The fact that Japan's exports of raw silk amount to more than 12
millions sterling, while she sends over-sea only 3½ millions' worth of
silk fabrics, suggests some marked inferiority on the part of her
weavers. But the true explanation seems to be that her distance from
the Occident handicaps her in catering for the changing fashions of
the West. There cannot be any doubt that the skill of Japanese weavers
was at one time eminent. The sun goddess herself, the predominant
figure in the Japanese pantheon, is said to have practised weaving;
the names of four varieties of woven fabrics were known in prehistoric
times; the 3rd century of the Christian era saw the arrival of a
Korean maker of cloth; after him came an influx of Chinese who were
distributed throughout the country to improve the arts of sericulture
and silk-weaving; a sovereign (Yuriaku) of the 5th century employed 92
groups of naturalized Chinese for similar purposes; in 421 the same
emperor issued a decree encouraging the culture of mulberry trees and
calling for taxes on silk and cotton; the manufacture of textiles was
directly supervised by the consort of this sovereign; in 645 a bureau
of weaving was established; many other evidences are conclusive as to
the great antiquity of the art of silk and cotton weaving in Japan.
The coming of Buddhism in the 6th century contributed not a little to
the development of the art, since not only did the priests require for
their own vestments and for the decoration of temples silken fabrics
of more and more gorgeous description, but also these holy men
themselves, careful always to keep touch with the continental
developments of their faith, made frequent voyages to China, whence
they brought back to Japan a knowledge of whatever technical or
artistic improvements the Middle Kingdom could show. When Kioto became
the permanent metropolis of the empire, at the close of the 8th
century, a bureau was established for weaving brocades and rich silk
stuffs to be used in the palace. This preluded an era of some three
centuries of steadily developing luxury in Kioto; an era when an
essential part of every aristocratic mansion's furniture was a
collection of magnificent silk robes for use in the sumptuous _No_.
Then, in the 15th century came the "Tea Ceremonial," when the brocade
mountings of a picture or the wrapper of a tiny tea-jar possessed an
almost incredible value, and such skill was attained by weavers and
dyers that even fragments of the fabrics produced by them command
extravagant prices to-day. Kioto always remained, and still remains,
the chief producing centre, and to such a degree has the science of
colour been developed there that no less than 4000 varieties of tint
are distinguished. The sense of colour, indeed, seems to have been a
special endowment of the Japanese people from the earliest times, and
some of the combinations handed down from medieval times are treasured
as incomparable examples. During the long era of peace under the
Tokugawa administration the costumes of men and women showed an
increasing tendency to richness and beauty. This culminated in the
Genroku epoch (1688-1700), and the aristocracy of the present day
delight in viewing histrionic performances where the costumes of that
age and of its rival, the Momoyama (end of the 16th century) are
reproduced.
It would be possible to draw up a formidable catalogue of the various
kinds of silk fabrics manufactured in Japan before the opening of the
Meiji era, and the signal ability of her weavers has derived a new
impulse from contact with the Occident. Machinery has been largely
introduced, and though the products of hand-looms still enjoy the
reputation of greater durability, there has unquestionably been a
marked development of producing power. Japanese looms now turn out
about 17 millions sterling of silk textiles, of which less than 4
millions go abroad. Nor is increased quantity alone to be noted, for
at the factory of Kawashima in Kioto Gobelins are produced such as
have never been rivalled elsewhere.
_Commerce in Tokugawa Times._--The conditions existing in Japan during
the two hundred and fifty years prefatory to the modern opening of the
country were unfavourable to the development alike of national and of
international trade. As to the former, the system of feudal government
exercised a crippling influence, for each feudal chief endeavoured to
check the exit of any kind of property from his fief, and free
interchange of commodities was thus prevented so effectually that cases
are recorded of one feudatory's subjects dying of starvation while those
of an adjoining fief enjoyed abundance. International commerce, on the
other hand, lay under the veto of the central government, which punished
with death anyone attempting to hold intercourse with foreigners. Thus
the fiefs practised a policy of mutual seclusion at home, and united to
maintain a policy of general seclusion abroad. Yet it was under the
feudal system that the most signal development of Japanese trade took
place, and since the processes of that development have much historical
interest they invite close attention.
