look still more keenly

to the future.

[Sidenote: Hanno’s management of the war.]

+73.+ No such considerations, however, prevented the Carthaginians

in their hour of distress from appointing Hanno general; because he

had the credit of having on a former occasion reduced the city called

Hecatompylos, in Libya, to obedience. They also set about collecting

mercenaries; arming their own citizens who were of military age;

training and drilling the city cavalry; and refitting what were left of

their ships, triremes, penteconters, and the largest of the pinnaces.

Meanwhile Mathōs, being joined by as many as seventy thousand Libyans,

distributed these fresh troops between the two forces which were

besieging Utica and Hippo Zarytus, and carried on those sieges without

let or hindrance. At the same time they kept firm possession of the

encampment at Tunes, and had thus shut out the Carthaginians from

the whole of outer Libya. For Carthage itself stands on a projecting

peninsula in a gulf, nearly surrounded by the sea and in part also by

a lake. The isthmus that connects it with Libya is three miles broad:

upon one side of this isthmus, in the direction of the open sea and at

no great distance, stands the city of Utica, and on the other stands

Tunes, upon the shore of the lake. The mercenaries occupied both

these points, and having thus cut off the Carthaginians from the open

country, proceeded to take measures against Utica itself. They made

frequent excursions up to the town wall, sometimes by day and sometimes

by night, and were continually throwing the citizens into a state of

alarm and absolute panic.

[Sidenote: Fails to relieve Utica.]

+74.+ Hanno, however, was busying himself with some success in

providing defences. In this department of a general’s duty he showed

considerable ability; but he was quite a different man at the head of

a sally in force: he was not sagacious in his use of opportunities,

and managed the whole business with neither skill nor promptitude. It

was thus that his first expedition miscarried when he went to relieve

Utica. The number of his elephants, of which he had as many as a

hundred, struck terror into the enemy; yet he made so poor a use of

this advantage that, instead of turning it into a complete victory,

he very nearly brought the besieged, as well as himself, to utter

destruction. He brought from Carthage catapults and darts, and in

fact all the apparatus for a siege; and having encamped outside Utica

undertook an assault upon the enemy’s entrenchment. The elephants

forced their way into the camp, and the enemy, unable to withstand

their weight and the fury of their attack, entirely evacuated the

position. They lost a large number from wounds inflicted by the

elephants’ tusks; while the survivors made their way to a certain hill,

which was a kind of natural fortification thickly covered with trees,

and there halted, relying upon the strength of the position. But Hanno,

accustomed to fight with Numidians and Libyans, who, once turned, never

stay their flight till they are two days removed from the scene of the

action, imagined that he had already put an end to the war and had

gained a complete victory. He therefore troubled himself no more about

his men, or about the camp generally, but went inside the town and

occupied himself with his own personal comfort. But the mercenaries,

who had fled in a body on to the hill, had been trained in the daring

tactics of Barcas, and accustomed from their experience in the Sicilian

warfare to retreat and return again to the attack many times in the

same day. They now saw that the general had left his army and gone into

the town, and that the soldiers, owing to their victory, were behaving

carelessly, and in fact slipping out of the camp in various directions:

they accordingly got themselves into order and made an assault upon

the camp; killed a large number of the men; forced the rest to fly

ignominiously to the protection of the city walls and gates; and

possessed themselves of all the baggage and apparatus belonging to the

besieged, which Hanno had brought outside the town in addition to his

own, and thus put into the hands of the enemy.

[Sidenote: Hanno’s continued ill success.]

But this was not the only instance of his incompetence. A few days

afterwards, near a place called Gorza, he came right upon the enemy,

who lay encamped there, and had two opportunities of securing a

victory by pitched battles; and two more by surprising them, as they

changed quarters close to where he was. But in both cases he let the

opportunities slip for want of care and proper calculation.

[Sidenote: Hamilcar Barcas takes the command.]

