SIEGE AND FALL OF NAMUR
When the Germans occupied Brussels on August 20, 1914, we observed that
corps after corps did not enter the city, but swept to the south. This
was Von Kluck's left wing moving to attack the Allies on the Sambre-Mons
front. The forces which passed through Brussels were Von Kluck's
center, advancing south by east to fall in line beside the right wing,
which had mainly passed between Brussels and Antwerp to the capture of
Bruges and Ghent. The whole line when re-formed on the French frontier
would stretch from Mons to the English Channel--the great right wing of
the German armies.
Meanwhile, Von Buelow's second army had advanced up the valley of the
Meuse, with its right sweeping the Hisbaye uplands. Some part of this
army may have been transported by rail from Montmedy. Its general
advance in columns was directed chiefly upon the Sambre crossings. As
Von Kluck's wide swing through Belgium covered a greater distance, Von
Buelow's army was expected to strike the Allies some twenty-four hours
earlier. Its march, therefore, was in the nature of an onrush.
But Von Buelow was now in the full tide of fighting strength--an amazing
spectacle to chance or enforced witnesses. Well may the terrified
peasants have stood hat in hand in the midst of their ruined villages.
Any door not left open was immediately broken down and the interior
searched. Here and there a soldier could be seen carrying a souvenir
from some wrecked chateau. But for the most part everyone fled from
before its path, leaving it silent and abandoned. The field gray-green
uniforms were almost invisible in cover, in a half light, or when
advancing through mist. No conceivable detail seemed to have been
overlooked. Each man carried a complete equipment down to handy trifles,
the whole weighed to the fraction of an ounce, in carefully estimated
proportions.
But this was not enough. Waiting for each column to pass were men with
buckets of drinking water, into which the soldiers dipped their aluminum
cups. Temporary field post offices were established in advance, so that
messages could be gathered in as the columns passed. Here and there were
men to offer biscuits and handfuls of prunes. In methodical,
machine-like progress came the ammunition wagons, commissariat carts,
field kitchens, teams of heavy horses attached to pontoons, traction
engines hauling enormous siege guns, motor plows for excavating
trenches, aeroplanes, carriages containing surgeons, automobiles for
the commanders, and motor busses in which staff officers could be seen
studying their maps. On some of these vehicles were chalked
Berlin-Paris. No branch of the service was absent, no serviceable part
if it overlooked--not even a complement of grave diggers. It moved
forward always at an even pace, as if on parade, with prearranged
signals passed down the line when there was any obstacle, a descent or
bend in the road.
The tramp of many thousands cast into the atmosphere clouds of fine
dust, but even those in rear marched through it as if their lungs were
made of steel. No permission was granted to open out for the circulation
of air, though it was the month of August. It is safe to assert there
was not a single straggler in Von Buelow's army. At the first sign of it
he was admonished with a vigor to deter his comrades. Discipline was
severely maintained. At every halt the click of heels, and rattle of
arms in salute went on down the line with the sharp delivery of orders.
On Wednesday, August 12, 1914, the town of Huy, situated midway between
Liege and Namur, was seized. It possessed an old citadel, but it was
disarmed, and used now only as a storehouse. Some Belgian detachments
offered a slight resistance at the bridge, but were speedily driven off.
The capture of Huy gave the Germans control of the railway from
Aix-la-Chapelle to France, though broken at Liege by the still standing
northern forts. But they secured a branch line of more immediate
service, running from Huy into Central Belgium.
On August 15, 1914, Von Buelow's vanguard came within sight of Namur.
Before evening German guns were hurling shells upon its forts. Began
then the siege of Namur. Namur, being the second fortress hope of the
Allies--the pivot upon which General Joffre had planned to swing his
army into Belgium in a sweeping attack upon the advancing Germans--a
brief survey of the city and fortifications will be necessary. The
situation of the city is not as imposing as that of Liege. For the most
part it sits on a hillside declivity, to rest in the angle formed by the
junction of the Sambre and Meuse. It is a place of some historic and
industrial importance, though in the latter respect not so well known as
Liege. To the west, however, up the valley of the Sambre, the country
presents the usual features of a mining region--pit shafts, tall
chimneys issuing clouds of black smoke, and huge piles of unsightly
debris. While away to the north stretches the great plain of Central
Belgium, southward the Central Meuse offers a more picturesque prospect
in wooded slopes rising to view-commanding hilltops. Directly east, the
Meuse flows into the precipitous cut on its way to Liege.
