PAUL III. AND THE COUNTER-REFORMATION
The period immediately following the death of Leo X. is known as
that of the Counter-Reformation. The name which has clung to the
great religious schism of the sixteenth century still indicates how
essentially it was, in its origin, a protest against the corruption of
the mediæval Church. The reform of dogma was an afterthought; and the
Reformation would probably have proved one more futile and academic
criticism of the mediæval growth of doctrine if it had not primarily
appealed to the very general resentment against the practices of the
Curia and contempt for the unworthy lives of so large a proportion
of the clergy and regulars. The situation, indeed, offers a romantic
aspect to the historian. If a strong and entirely religious man, like
Cardinal Carafa, had succeeded Leo X., it might have been possible,
by a notable improvement in practice, to disarm a very effective
proportion of the followers of the Reformers and thus to put back for
a century or two the doctrinal revision. Unhappily for the Papacy, Leo
X. had filled the Sacred College with men of his own disposition, and
thirty years were wasted in fruitless efforts at compromise. In those
thirty years, the hesitating criticisms of Luther crystallized into a
settled creed which no persuasion could dissolve and no persecution
could obliterate.
Hadrian VI., who followed Leo, spent two unhappy years (1521-3) in a
pitiable and wholly vain attempt to save the authority of the Popes
in northern Europe. Sprung from a pious working-class family of the
Low-lands, and retaining his simple tastes and stern religious idealism
in the evil atmosphere of the higher clergy, he sincerely resented the
vices and frivolity of the cardinals. Rome itself now ridiculed so
fiercely the contrast between their pretensions and their lives that
the worldly cardinals were unable to put into power a man like Leo X.,
and the learned, venerable, and more or less disdained Hadrian VI.
shuddered to find himself at the helm on so stormy a sea. He was not
the type of man to save the Church. With simple fidelity, he at once
made it clear that the debased policy of his predecessor was abandoned;
but he had not the strength to control the crowd of discontented
cardinals and prelates, or to frame and carry through a consistent
scheme of reform. He was concerned, too, about the financial loss which
would be caused by a thorough reform, and the traffic in benefices
and indulgences was merely moderated instead of being abolished. The
curtailment was in itself a confession that the system was corrupt,
and the Reformers scoffed at Hadrian's invitation to return on such a
basis, while orthodox Catholics deplored the candour of the admission.
Between these antagonistic and weighty forces the slender energy of the
well meaning Pontiff was exhausted in two years.
The Pontificate of Clement VII. (1523-34) was a compromise; he was
a Medicean Pope (Giulio de' Medici), a patron of art and letters,
but a man of sober taste and regular life. It was a compromise, too,
between a keen intelligence and a flabby will--a sagacious perception
of the danger and a complete lack of the virility needed to avert
it--and eleven further years of impotence permitted the Reformation
to take deep and indestructible root in Germany. Clement VII. was,
in fact, largely absorbed in the unending political struggle. After
some vacillation he allied himself with France against Charles V.,
and Charles won. Rome had to endure one of the most cruel and most
prolonged pillages in its history, and the Pope was for seven months
imprisoned in Sant' Angelo. He made peace with Charles, but he had
little satisfaction in contemplating the imperial shadow which lay over
fallen Italy, while the Turks came ever nearer and no Christian monarch
would advance against them. In these circumstances, Protestantism
became a creed and spread over the north. Henry VIII. married Anne
Boleyn and became the "defender" of a new faith; and the revolt spread
to Switzerland and Scandinavia. The scanty measures of reform passed
by Clement were regarded with disdain by the dissenters, and the
artistic Renaissance itself never recovered from the sack of Rome and
the overrunning of Italy. It was left to the founders of new religious
congregations, especially the Oratorians, Theatines, and Barnabites,
and to the reformers of the older orders, to lay the foundations of the
Counter-Reformation.
Clement died on September 25, 1534, and the College of Cardinals, which
had almost become the curse of the Church, met to elect a successor.
Few of these cardinals, even now, grasped with any intelligence the
grave situation of their Church. It was, indeed, feared that, while
the reform was spreading rapidly in the north, the Conclave would be
wrecked by the conflict of the French and Imperialist partisans. The
struggle was so menacing that a politically neutral cardinal was
forced upon the College, and the graver need of the Church--the need of
a Pontiff of the most sincere and spontaneous religion, as well as of
large mind and inflexible will--was almost unnoticed.
