THE UNITY OF ITALY (1849-1871)
After the uprisings of 1848-49, the old tyrannical system prevailed for
eight years and seemed heavier than ever. Liberalism meant suspicion,
disfavour, danger. The liberals were not very numerous and did not agree
among themselves. Some looked for hope to Piedmont, some to England,
some to France. Some were for a republic, some for a confederation, some
for unity; some wished insurrection, others lawful agitation.
In Naples the king busied himself with putting the liberals in dungeons.
According to the general belief the number of prisoners for political
offences in the Two Sicilies was between fifteen and thirty thousand.
Among them was Baron Carlo Poerio, "a refined and accomplished
gentleman, a respected and blameless character," at one time one of the
ministers of the Crown. It happened that Mr. Gladstone, travelling for
the benefit of a daughter's health, passed several months in Naples at
this time (1850-51). He attended trials of the liberal prisoners,
listened to a "long tissue of palpable lies told by witnesses suborned
by the government," and visited the horrible and filthy prisons. After
his return to England he published his "Letters to the Earl of
Aberdeen." He set forth before the English people "the horrors--amidst
which the government of that country (Naples) is now carried on." He
said that "the present practices of the Government of Naples in
reference to real or supposed political offenders are an outrage upon
religion, upon civilization, upon humanity, and upon decency." He
described the "incessant, systematic, deliberate violation of the law by
the Power appointed to watch over and maintain it." "It is the wholesale
persecution of virtue,--it is the awful profanation of public
religion,--it is the perfect prostitution of the judicial office,--this
is 'The negation of God erected into a system of government.'" He
recounted Poerio's trial at length, and told how Poerio and fifteen
others were confined in a room about thirteen feet long and eight feet
high, in which they slept, always chained two by two. These chains were
never taken off, day or night. He ended by saying, "It is time that
either the veil should be lifted from scenes fitter for hell than earth,
or some considerable mitigation should be voluntarily adopted. I have
undertaken this wearisome and painful task, in the hope of doing
something to diminish a mass of human suffering as huge, I believe, as
acute, to say the least, as any that the eye of Heaven beholds."
These letters were sent by Lord Palmerston to every government in
Europe, and helped to awaken general European sympathy for the oppressed
liberals of Italy.
In the Papal States Pius IX put himself wholly in the hands of the
reactionaries and the Jesuits. His government was practically imbecile.
Brigands came and went at will. In Forlimpopoli, for instance, a city of
the Romagna, a famous highwayman and his band appeared on the stage of a
theatre, and made the spectators empty their pockets of their money and
of their front-door keys. In Modena, Parma, and Tuscany the governments
did whatever they deemed would be pleasing to Austria; and in Lombardy
and Venice the Austrians repressed the slightest signs of patriotism.
In Piedmont alone was there light ahead. The young king was the
embodiment of the best qualities of his race. The statues of him, carved
in the first fury of patriotism, which disfigure many a _piazza_, reveal
only his corpulence, his monstrous mustachios, and the forceful ugliness
of his shrewd face. Victor Emmanuel was a soldier born, of careless
manners, imperious and brusque, yet with a charm of obvious honesty that
won men's hearts and gained for him the title of _il re galantuomo_. He
reminds one of Henry of Navarre, in his dash, his impetuous energy, his
shrewdness, his deserved popularity, and his eternally youthful
readiness to fall in love. After the defeat at Novara (1849) pressure
was put upon him to return to the autocratic system, and, it is said,
Austria offered him easier terms if he would. He had been brought up
with the old ideas of the royal position, but he was statesman enough to
perceive that if Piedmont and the House of Savoy were to lead in the
movement of Italian independence, they must win the confidence of the
liberals; and he had sworn to maintain the constitution. He was always
a man of his word, whatever policy might advise, and answered that he
should be loyal to the constitution.
Piedmont's history for the next few years is a record of liberal
legislation, as it was then understood. This legislation was especially
directed against antiquated ecclesiastical privileges, with the purpose
of realizing Cavour's principle, "A free Church in a free State." A
little later Cavour was called to the head of the government, and for
ten years, with certain brief exceptions, he remained the chief figure
on the Italian stage. There are diverse judgments on the very diverse
merits of the master-builders of the Italian kingdom; some admire most
Mazzini, the indefatigable conspirator, the dreamy idealist, the nobly
fanatical republican; others, Garibaldi, the man after Petrarch's heart,
the rival of Roland or the Cid; others, Victor Emmanuel, the honourable,
bold, shrewd, resolute king; but all agree that Cavour's brilliant
diplomacy entitles him to rank as one of the world's great statesmen,
and that his work was indispensable to the establishment of the Italian
kingdom.