As the bulk of a feudal chief's income was paid in rice, arrangements
had to be made for sending the grain to market and transmitting its
proceeds. This was effected originally by establishing in Osaka stores
(_kura-yashiki_), under the charge of samurai, who received the rice,
sold it to merchants in that city and remitted the proceeds by
official carriers. But from the middle of the 17th century these
stores were placed in the charge of tradesmen to whom was given the
name of _kake-ya_ (agent). They disposed of the products entrusted to
them by a fief and held the money, sending it by monthly instalments
to an appointed place, rendering yearly accounts and receiving
commission at the rate of from 2 to 4%. They had no special licence,
but they were honourably regarded and often distinguished by an
official title or an hereditary pension. In fact a kake-ya, of such
standing as the Mitsui and the Konoike families, was, in effect, a
banker charged with the finances of several fiefs. In Osaka the method
of sale was uniform. Tenders were invited, and these having been
opened in the presence of all the store officials and kake-ya, the
successful tenderers had to deposit bargain-money, paying the
remainder within ten days, and thereafter becoming entitled to take
delivery of the rice in whole or by instalments within a certain time,
no fee being charged for storage. A similar system existed in Yedo,
the shogun's capital. Out of the custom of deferred delivery developed
the establishment of exchanges where advances were made against sale
certificates, and purely speculative transactions came into vogue.
There followed an experience common enough in the West at one time:
public opinion rebelled against these transactions in margins on the
ground that they tended to enhance the price of rice. Several of the
brokers were arrested and brought to trial; marginal dealings were
thenceforth forbidden, and a system of licences was inaugurated in
Yedo, the number of licensed dealers[7] being restricted to 108.
The system of organized trading companies had its origin in the 12th
century, when, the number of merchants admitted within the confines of
Yedo being restricted, it became necessary for those not obtaining
that privilege to establish some mode of co-operation, and there
resulted the formation of companies with representatives stationed in
the feudal capital and share-holding members in the provinces. The
Ashikaga shoguns developed this restriction by selling to the highest
bidder the exclusive right of engaging in a particular trade, and the
Tokugawa administration had recourse to the same practice. But whereas
the monopolies instituted by the Ashikaga had for sole object the
enrichment of the exchequer, the Tokugawa regarded it chiefly as a
means of obtaining worthy representatives in each branch of trade. The
first licences were issued in Yedo to keepers of bath-houses in the
middle of the 17th century. As the city grew in dimensions these
licences increased in value, so that pawnbrokers willingly accepted
them in pledge for loans. Subsequently almanack-sellers were obliged
to take out licences, and the system was afterwards extended to
money-changers.
It was to the fishmongers, however, that the advantages of commercial
organization first presented themselves vividly. The greatest
fish-market in Japan is at Nihon-bashi in Tokyo (formerly Yedo). It
had its origin in the needs of the Tokugawa court. When Iyeyasu
(founder of the Tokugawa dynasty) entered Yedo in 1590, his train was
followed by some fishermen of Settsu, to whom he granted the privilege
of plying their trade in the adjacent seas, on condition that they
furnished a supply of their best fish for the use of the garrison. The
remainder they offered for sale at Nihon-bashi. Early in the 17th
century one Sukegoro of Yamato province (hence called Yamato-ya) went
to Yedo and organized the fishmongers into a great gild. Nothing is
recorded about this man's antecedents, though his mercantile genius
entitles him to historical notice. He contracted for the sale of all
the fish obtained in the neighbouring seas, advanced money to the
fishermen on the security of their catch, constructed preserves for
keeping the fish alive until they were exposed in the market, and
enrolled all the dealers in a confederation which ultimately consisted
of 391 wholesale merchants and 246 brokers. The main purpose of
Sukegoro's system was to prevent the consumer from dealing direct with
the producer. Thus in return for the pecuniary accommodation granted
to fishermen to buy boats and nets they were required to give every
fish they caught to the wholesale merchant from whom they had received
the advance; and the latter, on his side, had to sell in the open
market at prices fixed by the confederation. A somewhat similar system
applied to vegetables, though in this case the monopoly was never so
close.
