Though the name of neither Hynson or his sweetheart figures in any of
the serious histories of the day, only an unforeseen incident prevented
his, at least, from being there recorded. Isabella’s influence was to
change all his original program. It now remains to show how serious were
the results of Hynson’s uncertain faith, and with what measure of
plausibility Isabella Cleghorn may be called an actual though humble and
unconscious factor in the creation of the American republic.
Hynson, as has already been stated, was a man possessed of ambition,
self-confidence, and a love of intrigue. Half his heart’s desire was to
see an early reconciliation of mother-country and colony; the other half
to be himself the maker of the peace. His connection with the American
Commission to Versailles he consequently regarded purely as a means to
this end—his intimacy with the Commission’s affairs as a password to the
confidence of Downing Street. Never fearing to match his own wit against
that of two nations, he clung to the idea that England must be brought
to offer to America acceptable terms of compromise before the conclusion
of a Franco-American understanding should lend new courage to the
rebellious colony. And English diplomatists astutely upheld his faith in
his own powers of high accomplishment: “Ce Capitaine continue à voir le
Ld. Stormont, qui lui fait l’accueil le plus capable de le flatter,”
said Gérald, in his report of April 3, 1777. “Cet homme simple, honnête
mais bien intentionné, en a la tête tournee et se croit destiné â être
le pacificateur des deux nations.”
The first move in Hynson’s cloudy scheme involved the delivery to the
British of certain valuable despatches going from the Commissioners to
Congress. As bearer of these papers, which were to be placed in his
hands by Franklin in person, the agent lay under orders to sail from
Havre about March 10, in the cutter-sloop that he himself had smuggled
over from Dover for the purpose. Lords North and Suffolk, being informed
accordingly, despatched Lieut.-Col. Edward Smith to Havre, “furnished
with £800 on account, in case it should become necessary to make use of
money.” No sooner had Smith opened negotiations, however, than a new
feature of the scheme developed. Hynson’s complaisance had its limits,
and he utterly refused to turn over the despatches in simple barter.
“Persuasion hangs not on my tongue to attain it,” wrote Smith. The
precious papers must be forcibly wrested from their keeper, on the very
deck of his vessel. Every interest, therefore, turned to that vessel’s
capture.
“The sloop” [Smith told his principals across the Channel] “is hawl’d
up into the most private part of the harbour, and the King’s Dock. Men
are at work upon her with all expedition. I mean that she shall be
stuffed with everything that is good, to make her a better and more
valuable prize.... So tell your ships to be well apprized.... You had
better have sixty ships out than miss her.”
The Admiralty responded promptly. Vessels of war on Channel stations
received minute instructions toward effecting so important a capture. No
precaution was spared, yet in the event all proved vain, for Hynson was
balked of his commission.
“A Schooner arrived in the Mean Time at Nantz from Baltimore,”
[explained Smith] “with News of the Hessian Misfortune, which
determined Messrs. Deane and Franklin to wait for more Events ... to
send their Despatches ... and to employ Hynson, on whose Courage &
Seamanship they place great Confidence, in some other Service.”
Foiled in his first design, Hynson now proceeded upon a new one—that of
gathering from the Commission to Versailles such news of American
affairs as, placed in British hands, might serve his object. Some of
these gleanings he gave to Lord Stormont, in Paris, some he confided to
Smith, “whom he met as often as they found it convenient,” and some
travelled by post to England, under protection of the covers of Admiral
Rodney, Hynson’s fellow-lodger in a Parisian inn.
“In doing this,” said Smith, whose relations with Hynson were always
most friendly, “he found the Character & Situation of the several
People with whom he has to do very favorable to his Purpose. Franklin
lives at a little Distance from Paris, but seldom passes a Day without
seeing Deane; the latter appears to be the More active & efficient
Man, but less circumspect and Secret, his Discretion not being always
proof against the natural Warmth of his temper & being weakened also
by his own Ideas of the importance of his present Employment. His
Residence is at the Hotel d’Hombourg, where he keeps a regular Table
for such of his Countrymen as are engaged in the service of the
Congress (Carmichael, Weeks, Hynson, Nicholson, Moyland, Franklin’s
Grandson, and others).... Hynson, who is a free, easy Fellow, & in
good Graces of the whole Party, has a real regard for Carmichael &
labours hard to draw him into the same system with himself.... It is
certainly material, if he succeeds. For tho’ both Deane and Franklin
may be, & are, according to Carmichael’s, account, too ambitious &
Determined (or, in other Words, too malevolent against Great Britain,)
ever to adopt any line of conduct short of American Independence, yet
Deane and Franklin can, in themselves, individually, do little, & if
they are betrayed by those whom they must employ, their Agency will
soon come to Disgrace & Despair.”
No ships bearing arms or stores left France for America unknown to the
English Admiralty if Hynson’s diligence could prevent it. And Hynson’s
diligence seldom slept. During all this period, Deane’s confidence in
his agent never faltered. Toward the end of May, 1777, he wrote to John
Hancock concerning him:
“——I must in duty to my Country say, I believe he will render ... good
service in the Navy, being a good Seaman, & of a cool, sedate, and
Steady Temper of mind.”
Again, on the 5th of September, he says: “I can answer for his
fidelity,” of which confidence a conclusive proof shortly came forward.
