The chief strength of the Russians was massed against the left of this

army, for if that wing was broken the entire army would find itself

hemmed in and must retreat in order to avoid being surrounded. And so,

forced from Opolie along the Vistula, attacked constantly on its entire

front and right flank from Tomaszow and Tarnograd, Dankl's army was

forced down to and across the San and beyond it.

The movements of the Russians had been executed with great harmony. By

September 23, 1914, Dankl's army had been driven by Ewarts and Plehve to

the line of the Wisloka. Jaroslav was taken by Russky on September 21.

Chyrow was possessed by Brussilov on September 24. Brussilov had entered

Galicia at Woloczysk on the same day--August 22--that Russky had crossed

the frontier and occupied Brody.

The Austrian losses, since the taking of Lemberg, according to an

official statement made by the Russians on September 17, 1914, were

250,000 killed and wounded, and 100,000 prisoners with 400 guns, many

colors, and a vast quantity of stores. We are not obliged to accept

these figures. They are given here for what significance and merit they

may have, but as coming from Russia. It was also reported by Russia that

the rifles taken numbered almost half a million. The enemy's total

losses were put by Russia at from 35 to 50 per cent. Even the small

estimate is said by Austria to be an exaggeration.

The Russians now held all eastern Galicia, and were masters of Lemberg,

Jaroslav, Brody, Busk, Tarnopol, Grodek, Brzezany, Sambor, and other

towns of no little importance, and also of the railroads between these

towns. They also were in control of the oil fields of Galicia, of

considerable importance to them at this time, and of the valuable

agricultural resources of Galicia, or of such part of it as they

occupied. Przemysl alone held out. Russian cavalry was already trying

the approach to the Carpathians from the Dukla Pass to the Bukowina.

CHAPTER LXIX

INVESTITURE OF PRZEMYSL

Many fortresses lost a reputation of long standing for strength during

the Austro-Russian campaign. Grodek and Rawa-Russka, with fine natural

defenses and excellent works, were carried by assault after gallant

resistance. Lemberg's defenses were reputed to be powerful, but no

attempt was made to utilize them. The fall of Jaroslav has never been

explained. It was considered generally to be stronger than Namur or

Liege, and a prolonged resistance was anticipated there. It withstood

attack for only two days. When heavy guns were brought to bear on it by

the Russians the garrison withdrew. Przemysl seems, alone of all the

Austrian defenses, to have justified its reputation.

Przemysl was not only a strongly fortified place but a beautiful city as

well, surrounded with flower gardens and orchards. Its history, like

that of Lemberg, had been a stormy one. Its population in 1914,

including residents of its suburbs, was about 50,000, principally Poles

and Ruthenes, who lived together in amity and great religious

toleration. In September of that year, when the Russians made their

whirlwind advance, there was, according to official reports from Vienna,

an army of 80,000 based on the city, under the leadership of General

Boroyevich.

With a large part of this army, Boroyevich was reported to have moved to

the line of the Wisloka to give aid to Dankl's hard-pushed troops as

they made their stand on that river. It was understood that many of Von

Auffenberg's soldiers, as they fell back, were employed as a garrison

for the fortress. At the time of its investment it was said to contain

about 100,000 men, with its defense in charge of General Kusmanek.

Afterward the strength of the garrison was increased.

It has been indicated previously how the railway communications had been

broken on the east and south by the advance of the Russians after the

fall of Grodek and the taking of Mocsiska. The isolation of the fortress

of Przemysl was completed by the fall of Jaroslav and the occupation of

Radymno, a town on the main Cracow railway on the left bank of the San,

about eight miles east of Jaroslav and fifteen miles north of the

fortress. And so it remained isolated, save for a short period when the

tide of invasion was driven back. During this time it was again in

communication with Cracow.

The Russians took it as a matter of course that the fortress would soon

fall to them. Its fate was predicted in the newspapers of the Allies;

but, in preparation for defense, stores of all kinds had been hurried

into it, and plans had been laid for stout resistance. It had a

determined commander in General Kusmanek.

The first shots were fired on September 18, 1914. The city was

surrounded on September 20, and an unbroken bombardment with many

desperate sorties ensued until October 2, when the Russians sent out a

white flag to the city and demanded its surrender. General Kusmanek's

reply was that he would not discuss surrender until he had exhausted all

powers of resistance. The attack reached its height on October 5, 1914.

The Russians stormed again and again, hills of corpses outside the works

testifying to furious attacks they made. They succeeded in carrying

temporarily one of the outer works, eleven battalions having succeeded

in approaching these defenses undetected, because of damage to an

Austrian searchlight.

Suddenly they stormed the walls. The garrison retreated to the

casemates, from which they defended themselves with rifles and machine

guns. The Russians forced their way to the casements and a hand-to-hand

struggle with bayonets, gun butts, and hand grenades followed. When

Austrian reenforcements, hastily telephoned for, arrived, the attacking

party was already retiring, leaving their dead and wounded in the

casemates and on the wall. Rockets and light shells illuminated their

retreat. There was desultory fighting during several days thereafter,

and then the Russian army settled down to a routine investment, biding

the time when their heavy siege guns could be brought up and the way

made ready for an effective assault. On October 18, 1914, there was a

battle to the east of Chyrow and Przemysl, which was successful for the

Austrians. The fighting near Mizynico was especially severe. The Magiera

Heights, which had been in the possession of the Russians, were occupied

by the Austrians after a formidable bombardment by their artillery. At

the same time Russian attacks on the east of Przemysl to Medyka Heights,

on the southern wing of the battle field, which were especially directed

against the heights to the southeast of Stryj and Sambor, were repulsed.

A fresh attack of the Russians on the east bank of the river near

Jaroslav also was repulsed.

The addition of reserves and the opportunity to reorganize their army,

gave new fighting force to the Austrians about this time. Wherever the

Russians retired they followed them closely and by reconnaissances were

able to develop weak points in the Russian positions. On October 20,

1914, the Austrians had gained ground in several spots in a heavy,

stubborn attack on the fortified positions of the Russians from Plotzyn

to the highroad east of Medyka, while a Russian counterattack was

unable to make headway.

On the heights north of Nizankowice, Austrian troops scored another

victory and took also the villages situated against the heights. In the

southern wing the battle was carried on mainly by artillery. The modern

field fortification system being liberally used by the Austrians, the

battles had largely the nature of fortress warfare. On the same day the

Austrians captured in the Carpathians the last point, Jablonki Pass,

held by the Russians.

Thus we now see the Austrian army, which had been described as routed

and destroyed in battles in Galicia, seemingly taking on a new lease of

life, although appearing to have found an impenetrable barrier at the

River San north of Jaroslav. On October 22, 1914, the Austrians retook

Czernowitz, capital of the crownland of Bukowina, which had been in the

possession of the Russians since early in the war. They also captured

two field fortifications, situated one behind the other, to the

southeast of Sambor.

For eight days a terrific fight was waged between the Russians and the

Austrians on the line from Sambor, along the River San to Przemysl and

Jaroslav, and then to the southward. The battle extended over a front of

about sixty-five miles. The cannonading was uninterrupted. The Austrians

had started the attack at Sambor, but were thrown back by vigorous

Russian counterattacks. A concentration of Austrian corps then attempted

an advance against Lemberg, with the intention of bisecting the Russian

line. This attack was defeated with losses.

On October 31, 1914, the Austrians defeated a mixed Russian column near

the Galician-Bukowinian frontier, north of Kuty. In middle Galicia by

that date they had occupied Russian positions northeast of Turka, near

Stryj, Sambor, east of Przemysl, and on the lower San. Several Russian

attacks around Lisko were repulsed. At Lisko, Stryj, Sambor, and other

points the Austrians took many prisoners. Near Stryj and Sambor the

Austrians blew up a Russian ammunition depot.

On November 1, 1914, the Austrians claimed that they then had interned

in Austria-Hungary, 649 Russian officers and 73,179 Russian soldiers,

not including the prisoners they had taken in the fighting in the

district northeast of Turka and south of the Stryj-Sambor line. The

fighting in this locality was renewed with greater intensity by both

sides early in the month, fortune favoring first one and then the other.

On November 2, 1914, two infantry divisions and a rifle brigade of

Russians were dislodged from a strongly intrenched position.

About this time the czar's forces began concentrating their main attack

northeast of Kielce in an effort to repeat the tactics by which they won

important victories over the Austrians in the first days of the war. It

was their plan, provided they were able to break through at this point,

to turn southward against the rear of the Austrian army in Galicia, just

as they did two months before, after the battle of Rawa-Russka.

The line of battle in the southeast now became more definitely outlined,

extending from Turka through Nadworna and Kolomea to the Russian border

just east of Czernowitz in Bukowina. The renewal of Russian attacks

followed the bringing up of a new levy of reserves.

The Russians now advanced with fair success along the whole Vistula

front. They secured Piotrkow and other places in such positions as to

suggest that the Austrians were running the risk of being cut off from

Cracow, their ultimate goal of retreat. A rear-guard defense was

attempted by the Austrians at Opatow but without success, and the

Russians took several hundred prisoners and six Maxims with a supply

train.

On the San River, where the fighting had been severe for a fortnight,

the Russians adopted the method of deliberately sapping their opponents'

trenches, precisely as a besieging force saps its way toward a fortress.

This proved a success. When the Russian sap burst in the trenches the

Austrians retreated, and the Russians, taking advantage of the

confusion, stormed the fortifications in the neighborhood and took them,

capturing 5 officers, 500 men, and all the Maxims.

An Austrian column which had descended the north slope of the

Carpathians in the direction of Narvoda, where it had intrenched itself,

was attacked and driven back. This operation, being removed by more

than one hundred miles from the nearest point to the great struggle,

indicated that the Austrians, confident of victory, sent forces across

the Carpathians to catch the Russians in the rear when the proper moment

came.

This moment, it seems, failed to arrive, and the Russians, having the

support of the native inhabitants, had little difficulty in dealing

successfully with successive isolated attempts of the considerable

Hungarian reserve bodies sent across the Carpathians at various points.

There was some activity about this time before Przemysl, which several

times had been reported, incorrectly, as having been taken by the

Russians. An attempt was made by the garrison at a sortie. The Russians

allowed it to proceed until they could cut in behind, when the force was

surrounded. When it found it was impossible to cut a way through either

forward or backward, it surrendered. The Russians took about 2,000

prisoners.

On the Austrian retiring line from Kielce to Sandomierz the Russians

succeeded on November 5, 1914, in breaking down the defenses of the

enemy, and in stimulating a more or less orderly retreat into a hasty

flight. Sandomierz, itself, an exceedingly important strategic point,

which had played a vital part since the early days of the war, fell into

the hands of the Russians. In fighting with the Austrian rear guard

southward of Kielce the Russians took within a week 200 officers and

15,000 men prisoners, with scores of guns and Maxims.