It will be observed that this federation of fishmongers approximated
closely to a trust, as the term is now understood; that is to say, an
association of merchants engaged in the same branch of trade and
pledged to observe certain rules in the conduct of their business as
well as to adhere to fixed rates. The idea was extended to nearly
every trade, 10 monster confederations being organized in Yedo and 24
in Osaka. These received official recognition, and contributed a sum
to the exchequer under the euphonious name of "benefit money,"
amounting to nearly £20,000 annually. They attained a high state of
prosperity, the whole of the cities' supplies passing through their
hands.[8] No member of a confederation was permitted to dispose of his
licence except to a near relative, and if anyone not on the roll of a
confederation engaged in the same business he became liable to
punishment at the hands of the officials. In spite of the limits thus
imposed on the transfer of licences, one of these documents commanded
from £80 to £6,400, and in the beginning of the 19th century the
confederations, or gilds, had increased to 68 in Yedo, comprising 1195
merchants. The gild system extended to maritime enterprise also. In
the beginning of the 17th century a merchant of Sakai (near Osaka)
established a junk service between Osaka and Yedo, but this kind of
business did not attain any considerable development until the close
of that century, when 10 gilds of Yedo and 24 of Osaka combined to
organize a marine-transport company for the purpose of conveying their
own merchandise. Here also the principle of monopoly was strictly
observed, no goods being shipped for unaffiliated merchants. This
carrying trade rapidly assumed large dimensions. The number of junks
entering Yedo rose to over 1500 yearly. They raced from port to port,
just as tea-clippers from China to Europe used to race in recent
times, and troubles incidental to their rivalry became so serious that
it was found necessary to enact stringent rules. Each junk-master had
to subscribe a written oath that he would comply strictly with the
regulations and observe the sequence of sailing as determined by lot.
The junks had to call _en route_ at Uraga for the purpose of
undergoing official examination. The order of their arrival there was
duly registered, and the master making the best record throughout the
year received a present in money as well as a complimentary garment,
and became the shippers' favourite next season.
Operations relating to the currency also were brought under the
control of gilds. The business of money-changing seems to have been
taken up as a profession from the beginning of the 15th century, but
it was then in the hands of pedlars who carried strings of copper cash
which they exchanged for gold or silver coins, then in rare
circulation, or for parcels of gold dust. From the early part of the
17th century exchanges were opened in Yedo, and in 1718 the men
engaged in this business formed a gild after the fashion of the time.
Six hundred of these received licences, and no unlicensed person was
permitted to purchase the avocation. Four representatives of the chief
exchange met daily and fixed the ratio between gold and silver, the
figure being then communicated to the various exchanges and to the
shogun's officials. As for the prices of gold or silver in terms of
copper or bank-notes, 24 representatives of the exchanges met every
evening, and, in the presence of an official censor, settled the
figure for the following day and recorded the amount of transactions
during the past 24 hours, full information on these points being at
once sent to the city governors and the street elders.
The exchanges in their ultimate form approximated very closely to the
Occidental idea of banks. They not only bought gold, silver and copper
coins, but they also received money on deposit, made loans and issued
vouchers which played a very important part in commercial
transactions. The voucher seems to have come into existence in Japan
in the 14th century. It originated in the Yoshino market of Yamato
province, where the hilly nature of the district rendered the carriage
of copper money so arduous that rich merchants began to substitute
written receipts and engagements which quickly became current. Among
these documents there was a "joint voucher" (_kumiai-fuda_), signed by
several persons, any one of whom might be held responsible for its
redemption. This had large vogue, but it did not obtain official
recognition until 1636, when the third Tokugawa shogun selected 30
substantial merchants and divided them into 3 gilds, each authorized
to issue vouchers, provided that a certain sum was deposited by way of
security. Such vouchers were obviously a form of bank-note. Their
circulation by the exchange came about in a similar manner. During
many years the treasure of the shogun and of the feudal chiefs was
carried to Yedo by pack-horses and coolies of the regular postal
service. But the costliness of such a method led to the selection in
1691 of 10 exchange agents who were appointed bankers to the Tokugawa
government and were required to furnish money within 30 days of the
date of an order drawn on them. These agents went by the name of the
"ten-men gild." Subsequently the firm of Mitsui was added, but it
enjoyed the special privilege of being allowed 150 days to collect a
specified amount. The gild received moneys on account of the Tokugawa
or the feudal chiefs at provincial centres, and then made its own
arrangements for cashing the cheques drawn upon it by the shogun or
the daimyo in Yedo. If coin happened to be immediately available, it
was employed to cash the cheques; otherwise the vouchers of the gild
served instead. It was in Osaka, however, that the functions of the
exchanges acquired fullest development. That city has exhibited, in
all eras, a remarkable aptitude for trade. Its merchants, as already
shown, were not only entrusted with the duty of selling the rice and
other products of the surrounding fiefs, but also they became
depositories of the proceeds, which they paid out on account of the
owners in whatever sums the latter desired. Such an evidence of
official confidence greatly strengthened their credit, and they
received further encouragement from the second Tokugawa shogun
(1605-1623)and from Ishimaru Sadatsugu, governor of the city in 1661.