+75.+ The Carthaginians, therefore, when they saw his mismanagement

of the campaign, once more placed Hamilcar Barcas at the head of

affairs; and despatched him to the war as commander-in-chief, with

seventy elephants, the newly-collected mercenaries, and the deserters

from the enemy; and along with them the cavalry and infantry enrolled

from the citizens themselves, amounting in all to ten thousand men.

His appearance from the first produced an immediate impression. The

expedition was unexpected; and he was thus able, by the dismay which

it produced, to lower the courage of the enemy. He succeeded in

raising the siege of Utica, and showed himself worthy of his former

achievements, and of the confidence felt in him by the people. What he

accomplished on this service was this.

[Sidenote: He gets his men across the Macaras.]

A chain of hills runs along the isthmus connecting Carthage with the

mainland, which are difficult of access, and are crossed by artificial

passes into the mainland; of these hills Mathōs had occupied all the

available points and posted guards there. Besides these there is a

river called Macaras (Bagradas), which at certain points interrupts

the passage of travellers from the city to the mainland, and though

for the most part impassable, owing to the strength of its stream,

is only crossed by one bridge. This means of egress also Mathōs was

guarding securely, and had built a town on it. The result was that, to

say nothing of the Carthaginians entering the mainland with an army,

it was rendered exceedingly difficult even for private individuals,

who might wish to make their way through, to elude the vigilance of

the enemy. This did not escape the observation and care of Hamilcar;

and while revolving every means and every chance of putting an end to

this difficulty about a passage, he at length hit upon the following.

He observed that where the river discharges itself into the sea its

mouth got silted up in certain positions of the wind, and that then

the passage over the river at its mouth became like that over a marsh.

He accordingly got everything ready in the camp for the expedition,

without telling any one what he was going to do; and then watched

for this state of things to occur. When the right moment arrived,

he started under cover of night; and by daybreak had, without being

observed by any one, got his army across this place, to the surprise

of the citizens of Utica as well as of the enemy. Marching across the

plain, he led his men straight against the enemy who were guarding the

bridge.

[Sidenote: And defeats Spendius.]

+76.+ When he understood what had taken place Spendius advanced into

the plain to meet Hamilcar. The force from the city at the bridge

amounted to ten thousand men; that from before Utica to more than

fifteen thousand men; both of which now advanced to support each

other. When they had effected a junction they imagined that they

had the Carthaginians in a trap, and therefore with mutual words of

exhortation passed the order to engage, and at once commenced. Hamilcar

was marching with his elephants in front, his cavalry and light troops

next, while his heavy armed hoplites brought up the rear. But when he

saw the precipitation of the enemy’s attack, he passed the word to

his men to turn to the rear. His instructions were that the troops in

front should, after thus turning to the rear, retire with all speed:

while he again wheeled to the right about what had been originally

his rear divisions, and got them into line successively so as to face

the enemy. The Libyans and mercenaries mistook the object of this

movement, and imagined that the Carthaginians were panic-stricken and

in full retreat. Thereupon they broke from their ranks and, rushing

forward, began a vigorous hand to hand struggle. When, however, they

found that the cavalry had wheeled round again, and were drawn up close

to the hoplites, and that the rest of the army also was being brought

up, surprise filled the Libyans with panic; they immediately turned

and began a retreat as precipitate and disorderly as their advance.

In the blind flight which followed some of them ran foul of their own

rear-guard, who were still advancing, and caused their own destruction

or that of their comrades; but the greater part were trampled to death

by the cavalry and elephants who immediately charged. As many as six

thousand of the Libyans and foreign troops were killed, and about two

thousand taken prisoners. The rest made good their escape, either to

the town on the bridge or to the camp near Utica. After this victory

Hamilcar followed close upon the heels of the enemy, carried the town

on the bridge by assault, the enemy there abandoning it and flying to

Tunes, and then proceeded to scour the rest of the district: some of

the towns submitting, while the greater number he had to reduce by

force. And thus he revived in the breasts of the Carthaginians some

little spirit and courage, or at least rescued them from the state of

absolute despair into which they had fallen.

[Sidenote: Mathōs harasses Hamilcar’s march.]