CHAPTER LXX

AUSTRIAN RETREAT BEGINS

At this time the Russians were strongly established on the six-mile

front of the left bank of the San River, between Nizko and Rudnik. The

Austrian opposition there had been long and determined, but was finally

broken early in November, 1914. The Austrians began a retreat along this

front.

This retreat was such as to indicate less a general defeat than a

general obedience to orders to withdraw. It is true that the Russians

had been pressing with great energy upon the upper Vistula and San

fronts, especially since the settlement of the main fight farther north

against the Germans and mixed forces, but the Austrians were in

possession of strong fortified positions which still were giving trouble

to the Russians, in spite of their constantly increasing numbers.

It was now plain that the Russians had left the Galician front until the

Vistula front had been cleared, when a proportion of the troops released

there could proceed to add to the fighting force in Galicia, thereby

causing the retreat of the Austrians along the whole front.

On November 5, 1914, the Russians achieved what the General Staff

characterized as "the greatest victory since the beginning of the war."

This was the recapture of Jaroslav. It was announced to the Allies by

Grand Duke Nicholas in a formal message, which also stated:

"Following our successes upon the Vistula, a complete victory has just

been gained by our troops along the whole of the front in Galicia. Our

strategical maneuver has thus been crowned by what is incontestably the

greatest success gained on our side since the beginning of the war. I am

most confident of the speedy and entire accomplishment of our common

task, persuaded as I am that decisive success will be gained by the

allied armies." In the capture of Jaroslav the Russians took 5,000

Austrian prisoners.

During several days before the general Austrian retreat along the

Vistula front began, they were engaged in furious attack, their

artillery fire being especially severe. It was evidently a supreme

effort. The last engagement was over an extended front, enormous forces

striving to prevent the Russians crossing the San at a point near

Monastryzek. It was reported that reenforcements pushing over the

Carpathians in an attempt to aid them were delayed in the snow-filled

mountain passes.

We will have a better understanding of Russian tactics as worked out in

the activities just referred to, if we consider here an official

statement issued by the General Staff about this time concerning them.

It read:

"Fierce combats on the River San and south of Przemysl, which have been

going on for more than three weeks, resulted on September 5 in the

general retreat of the Austrians.

"On the preceding night the Austrians made a last effort to repulse our

troops who were crossing the San. Until a late hour the enemy attacked

on an extended front, taking the offensive in dense, successive lines,

but everywhere they suffered enormous losses and were repulsed.

"On November 5,1914, the enemy's columns commenced to move from the San

in the direction of Dukla Pass across the Carpathians and south of

Przemysl, seeking everywhere to leave the battle front. We pursued them

energetically all along the line.

"The abandonment by the main Austrian forces of the line of the San is

the result of the victorious battle fought at the end of September, the

original purpose of which was to block the offensive of the

Austro-German armies against Warsaw and Ivangorod.

"At the beginning of October our troops were engaged along a front

extending for 330 miles and passing through Warsaw, Kozienica, Przemysl,

and Czernowitz. Toward October 20 we succeeded in gaining a decisive

victory on the left bank of the Vistula in the region of Warsaw.

"Following up our successes during the last eighteen days, on a front of

380 miles, we broke the resistance of the enemy who is now in full

retreat. This victory enables our troops to proceed to a realization of

further tasks to inaugurate a new period of the war."

This announcement is embodied here, not only for such information as it

contains which coincide with established facts, but that the Russian

viewpoint toward such events and the purpose behind Russian activities

may be manifest.

To the south of Przemysl on November 7, 1914, the Russians, having

increased their activities in the region considerably, took 1,000

prisoners. Warfare about the fortress now seemed to be entering a new

phase, which the Russians initiated with great artillery activity and

an advance against Medyka. The Austrians responded with a closer

concentration, with the fortress as their center. After the first attack

on Przemysl, all damage to the fortress had been repaired and the outer

forts strengthened by field fortifications, of a very strong character,

and covered by battery positions.

A new railroad bridge was built at Nizankowice and communications with

Chyrow, about twenty-five miles to the south, restored. Numerous trains

had been used to transport wounded soldiers and useless Przemysl

civilians southward and to bring back flour, Zwieback, and other

supplies to the fortress. The arrival of many carloads of beer caused

particular rejoicing.

On November 11, 1914, the Russians, advancing on Cracow from the

direction of Jaroslav, occupied Miechow and Dynow. The forces operating

farther south seized Lisko. It now seemed to the Russians that the enemy

would not be able to make an effective stand east of Tarnow and the

Dunajec River and so the Russians would find themselves once more on the

lines they had been forced to abandon hastily six weeks previously, when

the Germans first made their rapid advance to the Vistula. It was as a

result of this campaign and the course of the Russians in conceding

smaller successes in order to concentrate their forces at the most

important point that the Austrians found themselves driven back now at

every point, while the Russians advanced for the possession of the

western part of Galicia. It was the hope of the Russians that their

advance in Galicia would soon set free their Cossack divisions for a new

invasion of Hungary.

On November 12, 1914, the Russians sustained a defeat near Czernowitz,

capital of the Austrian province of Bukowina. The Austrians made an

unexpected movement, crossing the Pruth, a few kilometers north of

Czernowitz and suddenly attacking the Russian right wing. The Russians

were completely surprised and after a short resistance decided to fall

back upon their base, which seemed free. However, they were then taken

under fire by Austrian artillery, which caused great losses among the

Russian detachments. The battle field was strewn with corpses. Russian

forces in the Stryj valley also were forced to retire with heavy losses

by a surprise attack from an Austrian armored train and Austrian

cavalry.

The Russian offensive in Galicia toward Dounaietz nowhere encountered

resistance. The Russians occupied Krosno and inflicted heavy losses on

the Austrian rear guard.

It should be noted that during the middle of November, 1914, the

campaign on which the Russians were concentrating their attention was

against the Austrians. The Russian campaigns had consistently adhered to

the principle that in military operations important results are obtained

by bringing every force to bear upon a single point until the desired

end is accomplished. The Russians still followed this policy.

The operations in East Prussia and in western Poland were for the time

being made secondary while all energy was devoted to pushing forward the

campaign against Cracow. When they were now within fifteen miles of it,

an appeal was sent by the city to the Germans for reenforcements. The

civilians of the place removed themselves from the fortified area and

the inhabitants generally fled the locality. The German colony left for

Berlin and Bavaria.

Cracow was surrounded by a triple line of fortifications of which the

outer line contained fifteen forts, eleven on the north, and four on the

south bank of the Vistula. The defenses on the north were much stronger

than those on the East, where the San River and the fortresses of

Jaroslav and Przemysl were once regarded as a secure barrier against

Russian advance. The Russians already had broken down that barrier and

only two small streams lay between their eastern army and the last

stronghold of Galicia.

On November 15, 1914, the Austrians defending Przemysl again attempted a

sortie, this time with greater success than before. It forced back the

Russians on the north side of the fortress to the heights of Rokietnica,

with small Austrian losses. A second sortie was repulsed by Russian

artillery and cavalry and heavy losses inflicted on the Austrians.

In Galicia we now find the Austrians west of the Donajec River, along

the front from Tarnow to the Vistula. The Austrian line then followed

the Biala River for a few miles until it cut across to take advantage of

the Wisloka, north and south of Jaslo. From there east the Austrians

were retreating into the passes of the Carpathians.

These latter troops were relatively small bodies, whose main object was

to prevent the Russian cavalry from making raids into Hungary. Opposite

Tarnow the Austrians were prepared to put up a most stubborn resistance,

for they regarded the holding of this part of their line as essential.

Unless they could hold back the Russians there, they reasoned, the

latter would have a chance to break through and cut off the Austrian

army that was retreating from Sanok and Jaslo. A Russian advance north

of Cracow, they figured, would tend to cut off the entire Austrian army

from its German ally. This was an object for which the Russians were

striving.

Abandonment by the Austrians of Central Galicia and the gathering of

their armies toward Cracow soon began to show results in the stiffening

of their resistance to Russian advance. As the Austrians retreated

westward their front decreased in length with consequent strengthening

of their line. It was their desire that this strengthening should enable

them to extend northward along the Warthe River, thus freeing some of

the German troops for service in the army that was advancing from Thorn.

By the Russians a German advance in considerable force along the narrow

battle front on the west bank of the river Vistula was regarded as a

feint at the city of Warsaw, the intention of which was to draw Russian

troops from their advance upon Cracow and distract attention from

efforts to establish a strongly fortified defensive line from Kalisz to

Cracow.

CHAPTER LXXI

FIGHTING AT CRACOW

On November 20, 1914, the Russians were before the outer line of

defenses of Cracow, with strong opposition to their further advancement.

Meanwhile they were pushing forward minor columns of Cossacks into the

passes of the Carpathian Mountains, intending that these should emerge,

if possible, upon the Hungarian plains in raids similar to those which

were made in the first Russian advance in September.

During the next few days following November 20, 1914, there was constant

and hard fighting in the vicinity of Cracow, the Austrians reporting

that they had taken three battalions of Russians prisoners. All reports

showed a stiffening of the Austrian line, while the energy of Russian

attacks was reduced by the diversion of troops to stem the Austrian

invasion by way of the Vistula.

The Austrians were obliged, however, a few days later, to evacuate Neu

Sandec, fifty miles southeast of Cracow, and an important railroad

junction of the River Dunajec and the main line to Cracow. The Russians

reported they took 3,000 prisoners and some machine guns. The capture of

Neu Sandec revealed a new Russian advance, threatening the right flank

of the Austrian army along the Carpathian Mountains. By this capture the

Austrians were deprived of an important railway into Hungary. In order

to stop this turning move it was necessary for them to weaken their

campaign north of Cracow.

In the Cracow region the Austrians advanced on the north to Pilica,

Wolbrom, and Miechow, about twenty miles from the Galician border. To

the east the Russians advanced to within twelve miles of the fortress.

In the fighting at Pilica and Wolbrom the Austrians claimed the capture

of 29,000 Russians.

In the latter part of November, 1914, the Russians were successful in

attack in Galicia along a line from thirty to sixty miles southeast of

Cracow, taking more than 7,000 prisoners, thirty cannon, and twenty

machine guns in one engagement. On November 29, 1914, the Austrians also

scored a victory on the front extending from Proszowicz to Onszreniawa,

fourteen miles northeast of Cracow, southward through Brzesko on the

Vistula to Bochnia and Adsniez.

General Radko Dmitrieff's cavalry kept in close touch with the

retreating Austrians, who were attempting to shake off contact with, the

Russians and gain time to re-form their ranks back of Cracow. Part of

the Austrian troops defeated on the San had retired beyond the

Carpathians to recuperate while the Russians attacked the Austrian force

southeast of Cracow.

