The assessment of the taxation upon the _The Seven Great Monarchies Of The Ancient Eastern World, Vol 5: Persia The History, Geography, And Antiquities Of Chaldaea, Assyria, Babylon, Media, Persia, Parthia, And Sassanian or New Persian Empire; With Maps and Illustrations.

province was left to the satrap. We do not know on what principles he

ordinarily proceeded, or whether any uniform principles at all were

observed throughout the Empire. But we find some evidence that, in

places at least, the mode of exaction and collection was by a land-tax.

The assessment upon individuals, and the actual collection from them,

devolved, in all probability, on the local authorities, who distributed

the burthen imposed upon their town, village, or district as they

thought proper. Thus the foreign oppressor did not come into direct

contact with the mass of the conquered people, who no doubt paid the

calls made upon them with less reluctance through the medium of their

own proper magistrates.

If the taxation of the subject had stopped here, he would have had

no just ground of complaint against his rulers. The population of the

Empire cannot be estimated at less than forty millions of souls. The

highest estimate of the value of the entire tribute, both in money and

kind, will scarcely place it at more than ten millions sterling. Thus

far, then, the burthen of taxation would certainly not have exceeded

five shillings a head per annum. Perhaps it would not have reached half

that amount. But, unhappily, neither was the tribute the sole tax which

the crown exacted from its subjects, nor had the crown the sole right

of exacting taxation. Persian subjects in many parts of the Empire paid,

besides their tribute, a water-rate, which is expressly said to have

been very productive. The rivers of the Empire were the king’s; and when

water was required for irrigation, a state officer superintended the

opening of the sluices, and regulated the amount of the precious fluid

which might be drawn off by each tribe or township. For the opening of

the sluices a large sum was paid to the officer, which found its way

into the coffers of the state. Further, it appears that such things

as fisheries--and if so, probably salt-works, mines, quarries, and

forests--were regarded as crown property, and yielded large sums to the

revenue. They appear to have been farmed to responsible persons, who

undertook to pay at a certain fixed rate, and made what profit they

could by the transaction. The price of commodities thus farmed would be

greatly enhanced to the consumer.

By these means the actual burthen of taxation upon the subject was

rendered to some extent uncertain and indefinite, and the benefits of

the fixed tribute system were diminished. But the chief drawback upon

it has still to be mentioned. While the claims of the crown upon its

subjects were definite and could not be exceeded, the satrap was at

liberty to make any exactions that he pleased beyond them. There

is every reason to believe that he received no stipend, and that,

consequently, the burthen of supporting him, his body-guard, and his

Court was intended to fall on the province which had the benefit of his

superintendence. Like a Roman proconsul, he was to pay himself out of

the pockets of his subjects; and, like that class of persons, he took

care to pay himself highly. It has been calculated that one satrap of

Babylon drew from his province annually in actual coin a sum equal to

L100,000. of our money. We can scarcely doubt that the claims made by

the provincial governors were, on the average, at least equal to

those of the crown; and they had the disadvantage of being irregular,

uncertain, and purely arbitrary.

Thus, what was gained by the new system was not so much the relief of

the subject from uncertain taxation as the advantage to the crown of

knowing beforehand what the revenue would be, and being able to regulate

its expenditure accordingly. Still a certain amount of benefit did

undoubtedly accrue to the provincials from the system; since it gave

them the crown for their protector. So long as the payments made to the

state were irregular, it was, or at least seemed to be, for the interest

of the crown to obtain from each province as much as it could anyhow

pay. When the state dues were once fixed, as the crown gained nothing by

the rapacity of its officers, but rather lost, since the province became

exhausted, it was interested in checking greed, and seeing that the

provinces were administered by wise and good satraps.

The control of its great officers is always the main difficulty of a

despotic government, when it is extended over a large space of territory

and embraces many millions of men. The system devised by Darius for

checking and controlling his satraps was probably the best that has

ever yet been brought into operation. His plan was to establish in every

province at least three officers holding their authority directly from

the crown, and only responsible to it, who would therefore act as checks

one upon another. These were the satrap, the military commandant, and

the secretary. The satrap was charged with the civil administration, and

especially with the department of finance. The commandant was supreme

over the troops. The office of the secretary is less clearly defined;

but it probably consisted mainly in keeping the Court informed by

despatches of all that went on in the province. Thus, if the satrap

were inclined to revolt, he had, in the first place, to persuade the

commandant, who would naturally think that, if he ran the risk, it might

as well be for himself; and, further, he had to escape the lynx eyes of

the secretary, whose general right of superintendence gave him entrance

everywhere, and whose prospects of advancement would probably depend a

good deal upon the diligence and success with which he discharged the

office of “King’s Eye” and “Ear.” So, if the commandant were ambitious

of independent sway, he must persuade the satrap, or he would have no

money to pay his troops; and he too must blind the secretary, or else

bribe him into silence. As for the secretary, having neither men

nor money at his command, it was impossible that he should think of

rebellion.

But the precautions taken against revolt did not end here. Once a year,

according to Xenophon, or more probably at irregular intervals, an

officer came suddenly down from the Court with a commission to inspect

a province. Such persons were frequently of royal rank, brothers or sons

of the king. They were accompanied by an armed force, and were empowered

to correct whatever was amiss in the province, and in case of necessity

to report to the crown the insubordination or incompetency of its

officers. If this system had been properly maintained, it is evident

that it would have acted as a most powerful check upon misgovernment,

and would have rendered revolt almost impossible.

Another mode by which it was sought to secure the fidelity of the

satraps and commandants was by choosing them from among the king’s blood

relations, or else attaching them to the crown by marriage with one of

the princesses. It was thought that the affection of sons and brothers

would be a restraint upon their ambition, and that even connections by

marriage would feel that they had an interest in upholding the power and

dignity of the great house with which they had been thought worthy of

alliance. This system, which was entensively followed by Darius, had on

the whole good results, and was at any rate preferable to that barbarous

policy of prudential fratricide which has prevailed widely in Oriental

governments.

The system of checks, while it was effectual for the object at which it

specially aimed, had one great disadvantage. It weakened the hands of

authority in times of difficulty. When danger, internal or external,

threatened, it was an evil that the powers of government should be

divided, and the civil authority lodged in the hands of one officer, the

military in those of another. Concentration of power is needed for rapid

and decisive action, for unity of purpose, and secrecy both of plan and

of execution. These considerations led to a modification of the original

idea of satrapial government, which was adopted partially at first--in

provinces especially exposed to danger, internal or external--but which

ultimately became almost universal. The offices of satrap, or civil

administrator, and commandant, or commander of the troops, were vested

in the same person, who came in this way to have that full and complete

authority which is possessed by Turkish pashas and modern Persian

khans or beys--an authority practically uncontrolled. This system was

advantageous for the defence of a province against foes; but it was

dangerous to the stability of the Empire, since it led naturally to the

occurrence of formidable rebellions.

Two minor points in the scheme of Darius remain to be noticed, before

this account of his governmental system can be regarded as complete.

These are his institution of posts, and his coinage of money.

In Darius’s idea of government was included rapidity of communication.

Regarding it as of the utmost importance that the orders of the Court

should be speedily transmitted to the provincial governors, and that

their reports and those of the royal secretaries should be received

without needless delay, he established along the lines of routes already

existing between the chief cities of the Empire a number of post-houses,

placed at regular intervals, according to the estimated capacity of a

horse to gallop at his best speed without stopping. At each post-house

were maintained, at the cost of the state, a number of couriers and

several relays of horses. When a despatch was to be forwarded it was

taken to the first post-house along the route, where a courier received

it, and immediately mounting on horseback galloped with it to the next

station. Here it was delivered to a new courier, who, mounted on a fresh

horse, took it the next stage on its journey; and thus it passed from

hand to hand till it reached its destination. According to Xenophon, the

messengers travelled by night as well as by day; and the conveyance was

so rapid that some even compared it to the flight of birds. Excellent

inns or caravanserais were to be found at every station; bridges or

ferries were established upon all the streams; guard-houses occurred

here and there, and the whole route was kept secure from the brigands

who infested the Empire. Ordinary travellers were glad to pursue so

convenient a line of march; it does not appear, however, that they could

obtain the use of post-horses even when the government was in no need

of them. The coinage of Darius consisted, it is probable, both of a gold

and silver issue. It is not perhaps altogether certain that he was

the first king of Persia who coined money; but, if the term “daric” is

really derived from his name, that alone would be a strong argument in

favor of his claim to priority. In any case, it is indisputable that

he was the first Persian king who coined on a large scale, and it is

further certain that his gold coinage was regarded in later times as of

peculiar value on account of its purity. His gold darics appear to have

contained, on an average, not quite 124 grains of pure metal, which

would make their value about twenty two shillings of our money.

They were of the type usual at the time both in Lydia and in

Greece--flattened lumps of metal, very thick in comparison with the size

of their surface, irregular, and rudely stamped. The silver darics

were similar in general character, but exceeded the gold in size. Their

weight was from 224 to 230 grains, and they would thus have been worth

not quite three shillings of our money. It does not appear that any

other kinds of coins besides these were ever issued from the Persian

mint. They must, therefore, it would seem, have satisfied the commercial

needs of the people.

From this review of the governmental system of Darius we must now return

to the actions of his later life. The history of an Oriental monarchy

must always be composed mainly of a series of biographies; for, as the

monarch is all in all in such communities, his sayings, doings, and

character, not only determine, but constitute, the annals of the State.

In the second period of his reign, that which followed on the time of

trouble and disturbance, Darius (as has been already observed)

appears to have pursued mainly the arts of peace. Bent on settling and

consolidating his Empire, he set up everywhere the satrapial form of

government, organized and established his posts, issued his coinage,

watched over the administration of justice, and in various ways

exhibited a love of order and method, and a genius for systematic

arrangement. At the same time he devoted considerable attention to

ornamental and architectural works, to sculpture, and to literary

composition. He founded the royal palace at Susa, which was the main

residence of the later kings. At Persepolis he certainly erected one

very important building; and it is on the whole most probable that he

designed--if he did not live to execute--the Chehl Minor itself--the

chief of the magnificent structures upon the great central platform. The

massive platform itself, with its grand and stately steps, is certainly

of his erection, for it is inscribed with his name. He gave his works

all the solidity and strength that is derivable from the use of huge

blocks of a good hard material. He set the example of ornamenting the

stepped approached to a palace with elaborate bas-reliefs. He designed

and caused to be constructed in his own lifetime the rock-tomb at

Nakhsh-i-Rustam, in which his remains were afterwards laid. The

rock-sculpture at Behistun was also his work. In attention to the

creation of permanent historical records he excelled all the Persian

kings, both before him and after him. The great Inscription of Behistun

has no parallel in ancient times for length, finish, and delicacy

of execution, unless it be in Assyria or in Egypt. The only really

historical inscription at Persepolis is one set up by Darius. He was the

only Persian king, except perhaps one, who placed an inscription upon

his tomb. The later monarchs in their records do little more than repeat

certain religious phrases and certain forms of self-glorification which

occur in the least remarkable inscriptions of their great predecessor.

