CHAPTER VII

FROM CHARLEMAGNE TO NICHOLAS I (814-867)

The period from the death of Charlemagne (814) to the coronation of Otto

the Great (962) is a long dismal stretch, tenanted by discord and

ignorance. At the beginning stands the commanding figure of Charlemagne,

With Atlantean shoulders, fit to bear

The weight of mightiest monarchies.

But his descendants were unequal to their inheritance, and under them

his Empire crumbled away and resolved itself into incipient nations.

That Empire, in theory the restored Roman Empire, was in fact strictly

Teutonic, though buttressed by the Roman Church. Charlemagne deemed

himself head of both Empire and Church. In his eyes the Pope was his

subject, and he legislated, as a matter of course, upon ecclesiastical

affairs. In secular matters he endeavoured to maintain local

administration without detriment to a strong central government. For

this purpose he divided the Empire into three divisions, of which he

made his three sons nominally kings, really his lieutenants. Under these

sons he appointed counts and bishops, as local governors. He maintained

his central authority by means of deputies (_missi dominici_), who

traversed the whole Empire, two by two, a bishop and a count together.

The maintenance of such a political unity, however, required either the

organic strength and momentum of the old Roman Empire, or a breed of

Charlemagnes. On the great Emperor's death the forces of disruption made

themselves felt at once. His son, Louis the Pious, indeed succeeded to

the whole sovereignty of the Empire; but Louis's sons demanded division.

They rebelled; and civil war lasted most of Louis's life. After his

death the sons fought one another, and finally agreed on a division of

the territory, though the Imperial title was kept. One brother took the

territory to the east, destined to become Germany; another, that to the

west, destined to become France; and Lothair, the eldest, who also

received the Imperial title, took Italy and a long, heterogeneous strip

between the territories of his brothers. This division was fatal to the

Empire. On Lothair's death the Imperial crown descended to his son Louis

II (855-875), and afterwards to two other degenerate members of a

degenerate family. The last made himself unendurable and was deposed

(887). With him ended Charlemagne's legitimate male line, and also the

first revival of the Roman Empire.

This Empire had been a civilizing power. It had supported the Papacy, as

an oak supports the creeper that clings to it; and in its decline and

fall it pulled the Papacy down with it. Without such support the Papacy

could maintain neither dignity abroad nor order at home. This lesson the

Church learned once through the outrages inflicted upon Pope Leo, but

forgot it; and required the experience of a hundred and fifty years to

learn it a second time. In theory Papacy and Empire were co-equal

powers, religious and secular, together carrying on the noble task of

God's government on earth. In practice, as their respective rights and

powers had not been definitely set off, they could not agree; each

wished to be master. The relations between the two constitute the great

axis on which mediaeval politics revolve, and for a long time must serve

as the main motive of our story. The contest between them for mastery

resembles a fencing match, in which the Pope thrusts at the Emperor's

crown, the Emperor parries, and lunges back at the papal tiara. For

convenience we divide the match into two bouts, and first take the

Pope's attack.

At the famous coronation on Christmas day, 800, Charlemagne and Leo

stood side by side, co-labourers in the great task of reconstructing

Europe. But once the coronation over, the two undefined authorities

jostled each other. Charlemagne, to whom government was as much a

religious as a secular matter, though he had accepted his Imperial crown

at the hands of the Pope, did not regard papal participation necessary

for the continuance of the Imperial dignity. At Aachen, 813, he crowned

his son Louis the Pious co-Emperor, without the help of Pope or priest.

This thrust must have carried discomfiture to the banks of the Tiber.

But with Charlemagne's weak successors the astute Papacy scored hit

after hit. Louis the Pious submitted to be recrowned by the Pope, so did

his son, Lothair, and his grandson Louis II; and their two successors

were also crowned by the Pope. This sequence of palpable hits won this

bout and secured for the Papacy beyond dispute the prerogative of

crowning the Emperors.