This period prior to the war with Austria is Cavour's. He set the
finances of Piedmont on a better basis; he began a series of measures
for the development of her resources; he secured various internal
reforms, but his brilliant achievement was in his foreign policy. He
knew that the Austrians could not be dispossessed without a war, that
Piedmont was not strong enough of herself, and that in order to gain
allies she must get a hearing before Europe. The Crimean War gave
Cavour an opportunity. England and France would have preferred Austria
as an ally, and there was much cautious proceeding; but Austria
hesitated, and Piedmont offered herself. Many Italians deemed the plan
of taking part in a war with which Piedmont had no visible concern a
piece of folly; but Cavour carried his point. The Piedmontese army went,
behaved with credit, and effaced the unfavourable impression left by the
disastrous campaigns of 1848-49. The fruits of the Crimean expedition
were gathered at the Congress of Paris (1856), where Cavour, supported
by England and France, was able to call the attention of the Congress to
the condition of Italy. He pointed to the tyranny of Austria in Lombardy
and Venetia, to the abominable condition of the Papal States, to the
horrible misgovernment in the Two Sicilies; and he pointed to Piedmont
as the bulwark against Austrian preponderance on the one hand, and
against the revolutionary spirit on the other. Nothing definite was
done, but the Italian question had been broached, and Cavour's
participation in the Congress was recognized as a great achievement.
Piedmont's leadership was helped by rash revolts elsewhere, easily put
down and cruelly punished; and it became plainer and plainer that
through the steady, orderly monarchy of Sardinia deliverance was to
come, if at all, and not through the visionary schemes of Mazzini. The
dark, mysterious plans of Napoleon III now loomed on the horizon.
Relations between him and Cavour became closer. Cavour, no doubt, would
have liked to gain his ends without French aid, but that could not be
done. The only other possible ally, England, would not interfere. In the
summer of 1858 an understanding was reached between him and Napoleon
that in case of Austrian aggression France would aid Piedmont. On
January 1, 1859, Napoleon hinted to the world what had happened; on
January 10, Victor Emmanuel at the opening of the Piedmontese parliament
said that the political situation was not free from perils ahead, "for
while we respect treaties, we cannot disregard the cry of pain which
comes to us from so many parts of Italy." Count Cavour asked for a loan
of 50,000,000 lire. Affairs moved fast. Relations between Piedmont and
Austria were strained taut; but it was essential that Austria should be
the aggressor. Russia and England, in order to prevent war, suggested a
European Congress to consider matters. Napoleon consented; and Cavour,
who knew that freedom for Italy could only be obtained by war, feared
that his chance had gone. There was talk of disarmament, but no
agreement had been reached, when Austria, impatient and arrogant, sent
an ultimatum to Piedmont that she must disarm prior to the Congress.
Victor Emmanuel refused and war was declared.
The French Emperor crossed the Alps, and in June the allies won the
battles of Magenta and Solferino. The Italians believed that Austria
would now be driven from every foot of Italian soil: when, suddenly,
without consulting Piedmont, Napoleon, for reasons of French policy,
made peace with Austria. The Emperor of Austria ceded Lombardy to
Napoleon, and Napoleon transferred it to Piedmont; and, as a sop to the
spirit of Italian unity, both Emperors agreed to favour the scheme of a
confederation of the Italian States with the Pope at its head, but the
latter plan was left in the air. This was the end of the high hopes of
Italian freedom and unity. Italy had received a slap in the face. Cavour
was furious; he had a stormy interview with his king, and passionately
urged him not to consent, but the king had the good sense to see that he
must. Cavour immediately resigned.