At this stage of hostilities, the Russians estimated that the

Austro-Hungarian casualties had amounted to 19,000 officers and 900,000

men. At the same time, it was estimated by the Austrians that the total

Russian losses had been 760,000 in dead, wounded, deserters, and

prisoners. Of these, 420,000 were attributed to the various battles

against the Austro-Hungarian forces, and 340,000 to battles against the

Germans.

The losses of the Russians in the campaigns against Austria-Hungary, as

estimated for the various engagements, were as follows: Early raids,

skirmishes, and frontier fighting, 15,000; Krasnik, Niedzfica Duza,

Lublin, 45,000; Zamosz, Komarow, Tyszowce, 40,000; first battle of

Lemberg, 45,000; second battle of Lemberg, 30,000; Rawa-Russka,

Magierow, 30,000; offensive against middle Galicia, 15,000; offensive

around Przemysl, 40,000; raising siege of Przemysl, 15,000; Carpathian

invasions, 30,000; battles on the San beyond Przemysl, to date, 25,000;

Medyka-Stari, Sambor, 40,000; outposts in the Carpathians, 15,000; last

battles of the Vistula from Sandomierz to Ivangorod, 35,000.

On December 1, 1914, the Austrians had been driven from all their

positions over a front about thirty-three miles long, which defended the

Carpathian passes from Konecha Village, twelve miles north of Bartfield

eastward--that is, on all roads leading through the Dukla Pass over the

Carpathians. This was the lowest pass anywhere available across the

mountain range and being also the widest, is in all respects best

suited for military purposes. All armies that previously had invaded the

present area of Hungary from time immemorial, via the Carpathian

Mountains, had used the Dukla Pass.

A number of points along the line mentioned, where the Austrians had

established defensive positions, were taken by the Russians, the most

easterly being south of Mezolaborez. All were taken by assault. Many

guns, Maxims, and prisoners were captured. An energetic Russian advance

continued to push the Austrians back toward Cracow. The Austrians

evacuated one position after another with large losses.

The Russian advance toward Bartfeld and Hammona, on the south slope of

the Carpathians in Hungary, indicated an attempt to push forward a

turning force around the south flank of the Austrian position, as it

stood at that time. The damage caused by this raiding expedition was

calculated to force the Austrians to meet it and so divert them from the

main fighting line at Cracow. Evidence of this shift was shown in a

reverse which the Austrians administered to the Russians at Hammona.

Early in December, 1914, Russia replied to reports that she was

suffering from a shortage of recruits by declaring she could put two

corps against every one that Germany brought into Poland and still have

enough to carry on the campaign against Cracow as originally planned.

Her two armies operating against that important objective point had

linked flanks. Investment of the city was daily feared.

The southern army, which moved directly west on the Tarnow-Cracow line,

had fought its way over every inch of the ground, making a record of

forty-five battles in forty-five days. At least, according to old

measures, these fights would be classed as battles. Under the stupendous

conditions which surrounded this modern cataclysm, they probably range

as little more than reconnaissances in force.

Back to the banks of the River Raba, the advancing Russians pushed the

Austrian foe. Here in a position of considerable defensive value, the

enemy made a determined resistance. But the Russians swept on. The

Austrians made a stand soon afterward, outside the protecting radius of

the fortress guns, in the angle made by the Raba and Schreniawa.

Przemysl about this time was reported to be in dire straits. Monsignor

Joseph Sebastian Felczar, Archbishop of Przemysl, said, December 3,

1914, after he had left the city for the Vatican:

"Would to God my cathedral city might be spared the horrors of invasion

but I feel I can hope no longer. Our garrison has resisted with stubborn

heroism but the Russians outnumber them two to one. I got away only

after long hours of wearisome wanderings across the Russian lines; the

Muscovites had then already captured several of the outer ring of forts,

besides other important vantage ground, and had hemmed round the whole

fortress in a circle of steel.

"When I left Przemysl, indescribable desolation reigned there. The

houses, palaces, and public buildings were reduced to dust heaps.

Despite severe measures taken by the authorities brigand bands prowled

among the ruins and pillaged such of the civil population as still

remained. A never-ending procession of caravans traversed the streets,

which were chock full of wounded and dying. The hospitals were

overcrowded and the injured laid out in rows in the churches."

On December 4, 1914, the Russians, by the capture of Wieliczka, gained

another step in their campaign for the possession of the broad passes to

the south and west of Cracow. Wieliczka is a small town, about nine

miles southwest of Cracow and three miles from the line of forts. It is

built over salt mines, a short railway bearing the product thereof to

the larger city.

On the northwestern side, the Russians were only a few miles from the

city. It was only the Austro-German army, sitting in trenches and making

occasional attacks on the Czenstochowa-Oilusz-Cracow line that prevented

the complete encirclement of the place. The contest between these forces

was mostly a slow artillery duel from day to day.

It was now the turn of the Germans to relieve the Austrians, if they

could, from a critical position. For months before, the Austrians had

been sacrificed in the interest of the German plan of winning a

crushing victory in France, and during the retreat from Warsaw it was

the Austrians who bore the brunt of the fighting as a rear guard. Again,

when the Germans found themselves hard pressed between the Warthe and

the Vistula, they flung the Austrian reenforcements to fresh defeat at

Wienun.

It was the contention of Austrian military writer that in order to

maintain an effective resistance to the Russians at this time and

afterward, the Germans should continue to withdraw troops from the

western front.

The Russians seemed to feel secure at this time in holding back the

German forces in Poland and so were passing forward their campaign in

Galicia, in an effort to interpose a wedge between the forces of the

opposing nations.

Russia also had a special motive for exerting every effort to inflict

some signal disaster upon the Austrians. It was only by such means that

she could relieve the pressure on Serbia and thus save the smaller Slav

state from being overrun by the victorious Austrians.

The Russian campaign against Cracow had been little effected by the

fighting going on at Lodz. The Russian forces in the region of Cracow

had a clear line of retreat, if retreat should be necessary, and were

not needed for strengthening the resistance being made by the Russians

at Warsaw, as troops from Central Russia could be moved to that

threatened district by the available railroads, much more rapidly than

armies could be sent overland from Cracow. The Russian forces in the

vicinity of Cracow could best help in the defense of Warsaw, the Russian

General Staff believed, by pressing their attack energetically and so

keeping busy in that field a large force of Austrians and Germans.

On December 6, 1914, the defense of Cracow was stiffened by the arrival

of a large body of German troops. All the magnificent trees which

surrounded the place were cut down to afford space for the artillery and

various new lines of fortifications and barbed-wire entanglements were

constructed.

The Russians perceived a turning movement on the part of the enemy,

south of Cracow, directed against the Russian left wing. Russian

reenforcements which arrived found that the bridge over the Dunajec,

near Kourove, had been destroyed, and that the heights on the left bank

of the river were occupied by the enemy. Under a sustained fire by

Germans, one of the Russian regiments crossed the Dunajec at a ford.

They made their way through ice water up to their necks, and coming out

on the other side, captured the heights by a vigorous assault. This

assured and made safe the passage of the river by the other Russian

troops.

On the following day, December 7, 1914, the Austro-Germans made an

effort to counteract the advance of the Russians to Wieliczka, southeast

of Cracow. By a dash toward Neu Sandek, on the headwaters of the Dunajec

River, the Austrians attempted to outflank the Russians and thus force

them to retreat from their advance position.

The Austro-German forces occupied the valley of the stream Lososzyna,

and the fighting front extended from near Wieliczka southeastward to the

Dunajec, about fifty miles in length. The Russian attack was successful,

the losses inflicted upon the enemy, especially the German Twenty-fourth

Corps, being very heavy. Several German heavy guns were knocked out,

five field batteries were reduced to silence, guns and prisoners taken,

and the Russians continued their attack.

In the next few days in December, 1914, events favored the Austrians. In

West Galicia the south wing of the Russian army was defeated at Limanovo

and compelled to retreat. The Austrians engaged in hot pursuit and took

many prisoners. Austrian forces took Neu Sandec and again entered

Grybow, Gorlice, and Zmigrod. The Austrians reported that the Russians

had completely evacuated the Zemplin country.

A third incursion of Germans into Galicia was arrested by Russians on

the very border of the province. Some maneuvering on the part of General

Dmitrieff's corps sufficed to check the invading columns, although they

crossed the Carpathians on a wide front extending between Wieliczka and

the headwaters of the San River.

During the same week, the garrison of Przemysl made a series of

attempts at sorties, but each time were driven back with heavy loss. The

Russians captured several hundred prisoners and ten Maxims. It was

learned later that increasing scarcity of provisions complicated by

sickness was responsible for these tentative efforts to lift the siege.

An unsuccessful attempt also was made by a force from the garrison to

open the railway in the direction of Biercza, on the southwest.

It was asserted at Austrian headquarters that the total number of

Russians captured by the Austro-Hungarians in Galicia within three days

in the middle of December, 1914, was 33,000. After a battle at Limanowa,

it was said, 26,000 were captured. The number of Russians killed was

very large, according to report, 1,200 dead being found at Limanowa

alone.

The problem of caring for prisoners had by this time become acute both

for Austria and for Russia. According to the Russian Department of the

Interior, which had charge of the maintenance of prisoners, there were

then in Russia, exclusive of the Germans reported captured in operations

under way in North Poland, 350,000 Austrian and German prisoners of war.

Of this number only 100,000 were Germans, the rest being Austrians

captured during the campaign in Galicia.

At Semipalatinek, on the Irtish River, near the borders of Western

Mongolia, one small escort of Russian soldiers was serving as guard for

100,000 Austrian and German prisoners, whose prison walls consisted of

four thousand miles of frozen steppes, separating them from the borders

of their own countries.

The prisoners were brought by rail to Omsk, where they were embarked on

steamboats for the thousand mile trip down the Irtish River to

Semipalatinek. Here quarters were found for them in the big barracks

erected for the mobilization of the Russian army and unoccupied since

its departure for the front.

Every morning at eight o'clock the prisoners were released from the

barracks and permitted to wander about at will. When they departed in

the morning, they were told that unless they reported at the barracks by

nightfall they would be locked out. At that time of the year, in such a

bleak country, this would mean death, as there was practically no place

where they could obtain shelter. The freedom of the prisoners during

the day was absolute, even to the extent of accepting employment from

local mining companies.

In the thick of its fighting in Galicia, Russia had another problem to

deal with, which was the Russianization of the country. In the middle of

December, 1914, arrangements were made under the auspices of a member of

the Duma charged with national education in Galicia, for a large number

of elementary school teachers in the native schools of Galicia, to

attend at certain centers a series of lectures on Russian language and

literature. Lember, Sambor, Tarnopol, Stanislavoff, and Chernovtsi were

the first towns chosen for the opening of these courses. Besides this

measure, Russia, in the following month, opened ten model elementary

schools where all teaching was given in the Russian language. These were

in small towns and villages.