He fostered wholesale transactions, sought to introduce a large
element of credit into commerce by instituting a system of credit
sales; took measures to promote the circulation of cheques;
inaugurated market sales of gold and silver and appointed ten chiefs
of exchange who were empowered to oversee the business of
money-exchanging in general. These ten received exemption from
municipal taxation and were permitted to wear swords. Under them were
22 exchanges forming a gild, whose members agreed to honour one
another's vouchers and mutually to facilitate business. Gradually they
elaborated a regular system of banking, so that, in the middle of the
18th century, they issued various descriptions of paper-orders for
fixed sums payable at certain places within fixed periods; deposit
notes redeemable on the demand of an indicated person or his order;
bills of exchange drawn by _A_ upon _B_ in favour of _C_ (a common
form for use in monthly or annual settlements); promissory notes to be
paid at a future time, or cheques payable at sight, for goods
purchased; and storage orders engaging to deliver goods on account of
which earnest money had been paid. These last, much employed in
transactions relating to rice and sugar, were generally valid for a
period of 3 years and 3 months, were signed by a confederation of
exchanges or merchants on joint responsibility, and guaranteed the
delivery of the indicated merchandise independently of all accidents.
They passed current as readily as coin, and advances could always be
obtained against them from pawnbrokers.
All these documents, indicating a well-developed system of credit,
were duly protected by law, severe penalties being inflicted for any
failure to implement the pledges they embodied. The merchants of Yedo
and Osaka, working on the system of trusts here described, gradually
acquired great wealth and fell into habits of marked luxury. It is
recorded that they did not hesitate to pay £5 for the first bonito of
the season and £11 for the first egg-fruit. Naturally the spectacle of
such extravagance excited popular discontent. Men began to grumble
against the so-called "official merchants" who, under government
auspices, monopolized every branch of trade; and this feeling grew
almost uncontrollable in 1836, when rice rose to an unprecedented
price owing to crop failure. Men loudly ascribed that state of affairs
to regrating on the part of the wholesale companies, and murmurs
similar to those raised at the close of the 19th century in America
against the trust system began to reach the ears of the authorities
perpetually. The celebrated Fujita Toko of Mito took up the question.
He argued that the monopoly system, since it included Osaka, exposed
the Yedo market to all the vicissitudes of the former city, which had
then lost much of its old prosperity.
Finally, in 1841, the shogun's chief minister, Mizuno Echizen-no-Kami,
withdrew all trading licences, dissolved the gilds and proclaimed that
every person should thenceforth be free to engage in any commerce
without let or hindrance. This recklessly drastic measure, vividly
illustrating the arbitrariness of feudal officialdom, not only
included the commercial gilds, the shipping gilds, the exchange gilds
and the land transport gilds, but was also carried to the length of
forbidding any company to confine itself to wholesale dealings. The
authorities further declared that in times of scarcity wholesale
transactions must be abandoned altogether and retail business alone
carried on, their purpose being to bring retail and wholesale prices
to the same level. The custom of advancing money to fishermen or to
producers in the provincial districts was interdicted; even the
fuda-sashi might no longer ply their calling, and neither bath-house
keepers nor hairdressers were allowed to combine for the purpose of
adopting uniform rates of charges. But this ill-judged interference
produced evils greater than those it was intended to remedy. The gilds
had not really been exacting. Their organization had reduced the cost
of distribution, and they had provided facilities of transport which
brought produce within quick and cheap reach of central markets.
Ten years' experience showed that a modified form of the old system
would conduce to public interests. The gilds were re-established,
licence fees, however, being abolished, and no limit set to the
number of firms in a gild. Things remained thus until the beginning of
the Meiji era (1867), when the gilds shared the cataclysm that
overtook all the country's old institutions.
