SOME STAGGERING BLOWS.
In the first edition, already extensively quoted from, of its issue of
Wednesday, April 29th, the _Times_ contained the following telegram
from its Portsmouth correspondent:--
“PORTSMOUTH, Tuesday, 9.30 p.m.--H.M.S. _Invincible_, guardship
at Southampton, arrived here early this afternoon, and is now at
Spithead, where H.M.S. _Hero_, _Minotaur_, _Hercules_, _Glatton_,
_Galatea_, _Latona_, _Iris_, _Bellona_, _Seagull_, and _Rattlesnake_,
all vessels belonging to the A Division of the Fleet Reserve of this
port, are also at anchor. The ten ships last named represent the
only Portsmouth vessels that are immediately available, and several
of them are not really quite fit for sea. Moreover, they are all, at
present, short-handed. It may be recollected that some time ago, when
the five cruisers and two gun-vessels of the Australian Squadron were
commissioned, the rule restricting service on the Australian station
to men of five years’ standing and upwards was suspended in order to
provide crews for them, and that, in addition, many men were taken out
of the harbour ships. From the depletion which was thus caused, the
Royal Dockyards and the various Naval Barracks have never completely
recovered; and in consequence there has to-day been the greatest
difficulty in finding for the mobilised vessels even sufficient crews
to take them to Spithead. Other ships could be sent thither, if only
men were forthcoming. The ten warships that have been commissioned here
would, to man them properly, need 2800 officers and men. Barely 1200
were available, and, although a few men of the Royal Naval Reserve have
offered themselves, and have been gladly accepted, I doubt whether the
total number of people now on board the ships in question exceeds 1500
all told. All kinds of civilians are volunteering, but none of them are
accepted pending the receipt of instructions from the Admiralty. The
ships are in the meantime busily engaged in getting in their powder and
shell, and work is, while I write, being energetically carried on by
the aid of the electric light. All the seaward forts are manned, and
many of the buoys and beacons have been to-day removed, nor were the
usual lights exhibited this evening; but unfortunately the conflict
between the naval and the military authorities continues, and it is but
too evident that the rapid perfecting of our defensive preparations
is being dangerously delayed by the fact that the local command is
divided. I learn, as I close this dispatch, that the _Alexandra_,
flagship of the Reserve Squadron, from Portland, has also arrived and
has anchored at Spithead. The _Hotspur_ from Harwich, the _Audacious_
from Hull, the _Shannon_ from Bantry, and the _Neptune_ from Holyhead,
are expected in the course of to-morrow, and the _Iron Duke_ from
Queensferry, the _Superb_ from Greenock, and the _Belleisle_ from
Kingstown on Thursday.”
[Illustration: “THE ‘ALEXANDRA’ HAS ALSO ARRIVED.”]
The same issue also contained the appended brief reports from Plymouth
and the Medway:--
“PLYMOUTH, Tuesday, 11 a.m.--The _Conqueror_, _Achilles_, _Gorgon_,
_Hecate_, _Prince Albert_, _Forth_, _Inconstant_, _Thames_, _Spanker_,
and _Sharpshooter_ have to-day gone out of harbour, and are now
anchored with the _Black Prince_ within the breakwater. They are
the only vessels at this port that are in anything like a state of
immediate readiness for sea, yet they are only half manned, and there
is no probability, so far as can at present be seen, of providing
proper complements for more than half of them.”
“SHEERNESS, Tuesday, 11 p.m.--The following vessels of the Medway
Fleet Reserve, A Division, are now here--_viz._, _Empress of India_,
_Northampton_, _Cyclops_, _Hydra_, _Narcissus_, _Arethusa_, _Mersey_,
_Medea_, _Medusa_, _Barracouta_, _Grasshopper_, _Salamander_,
_Skipjack_, and _Sheldrake_. Though all of them have been officially
reported as ready for sea, several--notably some of the cruisers and
gun-vessels--are suffering from various temporary defects, and not one
is, or at present can be properly manned, as neither lieutenants nor
men are available in sufficient numbers. The _Empress_ is reported to
have developed defects in her big guns, and is therefore partially
useless. The _Blenheim_ is not completed, but she may be got ready in
ten days.”