CHAPTER LXXII

AUSTRIANS AGAIN ASSUME THE OFFENSIVE

On December 14, 1914, the Russian General Staff announced that it had

"discovered the enemy trying again to assume the offensive in Galicia."

Two days later, Austro-German columns were pouring over the Dukla. It

was understood that three new German army corps had been sent to the

eastern front, making nine new corps since the beginning of hostilities,

and that three Austrian corps were withdrawn from Serbia. The number of

troops entering Galicia through the mountain passes was estimated at

175,000 men.

This movement compelled the Russians to withdraw the raiding parties

which had invaded Hungary. It is unlikely, however, that Russia had

planned to invade Hungary in force, so long as Przemysl and Cracow stood

firm. As the situation then was, it would have been a perilous feat to

send an army any distance across the mountains. Before such an invasion

could be attempted, it was first necessary that the positions of the

Russians in western Galicia and Poland should be greatly strengthened.

When the new Austro-German reenforcements arrived in Galicia over the

Dukla, the extreme southern end of the Russian line below Cracow was

pushed back from advanced positions west of the Raba to and over the

Dunajec. But the Russians did not regard the menace from this quarter as

a grave one. Announcement was made by General Sukhomlinoff, the Russian

Minister of War, on December 23,1914, that it had been stopped

"absolutely." We have said before that it was at the Austrians, rather

than the Germans, that the Russians wished at this time to strike a

telling blow.

On December 28, 1914, General Dankl's army sought to help the main

German forces by passing over the Nida near its junction with the upper

Vistula above Tarnow. The Russians suddenly were reenforced at this

point by troops who swam the ice-filled stream, attacked the Austrians

on their flank, drove them back, and took 10,000 prisoners.

It was about this time, when Radko Dmitrieff was operating so

successfully in the neighborhood of Tarnow, that General Brussilov

resumed the offensive in Galicia. He was able to feed and munition his

army from Kiev. Practically all the railroad system of Galicia could be

utilized by him for maneuvering troops and distributing supplies. His

troops numbered only about 250,000, but their strength was increased by

railway facilities. General Brussilov could afford to send a large force

under General Selivanoff to help invest Przemysl.

To the Russians, however, Przemysl was not of immediate importance. The

fortress commanded the railroad leading past Tarnow to Cracow, and would

have been badly needed, it is true, if the army of Dmitrieff at Tarnow

had been attacking Cracow. But the army of General Ivanoff had been

forced by this time to retire about fifty miles north of Cracow.

Therefore, the smaller force commanded by Dmitrieff was unable to do

anything against Cracow from the east; and so it withdrew from the upper

course of the Dunajec River and became intrenched along the more

westerly tributary of the Dunajec, the Biala.

The Russian line extended from the Biala to the Dukla Pass in the

Carpathians. Still farther eastward, all along the lower valleys of the

Carpathians, the army of General Brussilov was holding out against a

large Austro-Hungarian force. This was under the command of General

Ermolli.

The chief offensive movement of Ermolli in December, 1914, was directed

toward the relief of Przemysl. As has been indicated, his lines ran

through Grybov, Krosno, Sanok, and Lisko, thereby putting a wedge

between the army of Brussilov and that of Dmitrieff. He attacked

Dmitrieff from the east along the line of the Biala and the Dunajec. In

Christmas week Dmitrieff administered a heavy defeat to him, and took

nearly thirty thousand prisoners and many guns. In this way he helped

prepare for new plans which Grand Duke Nicholas and his staff had

prepared for the Russian army in Galicia for the new year.

Cracow had successfully resisted assault, and seemed likely to hold out

against the best efforts of the Russians. The gateway to Silesia had

been closed. Hindenburg had achieved one of his chief objects in forcing

the central Russian forces back. He had paid a huge price in men in

order to establish a deadlock of warfare in trenches, about midway in

the big bend of the Vistula. Nevertheless, from the German viewpoint,

the result achieved was worth it.

If the battle for Silesia had been won in November, 1914, by General

Russky and General Ivanoff on the field in front of Cracow, Italy and

Rumania might have been brought into the fight by their continued

advancing movement. Austria and Hungary thus might have been attacked

and overcome by huge forces from three sides. If Austria-Hungary fell,

the overthrow of Germany might have been threatened. Hindenburg's

strategy had put this out of the range of possibility.

It was such developments as have been mentioned that caused the Russian

commander in chief to decide on Hungary as the next object of attack. He

planned to bring direct pressure upon Vienna and Budapest and so force

first the Hungarians and then the Austrians to ask for terms of peace.

If they did not, he counted on Italy and Rumania entering the war and

assuring victory for the Allies.

On Christmas Day, 1914, under such conditions, began the great battles

of the Carpathians, which continued for many months to be a crisis of

the war. The Russians were outnumbered, but their position was

favorable. On December 25 they advanced on the Dukla Pass. Meanwhile

fierce fighting continued at various points in Galicia. In the

neighborhood of Tuchow, south of Tarnow, the Russians, on observing the

advance of the Twenty-sixth Austrian Brigade, slipped past on parallel

roads and surprised the Austrian rear. The Russians opened fire with

machine guns and virtually annihilated the whole brigade. In two days'

fighting in southern Galicia, near the Carpathians, the Russians

captured more than 4,000 prisoners, including a major of the General

Staff and five other officers, besides three heavy guns and two machine

guns. In this region the Russians were moving small detachments through

the mountain passes.

Many spectacular engagements took place during the development of the

Russian offensive among the mountain spurs of the Carpathians. On

Christmas Day, 1914, two Russian infantry regiments, under a murderous

fire and wading waist deep in the icy water of the River Jasiolka,

dislodged by bayonet charges the Austrians from their line and took as

prisoners four officers and 150 men. On the same day an inferior force

of Austrians surprised a Russian detachment and took 4,000 prisoners.

In another engagement south of the Vistula, in the region of Tarnow, the

Russians drove back the Austrians from the Tuchnow-Olpiny line. The

enemy abandoned ten rapid firers and the Russians took prisoner 43

officers and more than 2,500 men. The next day, December 2, 1914,

continuing the pursuit of the Austrians, the Russians captured 8 machine

guns and about 1,000 prisoners. The Russians occupied the heights near

Siedfizka, on the left bank of the Biala River. This gave them

possession of a twenty-mile strip of territory separating the two

Austrian forces.

Late in December, 1914, all attacks by the Austrians in the territory

between the Pilica and the upper reaches of the Vistula ceased and the

Russians assumed the active offensive in this region. They cleared the

left or easterly bank of the Nida River by the capture of an obstinately

defended Austrian position which was taken by storm.

South of the Vistula, or astride it on the front from Opatow across the

Biala River to Biecz, the Russians took prisoners 200 officers and

15,000 men in their sweeping process. A retreat of Austrians in Galicia

along the Lisko-Sanok-Dulka-Zmigrod front was precipitate, the nature of

the country favoring them, the corridor-like valleys and passes

preventing the Russians from pursuing them over parallel roads or

harassing their flanks. Only six roads cross the Carpathians, two of

which are little more than mountain trails. Owing to the unbroken

character of this region, the Russian cavalry was able to do little

scouting, while the extreme cold interfered with the work of aeroplanes.

In western Galicia the Russians made progress in spite of the almost

impassable condition of the country due to mud, driving the enemy from

the front of Stromnik-Gorlice-Jasliska, taking guns and a large number

of machine guns.

The year of 1914 closed with the Russian troops advancing in western

Galicia, having stormed several fortified works of the enemy, east of

Zakliczyn, making prisoners of 44 officers and 1,500 soldiers, and

capturing 8 machine guns.

Southwest of Dukla Pass the Russians had dislodged the Austrians from

positions they had strongly fortified. They had also realized an

important success south of Lisko and had repulsed counterattacks by the

enemy in the Carpathians at Uzsok Pass and renewed sorties by the

garrison at Przemysl.

Early in January, 1915, the Russians developed great activity in

Bukowina and the Carpathians, without making much impression on Austrian

positions which they attacked on the Sucwaza River, in the Upper

Csermosz territory, and also further west, on the ridges of the

Carpathians. In the district of Gorlice and to the northwest of

Zakliczyn determined Russian attacks were repulsed. During the fighting

at Gorlice the Austrians stormed and captured a height south of there.

During the second week in January, 1915, heavy rains put a stop

temporarily to the Russian offensive southward in the direction of Neu

Sandek, and at the same time to the Austrian offensive in Russian

Poland. A thaw following rain converted the whole country into a vast

morass. It was physically impossible for the Austrians to bring up heavy

artillery, without which the Russian position along the Nida River could

not be forced.

The Russian lines on the east bank of the Nida followed the heights,

which were admirably suited for intrenchments and well covered with

positions for the Russian artillery fire. There was little firing,

however, except an occasional artillery duel when the fog permitted and

sporadic local infantry firing. Conditions were similar east of Cracow,

the adversaries being well intrenched on opposite sides of the Dunajec

River.

During this time another determined sortie was made by the garrison at

Przemysl, preceded by extensive cavalry reconnaissance. The Austrian

infantry then advanced in force in the direction of a wood near the

city. The Russians opened fire, but the Austrians rushed forward and

gained the cover of the woods. They continued to push forward and the

Russians permitted them to advance close to their position before making

a serious attempt to halt them.

With the fighting thus at close range, the Russians opened a terrific

fire from rifles and machine guns. The battle raged for several hours,

with heavy losses on both sides. The Austrians then retired to the

fortress.

From the middle to the end of January, 1915, fierce snowstorms and

bitter cold interfered with the activity of both Russians and Austrians.

There were few engagements. Toward the end of the month, concentration

of Austrian troops in Bukowina became stronger. On January 21, 1914, an

Austrian force, including an infantry division with artillery, attacked

the Russian front in the region of Kirlibaba, but was repulsed.

On the night of January 27, 1914, the Russians were driven back in the

Upper Ung Valley from their positions on both sides of Uzsok Pass. This

was one of the most important of the Carpathian passes, for the

possession of which many important engagements had been fought since

the beginning of the war. It was strongly intrenched and stubbornly

defended in several good positions, one behind the other. It fell into

the hands of the Austrians after three days of hard fighting. West of

the Uzsok Pass, Russian attacks were repulsed with heavy losses. Near

Vezeralles and Volovco battles ended with the Russians being driven from

the heights of the pass. The Austrians took 400 prisoners.

During the latter part of January, 1915, there were no developments of

importance in Galicia.

PART VII--RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER LXXIII

FIRST CLASH ON PRUSSIAN FRONTIER

The first clash of arms between the Russian and German armies occurred

on August 6, 1914, near Soldau, East Prussia. In this chapter we will

follow the events which were taking place on this frontier,

simultaneously with the movements of the German invasions of Belgium and

France, the Austro-Serbian campaigns, the Russian invasion of Austria,

and the campaigns in the other parts of the world. The general causes

preceding the outbreak of the war have been fully narrated in Volume I,

while the theatre of the following campaign is clearly described in the

chapter on that subject. It is necessary at this time, however, to

review the fighting lines before we bring the mighty German army and the

Russian hosts into combat on their first battle ground.