He alone oversteps those limits, and presents us with geographical

notices and narratives of events profoundly interesting to the

historian.

During this period of comparative peace, which may have extended

from about B.C. 516 to B.C. 508 or 507, the general tranquillity was

interrupted by at least one important expedition. The administrational

merits of Darius are so great that they have obscured his military

glories, and have sent him down to posterity with the character of an

unwarlike monarch--if not a mere “peddler,” as his subjects said, yet,

at any rate, a mere consolidator and arranger. But the son of Hystaspes

was no carpet prince. He had not drawn the sword against his domestic

foes to sheath it finally and forever when his triumph over them was

completed. On the contrary, he regarded it as incumbent on him to carry

on the aggressive policy of Cyrus and Cambyses, his great predecessors,

and like them to extend in one direction or another the boundaries of

the Empire. Perhaps he felt that aggression was the very law of the

Empire’s being, since if the military spirit was once allowed to become

extinct in the conquering nation, they would lose the sole guarantee of

their supremacy. At any rate, whatever his motive, we find him, after

he had snatched a brief interval of repose, engaging in great wars

both towards his eastern and his western frontier--wars which in both

instances had results of considerable importance.

The first grand expedition was towards the East. Cyrus, as we have seen,

had extended the Persian sway over the mountains of Affghanistan and the

highlands from which flow the tributaries of the Upper Indus. From these

eminences the Persian garrisons looked down on a territory possessing

every quality that could attract a powerful conqueror. Fertile,

well-watered, rich in gold, peopled by an ingenious yet warlike race,

which would add strength no less than wealth to its subjugators, the

Punjab lay at the foot of the Sufeid Koh and Suliman ranges, inviting

the attack of those who could swoop down when they pleased upon the low

country. It was against this region that Darius directed his first great

aggressive effort. Having explored the course of the Indus from Attock

to the sea by means of boats, and obtained, we may suppose, in this way

some knowledge of the country and its inhabitants, he led or sent an

expedition into the tract, which in a short time succeeded in completely

reducing it. The Punjab, and probably the whole valley of the Indus, was

annexed, and remained subject till the later times of the Empire. The

results of this conquest were the acquisition of a brave race, capable

of making excellent soldiers, an enormous increase of the revenue, a

sudden and vast influx of gold into Persia, which led probably to the

introduction of the gold coinage, and the establishment of commercial

relations with the natives, which issued in a regular trade carried

on by coasting-vessels between the mouths of the Indus and the Persian

Gulf.

The next important expedition--one probably of still greater

magnitude--took exactly the opposite direction. The sea which bounded

the Persian dominion to the west and the north-west narrowed in two

places to dimensions not much exceeding those of of the greater Asiatic

rivers. The eye which looked across the Thracian Bosphorus or the

Hellespont seemed to itself to be merely contemplating the opposite

bank of a pretty wide stream. Darius, consequently being master of

Asia Minor, and separated by what seemed to him so poor a barrier

from fertile tracts of vast and indeed indefinite extent, such as were

nowhere else to be found on the borders of his empire, naturally turned

his thoughts of conquest to this quarter. His immediate desire was,

probably, to annex Thrace; but he may have already entertained wider

views, and have looked to embracing in his dominions the lovely isles

and coasts of Greece also, so making good the former threats of Cyrus.

The story of the voyage and escape of Democedes, related by Herodotus

with such amplitude of detail, and confirmed to some extent from other

sources, cannot be a mere myth without historical foundation. Nor is

it probable that the expedition was designed merely for the purpose of

“indulging the exile with a short visit to his native country,” or of

collecting “interesting information.” If by the king’s orders a vessel

was fitted out at Sidon to explore the coasts of Greece under the

guidance of Democedes, which proceeded as far as Crotona in Magna

Grsecia, we may be tolerably sure that a political object lay at the

bottom of the enterprise. It would have exactly the same aim and end as

the eastern voyage of Scylax, and would be intended, like that, to pave

the way for a conquest. Darius was therefore, it would seem, already

contemplating the reduction of Greece Proper, and did not require

to have it suggested to him by any special provocation. Mentally, or

actually, surveying the map of the world, so far as it was known to

him, he saw that in this direction only there was an attractive country

readily accessible. Elsewhere his Empire abutted on seas, sandy deserts,

or at best barren steppes; here, and here only, was there a rich prize

close at hand and (as it seemed) only waiting to be grasped.

But if the aggressive force of Persia was to be turned in this

direction, if the stream of conquest was to be set westward along the

flanks of Rhodope and Haemus, it was essential to success, and even to

safety, that the line of communication with Asia should remain intact.

Now, there lay on the right flank of an army marching into Europe a vast

and formidable power, known to be capable of great efforts, which, if

allowed to feel itself secure from attack, might be expected at any

time to step in, to break the line of communication between the east

and west, and to bring the Persians who should be engaged in conquering

Pseonia, Macedonia, and Greece, into imminent danger. It is greatly to

the credit of Darius that he saw this peril--saw it and took effectual

measures to guard against it. The Scythian expedition was no insane

project of a frantic despot, burning for revenge, or ambitious of an

impossible conquest. It has all the appearance of being a well-laid

plan, conceived by a moderate and wise prince, for the furtherance of

a great design, and the permanent advantage of his empire. The lord of

South-Western Asia was well aware of the existence beyond his northern

frontier of a standing menace to his power. A century had not sufficed

to wipe out the recollection of that terrible time when Scythian hordes

had carried desolation far and wide over the fairest of the regions that

were now under the Persian dominion. What had occurred once might recur.

Possibly, as a modern author suggests, “the remembrance of ancient

injuries may have been revived by recent aggressions.” It was at any

rate essential to strike terror into the hordes of the Steppe Region in

order that Western Asia might attain a sense of security. It was still

more essential to do so if the north-west was to become the scene

of war, and the Persians were to make a vigorous effort to establish

themselves permanently in Europe. Scythia, it must be remembered,

reached to the banks of the Danube. An invader, who aspired to the

conquest even of Thrace, was almost forced into collision with her next

neighbor.

Darius, having determined on his course, prefaced his expedition by a

raid, the object of which was undoubtedly to procure information. He

ordered Ariaramnes, satrap of Cappadocia, to cross the Euxine with a

small fleet, and, descending suddenly upon the Scythian coast, to carry

off a number of prisoners. Ariaramnes executed the commission skilfully,

and was so fortunate as to make prize of a native of high rank, the

brother of a Scythian chief or king. From this person and his companions

the Persian monarch was able to obtain all the information which he

required. Thus enlightened, he proceeded to make his preparations.

Collecting a fleet of 600 ships, chiefly from the Greeks of Asia, and

an army estimated at from 700,000 to 800,000 men, which was made up

of contingents from all the nations under his rule, he crossed the

Bosphorus by a bridge of boats constructed by Mandrocles a Samian;

marched through Thrace along the line of the Little Balkan, receiving

the submission of the tribes as he went; crossed the Great Balkan;

conquered the Getae, who dwelt between that range and the Danube; passed

the Danube by a bridge, which the Ionian Greeks had made with their

vessels just above the apex of the Delta; and so invaded Scythia. The

natives had received intelligence of his approach, and had resolved not

to risk a battle. They retired as he advanced, and endeavored to bring

his army into difficulties by destroying the forage, driving off the

cattle, and filling in the wells. But the commissariat of the Persians

was, as usual, well arranged. Darius remained for more than two months

in Scythia without incurring any important losses. He succeeded in

parading before the eyes of the whole nation the immense military power

of his empire. He no doubt inflicted considerable damage on the hordes,

whose herds he must often have captured, and whose supplies of forage he

curtailed. It is difficult to say how far he penetrated. Herodotus was

informed that he marched east to the Tanais (Don), and thence north to

the country of the Budini, where he burnt the staple of Gelonus, which

cannot well have been below the fiftieth parallel, and was probably

not far from Voronej. It is certainly astonishing that he should have

ventured so far inland, and still more surprising that, having done

so, he should have returned with his army well-nigh intact. But we can

scarcely suppose the story that he destroyed the staple of the Greek

trade a pure fiction. He would be glad to leave his mark in the country,

and might make an extraordinary effort to reach the only town that was

to be found in the whole steppe region. Having effected his purpose by

its destruction, he would retire, falling back probably upon the coast,

where he could obtain supplies from his fleet. It is beyond dispute that

he returned with the bulk of his army, having suffered no loss but

that of a few invalid troops whom he sacrificed. Attempts had been made

during his absence to induce the Greeks, who guarded the bridge over

the Danube, to break it, and so hinder his return; but they were

unsuccessful. Darius recrossed the river after an interval of somewhat

more than two months, victorious according to his own notions, and

regarded himself as entitled thenceforth to enumerate among the subject

races of his empire “the Scyths beyond the sea.” On his return march

through Thrace, he met, apparently, with no opposition. Before passing

the Bosphorus, he gave a commission to one of his generals, a certain

Megabazus, to complete the reduction of Thrace, and assigned him for the

purpose a body of 80,000 men, who remained in Europe while Darius and

the rest of his army crossed into Asia.

Megabazus appears to have been fully worthy of the trust reposed in him.

In a single campaign (B.C. 506) he overran and subjugated the entire

tract between the Propontis and the Strymon, thus pushing forward the

Persian dominion to the borders of Macedonia. Among the tribes which he

conquered were the Perinthians, Greeks; the Pseti, Cicones, Bistones,

Sapaei, Dersaei and Edoni, Thracians; and the Paeoplae and Siripasones,

Pseonians. These last, to gratify a whim of Darius, were transported

into Asia. The Thracians who submitted were especially those of the

coast, no attempt, apparently, being made to penetrate the mountain

fastnesses and bring under subjection the tribes of the interior.