[Illustration: “THE CHANNEL FLEET HAS BEEN ORDERED HOME.”]
It was further announced that the Channel Fleet, consisting of the
battleships _Royal Sovereign_, _Anson_, _Howe_, and _Rodney_, the
belted cruisers _Aurora_ and _Immortalité_, and the small craft
_Curlew_ and _Speedwell_, was at Vigo, and had been ordered home by
telegraph, _viâ_ the Falmouth-Vigo cable. It might be expected at
Spithead on Saturday morning. Most of the above-quoted news was of
an unsatisfactory nature; for though the mention of so many ships as
being more or less ready for sea inspired a certain vague confidence in
the mind of the average layman as he sat at his breakfast table, the
admission that, owing to lack of men, half of them were really useless,
was one the significance of which could not but strike even him who
had only the most casual knowledge of naval affairs. To the expert the
reports were still more painful, for every expert knew well enough that
ships like the _Minotaur_, _Shannon_, _Achilles_, _Prince Albert_,
and others were, manned or unmanned, of little value save on paper.
Naturally, therefore, the early morning news, and particularly the
terrible intelligence of the catastrophe off Toulon, aroused immense
excitement and universal uneasiness. But excitement does not at once
betray itself. Men must first meet and talk, and hear one another’s
views and apprehensions concerning what has happened and what is to
come. And ere they had time to meet and talk on that awful Wednesday,
more alarming news than had yet reached them arrived, and drove them
from a state of repressed excitement into a condition of panic.
The French had struck boldly, promptly, and effectively at Toulon,
but, alas! not only there. Before ten o’clock a second edition of
each of the morning papers announced the occurrence of a fresh and
more humiliating catastrophe than that which had befallen us in the
Mediterranean. The _Standard’s_ account is here given:--
“PORTSMOUTH, Wednesday, 6.45 a.m.--While lamenting the magnitude of the
misfortune that has just overtaken a great part of the Fleet assembled
here, and the dreadful fate that has overwhelmed I am afraid to say
how many hundreds of Her Majesty’s officers and men, it is impossible
to avoid admiring the energy and dash of an enemy who, almost as soon
as war is declared, succeeds in planting a deadly blow at our very
vitals. What has happened is shocking in the extreme; but it is also
marvellous. With a suddenness that seems almost inexplicable, the
squadron at Spithead has been practically destroyed. Late last night it
seemed ready to go anywhere and do anything; this morning the little
that exists of it is a shattered remnant, barely able to keep itself
afloat, and utterly useless for any of the purposes of the immediate
future.
“I had, as you are aware, obtained authority from the Admiralty to
proceed to sea as a passenger on board H.M.S. _Alexandra_ during the
Channel cruise, which it was yesterday announced the Reserve Squadron
would undertake as soon as it could be assembled at Spithead. The only
ships of the squadron to arrive yesterday were the _Invincible_ from
Southampton and the _Alexandra_ from Portland. The latter did not
take up her anchorage until between nine and ten o’clock at night;
but as she had been previously sighted and signalled, I--with some
difficulty--engaged a shore boat and was at Spithead, ready to board
her when she appeared. The ships already there were anchored in two
lines, which stretched from the south-west, nearly abreast of No
Man’s Land and the Horse Sand to the north-west, abreast of Gilkicker
Point and Ryde. The heavier part of the Fleet formed the line which
lay nearest to the Isle of Wight, and, beginning from the south-east,
consisted of the _Hercules_, _Minotaur_, _Alexandra_, _Hero_,
_Invincible_, and _Glatton_. The cruiser squadron formed the line
which lay nearest to the harbour, and, beginning from the south-east,
consisted of the _Rattlesnake_, _Bellona_, _Iris_, _Galatea_,
_Latona_, and _Seagull_. There were thus six vessels in each line, the
_Rattlesnake_ being abreast of the _Hercules_, the _Bellona_ of the
_Minotaur_, and so on; and there was a distance of two cables between
the ships of each line, and of four cables between the lines.