Alessandro Farnese, who now became Paul III.,[302] was a man of high
intelligence, fine culture, and great will-power; but he had neither
the immaculate record and deep piety which were needed to impress the
Reformers nor the political decision which might have compensated
for these defects. However much the historian may appreciate the
difficulties of the Papacy, he cannot but recognize that the idea of
compromising with the Reformers had at least since 1520 been futile.
Paul III. had, it is true, no idea of compromise: the dissenters
were to surrender every doctrinal and disciplinary claim, or to be
extinguished. The great European schism could now have been remedied
by no man. But a reform of the Church on other than doctrinal matters
might have done much to arrest the spread of Protestantism, and on
this Paul compromised. His policy was a reflection of his personality;
he was a son of the Renaissance Church, and feebly--in spite of his
admitted strength of will--he endeavoured to retain certain pleasant
features of the vicious _ancien régime_ with which to soften the
asperity of the new ideal which was forced upon him. He was in a sense
a Papal Louis XVIII.
We remember Paul as the brother of Alexander VI's doll-like mistress,
Giulia Farnese. Born on February 29, 1468, he had received early
instruction in the new culture from Pomponio Leto at Rome, and had
spent his youth in that seminary of the Humanists, the splendid palace
of Lorenzo de' Medici at Florence, and then at Pisa University. His
wealth was far inferior to the nobility of his descent, and it was
not until his young sister had attracted the eye of the voluptuous
Pope that he was promoted to the cardinalate (September 20, 1493).
In 1502, he was appointed legate for the March of Ancona, and the
more comfortable establishment he could now afford to maintain
included a mistress. Four children--Pier Luigi, Paolo, Costanza, and
Ranuccio--were born in his palace between 1502 and 1509; and the eldest
son and Costanza were familiar figures in Roman society during his
later Pontificate.
The more minute inquirer will find the documents transcribed from the
Vatican archives, relating to these children, in Pastor.[303] His
mistress died at an early age in 1513, and Alessandro (now forty-five
years old) is described as moderating his irregularities and as
devoting some attention to his bishopric of Parma. Papal historians
observe with pride that his irregularities entirely ceased in 1519,
when he was ordained priest. The friend of his youth, Leo X., cordially
included him in his generous patronage, and he was able to build the
Farnese palace and to cultivate ambition. In 1523, he made an effort
to secure the tiara, but at the Conclave the cardinals had not the
courage to present to the Reformers as Pontiff the father of four
children. He stifled his lament that Clement VII. had "robbed him of
ten years of the Papacy," and became as amiable a friend of that Pope
as he had been of his five predecessors; and amidst the fierce clash
of political passion he retained a diplomatic neutrality. He shared
Clement's bitter days in Sant' Angelo, yet did not quarrel with the
Imperialists.
These characteristics marked Alessandro for the throne; and they at
the same time ensured that his struggle with Protestantism would be
entirely futile. He was now sixty-seven years old, and we easily
picture him from Titian's wonderful portrait; frail and worn in flesh
and stooping with age; yet his penetrating eyes and large bald dome of
a forehead indicated a great energy of will and force of intellect.
He was essentially a diplomat, and the cardinals, absorbed for the
most part in the political troubles, did not reflect that the rapier
of diplomacy was the last weapon with which to meet the stout staves
of the northerners. He was an excellent listener, a sparing and
deliberate talker, a most skilful postponer of crucial decisions; a
"_vas dilationis_," the Roman wits said, parodying the description of a
greater Paul.
Dr. Pastor thinks that the reforming cardinals--of whom there were now
many--had much confidence in his disposition to reform. If they had,
their trust is in the main another tribute to his diplomatic skill. He
had no idea of reforming the Curia and the Church further than might be
exacted of him by unpleasant circumstances.