The first contact between Persia and Macedonia possesses peculiar

interest from the circumstances of the later history. An ancestor of

Alexander the Great sat upon the throne of Macedon when the general of

Darius was brought in his career of conquest to the outskirts of the

Macedonian power. The kingdom was at this time comparatively small, not

extending much beyond Mount Bermius on the one hand, and not reaching

very far to the east of the Axius on the other. Megabazus saw in it,

we may be sure, not the fated destroyer of the Empire which he was

extending, but a petty state which the mere sound of the Persian

name would awe into subjection. He therefore, instead of invading the

country, contented himself with sending an embassy, with a demand

for earth and water, the symbols, according to Persian custom, of

submission. Amyntas, the Macedonian king, consented, to the demand

at once; and though, owing to insolent conduct on the part of the

ambassadors, they were massacred with their whole retinue, yet this

circumstance did not prevent the completion of Macedonian vassalage.

When a second embassy was sent to inquire into the fate of the first,

Alexander, the son of Amyntas, who had arranged the massacre, contrived

to have the matter hushed up by bribing one of the envoys with a large

sum of money and the hand of his sister, Gygsea. Macedonia took up the

position of a subject kingdom, and owned for her true lord the great

monarch of Western Asia.

Megabazus, having accomplished the task assigned him, proceeded to

Sardis, where Darius had remained almost, if not quite, a full year His

place was taken by Otanes, the son of Sisamnes, a different person from

the conspirator, who rounded off the Persian conquests in these parts

by reducing, probably in B.C. 505, the cities of Byzantium, Chalcedon,

Antandrus, and Lamponium, with the two adjacent islands of Letnnos and

Imbrus. The inhabitants of all were, it appears, taxable, either with

having failed to give contingents towards the Scythian expedition,

or with having molested it on its return--crimes these, which Otanes

thought it right to punish by their general enslavement.

Darius, meanwhile, had proceeded to the seat of government, which

appears at this time to have been Susa. He had perhaps already built

there the great palace, whose remains have been recently disinterred

by English enterprise; or he may have wished to superintend the work of

construction. Susa, which was certainly from henceforth the main Persian

capital, possessed advantages over almost any other site. Its climate

was softer than that of Ecbatana and Persepolis, less sultry than that

of Babylon. Its position was convenient for communicating both with

the East and with the West. Its people were plastic, and probably

more yielding and submissive than the Medes or the Persians. The king,

fatigued with his warlike exertions, was glad for a while to rest and

recruit himself at Susa, in the tranquil life of the Court. For some

years he appears to have conceived no new aggressive project; and he

might perhaps have forgotten his designs upon Greece altogether, had not

his memory been stirred by a signal and extraordinary provocation.

The immediate circumstances which led to the Ionian Revolt belong to

Greek rather than to Persian history, and have been so fully treated of

by the historians of the Hellenic race that a knowledge of them may be

assumed as already possessed by the reader. What is chiefly remarkable

about them is, that they are so purely private and personal. A chance

quarrel between Aristagoras of Miletus and the Persian Megabates,

pecuniary difficulties pressing on the former, and the natural desire

of Histiseus, father-in-law of Aristagoras, to revisit his native place,

were undoubtedly the direct and immediate causes of what became a

great national outbreak. That there must have been other and wider

predisposing causes can scarcely be doubted. Among them two may be

suggested. The presence of Darius in Asia Minor, and his friendliness

towards the tyrants who bore sway in most of the Greek cities, were

calculated to elate those persons in their own esteem, and to encourage

in them habits and acts injurious or offensive to their subjects. Their

tyranny under these circumstances would become more oppressive and

galling. At the same time the popular mind could not fail to associate

together the native despot and the foreign lord, who (it was clear to

all) supported and befriended each other. If the Greeks of Asia, like so

many of their brethren in Europe, had grown weary of their tyrants

and were desirous of rising against them, they would be compelled to

contemplate the chances of a successful resistance to the Persians.

And here there were circumstances in the recent history calculated

to inspirit them and give them hopes. Six hundred Greek ships, manned

probably by 120,000 men, had been lately brought together, and had

formed a united fleet. The fate of the Persian land-army had depended

on their fidelity. It is not surprising that a sense of strength should

have been developed, and something like a national spirit should have

grown up in such a condition of things.

If this were the state of feeling among the Greeks, the merit of

Aristagoras would be, that he perceived it, and, regardless of all class

prejudices, determined to take advantage of the chance which it gave

him of rising superior to his embarrassments. Throwing himself on the

popular feeling, the strength of which he had estimated aright, he by

the same act gave freedom to the cities, and plunged his nation into

a rebellion against Persia. It was easy for reason to show, when the

matter was calmly debated, that the probabilities of success against

the might of Darius were small. But the arrest of the tyrants by

Aristagoras, and his deliverance of them into the hands of their

subjects, was an appeal to passion against which reason was powerless.

No state could resist the temptation of getting rid of the tyranny under

which it groaned. But the expulsion of the vassal committed those who

took part in it to resist in arms the sovereign lord.

In the original revolt appear to have been included only the cities

of Ionia and AEolis. Aristagoras felt that some further strength was

needed, and determined to seek it in European Greece. Repulsed from

Sparta, which was disinclined to so distant an expedition, he applied

for aid to cities on which he had a special claim. Miletus counted

Athens as her mother state; and Eretria was indebted to her for

assistance in her great war with Chalcis. Applying in these quarters

Aristagoras succeeded better, but still obtained no very important help.

Athens voted him twenty ships, Eretria five and with the promise of

these succors he hastened back to Asia.

The European contingent soon afterwards arrived; and Aristagoras,

anxious to gain some signal success which should attract men to his

cause, determined on a most daring enterprise. This was no less than an

attack on Sardis, the chief seat of the Persian power in these parts,

and by far the most important city of Asia Minor. Sailing to Ephesus, he

marched up the valley of the Cayster, crossed Mount Tmolus, and took

the Lydian capital at the first onset. Artaphernes, the satrap, was only

able to save the citadel; the invaders began to plunder the town, and in

the confusion it caught fire and was burnt. Aristagoras and his troops

hastily retreated, but were overtaken before they could reach Ephesus by

the Persians quartered in the province, who fell upon them and gave

them a severe defeat. The expedition then broke up; the Asiatic Greeks

dispersed among their cities; the Athenians and Eretrians took ship and

sailed home.

Results followed that could scarcely have been anticipated. The failure

of the expedition was swallowed up in the glory of its one achievement.

It had taken Sardis--it had burnt one of the chief cities of the Great

King. The news spread like wildfire on every side, and was proclaimed

aloud in places where the defeat of Ephesus was never even whispered.

Everywhere revolt burst out. The Greeks of the Hellespont--not only

those of Asia but likewise those of Europe--the Carians and Caunians of

the south-western coast--even the distant Cyprians broke into rebellion;

the Scythians took heart and made a plundering raid through the Great

King’s Thracian territories;4 vassal monarchs, like Miltiades, assumed

independence, and helped themselves to some of the fragments of the

Empire that seemed falling to pieces. If a great man, a Miltiades or

a Leondias, had been at the head of the movement, and if it had been

decently supported from the European side, a successful issue might

probably have been secured.

But Aristagoras was unequal to the occasion; and the struggle for

independence, which had promised so fair, was soon put down. Despite a

naval victory gained by the Greeks over the Phoenician fleet off Cyprus,

that island was recovered by the Persians within a year. Despite a

courage and a perseverance worthy of a better fate, the Carians were

soon afterwards forced to succumb. The reduction of the Hellespontine

Greeks and of the AEolians followed. The toils now closed around Ionia,

and her cities began to be attacked one by one; whereupon the incapable

Aristagoras, deserting the falling cause, betook himself to Europe,

where a just Nemesis pursued him: he died by a Thracian sword. After

this the climax soon arrived. Persia concentrated her strength upon

Miletus, the cradle of the revolt, and the acknowledged chief of the

cities; and though her sister states came gallantly to her aid, and a

fleet was collected which made it for a while doubtful which way victory

might incline, yet all was of no avail. Laziness and insubordination

began and treachery completed the work which all the force of Persia

might have failed to accomplish; the combined Ionian fleet was totally

defeated in the battle of Lade; and soon after Miletus herself fell.

The bulk of her inhabitants were transported into inner Asia and settled

upon the Persian Gulf. The whole Ionian coast was ravaged, and the

cities punished by the loss of their most beautiful maidens and youths.

The islands off the coast were swept of their inhabitants. The cities on

the Hellespont and Sea of Marmora were burnt. Miltiades barely escaped

from the Chersonese with the loss of his son and his kingdom. The flames

of rebellion were everywhere ruthlessly trampled out; and the power

of the Great King was once more firmly established over the coasts and

islands of the Propontis and the Egean Sea.

It remained, however, to take vengeance upon the foreigners who had

dared to lend their aid to the king’s revolted subjects, and had borne

a part in the burning of Sardis. The pride of the Persians felt such

interference as an insult of the grossest kind: and the tale may well be

true that Darius, from the time that he first heard the news, employed

an officer to bid him daily “remember Athens.” The schemes which he had

formerly entertained with respect to the reduction of Greece recurred

with fresh force to his mind; and the task of crushing the revolt was no

sooner completed than he proceeded to attempt their execution.

Selecting Mardonius, son of Gobryas the conspirator, and one of his

own sons-in-law, for general, he gave him the command of a powerful

expedition, which was to advance by way of Thrace, Macedonia, and

Thessaly, against Eretria and Athens. At the same time, with a wisdom

which we should scarcely have expected in an Oriental, he commissioned

him, ere he quitted Asia, to depose the tyrants who bore rule in the

Greek cities, and to allow the establishment of democracies in their

stead. Such a measure was excellently calculated to preserve the

fidelity of the Hellenic population and to prevent any renewal of

disturbance. It gave ample employment to unquiet spirits by opening to

them a career in their own states--and it removed the grievance which,

more than anything else, had produced the recent rebellion.