Japanese commercial and industrial life presents another feature which
seems to suggest special aptitude for combination. In mercantile or
manufacturing families, while the eldest son always succeeded to his
father's business, not only the younger sons but also the apprentices
and employees, after they had served faithfully for a number of years,
expected to be set up as branch houses under the auspices of the
principal family, receiving a place of business, a certain amount of
capital and the privilege of using the original house-name. Many an
old-established firm thus came to have a plexus of branches all
serving to extend its business and strengthen its credit, so that the
group held a commanding position in the business world. It will be
apparent from the above that commercial transactions on a large scale
in pre-Meiji days were practically limited to the two great cities of
Yedo and Osaka, the people in the provincial fiefs having no direct
association with the gild system, confining themselves, for the most
part, to domestic industries on a small scale, and not being allowed
to extend their business beyond the boundaries of the fief to which
they belonged.
_Foreign Commerce during the Meiji Era._--If Japan's industrial
development in modern times has been remarkable, the same may be said
even more emphatically about the development of her over-sea commerce.
This was checked at first not only by the unpopularity attaching to all
intercourse with outside nations, but also by embarrassments resulting
from the difference between the silver price of gold in Japan and its
silver price in Europe, the precious metals being connected in Japan by
a ratio of 1 to 8, and in Europe by a ratio of 1 to 15. This latter fact
was the cause of a sudden and violent appreciation of values; for the
government, seeing the country threatened with loss of all its gold,
tried to avert the catastrophe by altering and reducing the weights of
the silver coins without altering their denominations, and a
corresponding difference exhibited itself, as a matter of course, in the
silver quotations of commodities. Another difficulty was the attitude of
officialdom. During several centuries Japan's over-sea trade had been
under the control of officialdom, to whose coffers it contributed a
substantial revenue. But when the foreign exporter entered the field
under the conditions created by the new system, he diverted to his own
pocket the handsome profit previously accruing to the government; and
since the latter could not easily become reconciled to this loss of
revenue, or wean itself from its traditional habit of interference in
affairs of foreign commerce, and since the foreigner, on his side, not
only desired secrecy in order to prevent competition, but was also
tormented by inveterate suspicions of Oriental espionage, not a little
friction occurred from time to time. Thus the scanty records of that
early epoch suggest that trade was beset with great difficulties, and
that the foreigner had to contend against most adverse circumstances,
though in truth his gains amounted to 40 or 50%.
Tea and Silk.
The chief staples of the early trade were tea and silk. It happened that
just before Japan's raw silk became available for export, the production
of that article in France and Tea and Italy had been largely curtailed
owing to a novel disease of the silkworm. Thus, when the first bales of
Japanese silk appeared in London, and when it was found to possess
qualities entitling it to the highest rank, a keen demand sprang up.
Japanese green tea also, differing radically in flavour and bouquet from
the black tea of China, appealed quickly to American taste, so that by
the year 1907 Japan found herself selling to foreign countries tea to
the extent of 1¼ millions sterling, and raw silk to the extent of 12¼
millions. This remarkable development is typical of the general history
of Japan's foreign trade in modern times. Omitting the first decade and
a half, the statistics for which are imperfect, the volume of the trade
grew from 5 millions sterling in 1873--3 shillings per head of the
population--to 93 millions in 1907--or 38 shillings per head. It was not
a uniform growth. The period of 35 years divides itself conspicuously
into two eras: the first, of 15 years (1873-1887), during which the
development was from 5 millions to 9.7 millions, a ratio of 1 to 2,
approximately; the second, of 20 years (1887-1907), during which the
development was from 9.7 millions to 93 millions, a ratio of 1 to 10.
That a commerce which scarcely doubled itself in the first fifteen years
should have grown nearly tenfold in the next twenty is a fact inviting
attention. There are two principal causes: one general, the other
special. The general cause was that several years necessarily elapsed
before the nation's material condition began to respond perceptibly to
the improvements effected by the Meiji government in matters of
administration, taxation and transport facilities. Fiscal burdens had
been reduced and security of life and property obtained, but railway
building and road-making, harbour construction, the growth of posts,
telegraphs, exchanges and banks, and the development of a mercantile
marine did not exercise a sensible influence on the nation's prosperity
until 1884 or 1885. From that time the country entered a period of
steadily growing prosperity, and from that time private enterprise may
be said to have finally started upon a career of independent activity.
The special cause which, from 1885, contributed to a marked growth of
trade was the resumption of specie payments. Up to that time the
treasury's fiat notes had suffered such marked fluctuations of specie
value that sound or successful commerce became very difficult. Against
the importing merchant the currency trouble worked with double potency.