Shrewd observers must quickly have observed that Paul III. remained
at heart a Farnese. His son, Pier Luigi, visited him in Rome soon
after his election. Pier Luigi had become a military adventurer, a
feeble emulator of Cæsar Borgia, and by taking arms in the Imperialist
service, had incurred excommunication under Clement. Paul is said to
have received his son in secret and directed him to keep away from
Rome. There was to be no open nepotism. But in a few weeks Pier Luigi
was back in Rome and was observed to have plenty of money. Paul was
crowned on November 3d (1534) and announced his intention to reform the
Church. On, December 18th he bestowed the cardinalate on two of his
nephews, Guido Sforza and Alessandro Farnese. Sforza was a youth of
seventeen; Alessandro was a fourteen-year old pupil at Bologna, yet he
received, besides the red hat, the governorship of Spoleto and such a
number of profitable benefices that he was soon able to outshine some
of the more ostentatious cardinals; and in the next year he was made
Vice-Chancellor. Both he and Sforza were notoriously immoral. Pier
Luigi was made Gonfaloniere, Commander of the Papal troops, and Duke
of Castro; and proportionate benefits were showered on all friends and
connexions of the Farnese family.
It would not be history to dwell on the "obstinacy" of the Reformers
and to fail to emphasize these very pertinent and entirely undisputed
facts; but I will dismiss in few words this aspect of Paul's character.
Nepotism was one of his most persistent traits, and we shall repeatedly
find his direction of Papal policy perverted by a care for the worldly
advancement of his family. He was equally unable and unwilling to
break with the gayer tradition of the Borgia-Medici court. He loved
pageantry and comedy, encouraged the merry riot of the carnival,
favoured astrologers, buffoons, and pseudo-classical poets, and liked
to dine with fair women. It is, perhaps, not much to say that his
private life--at the age of seventy--was irreproachable; but it is not
immaterial to observe that he gave an indulgent eye to the conduct of
the looser cardinals. Instead of sternly attempting to crush that
large body of loose and luxurious cardinals to whom, in the first
place, we may trace the catastrophe of the Church, he added, at each
promotion, a few to their number. Of the seventy-one cardinals he
promoted during his Pontificate the great majority were good men; but
a few were of such a character that their election was, in the actual
situation of the Church, unpardonable.
These little personal details must be considered first if we are to
understand aright the attitude of Paul III. toward reform and the
reforming council. From the first he assured his visitors that he
intended to reform the Church. Before the end of 1534, he appointed
two reform commissions--one on morals and the other on Church offices;
though he chilled the zeal of the more ardent cardinals by enjoining
them to take into account the circumstances. In the spring of 1535, he
prosecuted Cardinal Accolti for grave abuse of his position of legate,
but compromised for a fine of 59,000 scudi. The Reformers of Germany
had from the first appealed to a council, and Paul declared himself
in favour of a council; but he insisted that it must be summoned by
him, presided over by his legates, and held in Italy; and this not
only the princes of the Schmalkaldic League but the three monarchs
concerned emphatically refused. Charles V. saw that such a council
would be--as Paul III. well knew--utterly useless as an instrument of
reconciliation; Francis I. did not want reconciliation at all, since
it would give to Charles command of a united Germany; and Henry VIII.,
who accepted the title of Head of the English Church in 1534, and in
the following year initiated his policy of bloody persecution, had done
with Rome. In fact, instead of giving all the negotiations about a
council, I would point out that there never was the slightest hope by
such a means of ending the schism. Each side was absolutely convinced
of the truth of its formulas, and very few, least of all the Pope,
thought that compromise was possible or desirable. Luther was quite
willing to attend a council, even in Italy; but merely in order to
convince the Church of its errors and abominations. The Pope wanted
a council merely in order to formulate Catholic doctrine in clear
official terms and thus to provide a standard for the condemnation and
extermination of the heretics. No Pope could think otherwise.
Paul at length ventured to announce "to the city and the world" that a
general council would be held at Mantua on the 23d of May, 1537; but
when the Duke of Mantua directed the Pope to send an army to protect
his council, the design was abandoned. A Bull next announced that the
council would meet at Vicenza on May 1, 1538; but as only five prelates
had arrived there when, on May 12th, the three Papal Legates made their
imposing entry--after waiting in nervous hope some distance away--that
project, also, was abandoned. I would not agree that Paul did not
sincerely want a council, but during the first ten years the council he
wanted was an impossibility.