[Illustration: “SHIPS WERE TAKING IN POWDER AND SHELL.”]
“Most of the ships, when I reached Spithead, were taking in powder and
shell, and were doing so by the light of their search-lights, from the
hoys and barges which lay alongside. Some ships, also, were completing
with coal. All, moreover, were taking in sea stores and supplies of
every kind, the result being that night seemed to be turned into day,
and that Spithead was crowded with boats and launches. I boarded the
_Alexandra_ as soon as she had taken up her berth between the
_Minotaur_ and the _Hero_; but, though it was getting late, there was,
of course, no thought of turning in. Indeed, even if there had been
no work on hand, and if Spithead had been as quiet as it commonly is
at ten o’clock, there was so much anxiety in every ship concerning
the news from the Mediterranean, and such continuous expectation that
weighty intelligence of some sort would presently be brought off by
one of the numerous craft from the shore, that no one cared to go to
sleep lest perchance he might not hear the first word of definite
intelligence. The few officers who had leisure to sit in the ward-room
and smoking-room could talk of nothing but the war and the ships up the
Straits. Those who had to be on deck thought, if they did not talk, on
the same subjects. The Vice-Admiral and captain had gone ashore to see
the Commander-in-Chief; the ship was in charge of the commander; and I
had nothing better to do than to take stock of the scene around me.
“Alongside the _Hero_ a hoy was hoisting out powder cases and boxes
of ammunition, which were stacked around the turret on her low deck
forward, and thence gradually removed to the magazines below. The
_Minotaur_ was filling up with coal, and had a barge on each side
of her. The _Iris_, abreast of us, was, like the _Hero_, taking in
her powder, and also a number of huge electro-contact mines--great
red-painted iron cases, which must have weighed nearly a ton a-piece.
We at first did nothing, but soon a coal barge came alongside, and we
began not only to fill up our bunkers, but also to pile coal on our
decks, for the order had gone forth that every ship was to be coaled
to her utmost capacity. Usually when a ship is coaling her ports
are closed, and pains are taken to exclude as much as possible the
all-pervading dust; but we and the other ships were coaling cleared for
action, and with half the guns loaded and run out. No vessel had her
torpedo nets completely down, as all had craft alongside; but all had
a certain number of boats out, and the whole anchorage between the Nab
on the east and Hurst Castle on the west was supposed to be patrolled
by these and by torpedo boats. A large amount of material in the shape
of spars and buoys had been towed out of harbour during the day, with
a view to constructing substantial defence booms, within which ships
might lie in safety; but the work of construction had not been begun,
and most of the material was anchored on No Man’s Land, where it was to
remain for the night. No one, I think I may safely say, thought that
there was the slightest probability of our being attacked. At midnight,
however, with a view to making all sure, a couple of first-class
torpedo boats were sent out by each entrance, and the four were ordered
to scout between Christchurch and Selsea Bill, and at the back of the
Isle of Wight.
[Illustration: “A COUPLE OF FIRST-CLASS TORPEDO BOATS WERE SENT OUT.”]
“Portsmouth, as the crow flies, is only about seventy knots--nautical
miles--from Cherbourg. A vessel steaming, therefore, at a speed of
fifteen knots, should do the distance easily in five hours. Our
enemy must have come from Cherbourg. He can scarcely, indeed, in the
circumstances, have come from anywhere else; and he probably left
Cherbourg at about nine o’clock, for he came upon us soon after two
this morning. The sea was smooth, the night was dark and chilly, and
our vitality was at its lowest, as most men’s vitality is in the small
hours, when suddenly, apparently not more than two or three miles from
us, we heard the boom of a gun. In an instant all were on deck. Some
declared that the sound had come from the east; others swore that they
had seen the flash light up the sky over Egypt Point to the westward.