But in Belgian eyes the fame of Namur lay to a great extent in its being
the second of Brialmont's fortress masterpieces. Its plan was that of
Liege--a ring of outer detached forts, constructed on the same
armor-clad cupola principle. At Namur these were nine in number, four
major forts and five _fortins_. The distance between each fort was on
the average two and a half miles, with between two and a half to five
miles from the city as the center of the circumference.
Facing Von Buelow's advance, fort Cognelee protected the Brussels
railway, while the guns of Marchovelette swept the space between it and
the left bank of the Meuse. In the southwest angle formed by the Meuse,
forts Maizeret, Andoy and Dave continued the ring. Again in the angle of
the Sambre and Meuse forts St. Heribert and Malonne protected the city.
North of the Sambre, forts Suarlee and Emines completed the circle.
In the emergency Namur possessed one advantage over Liege. The
resistance of Liege gave Namur due warning of the German invasion, and
some days to prepare for attack. General Michel was in command of the
garrison of Namur, which comprised from 25,000 to 30,000 men. Doubtless
reports had come to him of the situation at Liege. He immediately set to
work to overcome the cause of the failure of Brialmont's plan at Liege,
by constructing trenches between the forts, protected by barbed wire
entanglements, and mines in advance of the German approach. As his
circumference of defense was less than that of Liege, his force promised
to be capable of a more prolonged resistance.
Besides the Allies were close at hand. Only eighteen miles separated
him from strong detachments of French infantry and artillery at Dinant.
As we have seen French cavalry had been thrown forward as far as
Gembloux on the road to Brussels, but ten miles to the northeast of
Namur. Somewhere between that place and Charleroi French Chasseurs
d'Afrique had advanced to occupy outpost positions. His position
appeared by no means hopeless--considerably better than the unsupported
field army at Liege. The armor of his forts was calculated to withstand
the 36-lb. shells of the heaviest German fieldpieces, but comparatively
slight damage was anticipated from the known heavier howitzers. If the
Germans purposed to assault Namur in mass formation, as they had done at
Liege, General Michel had every reason to feel confident he could
repulse them with tremendous losses.
But the Germans had learned a severely taught lesson at Liege. They had
no intention of repeating those tactics. Behind a remarkable screen of
secrecy, they managed to conceal from General Michel--as they did from
the Allies--the existence of their enormous siege guns. Whether they
brought into action at Namur their famous 42-centimeters, capable of
throwing a shell of high explosive power weighing 2,500 lbs., is
uncertain. In fact, it is still doubtful where they were first fired at
the allied enemy. Two are said to have assisted in the final destruction
of the northern forts of Liege, and two were seen rolling over the field
of Waterloo. The Germans remained silent upon the subject, and nothing
definite about their first discharge was disclosed. But unquestionably
their fire was capable of demolishing into ruin any fort on earth within
a short period. It is certain, however, the Germans brought against
Namur their 28-centimeter guns, and probably some of 21-centimeter
caliber. These artillery weapons were quite formidable enough to reduce
the Namur forts. The former threw a shell of 750 pounds from a range of
three miles--beyond the reach of the Namur guns. The latter projected
shells of 250 pounds. The Germans are said to have employed thirty-two
of the heavier caliber guns, and a large number of 21-centimeter.
Thus Namur was doomed before the bombardment commenced. Von Buelow's
left wing advanced up the Meuse north bank from Huy, some part of it
crossing to the south bank at Ardenne, where it came in touch with the
Saxon army.
At sundown of August 20, 1914, Von Buelow was in position before Namur,
three miles from its defenses. Darkness fell upon a hot and sultry
August atmosphere. Presently the flashes and boom of the German guns
began a bombardment of the trenches between forts Cognelee and
Marchovelette. It continued through the night. But the Belgian fortress
guns were outranged. It would have been a mere waste of ammunition to
reply. Neither could the Belgian infantry venture on a counterattack,
for the Germans were clearly observed in overwhelming strength. At the
outset the Germans devoted their efforts to clearing the trenches of the
Belgian infantry, leaving the forts for subsequent demolition. The
unfortunate Belgian infantry, therefore, could do nothing but fire
intermittent rifle volleys, without any effect upon the Germans. They
bravely bore this storm of shells for ten hours. Not a man who lifted
his head above the German machine gun-swept parapets but was not
instantly killed or wounded. Thus the majority of the officers were
killed, and the ranks within the trenches decimated.