+77.+ Meanwhile Mathōs himself was continuing the siege of Hippo

Zarytus, and he now counselled Autaritus, the leader of the Gauls,

and Spendius to stick close to the skirts of the enemy, avoiding

the plains, because the enemy were strong in cavalry and elephants,

but marching parallel with them on the slopes of the mountains,

and attacking them whenever they saw them in any difficulty. While

suggesting these tactics, he at the same time sent messengers to the

Numidians and Libyans, entreating them to come to their aid, and not to

let slip the opportunity of securing their own freedom. Accordingly,

Spendius took with him a force of six thousand men, selected from each

of the several nationalities at Tunes, and started, keeping along a

line of hills parallel to the Carthaginians. Besides these six thousand

he had two thousand Gauls under Autaritus, who were all that were

left of the original number, the rest having deserted to the Romans

during the period of the occupation of Eryx. Now it happened that, just

when Hamilcar had taken up a position in a certain plain which was

surrounded on all sides by mountains, the reinforcements of Numidians

and Libyans joined Spendius. The Carthaginians, therefore, suddenly

found a Libyan encampment right on their front, another of Numidians

on their rear, and that of Spendius on their flank; and it seemed

impossible to escape from the danger which thus menaced them on every

side.

[Sidenote: Hamilcar is joined by the Numidian Narávas.]

[Sidenote: Again defeats Spendius.]

+78.+ But there was at that time a certain Narávas, a Numidian of

high rank and warlike spirit, who entertained an ancestral feeling of

affection for the Carthaginians, rendered especially warm at that time

by admiration for Hamilcar. He now thought that he had an excellent

opportunity for an interview and association with that general; and

accordingly came to the Carthaginian quarters with a body of a hundred

Numidians, and boldly approaching the out-works, remained there waving

his hand. Wondering what his object could be Hamilcar sent a horseman

to see; to whom Narávas said that he wished for an interview with

the general. The Carthaginian leader still showing hesitation and

incredulity, Narávas committed his horse and javelins to the care of

his guards, and boldly came into the camp unarmed. His fearlessness

made a profound impression not unmixed with surprise. No further

objection, however, was made to his presence, and the desired interview

was accorded; in which he declared his goodwill to the Carthaginians

generally, and his especial desire to be friends with Barcas. “This

was the motive of his presence,” he said; “he was come with the full

intention of taking his place by his side and of faithfully sharing

all his actions and undertakings.” Hamilcar, on hearing these words,

was so immensely charmed by the young man’s courage in coming, and

his honest simplicity in the interview, that he not only consented to

accept his co-operation, but promised also with an oath that he would

give him his daughter in marriage if he kept faith with Carthage to

the end. The agreement having been thus made, Narávas came with his

division of Numidians, numbering two thousand. Thus reinforced Hamilcar

offered the enemy battle; which Spendius, having joined forces with

the Libyans, accepted; and descending into the plain engaged the

Carthaginians. In the severe battle which followed Hamilcar’s army was

victorious: a result which he owed partly to the excellent behaviour

of the elephants, but particularly to the brilliant services rendered

by Narávas. Autaritus and Spendius managed to escape; but of the rest

as many as ten thousand were killed and four thousand taken prisoners.

When the victory was complete, Hamilcar gave permission to those of

the prisoners who chose to enlist in his army, and furnished them with

arms from the spoils of the enemy’s slain: those who did not choose to

accept this offer he summoned to a meeting and harangued them. He told

them that the crimes committed by them up to that moment were pardoned,

and they were permitted to go their several ways, wheresoever they

chose, but on condition that none of them bore arms against Carthage

again: if any one of them were ever caught so doing, he warned them

distinctly that he would meet with no mercy.

[Sidenote: Mutiny in Sardinia.]

