Class 1. Roads passing through several localities in succession, or
merely leading from one locality to another.
Class 2. Roads specially constructed for the convenience of
irrigation, pasturage, mines, factories, &c., in accordance with
measures determined by the people of the locality.
Class 3. Roads constructed for the benefit of Shinto shrines,
Buddhist temples, or to facilitate the cultivation of rice-fields
and arable land.
Of the above three headings, it was decided that all national roads
should be maintained at the national expense, the regulations for their
up-keep being entrusted to the care of the prefectures along the line of
route, and the cost incurred being paid from the Imperial treasury.
Prefectural roads are maintained by a joint contribution from the
government and from the particular prefecture, each paying one-half of
the sum needed. Village roads, being for the convenience of local
districts alone, are maintained at the expense of such districts under
the general supervision of the corresponding prefecture. The width of
national roads was determined at 42 ft. for class 1, 36 ft. for class 2,
and 30 ft. for class 3; the prefectural roads were to be from 24 to 30
ft., and the dimensions of the village roads were optional, according to
the necessity of the case.
Vehicles.
The Jinrikisha.
The vehicles chiefly employed in ante-Meiji days were ox-carriages,
_norimono_, _kago_ and carts drawn by hand. Ox-carriages were used
only by people of the highest rank. They were often constructed of
rich lacquer; the curtains suspended in front were of the finest
bamboo workmanship, with thick cords and tassels of plaited silk, and
the draught animal, an ox of handsome proportions, was brilliantly
caparisoned. The care and expense lavished upon these highly ornate
structures would have been deemed extravagant even in medieval Europe.
They have passed entirely out of use, and are now to be seen in
museums only, but the type still exists in China. The norimono
resembled a miniature house slung by its roof-ridge from a massive
pole which projected at either end sufficiently to admit the shoulders
of a carrier. It, too, was frequently of very ornamental nature and
served to carry aristocrats or officials of high position. The kago
was the humblest of all conveyances recognized as usable by the upper
classes. It was an open palanquin, V-shaped in cross section, slung
from a pole which rested on the shoulders of two bearers.
Extraordinary skill and endurance were shown by the men who carried
the norimono and the kago, but none the less these vehicles were both
profoundly uncomfortable. They have now been relegated to the
warehouses of undertakers, where they serve as bearers for folks too
poor to employ catafalques, their place on the roads and in the
streets having been completely taken by the _jinrikisha_, a
two-wheeled vehicle pulled by one or two men who think nothing of
running 20 m. at the rate of 6 m. an hour. The jinrikisha was devised
by a Japanese in 1870, and since then it has come into use throughout
the whole of Asia eastward of the Suez Canal. Luggage, of course,
could not be carried by norimono or kago. It was necessary to have
recourse to packmen, pack-horses or baggage-carts drawn by men or
horses. All these still exist and are as useful as ever within certain
limits. In the cities and towns horses used as beasts of burden are
now shod with iron, but in rural or mountainous districts straw shoes
are substituted, a device which enables the animals to traverse rocky
or precipitous roads with safety.
_Railways._--It is easy to understand that an enterprise like railway
construction, requiring a great outlay of capital with returns long
delayed, did not at first commend itself to the Japanese, who were
almost entirely ignorant of co-operation as a factor of business
organization. Moreover, long habituated to snail-like modes of travel,
the people did not rapidly appreciate the celerity of the locomotive.
Neither the ox-cart, the norimono, nor the kago covered a daily distance
of over 20 m. on the average, and the packhorse was even slower. Amid
such conditions the idea of railways would have been slow to germinate
had not a catastrophe furnished some impetus. In 1869 a rice-famine
occurred in the southern island, Kiushiu, and while the cereal was
procurable abundantly in the northern provinces, people in the south
perished of hunger owing to lack of transport facilities. Sir Harry
Parkes, British representative in Tokyo, seized this occasion to urge
the construction of railways. Ito and Okuma, then influential members of
the government, at once recognized the wisdom of his advice.