Mardonius having effected this change proceeded into Europe. He had a

large land force and a powerful navy, and at first was successful both

by land and sea. The fleet took Thasos, an island valuable for its

mines; and the army forced the Macedonians to exchange their position

of semi-independence for that of full Persian subjects, liable to both

tribute and military service. But this fair dawn was soon overcast. As

the fleet was rounding Athos a terrible tempest arose which, destroyed

300 triremes and more than 20,000 men, some of whom were devoured by

sea-monsters, while the remainder perished by drowning. On shore,

a night attack of the Brygi, a Thracian tribe dwelling in the tract

between the Strymon and the Axius, brought disaster upon the land force,

numbers of which were slain, while Mardonius himself received a wound.

This disgrace, indeed, was retrieved by subsequent operations, which

forced the Brygi to make their submission; but the expedition found

itself in no condition to advance further, and Mardonius retreated into

Asia.

Darius, however, did not allow failure to turn him from his purpose.

The attack of Mardonius was followed within two years by the well-known

expedition under Datis (B.C. 490), which, avoiding the dangers of Athos,

sailed direct to its object, crossing the Egean by the line of the

Cyclades, and falling upon Eretria and Attica. Eretria’s punishment

warned the Athenians to resist to the uttermost; and the skill of

Miltiades, backed by the valor of his countrymen, gave to Athens the

great victory of Marathon. Datis fell back upon Asia, having suffered

worse disasters than his predecessor, and bore to the king the

melancholy tidings that his vast force of from 100,000 to 200,000 men

had been met and worsted by 20,000 Athenians and Plataeans.

Still Darius was not shaken in his resolution. He only issued fresh

orders for the collection of men, ships, and materials. For three years

Asia resounded with the din of preparation; and it is probable that in

the fourth year a fresh expedition would have been led into Greece, had

not an important occurrence prevented it. Egypt, always discontented

with its subject position under a race which despised its religion, and

perhaps occasionally persecuted it, broke out into open revolt (B.C.

487). Darius, it seems, determined to divide his forces, and proceed

simultaneously against both enemies; he even contemplated leading one

of the two expeditions in person; but before his preparations were

completed his vital powers failed. He died in the year following the

Egyptian revolt (B.C. 486), in the sixty-third year of his age, and

the thirty-sixth of his reign, leaving his crown to his eldest son by

Atossa, Xerxes.

The character of Darius will have revealed itself with tolerable

clearness in the sketch which has been here given of the chief events

of his reign. But a brief summary of some of its main points may not be

superfluous. Darius Hystaspis was, next to Cyrus, the greatest of the

Persian kings; and he was even superior to Cyrus in some particulars.

His military talent has been underrated. Though not equal to the founder

of the Empire in this respect, he deserves the credit of energy, vigor,

foresight, and judicious management in his military expeditions, of

promptness in resolving and ability in executing, of discrimination in

the selection of generals, and of a power of combination not often found

in Oriental commanders. He was personally brave, and quite willing to

expose himself, even in his old age, to dangers and hardships. But

he did not unnecessarily thrust himself into peril. He was content to

employ generals, where the task to be accomplished did not seem to be

beyond their powers; and he appears to have been quite free from an

unworthy jealousy of their successes. He was a man of kindly and warm

feeling--strongly attached to his friends; he was clement and even

generous towards conquered foes. When he thought the occasion required

it, he could be severe but his inclination was towards mildness and

indulgence. He excelled all the other Persian kings in the arts of

peace. To him, and him alone, the Empire owed its organization. He was

a skilful administrator, a good financier, and a wise and far-seeing

ruler. Of all the Persian princes he is the only one who can be called

“many-sided.” He was organizer, general, statesman, administrator,

builder, patron of arts and literature, all in one. Without him Persia

would probably have sunk as rapidly as she rose, and would be known to

us only as one of the many meteor powers which have shot athwart the

horizon of the East.

Xerxes, the eldest son of Darius by Atossa, succeeded his father by

virtue of a formal act of choice. It was a Persian custom that the king,

before he went out of his dominions on an expedition, should nominate a

successor. Darius must have done this before his campaign in Thrace

and Scythia; and if Xerxes was then, as is probable, a mere boy, it is

impossible that he should have received the appointment. Artobazanes,

the eldest of all Darius’s sons, whose mother, a daughter of Gobryas,

was married to Darius before he became king, was most likely then

nominated, and was thenceforth regarded as the heir-apparent. When,

however, towards the close of his reign Darius again proposed to head

a foreign expedition, an opportunity occurred of disturbing this

arrangement, of which Atossa, Darius’s favorite wife, whose influence

over her husband was unbounded, determined to take advantage. According

to the law, a fresh signification of the sovereign’s will was now

requisite; and Atossa persuaded Darius to make it in favor of Xerxes.

The pleas put forward were, first, that he was the eldest son of the

king, and secondly, that he was descended from Cyrus. This latter

argument could not fail to have weight. Backed by the influence of

Atossa, it prevailed over all other considerations; and hence Xerxes

obtained the throne.

If we may trust the informants of Herodotus, it was the wish of Xerxes

on his accession to discontinue the preparations against Greece, and

confine his efforts to the re-conquest of Egypt. Though not devoid of

ambition, he may well have been distrustful of his own powers; and,

having been nurtured in luxury, he may have shrunk from the perils of a

campaign in unknown regions. But he was surrounded by advisers who had

interests opposed to his inclinations, and who worked on his facile

temper till they prevailed on him to take that course which seemed best

calculated to promote their designs. Mardonius was anxious to retrieve

his former failure, and expected, if Greece were conquered, that the

rich prize would become his own satrapy. The refugee princes of the

family of Pisistratus hoped to be reinstated under Persian influence as

dependent despots of Athens. Demaratus of Sparta probably cherished

a similar expectation with regard to that capital. The Persian nobles

generally, who profited by the spoils of war, and who were still full of

the military spirit, looked forward with pleasure to an expedition

from which they anticipated victory, plunder, and thousands of valuable

captives. The youthful king was soon persuaded that the example of his

predecessors required him to undertake some fresh conquest, while the

honor of Persia absolutely demanded that the wrongs inflicted upon her

by Athens should be avenged. Before, however, turning his arms against

Greece, two revolts required his attention. In the year B.C. 485--the

second of his reign--he marched into Egypt, which he rapidly reduced to

obedience and punished by increasing its burthens. Soon afterwards he

seems to have provoked a rebellion of the Babylonians by acts which they

regarded as impious, and avenged by killing their satrap, Zopyrus, and

proclaiming their independence. Megabyzus, the son of Zopyrus, recovered

the city, which was punished by the plunder and ruin of its famous

temple and the desolation of many of its shrines.

Xerxes was now free to bend all his efforts against Greece, and,

appreciating apparently to the full the magnitude and difficulty of the

task, resolved that nothing should be left undone which could possibly

be done in order to render success certain. The experience of former

years had taught some important lessons. The failure of Datis had proved

that such an expedition as could be conveyed by sea across the Egean

would be insufficient to secure the object sought, and that the only

safe road for a conqueror whose land force constituted his real strength

was along the shores of the European continent. But if a large army

took this long and circuitous route, it must be supported by a powerful

fleet; and this involved a new danger. The losses of Mardonius off Athos

had shown the perils of Egean navigation, and taught the lesson that the

naval force must be at first far more than proportionate to the needs

of the army, in order that it might still be sufficient notwithstanding

some considerable disasters. At the same time they had indicated one

special place of danger, which might be avoided, if proper measures

were taken. Xerxes, in the four years which followed on the reduction of

Egypt, continued incessantly to make the most gigantic preparations

for his intended attack upon Greece, and among them included all the

precautions which a wise foresight could devise in order to ward off

every conceivable peril. A general order was issued to all the satraps

throughout the Empire, calling on them to levy the utmost force of their

province for the new war; while, as the equipment of Oriental troops

depends greatly on the purchase and distribution of arms by their

commander, a rich reward was promised to the satrap whose contingent

should appear at the appointed place and time in the most gallant array.

Orders for ships and transports of different kinds were given to the

maritime states, with such effect that above 1200 triremes and 3000

vessels of an inferior description were collected together. Magazines

of corn were formed at various points along the intended line of route.

Above all, it was determined to bridge the Hellespont by a firm and

compact structure, which it was thought would secure the communication

of the army from interruption by the elements; and at the same time it

was resolved to cut through the isthmus which joined Mount Athos to the

continent, in order to preserve the fleet from disaster at that most

perilous part of the proposed voyage. These remarkable works, which made

a deep impression on the minds of the Greeks, have been ascribed to

a mere spirit of ostentation on the part of Xerxes; the vain-glorious

monarch wished, it is supposed, to parade his power, and made a useless

bridge and an absurd cutting merely for the purpose of exhibiting to

the world the grandeur of his ideas and the extent of his resources. But

there is no necessity for travelling beyond the line of ordinary human

motive in order to discover a reason for the works in question. The

bridge across the Hellespont was a mere repetition of the construction

by which Darius had passed into Europe when he made his Scythian

expedition, and probably seemed to a Persian not a specially dignified

or very wonderful way of crossing so narrow a strait, but merely the

natural mode of passage. The only respect in which the bridge of Xerxes

differed from constructions with which the Persians were thoroughly

familiar, was in its superior solidity and strength. The shore-cables

were of unusual size and weight, and apparently of unusual materials;

the formation of a double line--of two bridges, in fact, instead of

one--was almost without a parallel; and the completion of the work by

laying on the ordinary plank-bridge a solid causeway composed of earth

and brushwood, with a high bulwark on either side, was probably, if not

unprecedented, at any rate very uncommon. Boat-bridges were usually,

as they are even now in the East, somewhat rickety constructions, which

animals unaccustomed to them could with difficulty be induced to cross.

The bridge of Xerxes was a high-road, as AEschylus calls it along, which

men, horses, and vehicles might pass with as much comfort and facility

as they could move on shore.

The utility of such a work is evident. Without it Xerxes must have been

reduced to the necessity of embarking in ships, conveying across the

strait, and disembarking, not only his entire host, but all its stores,

tents, baggage, horses, camels, and sumpter-beasts. If the numbers of

his army approached even the lowest estimate that has been formed of

them, it is not too much to say that many weeks must have been spent in

this operation. As it was, the whole expedition marched across in seven

days. In the case of ship conveyance, continual accidents would have

happened: the transport would from time to time have been interrupted by

bad weather; and great catastrophes might have occurred. By means of the

bridge the passage was probably effected without any loss of either man

or beast. Moreover, the bridge once established, there was a safe

line of communication thenceforth between the army in Europe and the

headquarters of the Persian power in Asia, along which might pass

couriers, supplies, and reinforcements, if they should be needed.