+79.+ This conspiracy of Mathōs and Spendius caused an outbreak about

this same time in another quarter. For the mercenaries who were

in garrison in Sardinia, inspired by their example, attacked the

Carthaginians in the island; beleaguered Bostarus, the commander of

the foreign contingent, in the citadel; and finally put him and his

compatriots to the sword. The Carthaginians thereupon sent another army

into the island under Hanno. But the men deserted to the mutineers; who

then seized Hanno and crucified him, and exercising all their ingenuity

in the invention of tortures racked to death every Carthaginian in

the island. Having got the towns into their power, they thenceforth

kept forcible possession of the island; until they quarrelled with the

natives and were driven by them into Italy. This was the way in which

Carthage lost Sardinia, an island of first rate importance from its

size, the number of its inhabitants, and its natural products. But as

many have described it at great length, I do not think that I need

repeat statements about which there is no manner of dispute.

[Sidenote: B.C. 239. Plan of Spendius for doing away with the good

impression made by the leniency of Barcas.]

To return to Libya. The indulgence shown by Hamilcar to the captives

alarmed Mathōs and Spendius and Autaritus the Gaul. They were afraid

that conciliatory treatment of this sort would induce the Libyans,

and the main body of the mercenaries, to embrace with eagerness the

impunity thus displayed before their eyes. They consulted together,

therefore, how they might by some new act of infamy inflame to

the highest pitch of fury the feelings of their men against the

Carthaginians. They finally determined upon the following plan. They

summoned a meeting of the soldiers; and when it was assembled, they

introduced a bearer of a despatch which they represented to have been

sent by their fellow conspirators in Sardinia. The despatch warned them

to keep a careful watch over Gesco and all his fellow prisoners (whom,

as has been stated, they had treacherously seized in Tunes), as certain

persons in the camp were secretly negotiating with the Carthaginians

for their release. Taking this as his text, Spendius commenced by

urging the men not to put any trust in the indulgence shown by the

Carthaginian general to the prisoners of war, “For,” said he, “it is

with no intention of saving their lives that he adopted this course

in regard to the prisoners; his aim was, by releasing them, to get

us into his power, that punishment might not be confined to some of

us, but might fall on all at once.” He went on to urge them to be on

their guard, lest by letting Gesco’s party go they should teach their

enemies to despise them; and should also do great practical damage to

their own interests, by suffering a man to escape who was an excellent

general, and likely to be a most formidable enemy to themselves. Before

he had finished this speech another courier arrived, pretending to have

been sent by the garrison at Tunes, and bearing a despatch containing

warnings similar to that from Sardinia.

[Sidenote: Murder of Gesco.]

+80.+ It was now the turn of Autaritus the Gaul. “Your only hope,”

he said, “of safety is to reject all hopes which rest on the

Carthaginians. So long as any man clings to the idea of indulgence

at their hands, he cannot possibly be a genuine ally of yours. Never

trust, never listen, never attend to anyone, unless he recommend

unrelenting hostility and implacable hatred towards the Carthaginians:

all who speak on the other side regard as traitors and enemies.” After

this preface, he gave it as his advice that they should put to death

with torture both Gesco and those who had been seized with him, as

well as the Carthaginian prisoners of war who had been captured since.

Now this Autaritus was the most effective speaker of any, because he

could make himself understood to a large number of those present at

a meeting. For, owing to his length of service, he knew how to speak

Phoenician; and Phoenician was the language in which the largest number

of men, thanks to the length of the late war, could listen to with

satisfaction. Accordingly his speech was received with acclamation, and

he stood down amidst loud applause. But when many came forward from the

several nationalities at the same time; and, moved by Gesco’s former

kindnesses to themselves, would have deprecated at least the infliction

of torture, not a word of what they said was understood: partly because

many were speaking at the same time, and partly because each spoke in

his own language. But when at length it was disclosed that what they

meant was to dissuade the infliction of torture, upon one of those

present shouting out “Throw!” they promptly stoned to death all who had

come forward to speak; and their relations buried their bodies, which

were crushed into shapeless masses as though by the feet of elephants.