Arrangements were made for a loan of a million sterling in London on the
security of the customs revenue, and English engineers were engaged to
lay a line between Tokyo and Yokohama (18 m.). Vehement voices of
opposition were at once raised in private and official circles alike,
all persons engaged in transport business imagined themselves threatened
with ruin, and conservative patriots detected loss of national
independence in a foreign loan. So fierce was the antagonism that the
military authorities refused to permit operations of survey in the
southern suburb of Tokyo, and the road had to be laid on an embankment
constructed in the sea. Ito and Okuma, however, never flinched, and they
were ably supported by Marquis M. Inouye and M. Mayejima. The latter
published, in 1870, the first Japanese work on railways, advocating the
building of lines from Tokyo to Kioto and Osaka; the former, appointed
superintendent of the lines, held that post for 30 years, and is justly
spoken of as "the father of Japanese railways."
September 1872 saw the first official opening of a railway (the
Tokyo-Yokohama line) in Japan, the ceremony being performed by the
emperor himself, a measure which effectually silenced all further
opposition. Eight years from the time of turning the first sod saw 71
m. of road open to traffic, the northern section being that between
Tokyo and Yokohama, and the southern that between Kioto and Kobe. A
period of interruption now ensued, owing to domestic troubles and
foreign complications, and when, in 1878, the government was able to
devote attention once again to railway problems, it found the treasury
empty. Then for the first time a public works loan was floated in the
home market, and about £300,000 of the total thus obtained passed into
the hands of the railway bureau, which at once undertook the building
of a road from Kioto to the shore of Lake Biwa, a work memorable as
the first line built in Japan without foreign assistance.[5] During
all this time private enterprise had remained wholly inactive in the
matter of railways, and it became a matter of importance to rouse the
people from this apathetic attitude. For the ordinary process of
organizing a joint-stock company and raising share-capital the nation
was not yet prepared. But shortly after the abolition of feudalism
there had come into the possession of the former feudatories state
loan-bonds amounting to some 18 millions sterling, which represented
the sum granted by the treasury in commutation of the revenues
formerly accruing to these men from their fiefs. Already events had
shown that the feudatories, quite devoid of business experience, were
not unlikely to dispose of these bonds and devote the proceeds to
unsound enterprises. Prince Iwakura, one of the leaders of the Meiji
statesmen, persuaded the feudatories to employ a part of the bonds as
capital for railway construction, and thus the first private railway
company was formed in Japan under the name _Nippon tetsudo kaisha_
(Japan railway company), the treasury guaranteeing 8% on the paid-up
capital for a period of 15 years. Some time elapsed before this
example found followers, but ultimately a programme was elaborated and
carried out having for its basis a grand trunk line extending the
whole length of the main island from Aomori on the north to
Shimonoseki on the south, a distance of 1153 m.; and a continuation of
the same line throughout the length of the southern island of Kiushiu,
from Moji on the north--which lies on the opposite side of the strait
from Shimonoseki--to Kagoshima on the south, a distance of 232¾ m.; as
well as a line from Moji to Nagasaki, a distance of 163½ m. Of this
main road the state undertook to build the central section (376 m.),
between Tokyo and Kobe (via Kioto); the Japan railway company
undertook the portion (457 m.) northward of Tokyo to Aomori; the Sanyo
railway company undertook the portion (320 m.) southward of Tokyo to
Shimonoseki; and the Kiushiu railway company undertook the lines in
Kiushiu. The whole line is now in operation. The first project was to
carry the Tokyo-Kioto line through the interior of the island so as to
secure it against enterprises on the part of a maritime enemy. Such
engineering difficulties presented themselves, however, that the coast
route was ultimately chosen, and though the line through the interior
was subsequently constructed, strategical considerations were not
allowed completely to govern its direction.
When this building of railways began in Japan, much discussion was
taking place in England and India as to the relative advantages of the
wide and narrow gauges, and so strongly did the arguments in favour of
the latter appeal to the English advisers of the Japanese government
that the metre gauge was chosen. Some fitful efforts made in later
years to change the system proved unsuccessful. The lines are single,
for the most part; and as the embankments, the cuttings, the culverts
and the bridge-piers have not been constructed for a double line, any
change now would be very costly. The average speed of passenger trains
in Japan is 18 m. an hour, the corresponding figure over the
metre-gauge roads in India being 16 m., and the figure for English
parliamentary trains from 19 to 28 m. British engineers surveyed the
routes for the first lines and superintended the work of construction,
but within a few years the Japanese were able to dispense with foreign
aid altogether, both in building and operating their railways. They
also construct carriages, wagons and locomotives, and they may
therefore be said to have become entirely independent in the matter of
railways, for a government iron-foundry at Wakamatsu in Kiushiu is
able to manufacture steel rails.