Further, the grandeur, massiveness, and apparent stability of the work

was calculated to impose upon the minds of men, and to diminish their

power of resistance by impressing them strongly with a sense of the

irresistible greatness and strength of the invader.

The canal of Athos was also quite a legitimate and judicious

undertaking. [PLATE LXI.] No portion of the Greek coast is so dangerous

as that about Athos. Greek boatmen even at the present day refuse to

attempt the circumnavigation; and probably any government less apathetic

than that of the Turks would at once re-open the old cutting. The work

was one of very little difficulty, the breadth of the isthmus being less

than a mile and a half, the material sand and marl, and the greatest

height of the natural ground above the level of the sea about fifty

feet. The construction of a canal in such a locality was certainly

better than the formation of a ship-groove or Diolcus--the substitute

for it proposed by Ferodotus, [PLATE LXI.] not to mention that it is

doubtful whether at the time that this cutting was made ship-grooves

were known even to the Greeks.

[Illustration: PLATE LXI.]

Xerxes, having brought his preparations into a state of forwardness,

having completed his canal and his bridge--after one failure with the

latter, for which the constructors and the sea were punished--proceeded,

in the year B.C. 481, along the “Royal Road” from Susa to Sardis, and

wintered at the Lydian capital. His army is said to have accompanied

him; but more probably it joined him in the spring, flocking in,

contingent after contingent, from the various provinces of his vast

Empire. Forty-nine nations, according to Herodotus, served under his

standard; and their contingents made up a grand total of eighteen

hundred thousand men. Of these, eighty thousand were cavalry, while

twenty thousand rode in chariots or on camels; the remainder served on

foot. There are no sufficient means of testing these numbers. Figures

in the mouth of an Oriental are vague and almost unmeaning; armies are

never really counted: there is no such thing as a fixed and definite

“strength” of a division or a battalion. Herodotus tells us that a rough

attempt at numbering the infantry of the host was made on this occasion;

but it was of so rude and primitive a description that little dependence

can be placed on the results obtained by it. Ten thousand men were

counted, and were made to stand close together; a line was then drawn

round them, and a wall built on the line to the height of a man’s waist;

within the enclosure thus made all the troops in turn entered, and each

time that the enclosure appeared to be full, ten thousand were supposed

to be within it. Estimated in this way, the infantry was regarded as

amounting to 1,700,000. It is clear that such mode of counting was of

the roughest kind, and might lead to gross exaggeration. Each commander

would wish his troops to be thought more numerous than they really were,

and would cause the enclosure to appear full when several thousands

more might still have found room within it. Nevertheless there would be

limits beyond which exaggeration could not go; and if Xerxes was made to

believe that the land force which he took with him into Europe amounted

to nearly two millions of men, it is scarcely doubtful but that it must

have exceeded one million.

The motley composition of such a host has been described in a former

chapter. Each nation was armed and equipped after its own fashion, and

served in a body, often under a distinct commander. The army marched

through Asia in a single column, which was not, however, continuous,

but was broken into three portions. The first portion consisted of the

baggage animals and about half of the contingents of the nations; the

second was composed wholly of native Persians, who preceded and followed

the emblems of religion and the king; the third was made up of the

remaining national contingents. The king himself rode alternately in

a chariot and in a litter. He was preceded immediately by ten sacred

horses, and a sacred chariot drawn by eight milk-white steeds. Round

him and about him were the choicest troops of the whole army, twelve

thousand horse and the same number of foot, all Persians, and those too

not taken at random, but selected carefully from the whole mass of the

native soldiery. Among them seem to have been the famous “Immortals”--a

picked body of 10,000 footmen, always maintained at exactly the same

number, and thence deriving their appellation.

The line of march from Sardis to Abydos was only partially along the

shore. The army probably descended the valley of the Hermus nearly to

its mouth, and then struck northward into the Caicus vale, crossing

which it held on its way, with Mount Kara-dagh (Cane) on the left,

across the Atarnean plain, and along the coast to Adramytium (Adramyti)

and Antandros, whence it again struck inland, and, crossing the ridge

of Ida, descended into the valley of the Scamander. Some losses were

incurred from the effects of a violent thunderstorm amid the mountains;

but they cannot have been of a any great consequence. On reaching the

Scamander the army found its first difficulty with respect to water.

That stream was probably low, and the vast host of men and animals

were unable to obtain from it a supply sufficient for their wants. This

phenomenon, we are told, frequently recurred afterwards; it surprises

the English reader, but is not really astonishing, since, in hot

countries, even considerable streams are often reduced to mere threads

of water during the summer.

Rounding the hills which skirt the Scamander valley upon the east, the

army marched past Rhoeteum, Ophrynium, and Dardanus to Abydos. Here

Xerxes, seated upon a marble throne, which the people of Abydos had

erected for him on the summit of a hill, was able to see at one glance

his whole, armament, and to feast his eyes with the sight. It is not

likely that any misgivings occurred to him at such a moment. Before him

lay his vast host, covering with its dense masses the entire low ground

between the hills and the sea; beyond was the strait, and to his left

the open sea, white with the sails of four thousand ships; the green

fields of the Chersonese smiled invitingly a little further on; while,

between him and the opposite shore, the long lines of his bridges lay

darkling upon the sea, like a yoke placed upon the neck of a captive.

Having seen all, the king gave his special attention to the fleet, which

he now perhaps beheld in all its magnitude for the first time. Desirous

of knowing which of his subjects were the best sailors, he gave orders

for a sailing-match, which were at once carried out. The palm was borne

off by the Phoenicians of Sidon, who must have beaten not only their own

countrymen of Tyre, but the Greeks of Asia and the islands.

On the next day the passage took place. It was accompanied by religious

ceremonies. Waiting for the sacred hour of sunrise, the leader of the

host, as the first rays appeared, poured a libation from a golden goblet

into the sea, and prayed to Mithra that he might effect the conquest of

Europe. As he prayed he cast into the sea the golden goblet, and with it

a golden bowl and a short Persian sword. Meanwhile the multitude strewed

all the bridge with myrtle boughs, and perfumed it with clouds of

incense. The “Immortals” crossed first, wearing garlands on their

heads. The king, with the sacred chariot and horses passed over on the

second day. For seven days and seven nights the human stream flowed

on without intermission across one bridge, while the attendants and the

baggage-train made use of the other. The lash was employed to quicken

the movements of laggards. At last the whole army was in Europe, and the

march resumed its regularity.

It is unnecessary to follow in detail the advance of the host along the

coast of Thrace, across Chalcidice, and round the Thermaic Gulf into

Pieria. If we except the counting of the fleet and army at Doriscus no

circumstances of much interest diversified this portion of the march,

which lay entirely through territories that had previously submitted

to the Great King. The army spread itself over a wide tract of country,

marching generally in three divisions, which proceeded by three parallel

lines--one along the coast, another at some considerable distance

inland, and a third, with which was Xerxes himself, midway between them.

At every place where Xerxes stopped along his line of route the natives

had, besides furnishing corn for his army, to entertain him and his

suite at a great banquet, the cost of which was felt as a heavy burthen.

Contributions of troops or ships were also required from all the cities

and tribes; and thus both fleet and army continually swelled as they

advanced onward. In crossing the track between the Strymon and the Axius

some damage was suffered by the baggage-train from lions, which came

down from the mountains during the night and devoured many of the

camels; but otherwise the march was effected without loss, and the fleet

and army reached the borders of Thessaly intact, and in good condition.

Here it was found that there was work for the pioneers, and a

reconnaissance of the enemy’s country before entering it was probably

also thought desirable. The army accordingly halted some days in Pieria,

while preparations were being made for crossing the Olympic range into

the Thessalian lowland.

During the halt intelligence arrived which seemed to promise the invader

an easy conquest. Xerxes, while he was staying at Sardis, had sent

heralds to all the Grecian states, excepting Athens and Sparta, with a

demand for earth and water, the recognized symbols of submission. His

envoys now returned, and brought him favorable replies from at least

one-third of the continental Greeks--from the Perrhaebians, Thessalians,

Dolopians, Magnetians, Achaeans of Phthiotis, Enianians, Malians,

Locrians, and from most of the Boeotians. Unless it were the

insignificant Phocis, no hostile country seemed to intervene between the

place where his army lay and the great object of the expedition, Attica.

Xerxes, therefore, having first viewed the pass of Tempe, and seen with

his own eyes that no enemy lay encamped beyond, passed over the Olympic

range by a road cut through the woods by his army, and proceeded

southwards across Thessaly and Achaea Phthiotis into Malis, the fertile

plain at the mouth of the Spercheius river. Here, having heard that a

Greek force was in the neighborhood, he pitched his camp not far from

the small town of Trachis.

Thus far had the Greeks allowed the invader to penetrate their country

without offering him any resistance. Originally there had been an

intention of defending Thessaly, and an army under Evsenetus, a Spartan

polemarch, and Themistocles, the great Athenian, had proceeded to Tempe,

in order to cooperate with the Thessalians in guarding the pass. But the

discovery that the Olympic range could be crossed in the,place where

the army of Xerxes afterwards passed it had shown that the position was

untenable; and it had been then resolved that the stand should be

made at the next defensible position, Thermopylae. [PLATE LXII.] Here,

accordingly, a force was found--small, indeed, if it be compared with

the number of the assailants, but sufficient to defend such a position

as that where it was posted against the world in arms. Three hundred

Spartans, with their usual retinue of helots, 700 Lacedaemonians, other

Peloponnesians to the number of 2800, 1000 Phocians, the same number

of Locrians, 700 Thespians, and 400 Thebans, formed an army of 9000

men--quite as numerous a force as could be employed with any effect in

the defile they were sent to guard. The defile was a long and narrow

pass shut in between a high mountain, Callidromus, and the sea, and

crossed at one point by a line of wall in which was a single gateway.

Unless the command of the sea were gained, or another mode of crossing

the mountains discovered, the pass could scarcely be forced.

[Illustration: PLATE LXII.]

