ITALY’S DESIGNS ON SMYRNA
Austria’s imperial designs were extinguished by the outcome of the Great
War. Italy’s, however, burned more brightly than ever. In an article in
_Foreign Affairs_ of June 15, 1923, Mr. Francesco Coppola says:
“Although Italy entered the war to combat the German attempt at
hegemony and to wrest her historic frontiers and the control
of the Adriatic from Austria, Italy’s traditional instinct
really aimed to secure the indispensable modicum of security
and freedom for expansion. It was for this reason that in the
fundamental pact of alliance—the Treaty of London of April,
1915—Baron Sonnino stipulated for Italian colonial compensation
in Africa in the event of a Franco-English partition of the
German colonies, and for a corresponding zone in Southern
Anatolia in the event of Allied acquisitions in the Levant.
It was also for this reason that, later on, when he got wind
of the complete plan of a tripartite division of the Ottoman
Empire, (disloyally concluded in 1916 between France, Russia,
and England without the knowledge of Italy, who had been
fighting for more than a year by their side), he forced the
Allies to reopen the question and to give an adequate share to
Italy. The new treaty was discussed in April, 1917, between
Sonnino, Ribot and Lloyd George at St. Jean de Maurienne—from
which it took its name—and was concluded and signed in London
in August of the same year. While leaving Constantinople and
the Caucasus, Armenia and part of the Anatolian coast of
the Black Sea to Russia, Syria and Cilicia to France, and
Mesopotamia and the protectorate over Arabia to England, this
treaty assigned to Italy Southwestern Anatolia, the whole
vilayet of Aidin with Smyrna, the whole vilayet of Konia with
Adalia and a small part of the vilayet of Adana. But this very
treaty contained the poison which was later to weaken it.
Even before the war was over, the Allies hastened to avail
themselves of the pretext of the absence of Russia’s signature
to denounce the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne. Thus it
came about that in the spring of 1919, Lloyd George, taking
advantage of the weakness and temporary absence of Orlando, and
violating the treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne and the armistice
of Mudros, was able to arrange that Smyrna and the surrounding
neighborhood be given to Greece. This was done with the full
consent of Wilson, who, absolutely ignorant of European and
Mediterranean affairs, blindly allowed himself to be governed
by idealistic impulses and natural prejudices and with the
approbation of Clemenceau, who was only too delighted to be
able to ‘_jouer un mauvais tour a l’Italie_.’”
Some of the Italian publicist’s conclusions are open to discussion but
his article sets forth the Italian frame of mind. There was much talk at
Smyrna during the time of the Greek occupation in military circles and
among the Levantines about Italian efforts to build a port farther to the
south, in the vicinity of ancient Ephesus, that would become the chief
harbor of Asia Minor and leave Smyrna to sink into insignificance. Many
stories were told also of Italian efforts to win the affections of the
Turk. In any case, it is certain that bands of Turkish marauders were in
the habit of crossing the line from the Italian zone and of attacking and
killing Greeks, after which they would take refuge with the Italians,
where they could not be pursued.
The statement that the Turks received munitions and many arms from
Italian shippers was persistently repeated, and has never been
successfully refuted. The Italian view-point has already been explained.
They considered that Smyrna had been promised them and that the Hellenic
forces had been hurried there by their unfaithful allies to forestall
their own landing. Italy can consider herself very fortunate that she
did not beat the Greeks to Smyrna, for even with her own resources, so
superior to those of King Constantine, she would have had her hands full.
But, the point is, her attitude contributed to the Greek defeat, the
burning of Smyrna and the final destruction of the Christians of Asia
Minor. Much valuable Italian property was destroyed as well as that of
others. An aftermath of Italian antipathy to Greece may be seen in the
bombardment of Corfu and the seizure of the island by the Italian fleet
on August 31, 1923.
On the twenty-seventh of the same month, five Italian members of the
commission for the delimitation of the frontier between Albania and
Greece were waylaid on a lonely road in Albania and foully murdered
by unknown persons. The demands of the Italian Government, including
a payment of fifty million liras, were refused by the Greeks, on the
ground that culpability had not been established. A request by Greece
that the affair be referred to the League of Nations was refused and the
island bombarded, with the result that sixty-five civilians, largely
refugees, were killed or wounded. The indignation of the Italians is
easily understandable, but a knowledge of preceding events is necessary
to explain the wholly unnecessary bombardment of a Greek island on
insufficient data and the killing or the wounding of sixty-five entirely
innocent persons. As these latter were killed by cannon, they were not,
of course, murdered.