We have seen that for many years previous to the outbreak of the great

European War all the countries involved had been forced by political,

economic, and social conditions to work, each country in its own way,

toward the same main object--military preparedness. Many factors, of

course, determined not only the means for achieving this result, but

also the degree to which it was finally accomplished. At this time we

are interested only in the results so far as they affected Russia and

Germany at the beginning of the war.

When the armies gathered on the Russo-German frontier, both of these

countries had reached a high degree of military efficiency. Germany,

which for decades had been the acknowledged leader among the great

powers as far as army development was concerned, had practically

concluded the increases and improvements for the accomplishment of which

its people had only recently submitted to a special scheme of very

extensive taxation, the "Wehrbeitrag." By the results of this move, we

find that the western defenses against France and indirectly against

England profited much more than those in the east against Russia.

Russia, as its army stood ready to strike its first blow at Germany, had

drawn to the fullest extent the obvious conclusions impressed upon it by

its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. Graft, which had played such great

havoc during its last war, had been stamped out. The artillery equipment

had been brought up to date and the troops in charge of it had increased

vastly their skill in its use. Everywhere formations had been

rearranged, increased and improved, and this rearrangement had affected

especially the distribution of the empire's forces. Never before in its

history had Russia concentrated so many troops in its eastern and

central provinces.

In setting its armies into action, Germany faced by far the easier

problem. Its territory was much more compact, its means of communication

were vastly greater and superior, and racial differences between its

various parts were practically nonexistent. With a total area of 208,825

square miles, the German Empire possessed 39,532 miles of railroad,

whereas the Russian Empire in Europe, with 2,100,000 square miles had

only 35,447 miles of railroad. The Germans had the further advantage of

having brought all their means of transportation to the very acme of

perfection, while the Russians were lacking in equipment as well as in

organization.

The remarkable quickness and effectiveness with which the Russian army

operated at the moment of war indicates not only an unexpectedly high

state of preparedness, but also a remarkably high degree of leadership

on the part of its generals.

The general staffs of both Russia and Germany were as well prepared to

meet on the battle ground as far as it had been within human power and

foresight. Each side had collected all available information concerning

the other. The German genius for organization had proved itself

especially valuable and fertile in this direction. On the basis of this

knowledge, well-defined plans of campaign had been worked out, and the

leaders of both sides had many opportunities to exercise their strategic

abilities, not only by solving problems created by these plans

theoretically across the tables in their respective war colleges, but

also practically during the annual periods of maneuvers.

As the armies faced each other in the first week of August, 1914, the

strategy of both sides was determined chiefly by three factors: (1) by

the obstacles and defenses which nature itself had placed in the

localities in which the fighting was likely to take place; (2) by the

means of defense and offense which were available; (3) by political

conditions.

At the beginning of the war all but the last were absolutely known

quantities, and as far as Russia and Germany were concerned this last

factor could be figured out comparatively easily. For it was clear that

if Germany would become involved in a war with Russia, Austria would be

found fighting by its ally's side and _vice versa_. It was also fairly

reasonable to assume, and had immediately become a fact, that under such

conditions Germany would find itself involved with France too, which

would mean that Germany's available fighting strength would have to be

divided into two parts at least. It was, of course, a matter of fairly

common knowledge that Germany's concentration was much more powerful on

its western border than on its eastern, so that Russia could count with

reasonable certainty on a comparative weak, even if well organized,

resistance on the part of Germany at the beginning of war.

Germany's strategy in the east was influenced chiefly by its plan for

the western campaign, which we have already considered in the preceding

chapters. The fight against France seemed to be of greater importance

and urgency to Germany than that against Russia. Why German strategy

reached this conclusion does not concern us here. In passing, however,

it may be well to remember that the German provinces adjoining France

directly, or indirectly behind Belgium and Luxemburg, were of much

greater importance and value to the Germans than their provinces

adjoining Russia, and that even the temporary loss of these would

probably have spelled disaster to Germany. Then, too, it was on the

western side that England's influence was being felt; and, furthermore,

the French army, though much less numerous than the Russian, was a more

formidable adversary on account of its greater effectiveness, as well as

of the certainty of its much quicker movements.

Russia had a preponderantly large advantage in numbers over Germany. The

result of this fact, from a strategic point of view, was that Russia

could dare much more than her adversaries. She could strike stronger,

quicker, and with greater frequency in more directions, and could risk

to extend her operations much farther. The fact that means of

transportation, as has been pointed out, were much better developed in

the German frontier provinces than in those of Russia, was a

disadvantage only as long as Russia fought on its own territory, though

even then, necessarily, the invading enemy would be hampered at least

equally by the lack of transportation facilities.

Russia's natural advantage of greater numbers pointed clearly to an

immediate offensive which would bring with it the promise of more

advantages, while both German and Austrian conditions indicated with

equal clearness as the safest and sanest strategy a policy of "watchful

waiting," at least until such time when large enough forces could be

spared from the western front or concentrated from available reserve

sources to promise to a more aggressive policy a fair chance of success.

Thus Russia decided to strike immediately against Germany as well as

against Austria. With the latter campaign we are not concerned here. How

she devoted herself to this twofold task with all the power and means at

her command we shall see in the following narrative.

The hosts of Russia were standing on the German frontier. In the four

provinces adjoining Austria-Hungary a total of sixteen army corps, or

one-half of all the Russian army in European Russia, were available. By

July 31, 1914, the czar had ordered the general mobilization of army and

navy. The German Ambassador in Petrograd was instructed to notify the

Russian Government that unless this order was countermanded within

twelve hours, Germany would immediately respond by mobilization of her

army and navy. As the Russian mobilization had continued, Germany

officially took the same step in the late afternoon of August 1, 1914,

after a state of war had already been proclaimed for the entire empire

on July 31, 1914.

The fighting forces on the German side at the beginning of the war on or

near the east front included the First Army Corps at Koenigsberg, the

Twentieth at Allenstein, the Seventeenth at Danzig, the Fifth at Posen,

and the Sixth at Breslau. These mustered a total of forty-four infantry,

twenty-one cavalry, and twenty-five artillery regiments, augmented by

four battalions of rifles (Jaeger), and twelve formations of technical

troops. The entire peace effectiveness of these formations was about

150,000 men, which at full war strength undoubtedly meant at least not

less than 500,000 men, of whom about one-half were of the first line,

the balance being made up of reserves and Landwehr troops.

The Russians drew up, in the face of the Germans, two armies: the Army

of Poland and the Army of the Niemen. The latter in peace time centered

in Vilna and consisted of five army corps; the former used Warsaw as its

base and consisted of at least as many army corps. It now held a wide

front from the Narev in the north to the valley of the Bug River. These

two armies together had an effectiveness of almost twice as many men as

the German forces, supported as they were by a series of well-garrisoned

fortresses: Grodno, Osowiec, and Bialistock in the north; Lomza, Novo

Georgievsk, and Warsaw in the center; and Ivangorod and Brest-Litovsk in

the south. In its entirety the mobilization of these forces was

completed about the third week of August, 1914, but by the end of the

first week the Army of the Niemen had completed its mobilization, and it

was from there that the first blow was struck.

This army was commanded by General Rennenkampf, one of the few Russian

generals who had succeeded in coming through the Russo-Japanese War, not

only with an untarnished, but even with an enhanced reputation. Its task

was to invade the northern part of East Prussia, striking directly at

Koenigsberg.

Small engagements, of course, took place all along the Russo-German

border between the advance guards of the two armies from the day war had

been declared.

On August 6, 1914, a Russian cavalry division crossed over into the

enemy's country south of Eydtkuhnen. The next ten days saw many isolated

advances of this nature, all of them initiated by the Russians, and most

of them accomplishing their respective objects. One small force ventured

as far north as the immediate proximity of Tilsit of Napoleonic memory.

CHAPTER LXXIV

ADVANCE OF RUSSIANS AGAINST THE GERMANS

On August 16, 1914, within seventeen days after the official beginning

of the Russian mobilization, everything was in readiness for the general

advance. The next day immediately developed the first strong German

resistance. At Stallupoehnen the German First Corps from Koenigsberg,

under General von Francois, supported by two reserve corps, attempted to

stem the Russian flood. Though they succeeded in taking 3,000 prisoners

and some machine guns, they had to fall back upon Gumbinnen. The

pressure of the superior Russian numbers--four active and two reserve

corps--proved too strong. The battle front now was about thirty-five

miles long, extending from Pillkallen on the north to Goldap on the

south, with Gumbinnen in the center.

On August 20, 1914, the first real battle on the eastern front was

fought before this pretty country town, which was founded in the

beginning of the eighteenth century, and had gradually acquired about

15,000 people. General Rennenkampf used his numerical superiority for a

powerful onslaught against the enemy's center. Fourteen hours of the

most stubborn fighting--beginning at dawn and ending only with the

coming of night--resulted in the final withdrawal of the German center.

Though artillery did some preparatory work, it was the slashing thrust

of glittering bayonets in massed formations and the tearing devastation

of hand grenades that carried the day. The German wings kept up their

resistance for the next day, but finally joined the main army which had

withdrawn through Gumbinnen to Insterburg. The losses on both sides

probably were about even, amounting to at least 5,000.

The certainty of the Russian numerical superiority undoubtedly was

responsible for Von Francois's continuation of his retreat to his main

base, Koenigsberg. The Russians lost no time in following and reached

Insterburg on August 23, 1914. Practically without further opposition

all of northern East Prussia as far as the river Memel was in General

Rennenkampf's hands, Tilsit, Labiau, Tapiau, Gerdauen, Korschen,

Rastenburg, Angerburg, and Goldap indicate the limits of his conquest.

With it went four of the six railroads centering in Koenigsberg, leaving

open only the two lines running to Allenstein and Danzig, which, of

course, meant serious danger to this important German fortress.

The Russian Army of the Narew had, in the meantime, pushed its advance

with equal rapidity and success from the south. Its commander, General

Samsonoff, had won laurels in Manchuria, and had acquired considerable

military reputation as a commander in Turkestan and as a member of the

general staff. He had approximately as many men at his disposal as his

colleague--about 250,000. His task, however, was more difficult. For his

entire front would face, almost immediately after crossing the border,

the treacherous lake district in the south of East Prussia. For his

advance he used the two railroads from Warsaw into East Prussia, on the

west through Mlawa and Soldau, and on the east through Osowiec and Lyck.

From the latter town he pushed his right wing forward in a northwesterly

direction, and sent his center toward the southwest to Johannisburg.