The commander at once ordered away all the craft from alongside, and
directed that the nets were to be fully rigged out; but, as everyone
knows, lighters and barges cannot be got rid of in an instant, and long
before the order could have been obeyed, we and our consorts were in
the midst of one of the bloodiest struggles of which history gives any
record.
“Within a minute of the time when we heard the first report we heard
others, and saw over Bembridge Point the bouquet of a rocket which,
we knew, had been fired by one of our boats as a signal that the
enemy was approaching in force. I am not exaggerating, and I in no
way do injustice to our officers and men, when I say that a scene of
the direst confusion followed. The captain of the _Hercules_ was the
senior officer present. He signalled by means of flash lights from his
mast-head, ‘Cruisers will slip their cables and proceed with dispatch
to sea in search of the enemy, those lying to eastward of the _Galatea_
going out by the eastward, and those lying to westward of the _Iris_
going out by the westward entrance. Rendezvous, Spithead, 8 a.m.
Battleships will prepare to slip cables and follow--’ But the signal
was never completed. The shore boats and lighters were still pushing
off; our officers were still shouting at them from the bridge and
gangways for their delay, and the poor bum-boat women were shrieking,
partly from fear and partly because they and their goods had been
separated, when another rocket and yet another went up from a point
well on our side of the Nab, and, under the glare of their explosions,
we saw, not a mile and a half from us, three or four low-lying black
hulls, which we knew could only be those of the torpedo cruisers of
the enemy. In an instant, and forgetful of our torpedo boats, which
must have sent up the warning rockets, and which must, therefore,
have been not far out of the line of fire, every vessel that could
bring a gun of any kind to bear, opened in the direction of the foe.
The roar was infernal, and, for a brief period, the dense smoke hid
everything from us; but such slight air as there was gently carried the
smoke to the westward, and soon we could see the enemy again. He was
apparently none the worse for his reception, and was now much nearer
to us. Fire was re-opened, and maintained with fury. The _Alexandra_
was incommoded somewhat by the ships to windward of her, and fired
only occasionally; but the _Hercules_, _Minotaur_, and _Rattlesnake_
seemed to blaze away almost without intermission, and the volumes of
smoke that came slowly to leeward showed how freely they were spending
their powder. The enemy fired very little. We expected to hear him
using his torpedoes. And use them he did, but not from the direction
which we anticipated. That attack had lasted, I suppose, a quarter of
an hour, and there had been little, if any, cessation of the firing
from our side, when, to our consternation, a second attack quickly
developed itself from the westward. It is quite clear to me now that
the eastward attack by three or four torpedo cruisers--probably vessels
of the _Condor_ and _Bombe_ types--was merely a feint intended to amuse
us while the real attack from the westward was being made. The Needles,
or westward passage to Spithead, is not a particularly easy one in any
circumstances, and is commanded not only by numerous batteries, but
also by the Brennan torpedo station at Fort Cliff End; but our enemies
chose to take the risk of coming to grief in their attempt to find
their way in by that passage, and it must be sadly admitted that the
results have more than justified their temerity.
[Illustration: “EVERY VESSEL OPENED IN THE DIRECTION OF THE FOE.”]
[Illustration: “IT WAS FEARFUL WORK; THE VERY SILENCE OF THE GREY BOATS
MADE THE SCENE THE MORE IMPRESSIVE.”]