Still they at least were buried. But the followers of Spendius now

seized Gesco and his fellow prisoners, numbering about seven hundred,

led them outside the stockade, and having made them march a short

distance from the camp, first cut off their hands, beginning with

Gesco, the man whom a short while before they had selected out of all

Carthage as their benefactor and had chosen as arbitrator in their

controversy. When they had cut off their hands, they proceeded to lop

off the extremities of the unhappy men, and having thus mutilated them

and broken their legs, they threw them still alive into a trench.

+81.+ When news of this dreadful affair reached the Carthaginians, they

were powerless indeed to do anything, but they were filled with horror;

and in a transport of agony despatched messengers to Hamilcar and the

second general Hanno, entreating them to rally to their aid and avenge

the unhappy victims; and at the same time they sent heralds to the

authors of this crime to negotiate for the recovery of the dead bodies.

But the latter sternly refused; and warned the messengers to send

neither herald nor ambassador to them again; for the same punishment

which had just befallen Gesco awaited all who came. And for the future

they passed a resolution, which they encouraged each other to observe,

to put every Carthaginian whom they caught to death with torture; and

that whenever they captured one of their auxiliaries they would cut

off his hands and send him back to Carthage. And this resolution they

exactly and persistently carried out. Such horrors justify the remark

that it is not only the bodies of men, and the ulcers and imposthumes

which are bred in them, that grow to a fatal and completely incurable

state of inflammation, but their souls also most of all. For as in

the case of ulcers, sometimes medical treatment on the one hand only

serves to irritate them and make them spread more rapidly, while if,

on the other hand, the medical treatment is stopped, having nothing

to check their natural destructiveness, they gradually destroy the

substance on which they feed; just so at times it happens that similar

plague spots and gangrenes fasten upon men’s souls; and when this is

so, no wild beast can be more wicked or more cruel than a man. To men

in such a frame of mind if you show indulgence or kindness, they regard

it as a cover for trickery and sinister designs, and only become more

suspicious and more inflamed against the authors of it; while if you

retaliate, their passions are aroused to a kind of dreadful rivalry,

and then there is no crime too monstrous or too cruel for them to

commit. The upshot with these men was, that their feelings became so

brutalised that they lost the instincts of humanity: which we must

ascribe in the first place, and to the greatest extent, to uncivilised

habits and a wretchedly bad early training; but many other things

contributed to this result, and among them we must reckon as most

important the acts of violence and rapacity committed by their leaders,

sins which at that time were prevalent among the whole mercenary body,

but especially so with their leaders.

[Sidenote: Quarrels of Hanno and Hamilcar.]

[Sidenote: Revolt of Hippo Zarytus and Utica.]

+82.+ Alarmed by the recklessness displayed by the enemy, Hamilcar

summoned Hanno to join him, being convinced that a consolidation of

the two armies would give him the best chance of putting an end to

the whole war. Such of the enemy as he took in the field he put to

execution on the spot, while those who were made prisoners and brought

to him he threw to the elephants to be trampled to death; for he now

made up his mind that the only possibility of finishing the war was

to entirely destroy the enemy. But just as the Carthaginians were

beginning to entertain brighter hopes in regard to the war, a reverse

as complete as it was unexpected brought their fortunes to the lowest

ebb. For these two generals, when they had joined forces, quarrelled so

bitterly with each other, that they not only omitted to take advantage

of chances against the enemy, but by their mutual animosity gave the

enemy many opportunities against themselves. Finding this to be the

case, the Carthaginian government sent out instructions that one of the

generals was to retire, the other to remain, and that the army itself

was to decide which of them it should be. This was one cause of the

reverse in the fortunes of Carthage at this time. Another, which was

almost contemporaneous, was this. Their chief hope of furnishing the

army with provisions and other necessaries rested upon the supplies

that were being brought from a place to which they give the name of

Emporiae: but as these supplies were on their way, they were overtaken

by a storm at sea and entirely destroyed. This was all the more fatal

because Sardinia was lost to them at the time, as we have seen,

and that island had always been of the greatest service to them in

difficulties of this sort. But the worst blow of all was the revolt of

the cities of Hippo Zarytus and Utica, the only cities in all Libya

that had been faithful to them, not only in the present war, but also

at the time of the invasion of Agathocles, as well as that of the

Romans. To both these latter they had offered a gallant resistance;