Meantime, the idea of reform by commissions was sustaining the
half-desperate hopes of the better cardinals at Rome. In February,
1537, the commission drew up so sound and true and large a scheme of
reform that the anti-reformers successfully pleaded that it would
injure the Church to publish it, and it remains "a scrap of paper" in
the Vatican Archives. After much discussion, Paul decided to begin
with the reform of the Dataria (an office of the Court which yielded
more than 50,000 ducats a year, nearly half the entire income, to the
Papal exchequer in connexion with the issue of graces, privileges,
dispensations, etc.), and a further long discussion ensued. The
discussion lasted some three years, without practical issue, and it
was not until the end of 1540 that a few obvious reforms could be
carried in some of the departments of the Curia. Characteristic is the
story of one of these reforms. Pressed by the sterner cardinals, who
wrote grave letters to each other on the Pope's conduct, to put an end
to the scandal of non-resident prelates (absentee landlords), Paul
summoned eighty of them, who were living in comfort at Rome, to return
to their dioceses. There was terrible alarm. But they successfully
pleaded that they could not live on the mere incomes of their sees,
and they remained in Rome. Paul had to be content with discharging a
few officials, directing the clergy to reform their lives and their
sermons, and encouraging the new religious congregations: among which
was a certain very small community, calling itself the "Company of
Jesus," which seemed to him, when it first appeared in Rome, eccentric
and of very doubtful value to the Church.
In the meantime, Paul had successfully maintained the political
neutrality which he had from the first contemplated. Francis and
Charles both sought alliance with him, and he tried instead to
reconcile them and avert war. It is to his credit that when Charles,
perceiving his weakness, offered, as the price of alliance, the
marquisate of Novara to Pier Luigi and a principality in Naples to
Pier's son Ottavio, Paul still refused. But the fact that in 1536 he
received Charles with great pomp at Rome irritated Francis, and war
broke out.[304] In view of the advances of the Turks, Paul went in
person to Nice, in the spring of 1538, and reconciled the two monarchs,
but his nepotism again mars the merit of this work. He arranged that
his grandson Ottavio, a boy of thirteen, should marry the Emperor's
natural daughter, Margaret of Austria, a girl-widow of sixteen, who
hated the boy; and their connubial arrangements added, for many years,
to the scandal or the gaiety of Rome. Paul was also severely blamed for
the unscrupulous way in which he wrested the duchy of Camerino from
the Varani and gave it to Ottavio. When Francis violently objected to
this virtual alliance, Paul married his granddaughter Vittoria to a
French prince. Nor were the Reformers pleased when they learned that,
in return for the Emperor's natural daughter, the Pope had granted
to Charles the right to publish indulgences in Spain, and had given
him other privileges which would yield him a million ducats a year of
Church money; and that neither Francis nor Charles would help Italy to
face the Turks.
The unchecked advance of the Turk had, indirectly, another grave
disadvantage for the Papacy. Charles needed the united forces of his
dominions to meet the Turks, and the Protestants profited by his need.
Whatever may be said about the amiable intentions of Paul III., at an
earlier date, he now plainly designed to crush the followers of the
Reformers in the field. He sent his grandson, Cardinal Alessandro
Farnese, to the courts of Francis and of Charles, and the instructions
which he gave him, as well as the letters of the Cardinal himself,
show that he sought, not only their support of his Italian council,
but the co-operation of the monarchs against the Turks and the
Protestants.[305] Both refused, and Charles, in spite of the Pope's
vehement objections, consented to the holding of another conference or
discussion with the representatives of the Protestants. The conference
took place at Hagenau on June 12th, and had, of course, no result, but
a fresh attempt was made at Worms in January 1541, and Paul sent Bishop
Campeggio and four theologians to meet the Protestant divines. It is
needless to discuss the Colloquy in detail, since such experiments
never had the least prospect of success, but the next conference is of
some interest.
Some of the German princes, like the Duke of Bavaria, had no wish to
see a religious reconciliation, since their ambition had a larger
chance of success in a disunited Empire; and Francis I. was only too
eager to support these princes.[306] Other vassals of the Emperor were
irreconcilable Protestants. But there were on both sides a few men of
a moderate disposition, who believed that a round-table conference
might still secure religious peace, if not the old unity. Charles V.
was of this opinion, and he made it a test of the Pope's sincerity that
he should co-operate in a last attempt. Cardinal Contarini, a man of
impressive character and considerable ability, was sent as legate, and
for some time before the opening of the Diet of Ratisbon, he zealously
endeavoured to find the dogmatic formulæ which had some prospect of
common acceptance. Charles had begged the Pope to confer large powers
of concession on his legate, but we now know that Paul gave him but
slender authority, couched in the vaguest of language.[307] If any
attempt were made to settle important points of doctrine, he was to
protest and leave the Diet. In a later instruction, he warned Contarini
not to allow the Emperor to suspect that Rome favoured the use of force
rather than persuasion, and to say, in regard to the proposal that the
Papacy should send 50,000 scudi for the purpose of bribing influential
Protestants, that such a design seemed neither decent nor safe, but
that the 50,000 scudi would be sent "for distribution," if, and when,
a reconciliation was effected.[308] It is plain that Paul foresaw
the complete failure of the Colloquy--we must remember that success
depended entirely on _concession_ and no Pope could make a concession
on doctrine--and intended to make the failure a ground for an appeal to
arms.