If we now turn to that part of the game where Emperor lunged and Pope

parried, we find a more complicated situation. A third player takes a

hand, to the confusion of the game and to the great detriment of the

papal defence. This third player is the Roman people, who believed that

the _Senatus Populusque Romanus_ still possessed their ancient

prerogatives, and had the right to appoint both Emperor and Pope. Their

claim to elect the Emperor was flimsy enough, being merely the memory of

an empty form, and is not of enough consequence to stop for; but their

claim to interfere in the papal election was of the highest importance.

It arose from the anomalous nature of the Papacy. The Pope was bishop of

Rome, and as such his election lay in the hands of the clergy and people

of Rome; he was also the ruler of central Italy, and as such the barons

there were interested in his election; and, in addition, he was head of

all the Christian Churches in the West, and so all western Christendom,

and the Emperor as its temporal lord, was likewise concerned. The fact

was that no definite method of papal election and confirmation had been

settled upon during these disturbed centuries. The original practice had

been for the Roman churches, priests, and laymen together assembled, to

make the election; subsequently the senate, or the army, or the nobles,

had represented the lay body of electors; but whoever represented the

laymen, they and the clergy made the election; which was then submitted

to the Emperor, or his representative, for scrutiny and confirmation.

The submission of the Roman election to the examination of a Byzantine

Emperor had never been acceptable in Rome, and after the breach over

iconoclasm, the practice ceased. Naturally, on the revival of the Roman

Empire in the West, the new Emperors claimed the old Imperial right of

supervision; naturally, also, the papal party resisted the fresh

exercise of the old prerogative. Here was a situation for a scrimmage,

but any clear account of the papal elections in Rome, supposing such

were possible, would be too minute; this narrative must confine itself

to the main passes between the papal party and the Emperors.

After the death of Charlemagne (no papal election occurred during his

lifetime) several Popes were elected and consecrated without previously

consulting the Emperor. On the other hand, in the next reign the

Imperial deputy made the Romans take oath that no Pope should be

consecrated without the approval of the Emperor. What was done at the

following election is not known, but at the second the Pope was not

consecrated until the Emperor had ratified the proceedings. Thereafter

the Imperial right was acknowledged in theory, though in practice the

elected Pontiffs did not always wait for Imperial confirmation.

With the fall of the Carlovingian Empire the fencing match ceased for

lack of an Imperial contestant. The score stood thus: each had succeeded

in the attack, the Papacy had won its right to bestow the Imperial

crown, and the Empire had won, though not so definitely, its right to

supervise the election of a Pope. We must now pass to this Imperial

interregnum knowing that when the Empire shall be revived, the match

will begin anew and the combatants, with foils unbated and envenomed,

will fight to a finish.

The Imperial interregnum, nominally interrupted by one German and

several Italian make-believe Emperors, lasted for three generations; no

Imperial power was exercised from 875 to 962. It is a murky period in

which shadows wander about; but before taking our candle and descending

into the gloom, we will turn to the one bright spot, the career of a

great Pope, Nicholas I (858-867).

This Pope, in spite of the decadence of the Papacy, won immense prestige

for it by two successful assertions of cosmopolitan authority. The King

of Lorraine, brother to Louis II, the Emperor, wished to put away his

wife and marry another woman. The innocent queen, with the sanction of

the clergy of the kingdom, was divorced and forced to enter a convent;

and, with the consent of his clergy, the king married the other woman.

The wronged queen appealed to the Pope, who sent his legates to

investigate the affair; but the king bribed the legates and succeeded in

getting a decision from the local synod in his favour, although, in

fact, the whole matter had been a shocking scandal. Thereupon the king

sent the archbishops of Cologne and of Trier, the two great

ecclesiastical dignitaries of the kingdom, to announce this verdict of

acquittal. The Pope, "professing," as his enemies said, "to be

imperator of the whole world," seized his opportunity; he espoused the

cause of the innocent queen, annulled the fraudulent proceedings, and

excommunicated and deposed the two archbishops. The king applied to the

Emperor for help, and the Emperor went to Rome, but could obtain no

concession. The Pope stood like a rock. He allied himself with France

and Germany, and threatened to excommunicate the sinning husband and all

his bishops. The king was obliged to submit. The usurping wife was

excommunicated and banished, and the papal legate conducted the divorced

queen back to the royal palace. Thus the Papacy not only established a

great precedent for the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal

power, but also stood conspicuous before the world as the champion of

the weak and oppressed and the defender of morality and justice.