and, in short, had never at any time adopted any policy hostile to

Carthage. But now they were not satisfied with simply revolting to

the Libyans, without any reason to allege for their conduct. With all

the bitterness of turncoats, they suddenly paraded an ostentatious

friendship and fidelity to them, and gave practical expression to

implacable rage and hatred towards the Carthaginians. They killed every

man of the force which had come from Carthage to their aid, as well as

its commander, and threw the bodies from the wall. They surrendered

their town to the Libyans, while they even refused the request of the

Carthaginians to be allowed to bury the corpses of their unfortunate

soldiers. Mathōs and Spendius were so elated by these events that

they were emboldened to attempt Carthage itself. But Barcas had now

got Hannibal as his coadjutor, who had been sent by the citizens

to the army in the place of Hanno,—recalled in accordance with the

sentence of the army, which the government had left to their discretion

in reference to the disputes that arose between the two generals.

Accompanied, therefore, by this Hannibal and by Narávas, Hamilcar

scoured the country to intercept the supplies of Mathōs and Spendius,

receiving his most efficient support in this, as in other things, from

the Numidian Narávas.

[Sidenote: Friendly disposition of Rome.]

[Sidenote: Hiero of Syracuse.]

+83.+ Such being the position of their forces in the field, the

Carthaginians, finding themselves hemmed in on every side, were

compelled to have recourse to the help of the free states in alliance

with them.[145] Now Hiero, of Syracuse, had during this war been all

along exceedingly anxious to do everything which the Carthaginians

asked him; and at this point of it was more forward to do so than

ever, from a conviction that it was for his interest, with a view

alike to his own sovereignty and to his friendship with Rome, that

Carthage should not perish, and so leave the superior power to work

its own will without resistance. And his reasoning was entirely sound

and prudent. It is never right to permit such a state of things; nor

to help any one to build up so preponderating a power as to make

resistance to it impossible, however just the cause. Not that the

Romans themselves had failed to observe the obligations of the treaty,

or were showing any failure of friendly dispositions; though at first

a question had arisen between the two powers, from the following

circumstance. At the beginning of the war, certain persons sailing from

Italy with provisions for the mutineers, the Carthaginians captured

them and forced them to land in their own harbour; and presently had

as many as five hundred such persons in their prisons. This caused

considerable annoyance at Rome: but, after sending ambassadors to

Carthage and recovering possession of the men by diplomatic means, the

Romans were so much gratified that, by way of returning the favour,

they restored the prisoners made in the Sicilian war whom they still

retained; and from that time forth responded cheerfully and generously

to all requests made to them. They allowed their merchants to export

to Carthage whatever from time to time was wanted, and prohibited

those who were exporting to the mutineers. When, subsequently, the

mercenaries in Sardinia, having revolted from Carthage, invited their

interference on the island, they did not respond to the invitation; nor

when the people of Utica offered them their submission did they accept

it, but kept strictly to the engagements contained in the treaty.

[Sidenote: B.C. 238. Hamilcar, with assistance from Sicily, surrounds

Mathōs and Spendius.]

+84.+ The assistance thus obtained from these allies encouraged the

Carthaginians to maintain their resistance: while Mathōs and Spendius

found themselves quite as much in the position of besieged as in that

of besiegers; for Hamilcar’s force reduced them to such distress

for provisions that they were at last compelled to raise the siege.