Toward morning on August 21, 1914, the Belgians could stand the tornado
of death no longer. The demoralized troops fled from the trenches,
leaving the gap between forts Cognelee and Marchovelette open. The
Germans then opened fire on the forts. In comparison with the new German
siege howitzers, the old-fashioned Belgian guns proved to be weak
weapons. The tremendous pounding of the German shells not only smashed
the fort cupolas, and crumpled into ruin the interior stone and steel
protective armor, but quickly put the Belgian guns out of action. Thus
while fort Maizeret received some 1,200 German shells at the speed of
twenty to the minute, it was able to reply with only ten shots. Forts
Marchovelette and Maizeret were the first to fall. Seventy-five men of
the Marchovelette garrison were found dead amid its ruins--nearly its
total complement.
[Illustration: French Invasion of Alsace-lorraine.]
Early on Friday morning of August 21, 1914, forts Andoy, Dave, St.
Heribert and Malonne were subjected to a similar furious bombardment.
After three hours of the cannonade Andoy, Dave and St. Heribert
surrendered. During the morning the Germans thrust a force into the
southern angle of the Sambre and Meuse. Here the Belgian infantry
offered a vigorous resistance. It was hoped that the French at Dinant
would hasten to their relief. But Dinant was for the second time within
a few days the scene of conflict. Some 6,000 French Turcos and artillery
did arrive, but too late to be of use in helping to save Namur. Shells
now began to drop in the city while aeroplanes flung down bombs. A
thunderstorm rumbled in combination with the continuous roar of the
German guns. A panic took hold of the citizens. Distracted men, women
and children huddled together in spellbound terror, or sought the
shelter of their cellars. The more superstitious pronounced this to be
the end of all things, from the eclipse of the sun which darkened the
sky. Fort Malonne succumbed sometime during the afternoon of August 21,
1914.
As at Liege, with General Leman, so in Namur General Michel foresaw the
city and forts' fate was imminent. Only the northwest forts Suarlee,
Emines and Cognelee held out. The Belgians and French had been defeated
by the Germans in the angle of the Sambre and Meuse. The horizon
revealed no sign of a French army advancing. General Michel, therefore,
decided upon the evacuation of the city by the Belgian infantry. It was
successfully accomplished, though even more in the nature of a flight
than at Liege. But General Michel went with them, instead of remaining,
like General Leman, to fight the defense of his fortress to the last.
The retreating Belgians on August 22, 1914, had some adventurous
wandering before them. They had first to cut their way through a body of
German troops, then to become involved with a French force near
Charleroi. It took them seven days to reach Rouen by way of Amiens.
There they were embarked for sea transport to Ostend. At Ostend, they
joined the main Belgian army after its retreat from Antwerp.
On Sunday morning, August 23, 1914, the Germans began the bombardment of
Fort Suarlee. This fort repeated the heroic resistance of Fort
Boncelles at Liege. It held out until the afternoon of August 25. It was
apparently then blown up by the explosion of its own magazine, thus
again repeating the end of Fort Loncin at Liege. Meantime the Germans
had succeeded in reducing Forts Cognelee and Emines.
The Germans entered Namur on the afternoon of August 23, 1914. There
seems to have been some oversight in the plan, for the advance guard
found themselves under fire of their own guns directed upon the citadel
and the Grande Place. This, however, was speedily rectified. Their
behavior was much the same as at Louvain and Brussels. They marched in
with bands playing and singing patriotic songs. Proclamations were at
once issued warning the citizens not to commit any hostile act. The
inhabitants were far too cowed to contemplate anything but submission.
Good discipline was preserved. The city took fire that night probably by
deliberate design of the invaders. The citizens were induced to come
forth from their cellars and hiding places to reopen the cafes and
shops.
General von Buelow entered Namur on Monday morning August 24, 1914. He
was accompanied by Field Marshal Baron von der Goltz, recently appointed
Governor General of Belgium. Previous to the former Balkan War he had
been employed in reorganizing the Turkish army. An onlooker in Namur
thus describes the German Field Marshal:--"An elderly gentleman covered
with orders, buttoned in an overcoat up to his nose, above which gleamed
a pair of enormous spectacles."
General Michel attributed his defeat to the German siege guns. The fire
was so continuous upon the trenches that it was impossible to hold them,
and the forts simply crumpled under the storm of shells. But back of
General Michel's plea the allied Intelligence Departments lacked
efficiency or energy, or both, in not gaining more than a hint, at any
rate, of the enormous German siege guns until they were actually
thundering at the gates.