On August 23 and 24, 1914, to meet this advance, the Germans had

available only one active army corps, centered in Allenstein, the

Twentieth. Local Landwehr formations found the task of delaying the

Russians far beyond their power. In quick succession Samsonoff took

Soldau, Neidenburg, Ortelsburg, and finally Allenstein. At Frankenau,

just west of the Mazurian Lakes, his right wing connected with the

Twentieth German Corps, which, supported by strongly prepared

intrenchments, managed to hold up the Russian advance, but finally had

to give way and fall back on Allenstein and Osterode. This gave to the

Russians command of one more railroad to Koenigsberg, that from

Allenstein. Though the two Russian armies had not yet formed a solid

connection, they were in touch with each other through their cavalry,

and the Russian front was in the form of a doubly broken line running

from Friedland through Gerdauen to Angerburg (Niemen Army) and from

there through Frankenau and Allenstein to Soldau (Narew Army). The

former, facing southwest, in connection with the latter, now threatened

not only Koenigsberg, but the defensive line of the Vistula from Thorn to

Danzig. The greater part of East Prussia seemed securely in the

possession of more than 500,000 Russian soldiers, chiefly of the first

line, and under apparently very able leadership.

The occupied territory suffered severely. Bombardment and fire had laid

waste, at least partially, some of the towns and a great many of the

villages. Requisitions for the support of the invading army necessarily

brought great hardships and losses to the unfortunate inhabitants. The

avalanche-like success of the Russian arms, the clearly displayed

weakness of German numbers and the rapid retreat of their forces

naturally added to the terror of the peasants who make up the largest

part of East Prussia's population. By thousands they fled from their

villages and hamlets, carrying on their slow oxcarts or on their

shoulders whatever they had gathered as their most precious possessions

in their first hours of fear and terror. To them the word "Cossack"

still called up pictures of the wild hordes that had overrun their

country during the Seven Years' War, and later again in the Napoleonic

wars. The large, strongly fortified cities of Koenigsberg and Danzig

seemed to hold out the only hope for life and security, and toward these

they flocked in ever-increasing masses. Even Berlin itself had brought

home to it some of the more refined cruelties of war by the arrival of

East Prussian refugees.

We have already seen that at the outbreak of the war only five active

German corps were left on the eastern front. Two, the First and the

Twentieth, had, so far, had to bear the brunt of the Russian advance;

one other, the Sixth, had been sent from Breslau to detract, as much as

possible, the Russian onslaught against the Austrian forces in Galicia;

and the other two, the Fifth and Seventeenth, stationed in Danzig and

Posen, were too far back to be immediately available.

CHAPTER LXXV

BATTLE OF TANNENBERG AND RUSSIAN RETREAT

When on August 22, 1914, the full strength of the Russian attack became

evident, the German General Staff decided on heroic measures. An

immediate increase of the German forces to the point where they would

match the Russian seemed out of the question, and the solution of the

problem, therefore, clearly lay in the ability of the general staff to

find a general who could, with the forces on hand, meet the requirements

of the situation--free East Prussia of the invader.

Fortunately for Germany, its hour of need on the eastern front brought

forth this man. There had been living for a number of years in the west

German city of Hanover a general who had been retired in 1911 as

commander of an army corps. His name was Paul von Hindenburg. He was at

that time in his sixty-seventh year, but having been an army officer

since his youth, he was "hard as nails," and from a military point of

view still in the prime of his years as a leader.

It was well known in military circles that Von Hindenburg had acquired

the most thorough knowledge of the difficult lake district south of

Koenigsberg. He had devoted his time and energies for years to a most

exhaustive study and investigation of the Mazurian lakes and swamps.

Again and again he had tramped through them on foot, picked his way

along their treacherous paths on horseback, and finally put their few

roads to the supreme test of the motor car. He knew their every

shortcoming and advantage. His topographical information included

fording places for men and guns, and quicksands.

Much of this knowledge he passed on to younger officers to whom he

lectured at the General Staff College in Berlin, and when, only some

years ago, practically all arrangements had been concluded by powerful

financial interests to drain and cultivate his beloved lakes and swamps

for agricultural purposes, he succeeded in overthrowing these plans at

the last moment. It is said that so powerful were these interests that

Von Hindenburg succeeded only by going, at last, to the emperor himself,

and convincing him that the natural defensive possibilities outweighed

in value any amount of increased acreage of reclaimed land.

We have already shown the problem which faced Von Hindenburg. To drive

the Russians out of East Prussia he had to defeat two armies composed of

at least 500,000 men, whose offensive momentum had been raised to a very

high power by a highly successful advance of more than a week's

duration. He, himself, could count only on far inferior numbers, not

more than the equivalent of four army corps. These he had to assemble

without loss of time and with as much artillery equipment as could be

spared from all directions. From Koenigsberg came the biggest part of the

beaten First Corps and its reserves. What was left of the Twentieth

Corps, of course, was right on the ground. Undoubtedly the fortresses of

Danzig, Graudenz, Thorn, and Posen had to yield parts of their

garrisons. However, most of these were troops of the second line.

On August 23, 1914, Von Hindenburg arrived at Marienburg, about seventy

miles southwest from Koenigsberg and almost as far to the northwest from

Allenstein, and assumed command of the East Prussian forces. Only three

days later, on August 26, 1914, he was ready to put in execution the

plans on which he had worked for almost a lifetime.

[Illustration: Battle of Tannenberg.]

Hindenburg's general strategical plan was as simple as the carrying out

of it, considering the means at his command was difficult. Facing him

were two armies still out of contact with each other, or at least only

very loosely connected. Each alone outnumbered him at least by 50,000;

combined they were more than three times as powerful as all his forces.

His only hope, therefore, was in attacking them separately. Thus he

chose to strike first at Samsonoff's army which was much farther spread

out than Rennenkampf's, and would find it much more difficult than the

latter to keep open its main line of retreat and supply. Its left rested

on Soldau, its right on Frankenau, while its center had been pushed

forward to Allenstein through Soldau, and southeast from it ran the only

direct railroad to his Polish base by way of Mlawa. Three other lines

centered there, one in the west from Thorn, one in the northwest from

Eylau (connecting with Danzig and Koenigsberg), and one in the east from

Neidenburg, which from there run north to Allenstein and northeast to

Johannisburg and Lyck. Apparently centering his efforts on pushing his

advance, Samsonoff had neglected to secure the former two roads.

On August 26, 1914, Von Hindenburg occupied both and took Soldau

Junction. The shortest line of retreat had now been cut off to the

Russians, whose forces were scattered over a considerable territory, and

on account of lack of railroads could not be concentrated quickly or

efficiently at any one point. Though a determined effort was made on

August 27, 1914, to retake Soldau, it was foredoomed to failure.

Samsonoff's left was thrown back on Neidenburg, making his front even

more unwieldly than before.

At this time the German front was very short, its left being at

Hohenstein, about halfway between Soldau and Allenstein and slightly

northeast of Tannenberg. But it made up in activity what it lacked in

length. In vain the Russians tried to break the German ranks and open up

a road to the northwest. Much blood was spilled on both, sides during

three days' fighting, but the German line held. In the meantime the

Russians had evacuated Allenstein, feeling the imperative need of

shortening their front. This gave Von Hindenburg the railroad that ran

almost parallel to the Russian front as well as the splendid main road

that runs alongside of it. Commandeering every available motor vehicle

from the entire surrounding countryside, he immediately extended his

line and swung around the Russian right as previously he had swung

around their left. Almost every road, rail or otherwise, that was of any

importance was now in the hands of the Germans and along them could be

sent men and guns with overwhelming rapidity. With relentless energy Von

Hindenburg now used his intimate knowledge of the territory in which he

was fighting. Wherever he knew the most hopeless territory to be, there

he drove the Russians. Mazurian swamps and lakes did all that he had

ever claimed they would do and more. They swallowed up his enemy by the

thousand, they engulfed his guns and sucked in his horses.

Within a week after Von Hindenburg had reached East Prussia the problem

of the Narew Army had changed from how to extend its advance most

quickly to how to escape from this bottomless pit along the few

inadequate lines of escape that were left. The morale of this Russian

army was broken. For even the most stolid Russian peasant soldier, whom

neither the roar of guns nor the flash of bayonets could move, quaked at

seeing whole companies and batteries disappear, in less time that it

takes to tell about it, in the morasses of a country without firm roads

and a minimum of solid ground.

On the last day of August, 1914, thousands of Russians had laid down

their arms and were sent back into central Germany. Of Russian armies of

more than a quarter of a million nearly a hundred thousand fell into

German hands. Almost half as many more were killed or wounded. The

Russian commander in chief was killed on August 31, 1914. Only one corps

escaped by way of Ortelsburg and Johannisburg, while scattered fragments

of varying size fought their way out, some into north Poland and some

into the protecting arms of the Niemen Army. Most of the guns of

Samsonoff's army were either captured by the Germans or lost in the

swamps. This one week's battle among the Mazurian lakes is known now as

the Battle of Tannenberg, so named after a small town west of and

halfway between Soldau and Allenstein.

Without giving his troops any rest Von Hindenburg now turned against

Rennenkampf's forces. But, in spite of the rapidity of movement, the

German commander could not accomplish all that he had set out to do.

Apparently his plan was now to strike north past Angerburg and Goldap to

Gumbinnen, or possibly even to Eydtkuhnen in order to cut off the

retreat of the army of the Niemen and drive them in a southerly

direction to their destruction in the Mazurian lakes, just as he had

done in his easterly drive against the Narew Army. But Rennenkampf was

too quick. He recognized the danger that threatened him through the

defeat of Samsonoff's forces and he began his retreat as soon as it

became evident that the other army's cause was lost. He was in a much

more advantageous position than his colleague had been. For not only did

the territory through which he had to fall back offer no particular

difficulties when once he had escaped Hindenburg's attempt to push him

up against the Mazurian lakes, but he had also a fairly efficient

network of railroads at his command centering in Insterburg.

Long before he evacuated this city on September 11, 1914, he had drawn

in most of his outlying formations in the north and west and had sent

them back safely across the border and behind the protection of the

Niemen and its shield of fortresses--Kovno, Olita, and Grodno. In this

he was also materially assisted by the stubborn resistance which Von

Hindenburg encountered at Lyck at the hands of a small army that had

been sent out from Grodno to aid him, and the nucleus of which consisted

of an entirely new Finnish, and an equally complete, Siberian Corps. In

spite of this, however, the pressure of the victorious Germans was

strong and rapid enough to force him to a generally hurried retreat. The

losses in killed and wounded were comparatively small, for almost all

the fighting was rear-guard action. But the Germans succeeded in

gathering in about 30,000 more prisoners, chiefly detachments that had

been unsuccessful in connecting in time with the main army. Much more

serious was the loss of some 150 guns and vast quantities of war

material for the removal of which both time and means had been lacking.

