SECOND PHASE OF BATTLE OF THE AISNE
The second phase of the battle of the Aisne contained two factors. One,
the simplest, was the maintenance of that line of defense against any
force that could be brought up against it by the Allies. It meant the
ability to hold strongly fortified positions against all odds. The
history of the trenches that winter, of which more will be said later,
reveals the extent to which the Germans succeeded, aided by the iron
craft of the old Prussian fighter General von Zwehl.
The other factor depended on the vexed question of means of
communication. There was no cross-country railway linking the eastern
German wing to the western German wing. As has been previously remarked,
all supplies and munitions had to come in a roundabout way. Verdun was a
desired goal, but Field Marshal von Heeringen was wise enough to know
that if the crown prince's effort against General Sarrail had failed, if
the Third French Army had secured heavy reenforcement, and if it had
been left unmolested for a week, the outer ring of defenses around
Verdun would, by that time, have become so amazingly strengthened that
direct or frontal attack would be impossible, while the flanking attack
had failed. It was vain, therefore, at the present time, to hope that
the establishment of the direct communication between Metz and Verdun
might pass into the hands of the invaders.
On the other hand, there was a direct line of railway running through
Rheims, Rethel, Mezieres to the great war depot, Coblenz on the Rhine. A
branch line from Metz, through Luxemburg, thus gave communication to the
eastern wing. All the links of this were in German hands, except Rheims,
and if that railroad center could be secured, the importance to the
German advance would be enormous. Under such circumstances, it can
scarcely be held that Rheims was not necessarily a point, the attack of
which was due to military necessity.
The formation for this began on September 17, 1914. Crossing the Aisne
by the old ford of Berry-au-Bac, a powerful army under the direct
leadership of Field Marshal von Heeringen debouched upon the open
country between Berry-au-Bac and Suippes, east of Rheims. It was at this
point that the German commander in chief of this section of the battle
line intended to deliver a crushing blow by which might be regained the
prestige secured at Charleroi and lost again at the Marne.
Surprise may be felt that so important a railway center as Rheims should
not have been a strongly fortified place. It had been so once, though
the fortifications were old-fashioned. But, instead of bringing these
points of natural defense up to the highest degree of modern efficiency,
the French had dismantled them entirely, so as to make Rheims with its
glorious cathedral an open town, safe from bombardment. It was,
according to the rules of war, safe from bombardment, but only in the
event of its not being defended. General Foch did not dare to take this
stand. He knew, as well as did General von Heeringen, the strategic
value of Rheims as railroad center, and accepted the issue of battle.
In the falling back of the several German armies from the Marne to the
Aisne, the Germans had kept possession of the chief forts of the
district around Rheims. No strong effort had been made to dislodge them,
for the forward movement of the Allies had been directed against the
fortified heights of the Aisne, facing the Soissons-Craonne defense. It
will be remembered that the armies of General Foch and Langle,
especially the latter, had taken no part in the first phase of the
Battle of the Aisne, but had stubbornly thrown back the armies of the
Duke of Wuerttemberg, which had combined with those of the crown prince.
The right wing of this large conjoined army had held the fort sites
around Rheims and especially they had made full use of the chief fort on
the wooded heights of Nogent l'Abbesse, a trifle less than half a mile
from the cathedral city and therefore within easy destructive shelling
range. The heavy artillery was planted here, the infantry intrenched
around it, and strong defense trenches were established along the River
Suippe that runs into the Aisne near Berry-au-Bac.
On Friday, September 18, 1914, the first movement of the second phase
was begun, when the Germans launched a sharp counterattack on the French
center. This was the first German offensive movement since their retreat
from the Marne, and it was powerful and well handled. General Foch fell
back into defensive positions, but had much ado to hold his own. He
evaded giving battle around Rheims and took up a position at Souain,
which he held with the jaunty obstinacy he had displayed so often in the
retreat through northern France. It was obvious that he could not hold
out long, but by clever generalship, and especially by an
extraordinarily brilliant use of the cavalry arm, he held off the army
for that day. That night strong reenforcements came to his aid, and on
September 19, 1914, the balance of the forces was more nearly equal.
On September 19, 1914, therefore, the situation of the armies was much
as follows: The Germans, acting under the general command of Field
Marshal von Heeringen, controlled Rheims under the gunfire of their
heavy artillery from two points, the heights of Nogent l'Abbesse to the
southeast of Rheims, and the hill of Brimont a little over half a mile
to the northeast. Their right flank was covered by the powerful defenses
of the Aisne and the guns of the Craonne plateau, their left flank was a
series of intrenchments along the river Suippe, which merged into the
second line of defense of the main army under the Duke of Wuerttemberg.
On the other side of Rheims, or to the west of the cathedral city, the
Allies also held two heights, one at Pouillon, between the Aisle and the
Vesle, and therefore to the northwest of the city, and the other on a
sharp steep, known as the Mountain of Rheims, near Verzenay, on the
south side of the river. This was therefore west and a little south of
Rheims. But, and herein lies the question that has so often arisen in
the discussion of the comparative strength of the two armies--especially
without the British batteries--the French lacked heavy long-range
artillery. They had no such howitzers as those of the German forces.
Thus the Germans could shell Rheims to their hearts' content, and the
Allies could not silence that gunfire from their own fortified
positions. Once more, then, it became a battle between infantry and
artillery, between men and machines.
This time, however, the advance was not favorable to the Germans. Their
heavy artillery commanded Rheims, but it did not command the French line
to the west of Rheims. The invaders performed prodigies of valor. Again
and again they hurled themselves against the French line. But General
Foch's troops were well supplied with that terrible engine of
destruction--the French 3-inch fieldpiece, known, as the 75-mm., an
extremely powerful gun for its caliber.
In four successive night attacks on September 19-20, 1914, the heaviest
onset was made. Supported by a terrific gunfire, directed with the long
pointing fingers of searchlights, the German infantry, invigorated by a
week's rest, rolled up in gray-clad tidal waves against the French line.
General Foch had known how to post his defense, and within twenty-four
hours he had made the line between Pouillon and the Mountain of Rheims
almost as strong as the German line between Brimont and Nogent
l'Abbesse. Poor Rheims lay between, wide open to the eruption of
destruction that belched from the throats of the German howitzers.