However, after a short interval, they managed to muster the most

effective of the mercenaries and Libyans, to the number in all of fifty

thousand, among whom, besides others, was Zarzas the Libyan, with his

division, and commenced once more to watch and follow on the flank of

Hamilcar’s march. Their method was to keep away from the level country,

for fear of the elephants and the cavalry of Narávas; but to seize in

advance of him all points of vantage, whether it were rising ground or

narrow pass. In these operations they showed themselves quite a match

for their opponents in the fury of their assault and the gallantry of

their attempts; but their ignorance of military tactics frequently

placed them at a disadvantage. It was, in fact, a real and practical

illustration of the difference between scientific and unscientific

warfare: between the art of a general and the mechanical movements of

a soldier. Like a good draught-player, by isolating and surrounding

them, he destroyed large numbers in detail without coming to a general

engagement at all; and in movements of more importance he cut off

many without resistance by enticing them into ambushes; while he

threw others into utter dismay by suddenly appearing where they least

expected him, sometimes by day and sometimes by night: and all whom he

took alive he threw to the elephants. Finally, he managed unexpectedly

to beleaguer them on ground highly unfavourable to them and convenient

for his own force; and reduced them to such a pitch of distress that,

neither venturing to risk an engagement nor being able to run away,

because they were entirely surrounded by a trench and stockade, they

were at last compelled by starvation to feed on each other: a fitting

retribution at the hands of Providence for their violation of all laws

human and divine in their conduct to their enemies. To sally forth to

an engagement they did not dare, for certain defeat stared them in the

face, and they knew what vengeance awaited them if they were taken; and

as to making terms, it never occurred to them to mention it, they were

conscious that they had gone too far for that. They still hoped for the

arrival of relief from Tunes, of which their officers assured them, and

accordingly shrank from no suffering however terrible.

[Sidenote: Spendius and Autaritus fall into the hands of Hamilcar.]

+85.+ But when they had used up for food the captives in this horrible

manner, and then the bodies of their slaves, and still no one came to

their relief from Tunes, their sufferings became too dreadful to bear;

and the common soldiers broke out into open threats of violence against

their officers. Thereupon Autaritus, Zarzas, and Spendius decided

to put themselves into the hands of the enemy and to hold a parley

with Hamilcar, and try to make terms. They accordingly sent a herald

and obtained permission for the despatch of an embassy. It consisted

of ten ambassadors, who, on their arrival at the Carthaginian camp,

concluded an agreement with Hamilcar on these terms: “The Carthaginians

may select any ten men they choose from the enemy, and allow the rest

to depart with one tunic a-piece.” No sooner had these terms been

agreed to, than Hamilcar said at once that he selected, according

to the terms of the agreement, the ten ambassadors themselves. The

Carthaginians thus got possession of Autaritus, Spendius, and the other

most conspicuous officers. The Libyans saw that their officers were

arrested, and not knowing the terms of the treaty, believed that some

perfidy was being practised against them, and accordingly flew to seize

their arms. Hamilcar thereupon surrounded them with his elephants and

his entire force, and destroyed them to a man. This slaughter, by which

more than forty thousand perished, took place near a place called the

Saw, so named from its shape resembling that tool.

[Sidenote: Siege of Mathōs in Tunes.]

[Sidenote: Defeat and death of Hannibal.]

+86.+ This achievement of Hamilcar revived the hopes of the

Carthaginians who had been in absolute despair: while he, in

conjunction with Narávas and Hannibal, employed himself in traversing

the country and visiting the cities. His victory secured the submission

of the Libyans; and when they had come in, and the greater number of

the towns had been reduced to obedience, he and his colleagues advanced

to attack Tunes, and commenced besieging Mathōs. Hannibal pitched his

camp on the side of the town nearest to Carthage, and Hamilcar on the

opposite side. When this was done they brought the captives taken from

the army of Spendius and crucified them in the sight of the enemy. But

observing that Hannibal was conducting his command with negligence and

over-confidence, Mathōs assaulted the ramparts, killed many of the

Carthaginians, and drove the entire army from the camp. All the baggage

fell into the hands of the enemy, and Hannibal himself was made a

prisoner. They at once took him up to the cross on which Spendius was

hanging, and after the infliction of exquisite tortures, took down the

latter’s body and fastened Hannibal, still living, to his cross; and

then slaughtered thirty Carthaginians of the highest rank round the

corpse of Spendius. It seemed as though Fortune designed a competition

in cruelty, giving either side alternately the opportunity of outdoing

the other in mutual vengeance. Owing to the distance of the two camps

from each other it was late before Barcas discovered the attack made

from the town; nor, when he had discovered it, could he even then go to

the rescue with the necessary speed, because the intervening country

was rugged and difficult. He therefore broke up his camp, and leaving

Tunes marched down the bank of the river Macaras, and pitched his camp

close to its mouth and to the sea.

