FIRST DAY'S BATTLES
That first day of the battle of the Aisne, September 12, 1914, which was
indeed rather preparatory than actual, was also marked by some unusually
brilliant cavalry work in General Allenby's division. The German line
was on the farther side of the Aisne, but all the hill country between
the Marne and the Aisne had to be cleared of the powerful rear guards of
the retreating German army, or perhaps it would be more correct to say
the advance guards of the new German line. Early in the morning the
cavalry under General Allenby swept out from the town of Braisne on the
Vesle and harried in every direction the strong detachments that had
been sent forward, driving them back to the Aisne. Over the high wooded
ridge between the Vesle and the Aisne the Germans were driven back, and
the Third Division, under General Hamilton, supported the cavalry in
force, so that, by the evening, General Hamilton's division was able to
camp below the hill of Brenelle, and even, before night fell, to get
their guns upon that height, from which they could reply to the German
batteries snugly ensconced upon the frowning ridge on the northern bank
of the Aisne.
The Fifth British Division, under Sir Charles Fergusson, found itself in
a tight place at the confluence of the Vesle and Aisne Rivers, for at
that point lay a stretch of flat bottomland exposed to the German fire.
By a ruse, which returned upon their own heads, the Germans had
preserved one bridge across the Aisne, the bridge at Conde. This was
done as a lure to Sir Charles Fergusson's forces, but even more so it
was intended as a sallying point as soon as the German army deemed
itself in a position to attack again. The bridge was destined to figure
in the events of the great conflict when the grapple should come.
One of the most graphic of all the accounts of the fighting of that day
was from the pen of a major in the British field artillery, and it
presented in sharp and vivid colors how the field artillery joined with
the cavalry in clearing the German troops from the hills between the
Marne and the Aisne. He wrote:
"We got the order to go off and join a battery under Colonel ----'s
orders. We came en route under heavy shrapnel fire on the road. I gave
the order to walk, as the horses had hardly had any food for a couple of
days, and also I wanted to steady the show. I can't say I enjoyed
walking along at the head with old ---- behind me, especially when six
shrapnel burst right in front of us. We got there just in time, rushed
into action, and opened fire on a German counterattack at short range,
destroying the lot so far as I could see.
"We then moved slightly to another position to take on a valley, down
which they were attacking, and were at it the whole day, firing about
900 rounds into quantities of German attacks and counterattacks. They
cannot stand the shrapnel, and the moment I got one on them they turned
and bolted back to the wood.
"I got on to their trenches; one shell dropped in. [It would appear from
this that some of the advance guards of the new defense line were either
intrenching or occupying trenches made during the battles of the Marne,
probably the latter, or else the writer is speaking of the actions of
his battery on the 10th as well as the 12th before the invaders had
retreated across the Marne.] I was enfilading them, and they tore out of
the trenches, and so on, each trench in turn, and fell in hundreds.
Also, through the range finder, ---- saw I'd hit a machine gun, and they
had abandoned it and another. So it went all day, shells and bullets
humming around, but only one of my staff horses was hit. Our infantry
advancing and retiring--others advancing and coming back--Germans doing
likewise, a hellish din of shell fire, and me pouring in fire whenever I
could see them.
"At last I got six shrapnel into a wood and cleared a heap of them out
and got into them with shrapnel. It was awful! The sergeant major put
his hand up to his head and said: "Oh, sir, it's terrible!" That seemed
to settle them, and at last we saw the infantry advancing to their
positions without resistance.
"Now was my chance. I determined to get those machine guns if I could,
as otherwise the infantry would. So I left ---- in command and got the
trumpeter, sergeant major, and six men with six rifles, and went forward
'to reconnoiter,' as I reported to ---- after I had gone. It was a weird
ride, through thick black woods, holding my revolver ready, going in
front with the little trumpeter behind and the others following some way
in the rear. We passed some very bad sights, and knew the woods were
full of Germans who were afraid to get away on account of the dreaded
shell fire. We got in front of our infantry, who were going to fire at
us, but I shouted just in time.
"At last we came to the edge of a wood, and in front of us, about 200
yards away, was a little cup-shaped copse, and the enemy's trenches with
machine guns a little farther on. I felt sure this wood was full of
Germans, as I had seen them go in earlier. I started to gallop for it,
and the others followed. Suddenly about fifty Germans bolted out, firing
at us. I loosed off my revolver as fast as I could, and ---- loosed off
his rifle from the saddle. They must have thought we were a regiment of
cavalry, for, except for a few, they suddenly yelled and bolted. I
stopped and dismounted my lot to fire at them, to make sure that they
didn't change their minds.