“The real attack was delivered by torpedo boats only, some being of
the ‘_haute mer_’ type, and others of the ordinary first-class. The
larger vessels seem to have acted as ‘division boats,’ and there appear
to have been four divisions engaged, each division on this occasion
consisting of one _torpilleur de haute mer_ and three torpedo boats,
making sixteen craft all told. I do not pretend to be certain either
as to the exact numbers or as to the exact constitution of the force;
but those who had the best opportunities of knowing, place both as I
have given them. The flotilla must have evaded our scouts, possibly
by first making the land near Christchurch and then by keeping close
under it; for it was not seen until, almost like a flash, it steamed in
close order past Fort Cliff End. Both Fort Cliff End and Hurst Castle
were using their search-lights, and it was owing to this fact that
the enemy was discovered. But the forts were unprepared for instant
action, and ere fire of any kind could be opened, the boats were
somewhere abreast of the Bramble, and within ten or twelve minutes’
steam of their quarry. Even when the forts did open they did no harm,
for the smoke of the action which was raging at the other end of the
anchorage was drifting between them and the enemy. Besides, when the
search-lights from the forts, or later, from the ships, fell upon
any particular craft, they rendered all the other craft of the enemy
completely invisible; and the operators, speedily becoming conscious
of this fact, and being anxious to show up as many of the enemy as
possible, shifted their projectors so rapidly as to confuse the eyes
of the men at the guns. The truth seems to be that the most effective
shelter under which a torpedo boat can approach to do damage is the
shelter afforded by a search-light played upon some other vessel by the
intended victim. Moreover, very few guns could be brought to bear, the
chief works being so constructed as to be almost powerless for action
on the Solent side, and being mainly designed to impede the foe as he
comes in from the west-south-west, not to destroy him after he has got
in. Thus the French steamed up without let or hindrance to within quite
a short distance of the _Glatton_ and _Seagull_, which formed, as
I have already said, the north-eastern extremities of our two lines.
These ships, or their picket boats, sighted the flotilla when it cannot
have been anything like a mile from them. At the first shot from the
Fleet, or perhaps before it, the divisions must have separated in
order to act in accordance with orders previously given to them. Two
divisions, now formed in a single column of line ahead, came up at full
speed between our lines. The other two divisions, disposed respectively
on the port and starboard quarters of the central divisions, came up
also in columns of line ahead, one on each side of the still anchored
Fleet. The central divisions came on therefore at a distance of about
two cables from the ships on either beam of them. The other divisions
kept about as far outside the lines, and the speed I imagine was fully
eighteen knots. As the boats executed that terrible rush through us,
they were saluted with a perfect hurricane of projectiles; but they
did not, so far as I know, fire a gun in reply, and I fear that a
good many of our own shot intended for the central divisions must
have done more harm to friend than to foe. It was fearful work: the
very silence of the grey boats made the now brilliantly illuminated
though smoke-dimmed scene the more impressive. One could not help
admiring so splendid an exhibition of pluck, even though one was fully
conscious of the magnitude and imminence of one’s own peril. But
there was little time for thought. Our lines were less than a mile in
length. Travelling at eighteen knots a boat covers a mile in about
three minutes, and in five or six minutes at the outside the dismal
tragedy had begun and ended. The French launched their torpedoes with
wonderful precision, the central divisions discharging both right
and left, and the outside divisions, which approached a few seconds
later, apparently endeavouring to rectify any mistakes or omissions
which their comrades of the centre had been guilty of. Too well, alas!
did they do the business. It is as yet too early to send you details,
save of what happened to the vessels immediately within my own sphere
of vision; but there is no hope, that, by waiting, I can obtain any
less disheartening general results than those which I can already
give you. The _Hero_, _Invincible_, _Iris_, _Galatea_, and _Bellona_
have been sunk or have been obliged to run ashore to avoid sinking;
the _Minotaur_ has been blown up, the explosion of a torpedo having,
it is believed, fired some of the explosive stores which she had just
taken on board; the _Alexandra_ has a great hole in her port quarter
and a compartment full of water; and the _Glatton_ has a hole in her
bows. Only the _Hercules_, _Latona_, _Seagull_, and _Rattlesnake_
have escaped uninjured. A torpedo, barely submerged, seems to have
actually exploded in contact with the _Hercules_, but that ship’s stout
construction and armoured belt saved her from anything worse than a
very severe shaking. Several lighters and small craft were also sunk;
and the loss of life, in one way and another, is, I fear, frightful.