The Diet opened on April 27, 1541, and in a few weeks Contarini and
his friends announced with sincere joy that they had reached a common
formula on so delicate a topic as justification. This agreement had
been reached by the Papal Legate accepting a semi-heretical formula,
which Rome afterwards rejected. But the futility of the proceedings
soon became apparent. When they went on to discuss transubstantiation
and penance, priestly celibacy and monastic vows, the antagonism became
acute, and the Colloquy ended in disorder. The Pope rejected all the
formulas approved by his Legate, and wrote him, on June 10th, that
he was sending the 50,000 scudi, and would send a larger sum if the
Catholics found it necessary to draw the sword against the heretics.
Some of the stricter cardinals at Rome, such as Carafa and Toledo, were
now convinced that force was necessary.
In September (1541) the Pope met the Emperor at Lucca. Charles insisted
that the council, whatever form it took, must be held in Germany,
but Paul pleaded that he wished to preside in person and that his
age forbade so lengthy a journey. We shall hardly be unjust if we
regard these pleas as pretexts. The forthcoming council was, in the
Pope's view,--an inevitable view,--to be a canonical gathering for
the stricter definition of the doctrines already rejected by the
Reformers; when that council had formulated the faith, the secular
powers must deal with any who dissented from it. Paul still fought
for the holding of the council in Italy, where he could overwhelm the
Protestant envoys, but as it became entirely certain that not a single
Protestant would come to Italy, he spoke of Cambrai, Metz, and other
alternatives, and at length consented to Trent. Still there was much
friction, and many were not yet convinced that the Pope sincerely
desired a reform-council. Francis I. angrily exclaimed that this
council seemed to be an imperial concern, and he refused to publish
the Bull of Convocation. Charles, on the other side, was annoyed to
find that in the Bull he was put on a level with that perfidious ally
of the infidel, Francis I., and he threatened to keep his German
prelates from going to Trent. But the Pope energetically overbore
all opposition, and the historic Council of Trent was announced for
November 1st. In the meantime (July, 1542), the Pope reconstituted
the Inquisition in Italy and put it under the control of the more
fanatical cardinals like Carafa. It was empowered to imprison heretics,
confiscate their goods, and (with the use of the secular arm) to put
them to death. Dr. Pastor deplores that the Vatican authorities still
refuse to allow access to the records of the Roman Inquisition, so that
we are very imperfectly acquainted with its work.
The Papal Legates arrived at Trent with great pomp, on November 22d,
three weeks after the appointed date, yet not a single bishop had
appeared. Six weeks later the arrival of two bishops gave them a
slender satisfaction, but by the end of March not more than a dozen
bishops--and these mostly Italians--had reached the seat of the
council. Neither Germans nor French would come, and the Italians
thought it prudent not to arrive in a body so as to give to the council
a national complexion. In the summer, Paul went to confer with Charles
at Parma, but the issue of their conference was a bitter disappointment
for the Catholic reformers. Paul proposed to suspend the opening of
the council and to transfer it from Trent, and begged the Emperor to
bring about a compromise with France, by yielding Milan to the Pope's
nephew, Ottavio. Charles refused to assent, and Paul, on his own
account, suspended the council and began to look to Francis I. for the
aggrandizement of his family.