Xerxes, however, confident in his numbers--after waiting four days at

Trachis, probably in the hope that his fleet would join him--proceeded

on the fifth day to the assault. First the Medes and Cissians, then

the famous “Immortals” were sent into the jaws of the pass against the

immovable foe; but neither detachment could make any impression. The

long spears, large shields, and heavy armor of the Greeks, their skilful

tactics, and steady array, were far more than a match for the inferior

equipments and discipline of the Asiatics. Though the attack was made

with great gallantry, both on this day and the next, it failed to

produce the slightest effect. Very few of the Greeks were either slain

or wounded; and it seemed as if the further advance of a million of men

was to be stopped by a force less than a hundredth part of their number.

But now information reached Xerxes which completely changed the face

of affairs. There was a rough mountain-path leading from Trachis up

the gorge of the Asopus and across Callidromus to the rear of the Greek

position, which had been unknown to the Greeks when they decided on

making their first stand at Thermopylae, and which they only discovered

when their plans no longer admitted of alteration. It was, perhaps,

not much more than a goat-track, and apparently they had regarded it as

scarcely practicable, since they had thought its defence might be safely

entrusted to a thousand Phocians. Xerxes, however, on learning the

existence of the track, resolved at once to make trial of it. His

Persian soldiers were excellent mountaineers. He ordered Hydarnes to

take the “Immortals,” and, guided by a native, to proceed along the path

by night, and descend with early dawn into the rear of the Greeks, who

would then be placed between two fires. The operation was performed with

complete success. The Phocian guard, surprised at the summit, left the

path free while they sought a place of safety. The Greeks in the pass

below, warned during the night of their danger, in part fled, in part

resolved on death. When morning came, Leonidas, at the head of about

half his original army, moved forward towards the Malian plain, and

there met the advancing Persians. A bloody combat ensued, in which the

Persians lost by far the greater number; but the ranks of the Greeks

were gradually thinned, and they were beaten back step by step into the

narrowest part of the pass, where finally they all perished, except the

four hundred Thebans, who submitted and were made prisoners.

So terminated the first struggle on the soil of Greece, between the

invaders and the invaded. It seemed to promise that, though at vast

cost, Persia would be victorious. If her loss in the three days’ combat

was 20,000 men, as Herodotus states, yet, as that of her enemy was 4000,

the proportionate advantage was on her side.

But, for the conquest of such a country as Greece, it was requisite, not

only that the invader should succeed on land, but also that he should be

superior at sea. Xerxes had felt this, and had brought with him a fleet,

calculated, as he imagined, to sweep the Greek navy from the Egean. As

far as the Pagasaean Gulf, opposite the northern extremity of Euboea,

his fleet had advanced without meeting an enemy. It had encountered one

terrible storm off the coast of Magnesia, and had lost 400 vessels; but

this loss was scarcely felt in so vast an armament. When from Aphetse,

at the mouth of the gulf, the small Greek fleet, amounting to no more

than 271 vessels, was seen at anchor off Artemisium, the only fear which

the Persian commanders entertained was lest it should escape them. They

at once detached 200 vessels to sail round the Coast coast of Euboea,

and cut off the possibility of retreat. When, however, these vessels

were all lost in a storm, and when in three engagements on three

successive days, the Greek fleet showed itself fully able to contend

against the superior numbers of its antagonist, the Persians themselves

could not fail to see that their naval supremacy was more than doubtful.

The fleet at Artemisium was not the entire Greek naval force; on another

occasion it might be augumented, while their own could scarcely expect

to receive reinforcements. The fights at Artemisium foreshadowed a day

when the rival fleets would no longer meet and part on equal terms, but

Persia would have to acknowledge herself inferior.

Meanwhile, however, the balance of advantage rested with the invaders.

The key of Northern Greece was won, and Phocis, Locris, Boeotia, Attica,

and the Megarid lay open to the Persian army. The Greek fleet could gain

nothing by any longer maintaining the position of Artemisium, and fell

back towards the south, while its leaders anxiously considered where it

should next take up its station. The Persians pressed on both by land

and sea. A rapid march through Phocis and Boeotia brought Xerxes to

Athens, soon after the Athenians, knowing that resistance would be vain,

had evacuated it. The Acropolis, defended by a few fanatics, was taken

and burnt. One object of the expedition was thus accomplished. Athens

lay in ruins; and the whole of Attica was occupied by the conqueror.

The Persian fleet, too, finding the channel of the Euripus clear, sailed

down it, and rounding Sunium, came to anchor in the bay of Phalerum.

In the councils of the Greeks all was doubt and irresolution. The

army, which ought to have mustered in full force at Thermopylae and

Callidromus, and which, after those passes were forced, might have

defended Cithseron and Parnes, had never ventured beyond the Isthmus

of Corinth, and was there engaged in building a wall across the neck of

land from sea to sea. The fleet lay off Salamis, where it was detained

by the entreaties of the Athenians, who had placed in that island the

greater part of the non-combatant population; but the inclination was

strong on the part of many to withdraw westward and fight the next

battle, if a battle must be fought, in the vicinity of the land force,

which would be a protection in case of defeat. Could Xerxes have had

patience for a few days, the combined fleet would have broken up. The

Peloponnesian contingents would have withdrawn to the isthmus; and the

Athenians, despairing of success, would probably have sailed away to

Italy. But the Great King, when he saw the vast disproportion

between his own fleet and that of the enemy, could not believe in the

possibility of the Greeks offering a successful resistance. Like a

modern emperor, who imagined that, if only he could have been with his

fleet, all would necessarily have gone well, Xerxes supposed that by

having the sea-fight under his own eye he would be sure of victory. Thus

again, as at Artemisium, the only fear felt was lest the Greeks should

fly, and in that way escape chastisement. Orders were therefore issued

to the Persian fleet to close up at once, and blockade the eastern end

of the Salaminian strait, while a detachment repeated the attempted

manoeuvre at Euboea, and sailed round the island to guard the channel at

its western outlet.

These movements were executed late in the day on which the Persian

fleet arrived at Phalerum. During the night intelligence reached the

commanders that the retreat of the Greeks was about to commence at once;

whereupon the Persian right wing was pushed forward into the strait,

and carried beyond the Greek position so as to fill the channel where

it opens into the bay of Eleusis. The remainder of the night passed

in preparations for the battle on both sides. At daybreak both fleets

advanced from their respective shores, the Persians being rather the

assailants. Their thousand vessels were drawn up in three lines, and

charged their antagonists with such spirit that the general inclination

on the part of the Greeks was at first to retreat. Some of their ships

had almost touched the shore, when the bold example of one of the

captains, or a cry of reproach from unknown lips, produced a revulsion

of feeling, and the whole line advanced in good order. The battle was

for a short time doubtful; but soon the superiority of Greek naval

tactics began to tell. The Persian vessels became entangled one with

another, and crashing together broke each other’s oars. The triple

line increased their difficulties. If a vessel, overmatched, sought to

retreat, it necessarily came into collision with the ships stationed

in its rear. These moreover pressed too eagerly forward, since their

captains were anxious to distinguish themselves in order to merit the

approval of Xerxes. The Greeks found themselves able to practice

with good effect their favorite manoeuvre of the _periplus_, and thus

increased the confusion. It was not long before the greater part of

the Persian fleet became a mere helpless mass of shattered or damaged

vessels. Five hundred are said to have been sunk--the majority by the

enemy, but some even by their own friends. The sea was covered with

wrecks, and with wretches who clung to them, till the ruthless enemy

slew them or forced them to let go their hold.

This defeat was a death-blow to the hopes of Xerxes, and sealed the fate

of the expedition. From the moment that he realized to himself the fact

of the entire inability of his fleet to cope with that of the Greeks,

Xerxes made up his mind to return with all haste to Asia. From

over-confidence he fell into the opposite extreme of despair, and made

no effort to retrieve his ill fortune. His fleet was ordered to sail

straight for the Hellespont, and to guard the bridges until he reached

them with his army. He himself retreated hastily along the same road

by which he had advanced, his whole army accompanying him as far as

Thessaly, where Marnonius was left with 260,000 picked men, to prevent

pursuit, and to renew the attempt against Greece in the ensuing year.

Xerxes pressed on to the Hellespont, losing vast numbers of his troops

by famine and sickness on the way, and finally returned into Asia, not

by his magnificent bridge, which a storm had destroyed, but on board a

vessel, which, according to some, narrowly escaped shipwreck during the

passage. Even in Asia disaster pursued him. Between Abydos and Sardis

his army suffered almost as much from over-indulgence as it had

previously suffered from want; and of the mighty host which had gone

forth from the Lydian capital in the spring not very many thousands can

have re-entered it in the autumn.

Still, however, there was a possibility that the success which his

own arms had failed to achieve might reward the exertions of his

lieutenants. Mardonius had expressed himself confident that with 300,000

picked soldiers he could overpower all resistance, and make Greece

a satrapy of Persia. Xerxes had raised his forces to that amount by

sending Artabazus back from Sestos at the head of a _corps d’armee_

numbering 40,000 men. The whole army of 300,000 wintered in Thessaly;

and Mardonius, when spring came, having vainly endeavored to detach the

Athenians from the Grecian ranks, marched through Boeotia in Attica, and

occupied Athens for the second time. Hence he proceeded to menace the

Peloponnese, where he formed an alliance with the Argives, who promised

him that they would openly embrace the Persian cause. At the same time

the Athenians, finding that Sparta took no steps to help them, began to

waver in their resistance, and to contemplate accepting the terms which

Mardonius was still willing to grant them. The fate of Greece trembled

in the balance, and apparently was determined by the accident of a death

and a succession, rather than by any wide-spread patriotic feeling or

any settled course of policy. Cleombrotus, regent for the young son

of Leonidas, died, and his brother Pausanias--a brave, clever, and

ambitious man--took his place. We can scarcely be wrong in ascribing--at

least in part--to this circumstance the unlooked-for change of policy,

which electrified the despondent ambassadors of Athens almost as soon as

Pausanias was installed in power. It was suddenly announced that

Sparta would take the offensive. Ten thousand hoplites and 400,000

light-armed--the largest army that she ever levied--took the field,

and, joined at the isthmus by above 25,000 Peloponnesians, and soon

afterwards by almost as many Athenians and Megarians, proceeded to seek

the foreigners, first in Attica, and then in the position to which they

had retired in Boeotia. On the skirts of Citheeron, near Platsea, a

hundred and eight thousand Greeks confronted more than thrice their

number of Persians and Persian subjects; and now at length the trial

was to be made whether, in fair and open fight on land, Greece or Persia

would be superior. A suspicion of what the result would be might have

been derived from Marathon. But there the Persians had been taken at a

disadvantage, when the cavalry, their most important arm, was absent.