The total length of lines open for traffic at the end of March 1906
was 4746 m., 1470 m. having been built by the state and 3276 by
private companies; the former at a cost of 16 millions sterling for
construction and equipment, and the latter at a cost of 25 millions.
Thus the expenditure by the state averaged £10,884 per mile, and that
by private companies, £7631. This difference is explained by the facts
that the state lines having been the pioneers, portions of them were
built before experience had indicated cheap methods; that a very large
and costly foreign staff was employed on these roads in the early
days, whereas no such item appeared in the accounts of private lines;
that extensive works for the building of locomotives and rolling stock
are connected with the government's roads, and that it fell to the lot
of the state to undertake lines in districts presenting exceptional
engineering difficulties, such districts being naturally avoided by
private companies. The gross earnings of all the lines during the
fiscal year 1905-1906 were 7 millions sterling, approximately, and the
gross expenses (including the payment of interest on loans and
debentures) were under 3½ millions, so that there remained a net
profit of 3½ millions, being at the rate of a little over 8½% on the
invested capital. The facts that the outlays averaged less than 47% of
the gross income, and that accidents and irregularities are not
numerous, prove that Japanese management in this kind of enterprise is
efficient.
Nationalization of Private Railways.
When the fiscal year 1906-1907 opened, the number of private companies
was no less than 36, owning and operating 3276 m. of railway. To say
that this represented an average of 91 m. per company is to convey an
over-favourable idea, for, as a matter of fact, 15 of the companies
averaged less than 24 m. Anything like efficient co-operation was
impossible in such circumstances, and constant complaints were heard
about delays in transit and undue expense. The defects of divided
ownership had long suggested the expediency of nationalization, but
not until 1906 could the diet be induced to give its consent. On March
31 of that year, a railway nationalization law was promulgated. It
enacted that, within a period of 10 years from 1906 to 1915, the state
should purchase the 17 principal private roads, which had a length of
2812 m., and whose cost of construction and equipment had been 23½
millions sterling. The original scheme included 15 other railways,
with an aggregate mileage of only 353 m.; but these were eliminated as
being lines of local interest only. The actual purchase price of the
17 lines was calculated at 43 millions sterling (about double their
cost price), on the following basis: (a) An amount equal to 20 times
the sum obtained by multiplying the cost of construction at the date
of purchase by the average ratio of the profit to the cost of
construction during the six business terms of the company from the
second half-year of 1902 to the first half-year of 1905. (b) The
amount of the actual cost of stored articles converted according to
current prices thereof into public loan-bonds at face value, except in
the case of articles which had been purchased with borrowed money. The
government agreed to hand over the purchase money within 5 years from
the date of the acquisition of the lines, in public loan-bonds bearing
5% interest calculated at their face value; the bonds to be redeemed
out of the net profits accruing from the purchased railways. It was
calculated that this redemption would be effected in a period of 32
years, after which the annual profit accruing to the state from the
lines would be 5½ millions sterling. But the nationalization scheme,
though apparently the only effective method of linking together and
co-ordinating an excessively subdivided system of lines, has proved a
source of considerable financial embarrassment. For when the state
constituted itself virtually the sole owner of railways, it
necessarily assumed responsibility for extending them so that they
should suffice to meet the wants of a nation numbering some 50
millions. Such extension could be effected only by borrowing money.
Now the government was pledged by the diet in 1907 to an expenditure
of 11½ millions (spread over 8 years) for extending the old state
system of roads, and an expenditure of 6¼ millions (spread over 12
years) for improving them. But from the beginning of that year, a
period of extreme commercial and financial depression set in, and the
treasury had to postpone all recourse to loans for whatever purpose,
so that railway progress was completely checked in the field alike of
the original and the acquired state lines. Moreover, all securities
underwent such sharp depreciation that, on the one hand, the
government hesitated to hand over the bonds representing the
purchase-price of the railways, lest such an addition to the volume of
stocks should cause further depreciation, and, on the other, the
former owners of the nationalized lines found the character of their
bargain greatly changed. In these circumstances the government decided
to take a strong step, namely, to place the whole of the railways
owned by it--the original state lines as well as those
nationalized--in an account independent of the regular budget, and to
devote their entire profits to works of extension and improvement,
supplementing the amount with loans from the treasury when necessary.
