SECTION VII.

_Souls of Fools and Monsters._

A child, ill-formed, is born absolutely imbecile, has no ideas, lives

without ideas; instances of this have been known. How shall this animal

be defined? Doctors have said that it is something between man and

beast; others have said that it is a sensitive soul, but not an

intellectual soul: it eats, it drinks, it sleeps, it wakes, it has

sensations, but it does not think.

Is there for it another life, or is there none? The case has been put,

and has not yet been entirely resolved.

Some have said that this creature must have a soul, because its father

and its mother had souls. But by this reasoning it would be proved that

if it had come into the world without a nose, it should have the

reputation of having one, because its father and its mother had one.

A woman is brought to bed: her infant has no chin; its forehead is flat

and somewhat black, its eyes round, its nose thin and sharp; its

countenance is not much unlike that of a swallow: yet the rest of his

body is made like ours. It is decided by a majority of voices that it is

a man, and possesses an immaterial soul; whereupon the parents have it

baptized. But if this little ridiculous figure has pointed claws, and a

mouth in the form of a beak, it is declared to be a monster; it has no

soul; it is not baptized.

It is known, that in 1726, there was in London a woman who was brought

to bed every eight days of a young rabbit. No difficulty was made of

refusing baptism to this child, notwithstanding the epidemic folly which

prevailed in London for three weeks, of believing that this poor jade

actually brought forth wild rabbits. The surgeon who delivered her,

named St. André, swore that nothing was more true; and he was believed.

But what reason had the credulous for refusing a soul to this woman's

offspring? She had a soul; her children must likewise have been

furnished with souls, whether they had hands? or paws, whether they were

born with a snout or with a face: cannot the Supreme Being vouchsafe the

gift of thought and sensation to a little nondescript, born of a woman,

with the figure of a rabbit, as well as a little nondescript born with

the figure of a man? Will the soul which was ready to take up its abode

in this woman's fœtus return unhoused?

It is very well observed by Locke, with regard to monsters, that

immortality must not be attributed to the exterior of a body--that it

has nothing to do with the figure. "This immortality," says he, "is no

more attached to the form of one's face or breast than it is to the way

in which one's beard is clipped or one's coat is cut."

He asks: What is the exact measure of deformity by which you can

recognize whether an infant has a soul or not? What is the precise

degree at which it is to be declared a monster and without a soul?

Again, it is asked: What would a soul be that should have none but

chimerical ideas? There are some which never go beyond such. Are they

worthy or unworthy? What is to be made of their pure spirit?

What are we to think of a child with two heads, which is otherwise well

formed? Some say that it has two souls, because it is furnished with two

pineal glands, with two callous substances, with two "_sensoria

communia_." Others answer that there cannot be two souls, with but one

breast and one navel.

In short, so many questions have been asked about this poor human soul,

that if it were necessary to put an end to them all, such an examination

of its own person would cause it the most insupportable annoyance. The

same would happen to it as happened to Cardinal Polignac at a conclave:

his steward, tired of having never been able to make him pass his

accounts, took a journey to Rome, and went to the small window of his

cell, laden with an immense bundle of papers; he read for nearly two

hours; at last, finding that no answer was made, he thrust forward his

head: the cardinal had been gone almost two hours. Our souls will be

gone before their stewards have finished their statements; but let us be

just before God--ignorant as both we and our stewards are.

See what is said on the soul in the "Letters of Memmius."

A Philosophical Dictionary, Volume 09 · 第 7 / 11 章