On the 7th of October Deane informed Hynson, then in Havre de Grace:
“The Commissioners are sending a packet to America & by this
conveyance Capt’n Folger has been wrote to, to take the charge of it
if not otherwise engaged, but as it is of importance that this packet
goes by safe hands, ... if he cannot go, ... I must depend on your
executing the commission.”
The story of the packet’s arrival at the little lodging-house in Havre
where Folger and Hynson lived together is thus succinctly told by Lieut.
Col. Smith:
“Folger being ready and willing to sail away with them immediately,
Hynson took an opportunity of sending Folger out upon some business in
the Docks, while he, slipping off the string which was intended to
secure the end of the packett, gott possession of the despatches, ...
and then, making up paper equal in length and thickness to what he had
taken out, he dextrously filled up the vacancy, shutt up the end of
the bundle, passed back again the same string; and upon Folger’s
returning with a Mr. Moyland, he had the bundle well cover’d, put in a
bag, seal’d and deliver’d it to Folger in presence of Moyland, never
to be given again out of Folger’s hands (unless to be thrown overboard
in case of meeting with one of our ships, or into the hands of those
they are directed for).”
“Leaving behind an excuse for his absence, skilfully prepared to
hoodwink Deane, Hynson then hurried over to London, carrying the
precious papers with him. Official England delighted in the prettiness
of the trick.”
“Dear Eden,” [wrote the Earl of Suffolk]. “I am tickled with uncommon
pleasure ... at the neat manœuvre by which Hynson has ... proved
himself an honest Rascal. He well deserves his reward. I desire I may
communicate (the despatches) myself to Lord Mansfield.”
And Eden, in joy too great for formal phrases, informs the King’s self
that Hynson “is an honest Rascal, and no fool.”
So it happened that poor, gulled Folger eventually delivered to
Congress, with all due ceremony, a package of blank paper, and was cast
into prison for his pains. Duplicate despatches sent out by the
Commission soon after Folger’s departure were lost at sea, and in
consequence of the two calamities no official intelligence reached
Congress from France between May, 1777, and May 2, 1778, the day of the
arrival of the French treaty.
As to the effect of this circumstance, Deane is somewhat explicit.
Mentioning Hynson’s exploit as “the only instance of our having our
despatches intercepted,” he continues:
“At the time of making out the despatches our prospects both in France
and in America were extremely discouraging. The Court of France
appeared to view our cause as absolutely desperate, and even the
appearance of what little countenance they had before shown us they
gave the most unequivocal proofs of their resolution to disavow and
leave us to our fate.... The Commissioners were at that time refused
any access to the Minister, even in the most secret manner.
“... The Commrs. had not, for some time previous to this date, sent
any information of their situation to Congress, for they scarcely knew
what to write, and hitherto they had said nothing in a discouraging
style, but, on the contrary, had said everything they could ... to
encourage Congress to persevere, and ultimately to expect aid from
France. In these (Folger’s despatches), though, ... they could not
avoid the mention of facts from which the most unfavourable
conclusions must have been drawn by Congress had Folger arrived with
the dps. instead of blank paper....
“... On the other hand, the British Ministers, from the contents of
those despatches and letters, found in what state we were with the
Court of Versailles.... This encouraged them to prosecute the war with
vigour, confident that it must soon terminate successfully on their
part.”
The result of Hynson’s plot, if Deane’s conclusions be accepted, was,
therefore, directly contrary to his aim. By his diversion of the
despatches, British hopes were raised and British offers of concession
delayed until the critical moment had passed and America’s courage had
risen beyond all thought of compromise. Thanks to Hynson’s intervention,
“when the Commissioners on the part of Great Britain eventually
arrived in America to propose terms of accommodation to Congress, no
discouraging intelligence had been received ... from the Commissioners
in Paris, and they (Congress) still relied on the effect which the
victory at Saratoga was expected to have in their favour. They were
not, as the event has shown, deceived.”
“In every age of the world,” Deane reflects, “many, if not most of the
greatest events, have been produced from the most trifling causes.”
A defensible, if not a profitable, argument might be brought forward to
prove the “honest Rascal” the savior of the republic. And, to split a
hair still finer, Isabella Cleghorn might, by the same token, be hailed
as that savior’s inspiration.
Lord Stormont believed in Hynson’s sincerity as would-be conciliator of
the contending powers. Deane, despite heavy evidence, was never perhaps
wholly convinced of his agent’s venality. And Hynson himself again and
again protested to Smith:
“My motives are not interest,” or, “while ever there is a prospect of
the disputes being settled I shall still be in hopes.”
Is the secret of these contradictions to be found in Smith’s sly, early
hint:
“He has a connection in England which he is anxious to resume?”
And in Hynson’s own words to Isabella:
“My dear girl, if I have success I shall be able to receive you with
open Arms.”
Certainly the King’s gift of a round sum in cash, a pension of £200
yearly, and, if Deane be right, a rank in the English navy, placed that
consummation well within his reach, while his ensuing desertion of the
stirring life that his soul had loved and retirement into country
solitude pointed strongly toward a master motive satisfied. Samson was
shorn and drawn into paths of inglorious peace. “God knows what he
does!” said a wondering witness. “He dwells with his wife in a little
country house, a quarter of a mile out the town.”