South Manchuria Railway.
In the sequel of the war of 1904-5 Japan, with China's consent,
acquired from Russia the lease of the portion of the South-Manchuria
railway (see MANCHURIA) between Kwang-cheng-tsze (Chang-chun) on the
north and Tairen (Dalny), Port Arthur and Niuchwang on the south--a
total length of 470 m. At the close of 1906 this road was handed over
to a joint-stock company with a capital of 20 millions sterling, the
government contributing 10 millions in the form of the road and its
associated properties; the public subscribing 2 millions, and the
company being entitled to issue debentures to the extent of 8
millions, the principal and interest of these debentures being
officially guaranteed. Four millions' worth of debentures were issued
in London in 1907 and 4 millions in 1908. This company's programme is
not limited to operating the railway. It also works coal-fields at
Yentai and Fushun; has a line of steamers plying between Tairen and
Shanghai; and engages in enterprises of electricity, warehousing and
the management of houses and lands within zones 50 _li_ (17 m.) wide
on either side of the line. The government guarantees 6% interest on
the capital paid up by the general public.
Electric Railways.
Not until 1905 did Japan come into possession of an electric railway.
It was a short line of 8 m., built in Kioto for the purposes of a
domestic exhibition held in that city. Thenceforth this class of
enterprise grew steadily in favour, so that, in 1907, there were 16
companies with an aggregate capital of 8 millions sterling, having 165
m. open to traffic and 77 m. under construction. Fifteen other
companies with an aggregate capital of 3 millions had also obtained
charters. The principal of these is the Tokyo railway company, with a
subscribed capital of 6 millions (3½ paid up), 90½ m. of line open and
149 m. under construction. In 1907 it carried 153 million passengers,
and its net earnings were £300,000.
Maritime Communications.
The traditional story of prehistoric Japan indicates that the first
recorded emperor was an over-sea invader, whose followers must therefore
have possessed some knowledge of ship-building and navigation. But in
what kind of craft they sailed and how they handled them, there is
nothing to show clearly. Nine centuries later, but still 500 years
before the era of surviving written annals, an empress is said to have
invaded Korea, embarking her forces at Kobe (then called Takekura) in
500 vessels. In the middle of the 6th century we read of a general named
Abe-no-hirafu who led a flotilla up the Amur river to the invasion of
Manchuria (then called Shukushin). All these things show that the
Japanese of the earliest era navigated the high sea with some skill, and
at later dates down to medieval times they are found occasionally
sending forces to Korea and constantly visiting China in vessels which
seem to have experienced no difficulty in making the voyage. The 16th
century was a period of maritime activity so marked that, had not
artificial checks been applied, the Japanese, in all probability, would
have obtained partial command of Far-Eastern waters. They invaded Korea;
their corsairs harried the coasts of China; two hundred of their
vessels, sailing under authority of the Taiko's vermilion seal, visited
Siam, Luzon, Cochin China and Annam, and they built ships in European
style which crossed the Pacific to Acapulco. But this spirit of
adventure was chilled at the close of the 16th century and early in the
17th, when events connected with the propagation of Christianity taught
the Japanese to believe that national safety could not be secured
without international isolation. In 1638 the ports were closed to all
foreign ships except those flying the flag of Holland or of China, and a
strictly enforced edict forbade the building of any vessel having a
capacity of more than 500 _koku_ (150 tons) or constructed for purposes
of ocean navigation. Thenceforth, with rare exceptions, Japanese craft
confined themselves to the coastwise trade. Ocean-going enterprise
ceased altogether.