The events which followed make the historian wonder that any have
attempted to clear the character of Paul III. of disgraceful nepotism
and insincerity. Charles V. sought alliance with Henry VIII., and Paul
sent his nephew, Cardinal Farnese, to the Court of Francis I. In that
grave crisis of the Church's fortunes, we have the Catholic Emperor
in alliance with Henry VIII., the most Catholic King in alliance
with the Turks, and the Pope seeking, with a notoriety which gave
great scandal, the enrichment of his illegitimate children and other
relatives. Vittoria Farnese, the Pope's granddaughter, was betrothed
to the Duke of Orleans, and the Pope promised her, from the patrimony
of St. Peter, the duchies of Parma and Piacenza as her dowry. Charles
angrily threatened to invade Rome, and the Spanish and German envoys
at the Vatican used language which had rarely been heard in the Papal
chambers. It is put to the credit of the Pope only that he refused
still to disown or condemn Charles, as Francis demanded, and that he
earnestly sought to reconcile the monarchs. In September, his efforts
bore fruit in the Peace of Crespy. Yet we must recall that, as all
acknowledge, Paul was in part concerned for the security of his family
in refusing to incur the hostility of Charles; and we know that a
secret clause of the Treaty of Crespy compelled Francis and Charles
to unite for the purpose of destroying the Protestants as well as the
Turks.
It was also stipulated at Crespy that the council should at last
begin its labours, and Paul announced that it would open at Trent
on March 25, 1545. But the attempt was again abortive, and only two
bishops greeted the Papal Legates on the appointed date. The Catholic
monarchs did not believe that the Pope was sincere, and the Protestants
were violently opposed to a council on the orthodox Catholic lines.
Cardinal Farnese was sent to induce the Emperor to send his German
bishops, and we now find Charles leaning more decidedly to the plan
of coercion and war. Cardinal Farnese writes in high spirits to his
uncle that Charles is, in alliance with the Papacy, about to make
war on the Protestants; and it is unhappily characteristic that he
adds that this alliance may turn to the great profit of the Farnese
family.[309] In fact, the Cardinal returned to Rome with all speed, in
disguise, and Paul promised 100,000 ducats and 12,000 men for the war,
besides granting Charles a half-year's income of the Spanish Church and
permission to raise 500,000 ducats by the sale of monastic property.
The eagerness of the Pope at this adoption of a design he had so long
cherished may be judged from the fact that his courier to Charles left
Rome on June 16th and reached Worms by the 23d. Charles, however, had
begun to waver in his brave resolution, and the war was postponed; but
the advancement of the Farnesi was not forgotten. The duchies of Parma
and Piacenza were now given to Pier Luigi, and the Pope met the violent
protests of the cardinals with a statistical "proof" that the duchies
were of less value than a few small places which his son surrendered
to the Holy See. The annoyance of the reforming prelates was complete
when the Pope issued a medal representing a naked Ganymede leaning on
an eagle and watering the lily which was the emblem of the Farnese
family.[310]
Charles would not consent to the removal of the council to Bologna,
and it was at length opened at Trent on December 13, 1545, with an
attendance of four archbishops and twenty-one bishops. The first
session was purely formal, and the second session (January 7th) was
occupied by a violent discussion on procedure. The Emperor feared that
a formulation of Catholic doctrines would close the door of the Church
definitively against the Germans, and he insisted that the reform
of morals and discipline must come first. Paul feared that, if the
question of reform came first, the council would almost resolve itself
into a trial of the Papacy; and there is good ground to think that,
on the other hand, he wanted the doctrines in dispute formulated as a
preliminary step to the more drastic condemnation of the Reformers.
The conflict ended in compromise: each sitting of the council was to
consider both doctrine and reform. The correspondence of the legates
with the Pope[311] shows how vehemently Paul fought for his plan, and
it was only at their very grave and emphatic assurance that reform must
proceed--that deeds, not Bulls, were wanted, as they put it--that he
agreed to the compromise.
The fathers of the council, who, at the end of June, had risen in
number to about sixty, had held two further sessions, and had discussed
only a few dogmas and measures of reform when their labours were again
suspended by the outbreak of the religious war. The Protestants had
naturally refused to attend the Papal council, and had continued to
spread their faith in the north. Paul, therefore, urged Charles to
carry out his design of repressing them by arms, and in June (1546)
a secret treaty was signed by Charles V., the Duke of Bavaria,
Ferdinand I., and the Pope uniting their forces for an attack upon the
Schmalkaldic dissenters. In order to prevent Charles from again losing
his resolution, the Pope dishonourably communicated this treaty to the
Protestants, nor was Charles less angry with Paul for representing to
France, Poland, and Venice that the impending struggle was a religious
crusade in which any Catholic people might assist. It was the policy
of Charles to place his enterprise on purely secular grounds. There
was again grave friction between Charles and the Pope, and the Farnesi
mingled with the graver issues a petulant complaint that Charles had
done so little for them.