It would be difficult to overrate the effect of this papal achievement.

It may be that the Papacy stood forth as champion of innocence when

policy coincided with righteousness; but it was the righteousness and

not the policy which gave the Papacy strength. One can imagine, in days

when brutal barons, scattered in strongholds all over the country, were

the normal forms of power and authority, what effect such news had upon

the people. A pilgrim from across the Alps, a peddler, or some poor

vagrant, enters a village huddled at the foot of a hill, on which stands

a great castle where a drunken lord revels with his mistresses, and

recounts to the assembled peasants, serfs, and slaves, how the Holy

Father, in the name of God, had commanded a greater lord, in a greater

castle, to put away his mistress and bring back his wife, and how that

lord had got down on his knees and had done the Holy Father's bidding.

The second case was the victory of papal authority over the spirit of

nationality in the Church. When the incipient nations of France and

Germany, having separated from the Empire, had begun to be

self-conscious, the spirit of nationality naturally showed itself in

ecclesiastical matters as well as in political matters. There was

obvious likelihood that the nations would govern themselves

ecclesiastically as well as politically. Should they do so, the papal

supremacy would fall just as the Imperial supremacy had fallen, and the

unity of the Church would be shattered just as the Empire had been. Here

was certainly a great danger to the Papacy, and probably a great danger

to Christianity and civilization; at least so Nicholas thought. He

resolved to meet it boldly. His opportunity came when a French (West

Frankish) bishop appealed to Rome against the action of his

metropolitan. The metropolitan objected that there was no precedent for

papal action in such a case; he did not deny that the Pope had certain

appellate functions, but said that if the Pope interfered directly in

the discipline of bishops, the power of the metropolitan would be

impaired. It is needless to say that this argument did not produce the

result that the metropolitan desired. There was nothing the Papacy

wanted more than that its central government should act directly

everywhere, and that all bishops should be dependent upon Rome; that

was the very principle of papal supremacy. The issue would determine

whether the Papacy was to be an autocratic power, or a limited court of

appeal. Nicholas was able to take advantage of the troubled political

situation to enforce direct papal authority, and so added an immense

prerogative to the papal power.

Apart from this imperial ecclesiastical principle the latter episode is

especially interesting on account of the character of the evidence

produced by the Pope to maintain his position. This evidence consisted

of a new compilation of Church law which appeared somewhat mysteriously

about this time. Theretofore Church law had consisted of a collection of

precepts taken from the Bible, from the early Fathers, from decrees of

Councils, and also of letters, called decretals, written by the bishops

of Rome, but none of these decretals was earlier than the time of

Constantine. The fact, that there were no papal decretals prior to

Constantine, seemed to imply, at least to the sceptically minded, that

papal authority had really begun at the time of Constantine and not at

the time of St. Peter. To the ardent papist such an idea was incredible.

Nicholas now produced a new batch of documents. Among these was the

_Donation of Constantine_, of which I have spoken. Others were papal

decretals, which purported to come from Popes of the third and second

centuries, and to prove that papal jurisdiction over other bishoprics

had been exercised almost as far back as the time of St. Peter. These

new appearing documents placed the Pope not only above kings, but above

metropolitans and provincial synods, and justified Nicholas in acting

directly in the case of the West Frankish bishop, in the King of

Lorraine's matrimonial affairs, and also in assuming to act as

"imperator of the whole world." These documents, known as the _Isidorian

Decretals_, were probably composed by some priest in France, not long

before their use by Nicholas. For six hundred years they were believed

to be genuine, and during that time rendered the Papacy great service by

ranging the sentiment of law throughout Europe (at least until the

revival of Roman law) on the side of the Papacy in its struggle with the

Empire.

A Short History of Italy (476-1900) · 第 7 / 39 章