It is doubtful whether more than fifty of the _Minotaur’s_ people
survive. The blowing up of the vessel was so violent that we, who were
anchored immediately astern of her, felt as if we were jerked out
of the water, and a moment later our decks were covered with and even
set on fire by her burning fragments. May I never live to have another
so awful experience. Limbs, ragged pieces of charred flesh, scraps
of clothing, as well as wreckage, fell on board of us; and the shock
of the explosion smashed everything in the _Alexandra_ that had not
already been shattered by the bursting of a French torpedo under her
own port quarter. The _Iris_ was struck just before we were, and, being
in a sinking condition, was run on to the Sturbridge Sand, where she
lies with her bows in two and a half fathoms. The _Bellona_ is on the
Harrow Bank, immediately under Fort Monckton. The _Galatea_ and _Hero_
lie sunk at their anchorages; and I am sorry to have to say that, in
the struggle, a quantity of ammunition on the _Hero’s_ deck blew up,
killing and injuring a number of people. The _Invincible_ sank while
endeavouring to run on to the outer Spit. The heaviest losses were
suffered by the _Minotaur_, _Hero_, and _Galatea_. The other ships have
lost very few men killed, but have had a good many wounded; and in all
the vessels which were torpedoed there were numerous sufferers from
the poisonous and suffocating effects of the explosive gases and from
shock. The _Alexandra’s_ loss is ten killed, and sixty-four wounded or
otherwise injured. The torpedo which struck her threw down everyone on
board, and raised a column of water of such volume that when part of it
fell on deck, it washed men into the scuppers just as if it had been a
heavy sea.
[Illustration: “MAY I NEVER LIVE TO HAVE ANOTHER SO AWFUL EXPERIENCE.”]
[Illustration: “THEY RENDERED ALL THE OTHER CRAFT OF THE ENEMY
INVISIBLE.”]
[Illustration: “THE ATTACK ON THE ‘HERCULES.’”]
“The enemy also have suffered, but very slightly in comparison with
us. Two _torpilleurs de haute mer_ and four torpedo boats are said to
have been sunk or blown up, and of those which got away several are
known to have been badly damaged. Whether our fire did any harm worth
mentioning to the small cruisers which began the affair is more than we
can tell. We cannot, however, claim to have done much more than destroy
six little craft, and to have worked other harm which, altogether,
may represent a quarter of a million. The French have done us damage
to the extent of at least two and a quarter millions in money alone.
They may have lost a hundred in killed and wounded; we, at the lowest
computation, have lost nearly a thousand. The blow, therefore, is one
the seriousness of which it would be folly to shut one’s eye to. It is,
as far as the Portsmouth squadron is concerned, a thoroughly crippling
one.
“That the French attack was both well designed and well carried out it
is impossible to deny. It came swiftly after the declaration of war;
it was so arranged as to give the attacking torpedo boats the full
advantage not only of the feint from the eastward, but also of such
wind as was moving; and it was designed in such a way as to place the
torpedo boats, after they had done their work, in a position whence,
in case of necessity, they could be rescued by their friends the
cruisers. In fact it cannot be doubted that, after their wild rush
through our lines, some of the boats must have been very glad to run at
once under the protection of their larger consorts; for several of
them were certainly badly mauled. Of our own four boats which went out
at midnight to scout we have as yet heard nothing; but there is every
reason to fear, at least with regard to those which were on the eastern
side of the Isle of Wight, that they have been destroyed or captured.
The _Rattlesnake_ slipped her cable and followed the retreating enemy
for some miles, but was recalled by the Vice-Admiral, who was returning
from the shore when the alarm was first given, and whose steam launch
narrowly escaped being run down by the port line of French torpedo
boats as the vessels turned at the head of our port line in order to
rejoin their friends. The Spithead forts, I should add, did not fire
during the engagement. It is rumoured that they had not been supplied
with ammunition. The Commander-in-Chief has just left harbour in his
yacht, the _Fire Queen_, to inspect the ships which are damaged or
aground, and to settle what is to be done. In the meantime the town
is in a panic, other attacks being feared. The blowing up of the
_Minotaur_ broke nearly every pane of glass in Southsea, and created
such alarm that several aged people are reported to have died from
fright.”