On September 15, 1914, Von Hindenberg could announce that the last of

the invaders had either been captured or driven back and that not an

acre of German soil was in the possession of the Russian forces. On that

date, moreover, he had already advanced far enough into Russian

territory to occupy the seat of government of the Russian province of

Suwalki, almost 150 miles in direct line east of Tannenberg, though less

than 20 from the German border. From that point on he intrusted the

further conduct of these operations to Lieutenant General von Morgen,

who had been one of his division commanders at Tannenberg.

By September 23, 1914, Rennenkampf had completed his retreat behind the

Niemen. The fighting which took place during the ensuing week is

commonly designated as the "Battle of Augustovo," though it covered a

much larger area. Augustovo itself is a small town about ten miles from

the German frontier, about twenty miles south of Suwalki, and forty

miles northwest from Grodno.

The German advance clearly suggested an attempt on their part to force a

crossing of the Niemen. This in itself was a very difficult undertaking.

The river is more than 600 feet wide, too deep to ford, and naturally

none of the few bridges over it were available for the Germans.

Furthermore its right bank, which was held by the Russians, is very

high, commanding absolutely and practically everywhere the low left bank

which in many places is almost as swampy as the worst parts of the

Mazurian lakes. West of the Niemen and between it and the frontier the

country is full of lakes, much as in the Mazurian region. The Germans,

of course, were under the same disadvantages there as the Russians had

suffered from in East Prussia. Of railroads there were none except one,

running in the shape of a semicircle from Grodno through Augustovo and

Suwalki to Olita.

On September 25, 1914, in spite of these conditions and disregarding the

weakened state of their forces, the Germans attempted to cross the

Niemen simultaneously at two places. About thirty miles north of Grodno

they had constructed a pontoon bridge and began to send across their

infantry. It was only then that the Russians opened up their murderous

fire from well-protected positions. Against it the Germans were

practically helpless. In spite of large numbers of guns that they

brought up, and in spite of repeated efforts of crossing in massed

formations, the result was the same: immense losses on the part of the

Germans and comparatively slight ones on the part of the Russians.

Indeed, the last attempt was not only frustrated, but the Russians even

forced back the Germans some miles.

Somewhat farther south the other attempt met with a similar fate. There

not only had the Russians posted their heavy guns on the right bank, but

infantry had been strongly intrenched on the left. Their combined

opposition forced back the Germans under heavy losses after they had

fought all day and all night. During the last week of September, 1914,

the Germans were gradually forced back along their entire front. Much of

the fighting was done in the dense forests east of Augustovo and was

hand-to-hand fighting. In the afternoon of October 1, 1914, the Russians

recaptured Augustovo after the Germans had made a determined stand,

yielding only when heavy guns bombarded their positions from the west

and northwest. On the next day the Germans had to retreat from Suwalki

and withdraw the lines that they had extended northward, and fall back

behind their frontier. This meant the end of the German attempt to cross

the Niemen and the beginning of the second invasion of East Prussia.

CHAPTER LXXVI

SECOND RUSSIAN INVASION OF EAST PRUSSIA

Wonderful as had been Von Hindenburg's accomplishment in defeating the

Russians and practically destroying one of their first-line armies, the

latter's recuperative power was almost as surprising. Deprived of the

prize of three weeks' fighting, defeated, and driven by the enemy on

their entire front for a depth of fifty miles into their own country,

they were nevertheless ready in a few days for a new offensive.

Undoubtedly this was partly due to the talent of their new commander,

General Russky, who had been sent up from Galicia, where he had gathered

experience as well as honors. But more so was it due to the protecting

defenses of the Niemen and the opportunities they offered for

reorganization, rest, and the collection of new forces.

The situation which was faced on the first week of October, 1914, was

perilous to all the armies engaged. Russia's fortresses on its eastern

front were concerned for a twofold purpose. In the first place, they

were to lend increased power of resistance to whatever means of defense

nature had provided, and this function, of course, determined their

location. Wherever rivers or other natural obstacles would offer

themselves to an invading enemy, there Russia had added especially

strong artificial defenses.

Any army invading Russia from East Prussia in a southerly direction

would have to cross the Narew River and its principal tributary on the

right, the Bober. These two run, roughly speaking, parallel to the

Russo-German border at a distance of about thirty to thirty-five miles,

and no army attempting an invasion east of the Vistula and south of the

Niemen could advance farther than this short distance without first

crossing the Narew and Bober.

The group of fortresses along this natural line of defense begins

opposite the southwestern corner of East Prussia with Osowiec, situated

on the railroad that runs from Lyck Bialistock. Thence it stretches in a

southwesterly direction through Lomsha, Ostrolenka, Rozan, Pultusk to

Novo Georgievsk, which latter is the most important of these, commanding

as it does the conflux of the Narew, Wkra, and Vistula rivers.

This series of fortified places forms the center of the system of

fortifications against Germany. In a southeasterly direction from it the

Vistula offers another strong natural line of defense strengthened still

more by the two big fortresses of Warsaw and Ivangorod, behind which, on

a bend of the Bug River and almost equally distant from both,

Brest-Litovsk, at the very western end of the vast Pripet swamps,

defends the entrance to central Russia, to Smolensk and Moscow.

Adjoining Osowiec on the north and making even more formidable and

naturally very strong defensive line of the River Niemen are Grodno,

Olita, and Kovno.

The second purpose of all these fortified places is to protect the rear

of an offensive army advancing toward Germany and to offer a haven of

refuge if it should become necessary for such an army to fall back. At

the same time they serve as powerful bases and screens behind which an

army of defense could quickly be changed into one of offense. Not only

had they served well this last purpose at the time of mobilization, but

again and again later on weakened Russian armies succeeded in retreating

behind these protecting shields, from which they emerged again a little

later, bent on new attacks, after they had been strengthened by

reenforcements from Russia's inexhaustible resources of men.

It was thus that the Russian armies saved themselves after Von

Hindenburg's smashing victory at Tannenburg. Out of about 650,000 men,

forming the Army of the Narew, and the Vilna Army, more than 300,000 had

succeeded in reaching the shelter of their fortresses.

At that time the German forces, sadly in need of rest, were much too

small and too weak to attempt an energetic general attack against either

the Niemen or the Narew-Bug lines of defenses. However, in order to

prevent another invasion of East Prussia something had to be done. They

therefore advanced a goodly distance into the province of Suwalki,

occupying even the seat of its government, a town of the same name.

Farther south Osowiec represented a continuous danger to East Prussia,

being very close to the border and on the direct railroad to Lyck.

Though the Germans were in no condition to undertake a siege, they

determined to attempt at least to close the crossing of the Bober at

this most advantageous point.

September 18, 1914, saw the beginning of this movement and ten days

later heavy artillery in limited force was thundering against the gates

of the small but strong fortress.

The suffering on both sides during this period was very great. Keeping

continuously moving, fighting day and night under conditions the natural

difficulties of which had been increased still more by unending

rainstorms, resulting in long delays for food and other supplies,

Russians as well as Germans displayed wonderful energy and perseverance.

And in spite of these difficulties, in spite of roads ankle deep in mud,

the Germans advanced and the Russians re-formed their forces.

On October 2, 1914, the Russian advance started from Grodno as a base.

The Third Siberian and parts of the Twenty-second Finnish Army Corps,

forming the left wing, met the enemy at Augustovo. For two days the

battle lasted, and though it involved only comparatively small numbers

it was one of the most sanguinary engagements of this period. Both sides

lost thousands of men and large quantities of war equipment. The Germans

having received reenforcements, attempted a flanking movement against

the right wing, undoubtedly with the intention of attacking the Russians

from the rear. They succeeded in getting a small force around the

Russian right, which, however, had to be withdrawn very soon. For the

balance of October the fighting raged along the entire front from the

Niemen in the north to Lomsha in the south, a distance of about 150

miles. Neither side was able to gain any decisive advantage, for both

the offensive and the defensive was fought with equal stubbornness. One

day fortune would smile on Russia's masses, only to turn its back

against them during the next twenty-four hours. The lack of success of

the German flanking movement around the Russian right brought to the

latter greater freedom of movement. It advanced toward Wirballen with

the object of gaining the road to Eydtkuhnen and Stallupoehnen, which

would enable them to strike once more for the important junction at

Insterburg. This attempt resulted in another minor but very sanguinary

engagement north of Vysztyt Lake. Again no decision had been reached,

though the Russians were getting closer and closer to East Prussia. A

Russian attempt to outflank the German left at Schirwindt, a few miles

north of Eydtkuhnen and right across the line in East Prussia, was not

any more successful than the previous German attempt, and weakened the

Russian right, just as a similar failure on the other side had weakened

the German left. Again honors, hardships, and losses were fairly even.

In the center the Russian advance covered an extensive plain, known as

the Romintener Heide. There, too, continuous fighting, a great deal of

which was carried on at night, involved usually only comparatively small

formations and the result was equally indecisive.

The Russian left wing had been more successful. It had fought its way

across the border and taken Wargrabova. The Germans, however, succeeded

in retaking this place as early as October 9, 1914, pursuing the

Russians and finally stormed their strong intrenchments a week later.

The country here is slightly elevated and the Russians had dug

themselves in rather elaborately. Manyfold rows of trenches, in some

places six and eight deep, had been thrown up around the small village

of Vielitzken which suffered severely during the German onrush.

In the meantime another attempt to take Lyck had succeeded. The direct

road through Osowiec was not available on account of the German force

located there. So the Russians sent a division forward from Lomsha

which, taking Bialla, reached Lyck on October 8, 1914. The Germans,

lacking sufficient forces for a successful defense, withdrew not only

from Lyck, but also from before Osowiec.

But by October 13,1914, the Niemen Army's advance into East Prussia had

been either forced back or delayed to such an extent that this

comparatively weak Russian advance in the extreme south was out of touch

with the main forces of the Niemen Army, and therefore in turn was

withdrawn.

This practically finished the second Russian invasion of East Prussia.

The German forces gradually cleared all of their country of the enemy

and followed him even into his own territory. But although continuous

fighting went on during the last week of October, again chiefly around

Augustovo and Bakalartshev, the Russians for the time being contented

themselves with a defensive policy, just as the Germans were satisfied

with their success in preventing the Russian advance without going over

to a clean offensive.