[Sidenote: By a final effort the Carthaginians raise a reinforcement

for Hamilcar.]

[Sidenote: Mathōs beaten and captured.]

+87.+ This unexpected reverse reduced the Carthaginians once more to

a melancholy state of despair. But though their recent elation of

spirit was followed so closely by this depression, they did not fail

to do what they could for their own preservation. They selected thirty

members of the Senate; with them they associated Hanno, who had some

time ago been recalled; and, arming all that were left of military

age in the city, despatched them to Barcas, with the feeling that

they were now making their supreme effort. They strictly charged the

members of the Senate to use every effort to reconcile the two generals

Hamilcar and Hanno, and to make them forget their old quarrel and act

harmoniously, in view of the imminence of the danger. Accordingly,

after the employment of many various arguments, they induced the

generals to meet; and Hanno and Barcas were compelled to give in

and yield to their representations. The result was that they ever

afterwards co-operated with each other so cordially, that Mathōs found

himself continually worsted in the numerous skirmishes which took place

round the town called Leptis, as well as certain other towns; and at

last became eager to bring the matter to the decision of a general

engagement, a desire in which the Carthaginians also shared in an equal

degree. Both sides therefore having determined upon this course: they

summoned all their allies to join them in confronting the peril, and

collected the garrisons stationed in the various towns, conscious that

they were about to stake their all on the hazard. All being ready on

either side for the conflict, they gave each other battle by mutual

consent, both sides being drawn up in full military array. When victory

declared itself on the side of the Carthaginians, the larger number of

the Libyans perished on the field; and the rest, having escaped to a

certain town, surrendered shortly afterwards; while Mathōs himself was

taken prisoner by his enemies.

[Sidenote: Reduction of Hippo and Utica, B.C. 238.]

+88.+ Most places in Libya submitted to Carthage after this battle.

But the towns of Hippo and Utica still held out, feeling that they had

no reasonable grounds for obtaining terms, because their original acts

of hostility left them no place for mercy or pardon. So true is it

that even in such outbreaks, however criminal in themselves, it is of

inestimable advantage to be moderate, and to refrain from wanton acts

which commit their perpetrator beyond all power of forgiveness. Nor did

their attitude of defiance help these cities. Hanno invested one and

Barcas the other, and quickly reduced them to accept whatever terms the

Carthaginians might determine.

[Sidenote: B.C. 241-238.]

The war with the Libyans had indeed reduced Carthage to dreadful

danger; but its termination enabled her not only to re-establish her

authority over Libya, but also to inflict condign punishment upon the

authors of the revolt. For the last act in the drama was performed by

the young men conducting a triumphal procession through the town, and

finally inflicting every kind of torture upon Mathōs. For three years

and about four months did the mercenaries maintain a war against the

Carthaginians which far surpassed any that I ever heard of for cruelty

and inhumanity.

[Sidenote: The Romans interfere in Sardinia.]

And about the same time the Romans took in hand a naval expedition to

Sardinia upon the request of the mercenaries who had deserted from

that island and come to Italy; and when the Carthaginians expressed

indignation at this, on the ground that the lordship over Sardinia

more properly belonged to them, and were preparing to take measures

against those who caused the revolt of the island, the Romans voted

to declare war against them, on the pretence that they were making

warlike preparations, not against Sardinia, but against themselves. The

Carthaginians, however, having just had an almost miraculous escape

from annihilation in the recent war, were in every respect disabled

from renewing their quarrel with the Romans. They therefore yielded to

the necessities of the hour, and not only abandoned Sardinia, but paid

the Romans twelve hundred talents into the bargain, that they might not

be obliged to undertake the war for the present.