Here the error of Datis was not likely to be repeated. Mardonius had a

numerous and well-armed cavalry, which he handled with no little skill.

It remained to be seen, when the general engagement came, whether, with

both arms brought fully into play, the vanquished at Marathon would be

the victors.

The battle of Plataea was brought on under circumstances very

unfavorable to the Greeks. Want of water and a difficulty about

provisions had necessitated a night movement on their part. The

cowardice of all the small contingents, and the obstinacy of an

individual Spartan, disconcerted the whole plan of the operation, and

left the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians at daybreak separated from

each other, and deserted by the whole body of their allies. Mardonius

attacked at once, and prevented the junction of the two allies, so that

two distinct and separate engagements went on at the same time. In both

the Greeks were victorious. The Spartans repulsed the Persian horse and

foot, slew Mardonius and were the first to assail the Persian camp. The

Athenians defeated the _medizing_ Greeks, and effected a breach in

the defences of the camp, on which the Spartans had failed to make any

impression. A terrible carnage followed. The contingent of 40,000 troops

under Artabazus alone drew off in good order.

The remainder were seized with panic, and were either slaughtered like

sheep or fled in complete disarray. Seventy thousand Greeks not only

defeated but destroyed the army of 300,000 barbarians, which melted

away and disappeared making no further stand anywhere. The disaster of

Marathon was repeated on a larger scale, and without the resource of

an embarkation. Henceforth the immense superiority of Greek troops to

Persian was well known on both sides; and nothing but the distance from

Greece of her vital parts, and the quarrels of the Greek states among

themselves, preserved for nearly a century and a half the doomed empire

of Persia.

The immediate result of the defeats of Salamis and Platsea was a

contraction of the Persian boundary towards the west. Though a few

Persian garrisons maintained themselves for some years on the further

side of the straits, soothing thereby the wounded vanity of the Great

King, who liked to think that he had still a hold on Europe; yet there

can be no doubt that, after the double flight of Xerxes and Artabazus,

Macedonia, Pseonia, and Thrace recovered their independence. Persia lost

her European provinces, and began the struggle to retain those of Asia.

Terminus receded, and having once receded never advanced again in this

quarter. The Greeks took the offensive. Sailing to Asia, they not only

liberated from their Persian bondage the islands which lay along the

coast, but landing their men on the continent, attacked and defeated

an army of 60,000 Persians at Mycale, and destroyed the remnant of the

ships that had escaped from Salamis. Could they have made up their minds

to maintain a powerful fleet permanently on the coast of Asia, they

might at once have deprived Persia of her whole sea-hoard on the

Propontis and the Egean; but neither of the two great powers of Greece

was prepared for such a resolve. Sparta disliked distant expeditions;

and Athens did not as yet see her way to undertaking the protection

of the continental Greeks. She had much to do at home, and had not

yet discovered those weak points in her adversary’s harness, which

subsequently enabled her to secure by treaty the freedom of the Greek

cities upon the mainland. For the present, therefore, Persia only lost

the bulk of her European possessions, and the islands of the Propontis

and the Egean.

The circumstances which caused a renewal of Greek agressions upon Asia

towards the close of the reign of Xerxes are not very clearly narrated

by the authors who speak of them. It appears, however, that after twelve

years of petty operations, during which Eion was recovered, and Doriscus

frequently attacked, but without effect, the Athenians resolved, in B.C.

466, upon a great expedition to the eastward. Collecting a fleet of

300 vessels, which was placed under the command of Cimon, the son of

Miltiades, they sailed to the coast of Caria and Lycia, where they drove

the Persian garrisons out of the Greek towns, and augmenting their

navy by fresh contingents at every step, proceeded along the shores of

Pamphylia as far as the mouth of the river Eurymedon, where they found

a Phoenician fleet of 340 vessels, and a Persian army, stationed to

protect the territory. Engaging first the fleet they defeated it, and

drove it ashore, after which they disembarked and gained a victory

over the Persian army. As many as two hundred triremes were taken

or destroyed. They then sailed on towards Cyprus, where they met and

destroyed a squadron of eighty ships, which was on its way to reinforce

the fleet at the Eurymedon. Above a hundred vessels, 20,000 captives,

and a vast amount of plunder were the prize of this war; which had,

however, no further effect on the relations of the two powers.

In the following year the reign of Xerxes came to an end abruptly.

With this monarch seems to have begun those internal disorders of the

seraglio, which made the Court during more than a hundred and forty

years a perpetual scene of intrigues, assassinations, executions, and

conspiracies. Xerxes, who appears to have only one wife, Amestris,

the daughter (or grand-daughter) of the conspirator, Otanes, permitted

himself the free indulgence of illicit passion among the princesses

of the Court, the wives of his own near relatives. The most horrible

results followed. Amestris vented her jealous spite on those whom she

regarded as guilty of stealing from her the affections of her husband;

and to prevent her barbarities from producing rebellion, it was

necessary to execute the persons whom she had provoked, albeit they were

near relations of the monarch. The taint of incontinence spread among

the members of the royal family; and a daughter of the king, who was

married to one of the most powerful nobles, became notorious for

her excesses. Eunuchs rose into power, and fomented the evils which

prevailed. The king made himself bitter enemies among those whose

position was close to his person. At last, Artabanus, chief of the

guard, a courtier of high rank, and Aspamitres, a eunuch, who held the

office of chamberlain, conspired against their master, and murdered him

in his sleeping apartment, after he had reigned twenty years.

The character of Xerxes falls below that of any preceding monarch.

Excepting that he was not wholly devoid of a certain magnanimity, which

made him listen patiently to those who opposed his views or gave him

unpalatable advice and which prevented him from exacting vengeance on

some occasions, he had scarcely a trait whereon the mind can rest with

any satisfaction. Weak and easily led, puerile in his gusts of passion

and his complete abandonment of himself to them--selfish, fickle,

boastful, cruel, superstitious, licentious--he exhibits to us the

Oriental despot in the most contemptible of all his aspects--that

wherein the moral and the intellectual qualities are equally in defect,

and the career is one unvarying course of vice and folly. From Xerxes we

have to date at once the decline of the Empire in respect of territorial

greatness and military strength, and likewise its deterioration in

regard to administrative vigor and national spirit. With him commenced

the corruption of the Court--the fatal evil, which almost universally

weakens and destroys Oriental dynasties. His expedition against Greece

exhausted and depopulated the Empire; and though, by abstaining from

further military enterprises, he did what lay in his power to recruit

its strength, still the losses which his expedition caused were

certainly not repaired in his lifetime.

As a builder, Xerxes showed something of the same grandeur of conception

which is observable in his great military enterprise and in the works by

which it was accompanied. His Propylaea, and the sculptured staircase in

front of the Chebl Minar, which is undoubtedly his work, are among the

most magnificent erections upon the Persepolitan platform; and are quite

sufficient to place him in the foremost rank of Oriental builders. If

we were to ascribe the Chehl Minar itself to him, we should have to give

him the palm above all other kings of Persia; but on the whole it

is most probable that that edifice and its duplicate at Susa were

conceived, and in the main, constructed, by Darius.

Xerxes left behind him three sons--Darius, Hystaspes, and

Artaxerxes--and two daughters, Amytis and Rhodogune. Hystaspes was

satrap of Bactria, and at the time of their father’s death, only Darius

and Artaxerxes were at the Court.

Fearing the eldest son most, Artabanus persuaded Artaxerxes that the

assassination of Xerxes was the act of his brother, whereupon Artaxerxes

caused him to be put to death, and himself ascended the throne (B.C.

465).

Troubles, as usual, accompanied this irregular accession. Artabanus, not

content with exercising an influence under Artaxerxes such as has

caused some authors to speak of him as king, aimed at removing the

young prince, and making himself actual monarch. But his designs being

betrayed to Artaxerxes by Megabyzus, and at the same time his

former crimes coming to light, he was killed, together with his tool

Aspamitres, seven months after the murder of Xerxes. The sons of

Artabanus sought to avenge his death, but were defeated by Megabyzus in

an engagement, wherein they lost their lives.

Meanwhile, in Bactria, Hystaspes, who had a rightful claim to the

throne, raised the standard of revolt. Artaxerxes marched against him

in person, and engaged him in two battles, the first of which was

indecisive, while in the second the Bactrians suffered defeat, chiefly

(according to Ctesias) because the wind blew violently in their faces.

So signal was victory, that Bactria at once submitted. Hystaspes’ fate

is uncertain.

Not long after the reduction of Bactria, Egypt suddenly threw off the

Persian yoke (B.C. 460). Inarus, a king of the wild African tribes who

bordered the Nile valley on the west, but himself perhaps a descendant

of the old monarchs of Egypt, led the insurrection, and, in conjunction

with an Egyptian, named Amyrtseus, attacked the Persian troops stationed

in the country, who were commanded by Achaemenes, the satrap. A battle

was fought near Papremis in the Delta, wherein the Persians were

defeated, and Achaemenes fell by the hand of Inarus himself. The

Egyptians generally now joined in the revolt; and the remnant of the

Persian army was shut up in Memphis. Inarus had asked the aid of Athens;

and an Athenian fleet of 200 sail was sent to his assistance. This fleet

sailed up the Nile, defeated a Persian squadron, and took part in the

capture of Memphis and the siege of its citade (White Castle). When

the Persian king first learned what had happened, he endeavored to rid

himself of his Athenian enemies by inducing the Spartans to invade their

country; but, failing in his attempt, he had recourse to arms, and,

levying a vast host, which he placed under the command of Megabyzus,

sent that officer to recover the revolted province. Megabyzus marched

upon Memphis, defeated the Egyptians and their allies in a great battle,

relieved the citadel of Memphis from its siege, and recovered the rest

of the town. The Athenians fled to the tract called Prosopitis, which

was a a portion of the Delta, completely surrounded by two branch

streams of the Nile. Here they were besieged for eighteen months, till

Megabyzus contrived to turn the water from one of the two streams,

whereby the Athenian ships were stranded, and the Persian troops were

able to march across the river bed, and overwhelm the Athenians with

their numbers. A few only escaped to Cyrene. The entire fleet fell into

the enemy’s hands; and a reinforcement of fifty more ships, arriving

soon after the defeat, was attacked unawares after it had entered the

river, and lost more than half its number. Inarus was betrayed by some

of his own men, and, being carried prisoner to Persia, suffered death by

crucifixion. Amyrtseus fled to the fens, where for a while he maintained

his independence. Egypt, however, was with this exception recovered to

the Empire (B.C. 455); and Athens was taught that she could not always

invade the dominions of the Great King with impunity.