CHAPTER LXXVII

FIRST GERMAN DRIVE AGAINST WARSAW

We have already spoken of the strategic position of Russian Poland, of

its vulnerability, exposed as it is to attack from the Central Powers on

three sides, and finally what Russia had done to strengthen Poland's

natural line of defense, the Vistula River, by building fortresses on

its most important points. It may be well to recall here that the lower

part of this river flows through West Prussia, from Thorn to the Gulf of

Danzig. For almost a hundred miles, from Thorn to Novo Georgievsk, it

cannot actually be considered of defensive value to Russia; flowing

slightly northwest from the latter fortress to the border it is open to

German use on either side. But at that point, about twenty miles

northwest of Warsaw, any army coming along its valley would have to take

first this important fortress before it could continue farther into

central Poland. Should it fail in this it would have to withdraw its

forces from the right bank and then force a crossing at some point

between Novo Georgievsk and the point where the Vistula enters Russian

Poland from Austrian Poland, a few miles east of Cracow. It is at this

point also that the Vistula is swelled by its most important

contributary, the Bug River, which, roughly speaking, flows parallel to

the Vistula at a distance of about seventy miles from the Galician

border to a point on the Vilna-Warsaw railroad, about fifty miles east

of Warsaw, where it bends toward the west to join the Vistula. The Bug

River thus forms a strong secondary natural line of defense. In the

north the Narew--a tributary of the Bug--forms an equally strong barrier

against an army advancing from East Prussia.

There cannot be much doubt that the plan of the Central Powers

originally was to take Poland without having to overcome these very

formidable obstacles. If Von Hindenburg had succeeded after the battle

of Tannenberg in crossing the Niemen, and if, at about the same time the

Austro-Hungarians had also succeeded in defeating their Russian

adversaries in Galicia, described in another chapter, this object could

have been accomplished very easily by a concerted advance of both along

the east bank of the Bug, with Brest-Litovsk as the most likely point of

junction. The result would have been twofold: in the first place all of

Poland would have been in the hands of the Central Powers; for Russia

either would have had to withdraw its forces from there before their

three main lines of retreat--the railroads from Warsaw to Petrograd,

Moscow, Kiev--had been cut by the invaders, or else the latter would

have been in a position to destroy them leisurely, having surrounded

them completely. In the second place it would have meant the shortening

of the eastern front by hundreds of miles, making it practically a

straight line from the Baltic Sea to some point on the Russo-Galician

frontier.

In the preceding chapters, however, we have seen that up to the

beginning of October, 1914, neither the Germans nor the Austrians had

accomplished this object. The former had to satisfy themselves with

having cleared their own soil in East Prussia of the Russian invaders

and with keeping it free from further invasions, while the latter were

being pressed harder and harder every day and had to figure with a

possible invasion of Hungary. It was then that the Central Powers

decided to invade Poland from the west, and thus gradually drove out the

Russians. Why they persisted in their efforts to gain possession of

Russian Poland is clear enough. For in addition to the above-mentioned

advantage of shortening and straightening their front, they would also

deprive Russia of one of its most important and populous centers of

industry, in which the czar's domain was not overrich, and it would

remove forever this dangerous indentation in the back of the German

Empire.

Before we consider in detail the first German drive for Warsaw, it is

also necessary to consider briefly political conditions in Russian

Poland.

Ever since the partition of the old Kingdom of Poland among Germany,

Austria, and Russia, the Polish provinces created thereby for these

three empires had been a continuous source of trouble and worry to each.

The Poles are well known for their intense patriotism, which perhaps is

only a particular manifestation of one of their general racial

characteristics--temperament. At any rate the true Pole has never

forgotten the splendid past of his race, nor has he ever given up hope

for a reestablishment of its unity and independence. It is a rather

difficult question to answer whether Russia, Germany, or Austria have

sinned most against their Polish subjects. The fact remains, however,

that all three most ruthlessly suppressed all Polish attempts to realize

their national ideals. It is equally true that Russia went further along

that line than either Germany or Austria, and on the other hand did less

for its Polish subjects than the other two countries. Both in Germany

and Austria there existed therefore a more or less well-defined idea

that the Russian Poles would welcome German and Austrian troops with

open arms as their saviors from the Russian yoke. In Russia a certain

amount of anxiety existed about what the Poles would do. The latter, in

a way, at the beginning of the war found themselves facing a most

difficult alternative. That their country would at some time or other

become a battling ground of the contending armies was quite evident.

Whether Russia or the Central Powers would emerge as the final victor

was at least open to dispute. Whatever side the Poles chose, might be

the wrong side and bring to them the most horrible consequences. It was

undoubtedly with this danger in view that the "Gazeta Warzawska" printed

on August 15, 1914, an editorial which in part read as follows:

"Remain passive, watchful, insensible to temptation.

"During the coming struggle the Kingdom of Poland will be the

marching ground of various armies; we shall see temporary victors

assuming lordship for a while; but change of authority will

follow, and inevitable retaliation; this several times, perhaps,

in the course of the campaign. Therefore every improvident step

will meet with terrible revenge. By holding firm through the

present conflict you best can serve the Polish cause. In the name

of the love you bear your country, of your solicitude for the

nation's future, we entreat you, fellow countrymen, to remain

deaf to evil inspirations, unshakable in your determination not

to expose our land to yet greater calamities, and Poland's whole

future to incalculable perils."

This, of course, was far from being a rousing appeal to support Russia's

cause, but it was even further from being a suggestion to support that

of the Central Powers and revolt against Russia. Polish newspapers of

the next day printed a proclamation signed by the Commander in Chief

Grand Duke Nicholas prophesying the fulfillment of the Polish dream of

unity, at least, even if under the Russian scepter, and promising a

rebirth of Poland "free in faith, in language, in self-government."

On August 17, 1914, four of the Polish political parties published a

manifesto in which they welcomed this proclamation and expressed their

belief in the ultimate fulfillment of the promises made. The net result

of the sudden three-cornered bid for Polish friendship and support,

then, seems to have been that the leaders of Polish nationalism had

decided to abstain from embarrassing Russia, even though their

resistance against Germany and Austria with both of which other Poles

were fighting was not always very deep-seated.

During the first month of the war practically nothing of importance

happened in the Polish territory. German detachments occupied some of

the towns right across the border, in many instances for a short time

only. Mlawa, Kalish, and Czestochowa were the most important places

involved.

On August 31, 1914, however, the occupation of Radom, about 130 miles

from the German frontier, was reported, and a few days later that of

Lodz, next to Warsaw the biggest city of Russian Poland and an important

manufacturing center. At about the same time all of the places along two

of the railroads running from Germany to Warsaw, Thorn to Warsaw, and

Kalish to Warsaw, as far as Lowitz, where they meet, were occupied. In

this territory the Germans immediately proceeded to repair the railroad

bridges destroyed by the retreating Russians, who, apparently, had

decided to fall back to their defenses on the Vistula. The Germans must

have felt themselves fairly secure in their possession of this

territory, for on September 15, 1914, Count Meerveldt, then governor of

the Prussian Province of Muenster, was appointed its civil governor. A

day later the commanding general (Von Morgen) published a proclamation,

addressed to the inhabitants of the two provinces of Lomza and Warsaw.

In it he announced the defeat of the Russian Narew Army and

Rennenkampf's retreat and stated that larger forces were following his

own army corps, which latter considered them as its friends and had been

ordered to treat them accordingly. He called upon them to rise against

their Russian oppressors and to assist him in driving them out of

beautiful Poland which afterward was to receive at the hands of the

German Emperor political and religious liberty.

About ten days later the "additional stronger forces," which General

von Morgen had prophesied, put in an appearance. They consisted of

four separate armies, one advancing along the Thorn-Warsaw railroad,

another along the Kalish-Warsaw line, a third along the

Breslau-Czestochowa-Kielce-Radom-Ivangorod railroad, and the fourth

from Cracow in the same direction. Just how large these four armies

were is not absolutely known. Estimates range all the way from 500,000

to 1,500,000 which makes it most likely that the real strength was

about 1,000,000. Of these all but the Fourth Army were made up of

German soldiers, whereas the Cracow Army consisted of Austrians,

forming the left wing of their main forces which about that time had

been rearranged in western Galicia.

By the time all of these armies were ready to advance, the victor of

Tannenberg, Von Hindenburg--who meanwhile had been raised to the rank of

field marshal--had been put in supreme command of the combined German

and Austro-Hungarian armies in Poland. Though he was fighting now on

territory concerning which he had at least no superior knowledge than

his adversaries, his energy made itself felt immediately. He pushed the

advance of his four armies at an overpowering rate of speed and forced

the Russians, who apparently were not any too sure, either about the

strength of the opposing forces or their ultimate plans, to fall back

everywhere. By October 5 the Russians, attempting to make a desperate

stand near Radom, had been forced back almost as far as Ivangorod, and

within the week following the Austro-German army, still further south,

had reached the Vistula between the Galician border and Ivangorod. The

advance of the Germans as well as the retreat of the Russians took place

under terrific difficulties, caused by torrential rains which poured

down incessantly. Some interesting details may be learned from a letter

written about that time by a German officer in charge of a heavy

munition train: "From Czestochowa we advanced in forced marches. During

the first two days roads were passable, but after that they became

terrible, as it rained every day. In some places there were no roads

left, nothing but mud and swamps. Once it took us a full hour to move

one wagon, loaded with munitions and drawn by fifteen horses, a distance

of only fifteen yards.... Horses sank into the mud up to their bodies

and wagons up to their axles.... One night we reached a spot which was

absolutely impassable. The only way to get around it was through a dense

forest, but before we could get through there it was necessary to cut an

opening through the trees. For the next few hours we felled trees for a

distance of over five hundred yards.... For the past eight days we have

been on the go almost every night, and once I stayed in my saddle for

thirty consecutive hours. During all that time we had no real rest.

Either we did not reach our quarters until early in the morning or late

at night. What a bed feels like we've forgotten long ago. We consider

ourselves lucky if we have one room and straw on the floor for the seven

of us. For ten days I have not been out of my clothes. And when we do

get a little sleep it is almost invariably necessary to start off again

at once.... Even our food supplies have become more scarce day by day.

Long ago we saw the last of butter, sausage, or similar delicacies. We

are glad if we have bread and some lard. Only once in a great while are

we fortunate enough to buy some cattle. But then a great feast is

prepared.... Tea is practically all that we have to drink.... The

hardships, as you can see, are somewhat plentiful; but in spite of this

fact I am in tiptop condition and feeling wonderfully well. Sometimes I

am astonished myself what one can stand."

Early in October, 1914, the Germans came closer and closer to Warsaw. At

the end of it they were in the south, within twenty miles of the old

Polish capital--at Grojec. At that time only a comparatively small

force, not more than three army corps, was available, under General

Scheidemann's command, for its defense. These, however--all of them made

up of tried Siberian troops--fought heroically for forty-four hours,

especially around the strongly fortified little town of Blonie, about

ten miles west of Warsaw. The commander in chief of all the Russian

armies, Grand Duke Nicholas, had retired with his staff to Grodno, and

Warsaw expected as confidently a German occupation as the Germans

themselves. But suddenly the Russians, who up to that time seem to have

underestimated the strength of the Germans, awoke to the desperate needs

of the situation. By a supreme effort they contrived to concentrate vast

reenforcements to the east of Warsaw within a few days and to change the

proportion of numbers before Warsaw from five to three in favor of the

Germans to about three to one in their own favor.