Not only did the gold with which he purchased goods appreciate
constantly in terms of the silver for which he sold them, but the silver
itself appreciated sharply and rapidly in terms of the fiat notes paid
by Japanese consumers. Cursory reflection may suggest that these factors
should have stimulated exports as much as they depressed imports. But
such was not altogether the case in practice. For the exporter's
transactions were hampered by the possibility that a delay of a week or
even a day might increase the purchasing power of his silver in Japanese
markets by bringing about a further depreciation of paper, so that he
worked timidly and hesitatingly, dividing his operations as minutely as
possible in order to take advantage of the downward tendency of the fiat
notes. Not till this element of pernicious disturbance was removed did
the trade recover a healthy tone and grow so lustily as to tread closely
on the heels of the foreign commerce of China, with her 300 million
inhabitants and long-established international relations.
The Foreign Middleman.
Japan's trade with the outer world was built up chiefly by the energy
and enterprise of the foreign middleman. He acted the part of an almost
ideal agent. As an exporter, his command of cheap capital, his
experience, his knowledge of foreign markets, and his connexions enabled
him to secure sales such as must have been beyond reach of the Japanese
working independently. Moreover, he paid to native consumers ready cash
for their staples, taking upon his own shoulders all the risks of
finding markets abroad. As an importer, he enjoyed, in centres of
supply, credit which the Japanese lacked, and he offered to native
consumers foreign produce brought to their doors with a minimum of
responsibility on their part. Finally, whether as exporters or
importers, foreign middlemen always competed with each other so keenly
that their Japanese clients obtained the best possible terms from them.
Yet the ambition of the Japanese to oust them cannot be regarded as
unnatural. Every nation must desire to carry on its own commerce
independently of alien assistance; and moreover, the foreign middleman's
residence during many years within Japanese territory, but without the
pale of Japanese sovereignty, invested him with an aggressive character
which the anti-Oriental exclusiveness of certain Occidental nations
helped to accentuate. Thus from the point of view of the average
Japanese there are several reasons for wishing to dispense with alien
middlemen, and it is plain that these reasons are operative; for
whereas, in 1888, native merchants carried on only 12% of the country's
over-sea trade without the intervention of the foreign middlemen, their
share rose to 35% in 1899 and has since been slowly increasing.
Balance of Trade.
Analysis of Japan's foreign trade during the Meiji era shows that
during the 35-year period ending in 1907, imports exceeded exports in
21 years and exports exceeded imports in 14 years. This does not
suggest a very badly balanced trade. But closer examination
accentuates the difference, for when the figures are added, it is
found that the excesses of exports aggregated only 11 millions
sterling, whereas the excesses of imports totalled 71 millions, there
being thus a so-called "unfavourable balance" of 60 millions over all.
The movements of specie do not throw much light upon this subject, for
they are complicated by large imports of gold resulting from war
indemnities and foreign loans. Undoubtedly the balance is materially
redressed by the expenditures of the foreign communities in the former
settlements, of foreign tourists visiting Japan and of foreign vessels
engaged in the carrying trade, as well as by the earnings of Japanese
vessels and the interest on investments made by foreigners.
Nevertheless there remains an appreciable margin against Japan, and it
is probably to be accounted for by the consideration that she is still
engaged equipping herself for the industrial career evidently lying
before her.
Trade with Various Countries.
The manner in which Japan's over-sea trade was divided in 1907 among
the seven foreign countries principally engaged in it may be seen from
the following table:--
Exports to Imports from Total
£ (millions). £ (millions). £ (millions).
United States 13½ 8½ 22
China 8¾ 6¼ 15
Great Britain 2¼ 11¾ 14
British India 1{1/3} 7(2/3) 9
Germany 1{1/8} 4(7/8) 6
France 4{1/3} (2/3) 5
Korea 3{1/3} 1(2/3) 5
Among the 33 open ports of Japan, the first place belongs to Yokohama
in the matter of foreign trade, and Kobe ranks second. The former far
outstrips the latter in exports, but the case is reversed when imports
are considered. As to the percentages of the whole trade standing to
the credit of the five principal ports, the following figures may be
consulted:--Yokohama, 40%; Kobe, 35.6; Osaka, 10; Moji, 5; and
Nagasaki, 2.