[Illustration: “WHOSE STEAM LAUNCH NARROWLY ESCAPED BEING RUN DOWN.”]
[Illustration: “THE BLOWING UP OF THE ‘MINOTAUR.’”]
The second edition of each of the morning papers contained a dispatch
to the above effect. The bad news, owing to the lateness of its
arrival, was printed without comment; but immediate comment was
unnecessary--the intelligence spoke for itself. We had been suddenly
deprived of the services of five ironclads and three cruisers; which,
added to the tale of vessels that had been lost or taken off Toulon,
made a total of ten ironclads and five cruisers accounted for by the
enemy within forty-eight hours of the commencement of hostilities.
The panic that ensued has had no parallel in the history of the
country. The violation of our coasts, and indeed of our chief naval
port, was an exploit which the majority of Englishmen had for
generations deemed beyond the power of any foreigner or combination
of foreigners: and the shock of knowing that it not only could be,
but had been effected, threw nearly all men off their balance. The
less-educated classes entirely lost their heads, and, at hastily
summoned meetings in Trafalgar Square and elsewhere, wildly denounced
not only those who were, but also those who were not, responsible
for the disaster. It was, perhaps, difficult to apportion the
responsibility among those who might be fairly blamed--among, for
example, the members of the Government, the Lords of the Admiralty, and
the chiefs of certain departments--but it was ridiculous to blame, as
many mob orators did, the admirals and captains who had been concerned.
Steadier brains realised this, and their views were substantially
represented on this occasion by the _St. James’s Gazette_, which in the
course of its reflections that afternoon, said:--
“Let us be under no delusion as to the real causes of our misfortunes.
These may be easily catalogued. For years we have had naval manœuvres
every summer; and all of these have been full of valuable lessons, to
the majority of which we have, nevertheless, kept our eyes shut. For
years we have had a large number of ships on the list of the Royal
Navy; but we have not taken the trouble to make certain that the
greater part of these shall always be ready for immediate service. For
years we have had a Naval Intelligence Department; but we have not made
it large enough to be thoroughly efficient, and we have never raised it
to the level which it ought to occupy as the supreme adviser of what
should and what should not be done in naval affairs. For years we have
known that the French Fleet at Toulon was being gradually increased,
but we have never taken care that our Mediterranean Fleet should be
in all respects superior to it. For years we have had it dinned into
our ears that divided command at the naval ports--especially with
regard to coast and harbour defences--is a source of danger, but we
have not listened. For years we have been told that we were lamentably
short of stokers, seamen-gunners, and, indeed, bluejackets of all
sorts; but our efforts to increase their numbers have been spasmodic
and half-hearted. For years we have been aware that excessively big
guns were a broken reed on which to depend, but no action has been
taken in consequence. We might extend the lamentable catalogue of
our omissions and commissions, but it is useless and undignified to
moan over the unalterable past. The future only is now our concern.
Existing arrangements have convincingly demonstrated their feebleness
and inadequacy. Some means must be provisionally adopted for properly
managing the naval affairs of the Empire. It may be a bad thing to
swap horses when one is crossing a stream; but if one’s own horse be
sinking, there is no better course open. The Admiralty has collapsed;
yet, although it is moribund, it still has the power to work harm.
Let it, therefore, gracefully and promptly hand over its duties to
stronger men. We do not blame their Lordships so much as we blame the
system under which they have worked. But we have no time for making
compliments or for considering excuses. Already we have been hardly
hit. Another blow may paralyse us altogether. The safety of the country
is the one thing to be thought of, and we trust that neither the
Admiralty nor the public will think of anything else. To the one we
recommend unselfishness and resignation to the needs of the moment;
to the other, calmness, loyalty, and patriotic devotion. Ours is not
an inheritance to vanish in a day, but neither is it a treasure to be
trifled with.”
[Illustration: “A TORPEDO EXPLODED UNDER HER OWN PORT QUARTER.”]