The Protestants, however, were badly organized and were soon defeated.
Paul bitterly complained that Charles would not follow up his victory
by initiating a policy of persecution in south Germany, and would not,
when Henry VIII. died (1547), join forces with Francis I. for the
invasion of England; and another fiery quarrel ensued. The prelates
at Trent conceived that they were menaced by the distant and subdued
Protestants, and Paul quickly availed himself of the apprehension
to demand a removal to Italy. Charles went so far as to threaten to
confiscate the whole of the property of the Church in Germany, but a
convenient epidemic broke out at Trent and Paul removed the council to
Bologna. Another year was spent in discussion as to the validity of the
transfer, and the rumour that the Pope secretly desired to frustrate
the work of reform once more gained ground. This is, as I explained, a
half-truth. But so little reform was actually achieved during the life
of Paul that I need not deal further here with the Council of Trent.
The year 1648 was filled with the acrid conflict of Pope and Emperor.
Paul drew nearer to France, and Rome, believing that at length the
Pope was about to abandon his policy of neutrality, prepared once
more for invasion. Charles made no descent on Italy, but he now took
a step which seemed to the Pope almost as scandalous an outrage. He
issued his famous Interrim: a document which enacted that, until the
points in dispute were settled by a council, priests might marry, the
laity might communicate from the chalice, and vague and conciliatory
interpretations might be put on the doctrines of the Church. In spite
of the intrigues of France, Paul wearily maintained his negotiations
with Charles, and, to the last, pressed the ambitions of his family. In
October (1549), however, his favourite grandson rebelled against his
decision in regard to Parma, and the aged Pope abandoned the unhappy
struggle. He died on November 10th of that year.
In spite of the efforts of some recent historians, the character of
Paul does not stand out with distinction in the Papal chronicle. His
lamentable nepotism mars his whole career, and his real reluctance to
press the work of reform did grave injury to his Church. He belonged
essentially to the earlier phase of the Papacy, and it is apparent
that, if he could have extirpated Protestantism by the sword, the
Papacy would have returned to the more decent levities of the days of
Leo X. As it was, he did comparatively little for either culture or
religion. He very cordially employed Michael Angelo and Sangallo, and
showed a concern for the antiquities and the monuments of Rome. He had
ability, power, and taste; but he had not that fiery will for reform
and that deep religious faith which were needed in that hour of danger.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 302: For the valuable letters of the Italian ambassadors at
the time of the Conclave see _L'Elezione del Papa Paolo III._ (1907)
by P. Accame. An almost contemporary biography of Paul is given in the
_Vitæ et Res Gestæ Romanorum Pontificum_ of Ciaconius.]
[Footnote 303: XI., 19-20.]
[Footnote 304: See, for this aspect of Paul's Pontificate, an article
by L. Cardauns, "Paul III., Karl V., und Franz I.," in _Quellen und
Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven_, Bd. XI., Heft I., pp. 147-244.
The writer holds that an alliance with Charles was advisable with a
view to crush Protestantism. There is certainly much evidence that Paul
wished to discover which of the rival monarchs would do most for his
children, yet he assuredly had a sincere desire for neutrality.]
[Footnote 305: See _Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland_, edited by W.
Friedensberg, V. 140 and 59. Many useful documents will also be found
in H. Loemmer's _Monumenta Vaticana historiam ecclesiasticam sæculi
XVI. illustrantia_, 1861.]
[Footnote 306: See the report of the Venetian ambassador in _Le
Relazioni degli ambasciatori Veneti_, edited by C. Alberi, 1st series.]
[Footnote 307: E. Dietrich, _Kardinal Contarini_ (1885), p. 565.]
[Footnote 308: This curious side-light on the history of the
Reformation is given, in a document reproduced from the secret archives
of the Vatican, by Dr. Pastor (xi., 431).]
[Footnote 309: Farnese's letter to the Pope is reproduced by A. von
Druffel, _Karl V. und die Römische Kurie_, ii., 57.]
[Footnote 310: It is described in A. Armand, _Les Médailleurs
Italiens_, i., 172.]
[Footnote 311: See Pallavicini's _Istoria del Consilio di Trento_, bks.
vi. and vii.]