Meanwhile the war had caused the recall of the Austrian troops south of
the Po, and the patriots had risen in joy. The Grand Duke of Tuscany,
the Duke of Modena, the Duchess Regent of Parma, the papal legates of
the Romagna, ran away, and provisional governments were established; but
a permanent political disposition was attended with difficulties. The
states themselves wished to join Piedmont, but the wish was not
unanimous, for many people wanted to preserve local autonomy and their
old historic boundaries. Napoleon favoured his vague confederacy, and a
European Congress supported his view. Indecision reigned, but the cause
of national union triumphed through the vigour of Count Bettino
Ricasoli, a man of iron character, head of the provisional government in
Tuscany. "We must," he wrote, "no longer speak of Piedmont, nor of
Florence, nor of Tuscany; we must speak neither of fusion nor
annexation, but of the union of the Italian people under the
constitutional government of Victor Emmanuel."[24] Certainly the
fugitive dukes could only return by force, and though Continental Europe
approved their return, there was nobody to supply the force. The little
states voted to join Piedmont. Piedmont, however, hesitated, in fear of
European contradiction. Nobody but Cavour could manage the matter, and
he was recalled to office (1860). Cavour appealed to the doctrine of the
popular will to be expressed by a _plebiscite_. France, however, would
only consent upon cession of Savoy and Nice, a measure already talked of
as the price of the French alliance; and in spite of the reluctance of
the king to surrender Savoy, the cradle of his race, the price had to be
paid. The cession was made, and Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and the Romagna
were united with the Kingdom of Sardinia under the name of the Kingdom
of Italy (April 15, 1860).
In the mean time Ferdinand II, King of the Two Sicilies, had died, hated
and despised by everybody, and his son Francis II, a weak, ignorant,
bigoted lad, had mounted the throne. He refused a suggestion of Victor
Emmanuel to join in the war against Austria, threw himself into the arms
of the reactionary party, and made an alliance with the Pope. The
discontented liberals took courage at the news from the north. In April,
1860, the revolt began in Palermo, and, though suppressed there, spread.
Two young patriots, Francesco Crispi and Rosalino Pilo, went about
stirring the people to action. Garibaldi was begged to put himself at
the head of the proposed revolution. On the night of May 6, two ships,
the Lombardy and the Piedmont, secretly left Genoa, and took Garibaldi
and a thousand volunteers aboard. This band, known as _i Mille_, is
nearly as famous and as legendary as King Arthur and his Round Table. On
May 11, the ships landed at Marsala. Two Neapolitan cruisers came up,
but two English men-of-war happened to be there also; and the English
captains, under guise of friendly notification to the Neapolitans, took
some action which delayed the latter long enough to let the last
Garibaldians disembark. Once on shore, Garibaldi's volunteers ran to
secure the telegraph office. They arrived just after the operator had
telegraphed that two Piedmontese ships, filled with troops, had come
into the harbour; a Garibaldian was able to add to the message, "I have
made a mistake; they are two merchantmen." The answer came back,
"Idiot." The volunteers marched inland. A provisional government was
organized; Garibaldi was made dictator, and Crispi secretary of state.
The cry was "Italy and Victor Emmanuel!" Garibaldi was joined by
insurgent Sicilians, and, with numbers considerably increased, fought
and defeated the Bourbon army. The story reads like the exploits of
Hector before the Greek trenches. Victory followed victory. Palermo
fell, Milazzo and Messina; then he crossed the straits and invaded
Calabria (August). This marvellous triumph, for there had been thirty
thousand regular troops to oppose Garibaldi, frightened King Francis; he
proclaimed a constitution, appealed to Napoleon, and even to Victor
Emmanuel, for help. It was too late. Garibaldi swept on victorious, and
the king fled from Naples (September 6); the next day Garibaldi marched
in and assumed dictatorship of the kingdom.
England approved, but Continental Europe looked askance at this
irregular proceeding, and Victor Emmanuel and Cavour began to feel
uneasy, apprehensive lest the Great Powers should intervene in Italian
affairs. It was a difficult situation. Garibaldi was moving on
northward, and proclaimed his intention of going to Rome, regardless of
the French army stationed there, and then to Venice, regardless of the
European treaties that gave Venice to Austria. Besides, the Pope had
collected an army (largely of foreign recruits) to suppress the liberal
movements in Umbria and the Marches, and to give aid to the Neapolitan
king. Here were further opportunities for foreign intervention.
Evidently Cavour must act promptly if he wished Piedmont to continue to
control the national movement. He requested the Pope to dismiss his new
army. The Pope refused. The Piedmontese army crossed the pontifical
border, scattered the papal army, and took possession of all the papal
territory, except the city of Rome and the country immediately about it,
and then marched on across the Neapolitan boundary. Here the Bourbon
army was holding Garibaldi at bay. The arrival of the Piedmontese
determined the issue. A less noble man might have shown resentment at
having another come at the eleventh hour and seize the fruits of
victory, but Garibaldi hailed Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy, refused
the proffered honours and rewards, and went home, a poor man, to the
little island of Caprera. The Two Sicilies and the liberated parts of
the Papal States voted to join the Kingdom of Italy. In February, 1861,
the first Italian parliament was held, and Victor Emmanuel formally
received the title King of Italy. Excepting Rome and Venice, Italy was
free and independent.