Six years after this, the Athenians resolved on another effort. A fleet

of 200 ships was equipped and placed under the command of the victor

of the Eurymedon, Cimon, with orders to proceed into the Eastern

Mediterranean, and seek to recover the laurels lost in Egypt. Cimon

sailed to Cyprus, where he received a communication from Amyrtseus,

which induced him to dispatch sixty ships to Egypt, while with the

remaining one hundred and forty he commenced the siege of Citium. Here

he died, either of disease or from the effects of a wound; and his

armament, pressed for provisions, was forced soon afterwards to raise

the siege, and address itself to some other enterprise. Sailing past

Salamis, it found there a Cilician and Phoenician fleet, consisting of

300 vessels, which it immediately attacked and defeated, notwithstanding

the disparity of number. Besides the ships which were sunk, a hundred

triremes were taken; and the sailors then landed and gained a victory

over a Persian army upon the shore. Artaxerxes, upon this, fearing lest

he should lose Cyprus altogether, and thinking that, if Athens became

mistress of this important island, she would always be fomenting

insurrection in Egypt, made overtures for peace to the generals who were

now in command. His propositions were favorably received. Peace was made

on the following terms:--Athens agreed to relinquish Cyprus, and recall

her squadron from Egypt; while the king consented to grant freedom to

all the Greek cities on the Asiatic continent, and not to menace them

either by land or water. The sea was divided between the two powers,

Persian ships of war were not to sail to the west of Phaselis in the

Levant, or of the Cyanean islands in the Euxine; and Greek war-ships, we

may assume, were not to show themselves east of those limits. On these

conditions there was to be peace and amity between the Greeks and the

Persians, and neither nation was to undertake any expeditions against

the territories of the other. Thus terminated the first period of

hostility between Greece and Persia, a period of exactly half a century,

commencing B.C. 499 and. ending B.C. 449, in the seventeenth year of

Artaxerxes.

It was probably not many years after the conclusion of this peace that

a rebellion broke out in Syria. Megabyzus, the satrap of that important

province, offended at the execution of Inarus, in violation of the

promise which he had himself made to him, raised a revolt against

his sovereign, defeated repeatedly the armies sent to reduce him to

obedience, and finally treated with Artaxerxes as to the terms on which

he would consent to be reconciled. Thus was set an example, if not of

successful insurrection, yet at any rate of the possibility of rebelling

with impunity--an example which could not fail to have a mischievous

effect on the future relations of the monarch with his satraps. It

would have been better for the Empire had Megabyzus suffered the fate

of Oroetes, instead of living to a good old age in high favor with the

monarch whose power he had weakened and defied.

Artaxerxes survived the “Peace of Callias” twenty-four years. His

relations with the Greeks continued friendly till his demise, though,

on the occasion of the revolt of Samos (B.C. 440), Pissuthnes, satrap of

Sardis, seems to have transgressed the terms of the treaty, and to

have nearly brought about a renewal of hostilities. It was probably

in retaliation for the aid given to the revolted Samians, that the

Athenians, late in the reign of Artaxerxes, made an expedition against

Caunus, which might have had important consequences, if the Caunians

had not been firm in their allegiance. A revolt of Lycia and Caria under

Zopyrus, the son of Megabyzus, assisted by the Greeks, might have proved

even more difficult to subdue than the rebellion of Syria under his

father. Persia, however, escaped this danger; and Artaxerxes, no doubt,

saw with pleasure a few years later the Greeks turn their arms against

each other--Athens, his great enemy, being forced into a contest for

existence with the Peloponnesian confederacy under Sparta.

The character of Artaxerxes, though it receives the approval of Plutarch

and Diodorus, must be pronounced on the whole poor and contemptible.

His ready belief of the charge brought by Artabanus against his brother,

Darius, admits perhaps of excuse, owing to his extreme youth; but his

surrender of Inarus to Amestris on account of her importunity, his

readiness to condone the revolt of Megabyzus, and his subjection

throughout almost the whole of his life to the evil influence of Amytis,

his sister, and Amestris, his mother--both persons of ill-regulated

lives--are indications of weakness and folly quite unpardonable in

a monarch. That he was mild in temperament, and even kind and

good-natured, is probable. But he had no other quality that deserves the

slightest commendation. In the whole course of his long reign he seems

never once to have adventured himself in the field against an enemy.

He made not a single attempt at conquest in any direction. We have no

evidence that he patronized either literature or the arts. His peace

with Athens was necessary perhaps, but disgraceful to Persia. The

disorders of the Court increased under his reign, from the license

(especially) which he allowed the Queen-mother, who sported with the

lives of his subjects. The decay of the Empire received a fatal impulse

from the impunity which he permitted to Megabyzus.

Like his father, Artaxerxes appears to have had but one legitimate wife.

This was a certain Damaspia, of whom nothing is known, except that she

died on the same day as her husband, and was the mother of his only

legitimate son, Xerxes. Seventeen other sons, who survived him, were

the issue of various concubines, chiefly--it would appear--Babylonians.

Xerxes II. succeeded to the throne on the death of his father (B.C.

425), but reigned forty-five days only, being murdered after a festival,

in which he had indulged too freely, by his half-brother, Secydianus or

Sogdianus. Secydianus enjoyed the sovereignty for little more than half

a year, when he was in his turn put to death by another, brother, Ochus,

who on ascending the throne took the name of Darius, and became known to

the Greeks as Darius Nothus.

Darius Nothus had in his father’s lifetime been made satrap of Hyrcania,

and had married his aunt, Parysatis, a daughter of Xerxes. He had

already two children at his accession,--a daughter, Amestris, and a

son, Arsaces, who succeeded him as Artaxerxes. His reign, which lasted

nineteen years, was a constant scene of insurrections and revolts, some

of which were of great importance, since they had permanent and

very disastrous consequences. The earliest of all was raised by his

full-brother, Arsites, who rebelled in conjunction with a son of

Megabyzus, and, obtaining the support of a number of Greek mercenaries,

gained two victories over the forces dispatched against him by the king.

At last, however, the fortune of war changed. Persian gold was used

to corrupt the mercenaries; and the rebels being thus reduced to

extremities, were forced to capitulate, yielding themselves on the

condition that their lives should be spared. Parysatis induced her

husband to disregard the pledges given and execute both Arsites and his

fellow-conspirator--thus proclaiming to the world that, unless by the

employment of perfidy, the Empire was incapable of dealing with those

who rebelled against its authority.

The revolt of Pissuthnes, satrap of Lydia, was the next important

outbreak. Its exact date is uncertain; but it seems not to have very

long preceded the Athenian disasters in Sicily. Pissuthnes, who had held

his satrapy for more than twenty years, was the son of a Hystaspes, and

probably a member of the royal family. His wealth--the accumulations of

so long a term of office--enabled him to hire the services of a body of

Greek mercenaries, who were commanded by an Athenian, called Lycon. On

these troops he placed his chief dependence; but they failed him in the

hour of need. Tissaphernes, the Persian general sent against him, bribed

Lycon and his men, who thereupon quitted Pissuthnes and made common

cause with his adversaries. The unfortunate satrap could no longer

resist, and therefore surrendered upon terms, and accompanied

Tissaphernes to the Court. Darius, accustomed now to disregard the

pledged word of his officers, executed him forthwith, and made over his

satrapy to Tissaphernes, as a reward for his zeal. Lycon, the Athenian

traitor, received likewise a handsome return for his services, the

revenues of several towns and districts being assigned him by the Great

King.

The rebellion, however, was not wholly crushed by the destruction of

its author, Amorges, a bastard son of Pissuthnes, continued to maintain

himself in Caria, where he was master of the strong city of Iasus, on

the north coast of the Sinus Iasicus, and set the power of Tissaphernes

at defiance. Having probably inherited the wealth of his father, he

hired a number of Peloponnesian mercenaries, and succeeded in maintaining

himself as an independent monarch for some years.

Such was the condition of things in Asia Minor, when intelligence

arrived of the fearful disasters which had befallen the Athenians in

Sicily--disasters without a parallel since those of Salamis--sudden,

unexpected, overwhelming. The news, flying through Asia, awoke

everywhere a belief that the power of Athens was broken, and that her

hostility need no longer be dreaded. The Persian monarch considered that

under the altered circumstances it would be safe to treat the Peace of

Callias as a dead letter, and sent down orders to the satraps of Lydia

and Bithynia that they were once more to demand and collect the tribute

of the Greek cities within their provinces. The satraps began to

speculate on the advantages which they might derive from alliance with

the enemies of Athens, and looked anxiously to see a Peloponnesian fleet

appear off the coast of Asia. Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus vied with

each other in the tempting offers which they made to Sparta, and it was

not long before a formal treaty was concluded between that state

and Persia, by which the two powers bound themselves to carry on war

conjointly against Athens.

Thus the contest between Persia and her rival entered upon a new phase.

Henceforth until the liberties of Greece were lost, the Great King could

always count on having for his ally one of the principal Grecian powers.

His gold was found to possess attractions which the Greeks were quite

unable to resist. At one time Sparta, at another Athens, at another

Thebes yielded to the subtle influence; Greek generals commanded the

Persian armies; Greek captains manoeuvered the Persian fleets; the very

rank and file of the standing army came to be almost as much Greek as

Persian. Acting on the maxim, _Divide et impera_, Persia prolonged for

eighty years her tottering Empire, by the skilful use which she made of

the mutual jealousies and divisions of the Hellenic states.

The Seven Great Monarchies Of The Ancient Eastern World, Vol 5: Persia The History, Geography, And Antiquities Of Chaldaea, Assyria, Babylon, Media, Persia, Parthia, And Sassanian or New Persian Empire; With Maps and Illustrations. · 第 9 / 10 章

The assessment of the taxation upon the different portions of his