Things remained thus until the middle of the 19th century, when a
growing knowledge of the conditions existing in the West warned the
Tokugawa administration that continued isolation would be suicidal. In
1853 the law prohibiting the construction of sea-going ships was revoked
and the Yedo government built at Uraga a sailing vessel of European type
aptly called the "Phoenix" ("Howo Maru"). Just 243 years had elapsed
since the founder of the Tokugawa dynasty constructed Japan's first ship
after a foreign model, with the aid of an English pilot, Will Adams. In
1853 Commodore M. C. Perry made his appearance, and thenceforth
everything conspired to push Japan along the new path. The Dutch, who
had been proximately responsible for the adoption of the seclusion
policy in the 17th century, now took a prominent part in promoting a
liberal view. They sent to the Tokugawa a present of a man-of-war and
urged the vital necessity of equipping the country with a navy. Then
followed the establishment of a naval college at Tsukiji in Yedo, the
building of iron-works at Nagasaki, and the construction at Yokosuka of
a dockyard destined to become one of the greatest enterprises of its
kind in the East. This last undertaking bore witness to the patriotism
of the Tokugawa rulers, for they resolutely carried it to completion
during the throes of a revolution which involved the downfall of their
dynasty. Their encouragement of maritime enterprise had borne fruit, for
when, in 1867, they restored the administration to the Imperial court,
44 ocean-going ships were found among their possessions and 94 were in
the hands of the feudatories, a steamer and 20 sailing vessels having
been constructed in Japan and the rest purchased abroad.
If the Tokugawa had been energetic in this respect, the new government
was still more so. It caused the various maritime carriers to amalgamate
into one association called the _Nippon-koku yubin jokisen kaisha_ (Mail
SS. Company of Japan), to which were transferred, free of charge, the
steamers, previously the property of the Tokugawa or the feudatories,
and a substantial subsidy was granted by the state. This, the first
steamship company ever organized in Japan, remained in existence only
four years. Defective management and incapacity to compete with
foreign-owned vessels plying between the open ports caused its downfall
(1875). Already, however, an independent company had appeared upon the
scene. Organized and controlled by a man (Iwasaki Yataro) of exceptional
enterprise and business faculty, this _mitsubishi kaisha_ (three lozenge
company, so called from the design on its flag), working with steamers
chartered from the former feudatory of Tosa, to which clan Iwasaki
belonged, proved a success from the outset, and grew with each
vicissitude of the state. For when (1874) the Meiji government's first
complications with a foreign country necessitated the despatch of a
military expedition to Formosa, the administration had to purchase 63
foreign steamers for transport purposes, and these were subsequently
transferred to the mitsubishi company together with all the vessels (17)
hitherto in the possession of the Mail SS. Company, the Treasury further
granting to the mitsubishi a subsidy of £50,000 annually. Shortly
afterwards it was decided to purchase a service maintained by the
Pacific Mail SS. Company with 4 steamers between Yokohama and Shanghai,
and money for the purpose having been lent by the state to the
mitsubishi, Japan's first line of steamers to a foreign country was
firmly established, just 20 years after the law interdicting the
construction of ocean-going vessels had been rescinded.
The next memorable event in this chapter of history occurred in 1877,
when the Satsuma clan, eminently the most powerful and most warlike
among all the former feudatories, took the field in open rebellion.
For a time the fate of the government hung in the balance, and only by
a flanking movement over-sea was the rebellion crushed. This strategy
compelled the purchase of 10 foreign steamers, and these too were
subsequently handed over to the mitsubishi company, which, in 1880,
found itself possessed of 32 ships aggregating 25,600 tons, whereas
all the other vessels of foreign type in the country totalled only 27
with a tonnage of 6500. It had now become apparent that the country
could not hope to meet emergencies which might at any moment arise,
especially in connexion with Korean affairs, unless the development of
the mercantile marine proceeded more rapidly. Therefore in 1881 the
formation of a new company was officially promoted. It had the name of
the _kyodo unyu kaisha_ (Union Transport Company); its capital was
about a million sterling; it received a large subsidy from the state,
and its chief purpose was to provide vessels for military uses and as
commerce-carriers. Japan had now definitely embraced the policy of
entrusting to private companies rather than to the state the duty of
acquiring a fleet of vessels capable of serving as transports or
auxiliary cruisers in time of war. But there was now seen the curious
spectacle of two companies (the Mitsubishi and the Union Transport)
competing in the same waters and both subsidized by the treasury.
After this had gone on for four years, the two companies were
amalgamated (1885) into the _Nippon yusen kaisha_ (Japan Mail SS.
Company) with a capital of £1,100,000 and an annual subsidy of
£88,000, fixed on the basis of 8% of the capital. Another company had
come into existence a few months earlier. Its fleet consisted of 100
small steamers, totalling 10,000 tons, which had hitherto been
competing in the Inland Sea.
Japan now possessed a substantial mercantile marine, the rate of whose
development is indicated by the following figures:--
Year. Steamers. Sailing Vessels. Totals.