Rome was the more pressing question of the two. A history of twenty-five
hundred years, a profound sentiment, a patriotic, poetic, romantic love,
had inevitably determined that Rome must be the capital of United Italy.
On the other hand, opposed to the Italian national sentiment was the
historic Catholic sentiment, diffused throughout Europe and strongest in
France. The Pope naturally deemed his Italian birth inferior in
obligation to his Catholic position. Moreover, the Temporal Power of the
Popes had endured for more than a thousand years, and since the time of
Julius II the pontifical title had been as good as the title to public
or private property anywhere. Catholics honestly believed that this
political kingdom was necessary to the independence of the Church. How
could the world, they said, believe in papal impartiality if the Papacy
were under the thumb of the Italian government? The difference in point
of view inevitably brought the ardent Papist and the patriotic
Nationalist to mutual injustice. The Italians looked on Pius IX as their
worst enemy; the Roman Curia deemed the Italians robbers. French
sympathy with the Papists, and especially the presence of a French army
in Rome, made the question exceedingly difficult. A special
circumstance aggravated the difficulty. The King of Naples, having taken
refuge in Rome, armed and subsidized gangs of brigands, who raided the
Neapolitan provinces and committed unspeakable outrages. These rascals,
when pursued by the Piedmontese army, crossed the pontifical border and
were safe. This condition was intolerable.
At this juncture the great statesman who had steadfastly pursued his
policy,--a free Church in a free State,--and never lost hope of a
peaceful solution of the Roman difficulty, died (June 6, 1861). The
priest who shrived him was summoned to Rome, deprived of his parish,
suspended from his office, and sent to finish his days in a remote
monastery; so strongly did the Roman Court feel that Cavour and his
abettors were wicked men.
Cavour's successors, Ricasoli and Rattazzi, with feebler gait, followed
his policy as best they could; but uncertainty and hesitation prevailed.
The two great questions, Rome and Venice, pressed for solution. The
radicals clamored to have the Italian army march on Rome. Garibaldi's
impatience would not brook further inaction. He left his island home at
Caprera, and betook himself to Sicily, crying, "Rome or Death!" With a
little army of hot-tempered radicals he crossed into Calabria. The
Italian government had no choice. Regular troops met Garibaldi at
Aspromonte, near Reggio, and bade him withdraw; he refused; shots were
fired. Which side fired first is uncertain. Garibaldi was wounded and
made prisoner (August 29, 1862). This indignity to the national hero
roused much hard feeling, but reasonable men perceived that the solution
of the Roman question had to be found in some other way than by a
filibustering expedition against a city held by the troops of a power
with whom the nation was at peace.
The liberation of Venice came first. Prussia occupied a position in
Germany somewhat similar to that of Piedmont in Italy. Both had somewhat
similar problems. Both felt antagonism to Austria, and also a suspicion
of France. In April, 1866, the two states made an alliance against
Austria, who, fearing the combination, tried to break it by offering to
cede Venetia to Italy if she would abandon the Prussian alliance. Victor
Emmanuel refused, and war began in June. The Italians were beaten both
on land and sea, to their great mortification and chagrin. The crushing
Prussian victory at Sadowa, however, forced Austria to accept the
victor's terms, including the cession of Venice. On November 7 Victor
Emmanuel entered the city. Rome alone was left.
Garibaldi made another desperate attempt, but was defeated by the French
at Mentana (1867). Not by Italian victories, but in consequence of
Prussian victories, the conquest of Rome was finally effected. The
French were obliged to withdraw their garrison during the
Franco-Prussian War, and then the Italian government, which, to the
shame of ardent patriots, had so long forborne out of obedience to the
will of the French, gave notice to the world that it would annex Rome.
After a useless call upon the Pope for peaceful surrender, Victor
Emmanuel directed his army to march on the city. Real resistance was out
of the question, but Pius IX had decided to yield only to force. On the
20th of September, 1870, a breach was made in the wall near _Porta Pia_,
a few shots were fired, a few score soldiers killed and wounded, and the
Italian army marched in and took possession of the city. A _plebiscite_
was held, and by a vote of 133,681 to 1507 the city voted to become a
part of Italy. In June, 1871, the seat of government was formally
removed from Florence, and Rome once again, after fifteen hundred years,
became the capital of the Kingdom of Italy.
FOOTNOTES:
[24] _The Union of Italy_, W. J. Stillman, p. 300.