"I waited for a lull, and mounted all my lot behind the bushes and made
them spring as I gave the word to gallop for cover to the woods where
the Welsh company was. There I got ----, who understands them (the
guns), and an infantryman who volunteered to help, and ---- and I ran up
to the Maxims and took out the breech mechanism of both and one of the
belts, and carried away one whole Maxim. We couldn't manage the other.
"We got back very slowly on account of the gun, and the men went wild
with excitement that we had got one gun complete and the mechanism and
belt of the other."
With such incidents the pursuit of the Germans across the Marne and to
the Aisne was replete, and so thoroughly did the advance French and
English troops scour that country that when the morning of September 13,
1914, dawned there was scarcely a German soldier left on the southern
side of the Aisne, west of Rheims.
The administration of the German armies meanwhile had been markedly
changed. In the turning movement on the Marne the plan was clearly
outlined, each commander had his instructions, and that was all. But
with the need for changes of plan there was need for a directing head,
and Field Marshal von Heeringen was sent in a hurry to take charge of
the Aisne. This placed both General von Kluck and General von Buelow into
subordinate positions. Field Marshal von Heeringen held a deserved
reputation as one of the most brilliant as well as one of the most
iron-willed of the German military leaders. He had been the backbone of
the crown prince's movement against Troyon, a movement which, given a
day or two longer, might have meant the capture of Verdun.
This was not the only factor that was framing up to give the German
armies a decided advantage. The essential factor of the Aisne was the
arrival of General von Zwehl and his guns. On September 13, 1914, at 6
a. m., Zwehl arrived in Laon, and in less than an hour he was in action
on the Aisne front. The story of General von Zwehl and his guns is
essential to an understanding of the causes that rendered the British
victory of the Aisne a barren and a fruitless victory at best.
The week of September 5-12, 1914, witnessed the entire series of the
battles of the Marne, which drove the Germans across the Marne and
across the Aisne, as well as a German victory which exerted almost as
powerful an influence in favor of the invaders as the check at the Marne
did for the defenders. This victory was the fall of Maubeuge. It is
going too far to say--as several military writers have done--that
General von Zwehl saved Germany, and that unless he had arrived as
opportunely as he did the "German retreat to the Aisne valley would have
been changed into a disastrous and overwhelming rout." But it is not
going too far to say that the successful holding of the Aisne line was
due to the victor of Maubeuge.
General von Zwehl was one of the iron-jawed battle-scarred warriors of
1870, a man with a will as metallic as his own siege guns, and a man
who could no more be deflected from his purpose than a shell could be
diverted in its flight. He had been set to reduce Maubeuge and he had
done so with speed and with thoroughness. Maubeuge was not protected by
open-air earthworks, but by a circle of armor-plate concrete forts. To
the mighty siege guns handled by General von Zwehl, these were no
trouble, for Von Zwehl had not only the heavy batteries attached to the
Seventh Army Reserve, but he also had a number of Von Kluck's guns and
the majority of General von Buelow's, neither of whom was expected to
need siege guns in the forward drive where mobility was an essential. In
addition to this, General von Zwehl also had the great siege train that
had been prepared for the reduction of Paris. What chance had Maubeuge
against such a potency?
On September 8, 1914, word reached General von Zwehl that the forward
drive had failed, that the main armies had been beaten back and that he
was to bring up his guns as rapidly as possible to cover the retreat. As
rapidly as he could, to General von Zwehl, meant but one thing--to get
there! He collected 9,000 reserve troops, which was almost immediately
swelled by another 9,000, and with a total of 18,000 troops he started
his siege trains for the town of Laon, where Field Marshal von Heeringen
had taken up his headquarters. The weather turned bad, rendering the
heavy guns extremely difficult to handle, but there could be no delay,
no explanations, to General von Zwehl. If a gun was to be brought it was
to be brought and that was all about it! Four days and three nights of
almost continuous marching is killing. The German commander cared
nothing for that. The guns must be kept moving. Could he get them there
on time? In the last twenty-four hours of the march, his 18,000 troops
covered 41 miles and they arrived in Laon at six o'clock in the morning
of September 13, 1914, and were in action an hour later. The problem,
therefore, before the English and French at the Aisne, was not the
carrying of the river against a disheartened and retreating army, but
the carrying of the river against a well-thought-out and forceful
plan--a plan, moreover, backed up by the most powerful artillery that
the world has ever seen.