Number. Tons. Number. Tons. Number. Tons.
1870 35 15,498 11 2,454 46 17,952
1892 642 122,300 780 46,065 1,422 168,365
Nevertheless, only 23% of the exports and imports was transported in
Japanese bottoms in 1892, whereas foreign steamers took 77%. This
discrepancy was one of the subjects discussed in the first session of
the diet, but a bill presented by the government for encouraging
navigation failed to obtain parliamentary consent, and in 1893 the
Japan Mail SS. Company, without waiting for state assistance, opened a
regular service to Bombay mainly for the purpose of carrying raw
cotton from India to supply the spinning industry which had now
assumed great importance in Japan. Thus the rising sun flag flew for
the first time outside Far-Eastern waters. Almost immediately after
the establishment of this line, Japan had to engage in war with China,
which entailed the despatch of some two hundred thousand men to the
neighbouring continent and their maintenance there for more than a
year. All the country's available shipping resources did not suffice
for this task. Additional vessels had to be purchased or chartered,
and thus, by the beginning of 1896, the mercantile marine of Japan had
grown to 899 steamers of 373,588 tons, while the sailing vessels had
diminished to 644 of 44,000 tons.
In 1897 there occurred an event destined to exercise a potent
influence on the fortunes not only of Japan herself but also of her
mercantile marine. No sooner had she exchanged with China
ratifications of a treaty of peace which seemed to prelude a long
period of tranquillity, than Russia, Germany and France ordered her to
restore all the continental territory ceded to her by China. Japan
then recognized that her hope of peace was delusive, and that she must
be prepared to engage in a struggle incomparably more serious than the
one from which she had just emerged. Determined that when the crucial
moment came she should not be found without ample means for
transporting her armies, the government, under the leadership of
Prince Ito and with the consent of the diet, enacted, in March 1896
laws liberally encouraging ship-building and navigation. Under the
navigation law "any Japanese subject or any commercial company whose
partners or shareholders were all Japanese subjects, engaged in
carrying passengers and cargo between Japan and foreign countries or
between foreign ports, in their own vessels, which must be of at least
1000 tons and registered in the shipping list of the Empire, became
entitled to subsidies proportionate to the distance run and the
tonnage of the vessels"; and under the ship-building law, bounties
were granted for the construction of iron or steel vessels of not less
than 700 tons gross by any Japanese subject or any commercial company
whose partners and shareholders were all Japanese. The effect of this
legislation was marked. In the period of six years ended 1902, no less
than 835 vessels of 455,000 tons were added to the mercantile marine,
and the treasury found itself paying encouragement money which
totalled six hundred thousand pounds annually. Ship-building underwent
remarkable development. Thus, while in 1870 only 2 steamers
aggregating 57 tons had been constructed in Japanese yards, 53
steamers totalling 5380 tons and 193 sailing vessels of 17,873 tons
were launched in 1900. By the year 1907 Japan had 216 private ship
yards and 42 private docks,[6] and while the government yards were
able to build first-class line-of-battle ships of the largest size,
the private docks were turning out steamers of 9000 tons burden. When
war broke out with Russia in 1904, Japan had 567,000 tons of steam
shipping, but that stupendous struggle obliged her to materially
augment even this great total. In operations connected with the war
she lost 71,000 tons, but on the other hand, she built 27,000 tons at
home and bought 177,000 abroad, so that the net increase to her
mercantile fleet of steamers was 133,000 tons. The following table
shows the growth of her marine during the ten years ending 1907:--
Steamers. Sailing Vessels. Totals.
Gross Gross Gross
Year. Number. Tonnage. Number. Tonnage. Number. Tonnage.
1898 1130 477,430 1914 170,194 3044 648,324
1899 1221 510,007 3322 286,923 4543 467,930
1900 1329 543,365 3850 320,572 5179 863,937
1901 1395 583,532 4026 336,528 5471 920,060
1902 1441 610,445 3907 336,154 5348 946,600
1903 1570 663,220 3934 328,953 5504 992,173
1904 1815 798,240 3940 329,125 5755 1,127,365
1905 1988 939,749 4132 336,571 6170 1,276,320
1906 2103 1,041,569 4547 353,356 6700 1,395,925
1907 2139 1,115,880 4728 365,559 6867 1,481,439
With regard to the development of ship-building in Japanese yards the
following figures convey information:--